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The present work introduces a synthesis of neocerebellar state estimation and 
feedforward control with multi-level language processing. The approach combines 
insights from clinical, imaging, and modelling work on the cerebellum with 
psycholinguistic and historical linguistic research. It finally provides the first 
experimental attempts towards the empirical validation of this synthesis, employing 
transcranial magnetic stimulation. 
 
A neuroanatomical locus traditionally seen as limited to lower sensorimotor 
functions, the cerebellum has, over the last decades, emerged as a widely accepted 
foundation of feedforward control and state estimation. Its cytoarchitectural 
homogeneity and diverse connectivity with virtually all parts of the central nervous 
system strongly support the idea of a uniform, domain-general cerebellar computation. 
Its reciprocal connectivity with language-related cortical areas suggests that this uniform 
cerebellar computation is also applied in language processing. Insight into the latter, 
however, remains an elusive desideratum; instead, research on cerebellar language 
functions is predominantly involved in the frontal cortical-like deficits (e.g. aphasias) 
seldom induced by cerebellar impairment. At the same time, reflections on cerebellar 
computations in language processing remain at most speculative, given the lack of 
discourse between cerebellar neuroscientists and psycholinguists. 
 
On the other hand, the fortunate contingency of the recent accommodation of 
these computations in psycholinguistic models provides the foundations for satisfying 
the desideratum above. The thesis thus formulates a neurolinguistic model whereby 
multi-level, predictive, associative linguistic operations are acquired and performed in 
neocerebello-cortical circuits, and are adaptively combined with cortico-cortical 
categorical processes. A broad range of psycholinguistic phenomena, involving, among 
others, ‗pragmatic normalization‘, ‗verbal/semantic illusions‘, associative priming, and 
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phoneme restoration, are discussed in the light of recent findings on neocerebellar 
cognitive functions, and provide a rich research agenda for the experimental validation 
of the proposal. 
 
The hypothesis is then taken further, examining grammaticalization changes in 
the light of neocerebellar linguistic contributions. Despite a) the broad acceptance of 
routinization and automatization processes as the domain-general core of 
grammaticalization, b) the growing psycholinguistic research on routinized processing, 
and c) the evidence on neural circuits involved in automatization processes (crucially 
involving the cerebellum), interdisciplinary discourse remains strikingly poor. Based on 
the above, a synthesis is developed, whereby grammaticalization changes are introduced 
in routinized dialogical interaction as the result of maximized involvement of associative 
neocerebello-cortical processes.  
 
The thesis then turns to the first steps taken towards the verification of the 
hypothesis at hand. In view of the large methodological limitations of clinical research 
on cerebellar cognitive functions, the transcranial magnetic stimulation apparatus is 
employed instead, producing the very first linguistic experiments involving cerebellar 
stimulation. Despite the considerable technical difficulties met, neocerebellar loci are 
shown to be selectively involved in formal- and semantic-associative computations, with 
far-reaching consequences for neurolinguistic models of sentence processing. In 
particular, stimulation of the neocerebellar vermis is found to selectively enhance 
formal-associative priming in native speakers of English, and to disrupt, rather 
selectively, semantic-categorical priming in native speakers of Modern Greek, as well as 
to disrupt the practice-induced facilitation in processing repeatedly associated letter 
strings. Finally, stimulation of the right neocerebellar Crus I is found to enhance, quite 
selectively, semantic-associative priming in native speakers of English, while 
stimulation of the right neocerebellar vermis is shown to disrupt semantic priming 
altogether. The results are finally discussed in the light of a future research agenda 
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NCBV  neocerebellar vermis 
NCBKFLP  neocerebellar Kalman filter linguistic processor 
NOM  nominative case 
N(P)  noun, noun phrase               
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PART  participle 
PERF  perfect tense 
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Organization of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is largely divided into two parts, a theoretical (chapters 1-3; Volume 
I), and an empirical one (chapters 4-7; Volume II), followed by a brief discussion of the 
findings and future directions (chapter 8). 
 
In the theoretical part of the thesis (Volume I), chapter 1 provides a necessary 
non-technical background to basic cerebellar (CB) anatomy and circuitry, 
contextualizing the synthesis and the model proposed in the next chapter. CB circuitry is 
strikingly homogeneous, prompting neuroscientists to consider a uniform CB 
computation.
1
 The fact that different compartments reciprocally connect with different 
areas of the central nervous system indicates that such uniform computation is of a 
multimodal nature. The fact that fundamental language-related cortical areas show such 
reciprocal connectivity with the CB indicates that the same computation is extended to 
language processing. However, research on CB language pathology is preoccupied with 
the way in which CB impairments induce ‗frontal-like‘ language deficits, e.g. due to 
cerebrocerebellar diaschisis or impaired modulation of cerebral linguistic functions. On 
the other hand, reflections on the nature of the involvement of this uniform, multimodal 
CB computation in language processing remain poor and speculative. 
 
Expanding on Argyropoulos (2009), chapter 2 presents the first model of 
neocerebellar (NCB) state estimation and feedforward control in language processing.  
The chapter picks up the discussion with the answer to the question left open at the end 
of Chapter 1, i.e. on the nature of CB computations. The thesis adopts the long-
established and experimentally well-grounded theories that the CB is the storage space 
of internal models and/or the neuroanatomical analogue of a Kalman filter. In this 
context, the recent introduction of feedforward control and state estimation in 
psycholinguistic models represents a formidable opportunity to articulate concrete, 
computationally-based neurolinguistic hypotheses on the NCB.  After a brief 
                                                          
1
 See main text for all references. 
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introduction to the necessary neurocomputational concepts, the chapter introduces the 
hypothesis of the Neocerebellar Kalman Filter Linguistic Processor (NCBKFLP; 
Argyropoulos, 2009), along with the idea that the NCB instantiates associative processes 
adaptively combined with cerebral, categorical ones. Subsequently, a number of 
sentence processing mechanisms are shown to rely on computations identical or 
strikingly similar to those of the NCB. These mechanisms are discussed in the light of 
supportive evidence from recent literature on NCB language functions. While covert 
imitation and mirror neuron functions remain beyond the scope of the thesis, the 
possibility is entertained that the framework developed here may be fully compatible 
with proposals on such mechanisms.  The chapter then continues with the presentation 
of an experimental research agenda, explicitly based on psycholinguistic phenomena 
involving state estimation and feedforward control. The first elementary steps in 
implementing this agenda are made in chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
 
In the line of Argyropoulos (2008a, b), chapter 3 attempts an interdisciplinary 
synthesis among psycholinguistics, historical linguistics, and neuropsychology of 
language, by studying grammaticalization processes in the light of the NCBKFLP. The 
term ‗grammaticalization‘ is used to describe a wide range of multi-level linguistic 
phenomena that occur during the historical change of lexical items into grammatical 
ones, giving birth to new syntactic constructions. First, the approach to 
grammaticalization phenomena is discussed. Following the line of reasoning in 
Argyropoulos (2010a), it is supported that such changes cannot be explained as by-
products of structural misconvergences between transmission and reception. Instead, the 
thesis adopts a view particularly shared in the functionalist camp of 
grammaticalizationists,
2
 where these changes are seen as products of routinized-
automatized performance in intra-generational language transmission. Despite the 
psycholinguistic work on dialogical routinization and research on the circuits involved in 
automatization processes, interdisciplinary discourse remains strikingly poor. In view of 
this, the chapter goes on to briefly investigate the anatomical substrates of 
                                                          
2
 The term is often used in the relevant literature (e.g. Haspelmath, 2004). 
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automatization processes from a domain-general perspective, demonstrating the 
significance of CB circuitry. The discussion then turns to particular phenomena of 
grammaticalization processes, from phonetic attrition, cliticization, affixation, and 
univerbation, to pragmatic routines and mental backgrounding. The mechanisms 
employed by grammaticalizationists to describe such changes are shown to strongly 
reflect NCB, or, a fortiori, NCBKFLP computations. In particular, it is argued that 
grammaticalization is the larger-scale product of a shift from categorical to associative 
computations in processing particular instances of constructions in routinized dialogical 
contexts. As argued in chapter 2, these associative computations involve NCB circuitry, 
and such adaptive trade-offs are controlled by the NCBKFLP.  
 
In the empirical part of the thesis (Volume II), the first steps are taken to 
experimentally investigate the involvement of NCB state estimation and feedforward 
control in language processing. Chapter 4 presents the principles of the paradigm 
adopted here, i.e. transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), in the context of research on 
CB cognitive functions. The reasons why TMS was preferred over a clinical paradigm 
are provided, elucidating how TMS overcomes many methodological obstacles in 
studying CB language functions. The chapter then continues with the discussion of the 
particular TMS apparatus and parameters employed here, in setting up the first linguistic 
CB TMS studies in the literature. 
 
Chapter 5 reports and discusses the findings of the first TMS study undertaken 
(Argyropoulos, 2010b). Two different noun-to-noun priming phenomena were assessed 
before and after TMS of the right neocerebellar vermis (NCBV) and of a control, right 
posterolateral CB site in healthy native English speakers: ‗formal-associative‘ priming 
(e.g. ‗gift-horse‘) and ‗semantic-categorical‘ priming (e.g. ‗penny-coin‘). TMS of the 
NCB vermis was found to selectively enhance formal-associative priming and induce 
some reading-related disruptions. The findings are discussed in the light of the 




Chapter 6 reports and discusses the findings of the second TMS study 
(Argyropoulos et al., 2010). Semantic-categorical priming was again contrasted with 
formal-associative priming before and after stimulation of the same CB sites in healthy 
native Modern Greek speakers. Despite a number of limiting conditions in stimulus 
construction and TMS application, a rather selective disruption of semantic-categorical 
priming and reading-related processes was found after NCBV TMS. Above all, there 
was a striking lack of decrease of reaction times after NCBV TMS that was strongly 
selective for the group that underwent NCBV TMS in the second session of 
participation. This pattern is discussed in the context of the significance of the NCB in 
processing repetitively co-occurring linguistic input.  
 
Chapter 7 reports and discusses the findings of the third TMS study 
(Argyropoulos & Muggleton, 2010). Two distinct versions of semantic, noun-to-verb 
priming were assessed before and after TMS of the right NCBV and the right NCB Crus 
I in healthy native English speakers:  categorical priming, where nouns and verbs are 
synonymous (e.g. ‗robbery-stealing‘), and associative priming, where the nouns are 
appropriate fillers of the thematic roles projected by the following verbs (e.g. ‗broom-
sweeping‘). Despite the limitations in yielding priming effects in baseline conditions, 
TMS of the right Crus I was found to enhance semantic-associative priming quite 
selectively, while TMS of the right NCBV disrupted semantic priming overall. The 
findings are discussed in the context of NCBKFLP involvement in schema-transmission 
and mental model processing.  
 
The thesis is concluded in chapter 8, with a discussion of future theoretical and 
experimental directions in the light of the findings and the limiting conditions in the 
research conducted so far.  The discussion ends with the note that the foundations have 
been laid here to study NCB ‗dynamics memory‘ in language processing, from both a 

















































Introduction to Volume I 
 
The first part of the thesis (chapters 1-3) provides a synthesis among 
psycholinguistics, historical linguistics, and computational neuroscience in constructing 
a hypothesis on neocerebellar computations in language processing. A model is 
proposed, showing how neocerebellar feedforward control and state estimation are 
employed in language perception-comprehension. These processes are argued to provide 


































The Cerebellum and Language 
 
‗‗[…] this is some terrific computer down here‘‘ 






This chapter provides a selective, non-technical introduction to cerebellar (CB) 
architecture, along with some recent findings on CB involvement in language 
processing, in order to contextualize the hypothesis promoted in chapter 2. For further 
details on CB neuroanatomy and function, readers may refer to manuals of general 
neuroscience and human physiology (e.g. Arbib et al., 1998; Sherwood, 2010), or to 















1.2. Cerebellar Architecture 
 
The ‗cerebellum‘ (Latin, ‗little brain‘), also referred to as the ‗‗hind-brain‘‘ 
(Holmes, 1939), is located in the posterior cranial fossa, astride the brainstem, beneath 
the occipital cortex and the ‗tentorium cerebelli‘ (figure 1.1). While it occupies 
approximately 10% of total brain volume and accounts for 10-15% of brain weight, it is 
the largest structure in the human brain in terms of the number of neurons it contains 
(Williams & Herrup, 1988). This number exceeds that of the entire cerebral cortex
3
 
(Zagon et al., 1977; Noback & Demarest, 1981); it amounts to about half of all the 
neurons of the nervous system; it is at least five times larger than that of other parts of 
the nervous system in humans, and corresponds to at least half the nerve cell population 
of the entire body in higher mammals (Arbib et al., 1998, p. 265). The CB also occupies 
40% of brain surface area. During phylogenetic evolution, it enlarged more dramatically 
than any other part of the brain except the cerebral cortex (Passingham, 1975; Brodal, 
1981).  
 
The CB is also one of the most widely connected structures, having physiological 
connections with all major divisions of the central nervous system (e.g. Schmahmann & 
Pandya, 1989; Middleton & Strick, 1994; Schmahmann, 1996; section 1.3.2 below). 
These facts, along with its high afferent-to-efferent axon ratio (40:1; Carpenter, 1991), 
suggest a massively integrative CB function. The massive interconnectivity of the CB is 
as striking as its ‗‗essentially uniform, monotonously repetitive architecture‘‘– in other 
words, ‗‗there are no ‗‗Brodmann areas‘‘ in the cerebellum‘‘ (Schmahmann, 2000, p. 
206; section 1.2.3 below). Its cytoarchitectural homogeneity and massive 
interconnectivity have supported the idea that it applies a unitary computation across 
different behavioral modalities (e.g. Bloedel, 1992; Wolpert et al., 1998; Schmahmann, 
2000). 
                                                          
3
 Throughout the thesis, the terms ‗cortical‘/‗cerebral‘, and ‗cerebral cortex‘/‗cerebrum‘ will be used 
interchangeably, as no particular distinctions will be necessary for the argument. The term ‗cerebellar 
(CB) cortex/-ical‘ will be used to refer to the cortical layers of the CB, thus clearly distinguishing it from 








1.2.1. Major Cerebellar Subdivisions 
 
The CB is divided into the ‗flocculonodular lobe‘ and the ‗corpus cerebelli‘, the 
latter consisting of two bilateral hemispheres connected by a narrow median portion, the 
‗vermis‘. The corpus is subdivided into three broad longitudinal ‗regions‘ or ‗zones‘: 
‗medial‘ or ‗vermal‘; ‗paramedial‘, ‗paravermal‘, or ‗intermediate‘; and ‗lateral‘ or 
‗hemispheric‘. Each zone consists of an outer, surface gray mantle, the ‗(CB) cortex‘, a 
medullary core of underlying white matter composed of nerve fibers projecting to and 





The CB cortex is characterized by the homogeneous appearance of many long, 
transverse convolutions, generally oriented transversely and separated by ‗sulci‘ or 
‗fissures‘. Two deep fissures, the ‗primary‘ and ‗posterolateral‘ ones, divide the CB into 
three lobes: ‗anterior‘ and ‗posterior‘ within the corpus, and ‗flocculonodular‘ outwith 
the corpus. The primary fissure separates the anterior and posterior lobes of the CB. The 
anterior lobe is everything rostral to the primary fissure, while the posterior lobe is 
everything between the primary fissure and the posterolateral fissure. Each lobe consists 
of a vermal and a hemispheric component. Shallower fissures divide the anterior and 
posterior lobes into ten lobules (anatomists consider the flocculonodular lobe as the 
tenth lobule) in the vermis (I-X) and in the hemispheres (HI-HX). Accordingly, lobules 




Figure 1.2: CB lobes and lobules. Figure reproduced from Leiner et al. (1991, p. 114) with 
permission © 1991 Elsevier. 
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In terms of its phylogeny and the different outputs of its compartments, the CB 
can be similarly subdivided into three main parts: the ‗archicerebellum‘ outwith the 
corpus, and the ‗paleocerebellum‘ and ‗neocerebellum‘ within the corpus (figure 1.3). 
 
a) The ‗archicerebellum‘, ‗vestibulocerebellum‘, ‗flocculonodular lobe‘, or 
‗flocculonodulus‘ is the phylogenetically oldest part. It lies behind the posterolateral 
fissure, which separates it from the posterior lobe. It has no corresponding deep CB 
nucleus; it receives directly from the vestibular nuclei in the brainstem, and its output, 
from Purkinje cells of the CB cortex, projects back directly to them. In close connection 
with the vestibular system, it controls eye movements in relation to body position and 
motion (vestibular reflexes), and regulates balance, posture and trunk musculature.  
 
b) The phylogenetically next oldest part is the ‗paleocerebellum‘ or 
‗spinocerebellum‘. It is of vertebrate phylogeny, and comprises the anterior lobe and the 
medial and intermediate parts of the CB hemispheres. It receives spinal proprioceptive 
as well as auditory and visual inputs from the periphery and from the primary motor and 
somatosensory cortex. It projects information back to the spinal cord via the red nucleus, 
providing information about the progress of ongoing movements and correcting errors. It 
is concerned with orientation and precise control of proximal muscles. In general, the 
flocculonodular lobe, (anterior) vermis and paravermis are connected to the brain stem 
and the spinal cord, and confer adaptiveness on reflexes and compound movements, 
enabling animals to survive in ever-changing environments. 
 
c) The ‗neocerebellum‘ (NCB), ‗cerebrocerebellum‘, or ‗pontocerebellum‘ is the 
phylogenetically most recent part. It comprises the large posterior lobe, i.e. the posterior 
vermis, paravermis, and lateral hemispheres. It has undergone tremendous expansion in 
primate evolution, and is by far the largest CB subdivision in humans. It is involved in 
the regulation, planning, and learning of highly skilled, spatially and temporally 
complex movements, as well as in higher cognitive and affective processes (section 1.3). 
The NCB is connected, among other areas, to the motor cortex and is thus associated 
14 
 
with movements of limbs, feet, hands, and digits. Damage to intermediate and lateral CB 





Figure 1.3: Phylogenetically-based division of the CB. Figure adapted from Sherwood 









1.2.2. Deep Cerebellar Nuclei 
 
Each CB cortical region projects in a topographically systematic fashion to the 
underlying deep nuclei, which in turn project, via the thalamus, to the cortex and 
brainstem, thus providing the output fibers of the CB. Hence, virtually the entire CB 
output is conveyed to the rest of the central nervous system via the projections of the CB 
cortex to the CB nuclei.
4
 There are four major pairs (right and left) of deep nuclei: the 
dentate nuclei, the two pairs of interposed nuclei (globose and emboliform), and the 
fastigial nuclei. Each pair receives input from a different region of the CB cortex. In 
general, the NCB projects primarily to the dentate nucleus, the paleocerebellum 
(paravermis in particular) to the interposed nuclei, and the archicerebellum to the 
fastigial nucleus.  
 
 
1.2.3. Cerebellar Cortical Layers and Circuitry 
 
Despite the overwhelming number of its neurons, the CB contains relatively few 
neural cell types: the inhibitory stellate, basket, Purkinje, and Golgi neurons, and the 
excitatory granule cells. These five main neurons are organized in three layers in the CB 
cortex: 
 
a) The outermost or ‘molecular layer’ contains the bodies of stellate and basket 
cells, dispersed among the excitatory granule cell axons and inhibitory Purkinje cell 
dendrites; b) Beneath the molecular layer lies the thin middle or ‘Purkinje cell layer’, 
defined by Purkinje cell bodies; c) The innermost or ‘granular layer’ contains a huge 
number (approximately 10
11
) of granule cells and a few larger Golgi interneurons.  
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1.2.3.1. Purkinje Cells 
 
The ultimate destination of the afferent pathways to the CB cortex is the Purkinje 
cells in the middle CB layer. These neurons have large cell bodies and fan-like dendritic 
arborizations extending upward into the molecular layer. They are the only output cells 
of the CB cortex, with their axons projecting into the underlying white matter to the 
deep CB or vestibular nuclei. Their output is mediated by the neurotransmitter g-
aminobutyric acid and is thus wholly inhibitory. However, the deep CB nuclei receive 
excitatory input from the collaterals of the mossy (and climbing) fibers that ascend to the 
CB cortex to reach granule cells (see below). Thus, Purkinje cell inhibition of the deep 
nuclear neurons serves to modulate the level of such excitation. Depending on the 
prevalence of either nuclear or cortical activity, the CB input to the cerebrum may 
modulate tonically, enhancing excitability, or phasically, reducing the excitability of 
cortical outputs (Molinari et al., 2002).  
 
Purkinje cells receive inhibitory input by stellate, basket, and Golgi cells,
5
 and 
excitatory input from two afferent fiber systems: the climbing fiber, and the granule cell-
mossy-parallel fiber system. Both climbing and mossy fibers convey excitatory input 
directly from the spinal cord and brainstem to both deep CB nuclei and the CB cortex. 
 
1.2.3.2. Mossy Fiber Input 
 
Neurons in the pontine nuclei receive a projection from the cerebrum and relay 
such information to the contralateral CB cortex. The axons from the pontine nuclei, 
called ‗mossy fibers‘, synapse on granule cells in the CB cortex. The CB granule cells 
give rise to specialized axons called ‗parallel fibers‘, ascending to the molecular layer of 
the CB cortex. Parallel fibers carry some combination of activity on several mossy fibers 
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to the molecular layer, relaying information via excitatory synapses onto the dendritic 
spines of the Purkinje cells. This parallel fiber input creates the ‗context‘ that each 
Purkinje cell may recognize.  Each Purkinje cell is in a position to receive input from 
nearly a million parallel fibers, and each parallel fiber can contact tens of thousands of 
Purkinje cells. Mossy fibers thus indirectly excite the dendritic trees of Purkinje cells via 
the granule cell dendrites as well as their axonal branches in the form of parallel fibers. 
 
1.2.3.3. Climbing Fiber Input 
 
Purkinje cells also receive direct modulatory input from climbing fibers, all 
arising in the contralateral inferior olivary nucleus in the medulla. Every climbing fiber 
divides within the granular layer into branches, each of which enters the molecular layer 
and makes up to several hundred synaptic contacts on the adjacent dendrites of a single 
Purkinje cell. 
 
Climbing fibers induce selective ‗long-term depression‘ (LTD) in the synaptic 
strength of parallel fibers that are concurrently active, producing long-lasting effects on 
their synaptic efficacy (Ito et al., 1982). Their activity may thus create and change the 
mossy fiber-parallel fiber ‗activity context‘ driving a Purkinje cell. In the acquisition or 
adaptation of a movement, the climbing fiber, normally firing irregularly at a rate of 
approximately 1 Hz, suddenly, driven by errors, e.g. between the intended and the actual 
movement, fires once, immediately after the error, and reliably time after time. The 
effect of this is to reduce the strength of the synapse on the Purkinje cell of the parallel 
fibers active at that time, e.g. those participating in an inappropriate movement. 
Consequently, after practice and repeated firings, only the parallel fibers involved in the 
correct movement are left. Upon elimination of the error, the climbing fiber returns to its 





1.2.4. The Cerebellar Corticonuclear Microcomplex 
 
The CB ‗‗corticonuclear microcomplex‘‘ (Ito, 1984; henceforth, CNMC) 
crystallizes this repetitive CB microcircuitry described above into a ‗‗modular unit of the 
cerebellum‘‘ (Ito, 2002, p. 281). A CNMC consists of a ‗‗microzone‘‘, i.e. a small area 
of the CB cortex, and a small number of nuclear cells. As shown in figure 1.4 below, the 
microzone receives two basic kinds of input, mossy and climbing fibers, and the output 
is carried by the deep CB nuclei. The set of mossy fiber afferents descending from pre-
cerebellar loci conveys the major input to a CNMC, and provides excitatory synapses 
via collaterals to the nuclear neurons. The signals of the latter are under inhibitory 
regulation by the Purkinje cells of the CB cortex, which are the only output cells of the 
microzone. The mossy fiber input is at the same time transformed by the granule cells, 
whose axons form the parallel fibers, which in turn provide excitatory synapses to 
Purkinje cells. Climbing fiber inputs convey error signals to the CNMC, and LTD occurs 
at parallel fiber-to-Purkinje cell synapses after conjunctive activation of these synapses 
together with climbing fiber-to-Purkinje cell synapses. Conceivably, in the initial stage 
of practicing an activity, all parallel fiber synapses on Purkinje cells may be functional, 
so that Purkinje cells are fully activated by a mossy-fiber input. If the consequent silence 
of nuclear neurons results in performance errors, climbing fiber signals are transmitted, 
depressing parallel fiber-to-Purkinje cell signalling, and thereby releasing nuclear 
neurons from Purkinje cell inhibition and enabling CNMC output signals. In this way, 
CNMCs would be able to adaptively modify their performance toward the minimization 





Figure 1.4: The CNMC (Ito, 1984). Long-term depression (LTD) occurs at parallel fiber-to-
Purkinje cell synapses after their conjunctive activation with climbing fiber-to-Purkinje 
cell synapses (Ito et al., 1982). PC: Purkinje Cell; GR: Granule Cell; CC: CB Cortex; IO: 
Climbing Fiber; MF: Mossy Fiber; CN: CB Nucleus; CF: Climbing Fiber; LTD: Long-Term 
Depression; hollow circle: excitatory synapse; filled circle: inhibitory synapse. Figure 











1.3. Language Functions 
1.3.1. Historical Background 
 
Being ‗‗the long-time favorite brain structure of motor learning theorists‘‘ 
(Hazeltine & Ivry, 2002, p. 1979), the CB was traditionally seen as exclusively involved 
in motor functions, e.g. in the coordination of skilled, voluntary movement, gait, posture, 
balance, control of muscle tone, motor learning and articulation (Ivry & Fiez, 2000). As 
recorded in the monograph of Dow and Moruzzi (1958), such involvement has been 
reported for nearly two centuries. Pioneers in CB research in the nineteenth century 
observed symptoms arising from CB lesions in animals and humans. For instance, Luigi 
Rolando discovered that CB lesions resulted in motor disturbances. Marie-Jean-Pierre 
Flourens observed that animals with CB lesions showed movement with spared 
spontaneity but lacking coordination. Luciani examined recovery after CB resection. 
Joseph Babinski recognized dysmetria (see section 2.2.2 below) as a unique 
characteristic sign of CB diseases. During World War I, Holmes reported that soldiers 
with gunshot wounds through the CB exhibited significantly slower onset of arm 
movement on the damaged side. He also described a pattern of abnormal and scanning 
speech with indistinct articulation in CB patients, which is nowadays established as a 
feature of ataxic dysarthria (e.g. Hartelius et al., 2000; section 2.2.2 here). From this 
perspective, then, CB patients would be expected to exclusively exhibit motor-related 









1.3.2. Recent Findings 
 
However, much as in the case of the basal ganglia (e.g. Middleton & Strick, 
1994, 2000), anatomical, clinical, and, recently, neuroimaging (PET and fMRI) studies 
provide cumulative evidence for CB involvement in a wide range of higher cognitive 
functions, such as memory, executive functions, visuospatial processing, emotional 
regulation, thought modulation, and, crucially, language. 
 
The initial claims for such contributions largely relied on anatomical data 
concerning the phylogenetically recent reciprocal cortico-cerebellar projections (e.g. 
Brodal, 1981; Ito, 1984). The architectural heterogeneity of the dentate nucleus had been 
quite early recognized, with Dow (1942) defining a phylogenetically older, dorsomedial 
part, with minimal gyration and large neurons, and a recent, ventrolateral, heavily folded 
one, the ‗neodentate‘, containing small neurons. In their seminal theoretical paper, 
Leiner et al. (1986; elaborated in Leiner et al., 1989, 1991, 1995) proposed that, while 
this newer part was present in lower primates, only in anthropoids and humans had it 
evolved into a distinct region. They further emphasized that its massive expansion in 
humans had paralleled not only the expansion of NCB hemispheres, but also that of 
cerebral association areas (prefrontal cortex in particular). They also proposed that the 
evolution of the neodentate was paralleled by the differentiation of a ventrolateral 
thalamic nuclear area, through which the human neodentate would target the prefrontal 
cortex. This would involve the NCB in ‗‗mental skills‘‘ (ibid). 
 
The recent application of retrograde and anterograde tracing studies
6
 has 
corroborated these initial considerations. The cerebello-cerebral loop is nowadays 
established to be organized in multiple, topographically precise, segregated parallel 
channels, with each cerebral cortical area sending efferents to the CB via the pontine 
nuclei, while also being the recipient of a returning channel via the cerebello-thalamic 
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 ‗Retrograde‘: tracing neural connections from the synapse to the cell body; ‗anterograde‘: tracing neural 
connections from the cell body to the synapse. 
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tract. In particular, retrograde tracing studies have demonstrated that, while the elder part 
of the dentate sends projections to motor cortical areas, the neodentate projects, via the 
thalamus, not only to motor, but also to a range of ‗cognitive areas‘; among others, these 
include Brodmann areas (BA) 9/46 (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and 44/45 (Broca's 
area), as well as temporal areas, especially the superior temporal sulcus, and posterior 
parietal association areas (Middleton & Strick, 1994, 1997, 2001; Dum & Strick, 2003). 
On the other hand, anterograde tracing studies have shown that such cortical association 
areas send efferents to the CB cortex, via the basilar pons (Schmahmann & Pandya, 
1995, 1997; Schmahmann, 2001). These include the superior and inferior parietal 
lobules, the temporal lobe, the superior temporal sulcus (including Wernicke‘s area), and  
prefrontal cortical areas; most importantly, BA 8A (control of conjugate eye 
movements), BA 9/46 (working memory processes), BA 10 (planning of actions, 
foresight, and judgment tasks), BA 32 and 12 (motivational and decision-making 
capabilities), and, above all, areas homologous to the language areas in humans (BA 
44,45; e.g. Petrides & Pandya, 1994; see Schmahmann, 2001, p. 250, and Fabbro, 2000, 
for references). In addition to projections from the cerebral cortex, the phylogenetically 
older limbic lobe (reticular nuclei in the brainstem) and hypothalamus (BA 23, 24, 25 
and 35) also project to the pontine nuclei, thus providing the CB with information for 
regulating autonomic, motivational and emotional behavior. Output fibers to those areas 
allow the CB to transmit information back to the limbic structures (Fabbro, 2000; 
Schmahmann, 2001). 
 
 This pattern is probably reproduced throughout the cerebro-cerebellar system 
(Schmahmann & Pandya, 1997, p. 54), and has supported the idea that the 
aforementioned unitary CB computations (section 1.2) are applied to a range of different 
processes, determined, each time, by the cerebral compartment interacting with the 
corresponding CB lobule (e.g. Schmahmann, 2000). An illustration of such loops is 
given in figure 1.5. The reciprocal connections of the CB with the cerebrum have thus 




[…] the cerebellum modifies behaviorally relevant 
information that it has received from the cerebral cortex 
via the corticopontine pathway and then redistributes this 
now ―cerebellar-processed‖ information back to the 
cerebral hemispheres (Schmahmann & Pandya, 1997, p. 
32). 
 
Indeed, the discovery of such bisynaptic, reciprocal neural pathways between the 
NCB and language-related cerebral cortical areas (predominantly Broca‘s area, 
supplementary motor area, posterior parietal cortex and superior temporal sulcus) has 
provided the foundation for arguing for NCB involvement in non-motor language 
processes. Neuroimaging and clinical evidence corroborate this picture. Increased CB 
blood flow was initially found in a PET study, during covert word and rhyme generation 
in response to lexical stimuli (Petersen et al., 1989). Similar findings of concomitant 
cortical (Broca‘s area and supplementary motor area) and CB activations have been 
more recently reported in such tasks, as well as in reading, word-stem completion, and 
naming actions in response to line drawings (for references and discussion, see Fiez & 
Raichle, 1997; Fabbro, 2000; Fabbro et al., 2004). Similarly, in the clinical field, a case 
study on a right NCB patient showed very particular linguistic deficits: despite their 
excellent performance in memory, intelligence, and language function batteries, they 
showed deficits in practice-related learning and error detection (Fiez et al., 1992; 





              
Figure 1.5: Cerebrocerebellar reciprocal connectivity. Blue: Projections from the NCB 
cortex to the dentate nucleus, and, via the thalamus, to prefrontal cortical areas. Red: 
Projections from the prefrontal cortex via the basilar pons back to the NCB cortex. Figure 
reproduced from Ramnani & Miall (2001, p. 135) with permission © 2001 Elsevier. 
 
 
1.3.3. Beyond the Cerebral Chauvinism  
 
Much like the basal ganglia, then, the CB has been shown to participate in a 
range of behavioral modalities far broader than any traditional motor-based account 
would acknowledge. This is why these subcortical areas are nowadays held to have 
domain-general contributions with particular computational properties, which can be 





[…] both the CB and the B[asal]G[anglia]  exhibit 
massive interconnectivity with various areas of the cortex. 
Their interaction with these areas is probably not 
necessarily motor-based, but rather dependent on the 
nature of the process in each cortical area. The strategy of 
considering the kind of computations which are carried 
out by the CB and B[asal]G[anglia] in motor processing 
may reveal the nature of their contribution to other 
cognitive functions (Stowe et al., 2004, p. 294). 
 
However, despite the cumulating clinical evidence for even a ‗‗lateralized 
linguistic cerebellum‘‘
7
 (Mariën et al., 2001), little, if anything, has been said about the 
involvement of those unitary, multimodal computations (see section 1.2 above) in 
language processing. Instead, the study of CB involvement is constrained by the latent 
assumption that CB language deficits, if any, should reflect ‗cerebral-like‘ ones. 
Characteristically, on the basis of anatomical and clinical evidence, it has been 
advocated for a long time that CB patients might exhibit a ‗‗mild frontal-like syndrome‘‘ 
(Botez et al., 1985; Grafman et al., 1992). For instance, CB patients have shown 
impairments on verbal, spatial, and intelligence measures in batteries of standard 
neuropsychological tests (Botez et al., 1989; Bracke-Tolkmitt et al., 1989).  
 
Similarly, a number of cases of productive and receptive CB-induced 
agrammatism have followed up (see Mariën et al., 2001, for a review). Silveri et al. 
(1994) first documented an association between right CB focal damage and transient 
expressive agrammatism. Syntactic symptoms typically involve lesions in right CB 
compartments (Riva & Giorgi, 2000; although see Fabbro et al., 2000, for some 
exceptions), and frequently show satisfactory recovery. Morphosyntactic production 
errors, decreased utterance length, and erroneous comprehension of demanding syntactic 
structures are characteristic features. The explanation often promoted is that 
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 The degree of laterality of cerebellar linguistic functions is beyond the scope of the investigation here. 
Emphasis is given here to the right CB, which reciprocally connects with the left cortical loci.  
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agrammatism results as an adaptation to a deficit of a peripheral mechanism, e.g. 
working memory (Silveri et al., 1994; Molinari et al., 1997). In such an approach, then, 
the CB plays a modulatory role for the supratentorially represented cognitive and 
linguistic functions (Silveri & Misciagna, 2000), e.g. ensuring their correct execution 
(Daum & Ackermann, 1997).
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 Other cases of CB-induced agrammatism may even be 
explained on the basis of ‗‗crossed cerebro-cerebellar diaschisis‘‘, where (right) CB 
damage is followed by contralateral (left) cerebral cortical hypoperfusion (Broich et al., 
1987). In these cases, linguistic deficits are caused by functional depression of 
supratentorial language areas due to reduced cerebello-cortical input (Mariën et al., 
2001). Similarly, in speech pathology, CB ataxic dysarthria (section 1.3.1 here) exhibits 
commonalities with the articulation disorders in anterior perisylvian lesions, e.g. apraxia 
of speech and Broca‘s aphasia, suggesting close cooperation between these areas and the 
CB (e.g. Mariën et al., 2000). CB mutism is similarly explained by the fact that all these 
structures are traversed by pathways connecting the CB with supratentorial, language-
related cerebral cortical areas, e.g. pre-motor areas, supplementary motor areas and 
Broca‘s area (see Silveri & Misciagna, 2000; Justus & Ivry, 2001, pp. 276-7).  
 
Such emphasis on the frontal-like identity of CB language pathology is 
justifiable from a methodological perspective. The early availability of psychological 
batteries for the pathology of the frontal cortex, often celebrated as the ‗‗cortex of 
cognition‘‘ (Goldman-Rakic, 1995), the very recent growth of CB cognitive pathology, 
as well as the subtle, possibly non-fundamental CB contributions to language, make 
such frontal-like CB impairments more easily accessible for empirical investigation than 
any CB computation-based accounts. However, commitment to a frontal-like perspective 
overlooks the very aspects of CB linguistic deficits that would instead directly reflect 
CB computations (see section 2.2). In such fashion, the gap yawning between research 
on the CB neurocomputational properties and CB language functions remains hard to 
bridge. 
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1.4. Conclusion: From ‘What’ to ‘How’ 
 
In this chapter, the CB was shown to have ‗‗a unitary principle of architecture, 
but a localizationist organizing principle of the connectivity‘‘ (Schmahmann, 2000, p.  
206), supporting a unitary CB computation on multimodal input information. This 
‗‗Universal Cerebellar Transform‘‘, or ‗‗cerebellumizing‘‘ (ibid, p. 207) may equally 
pertain to arousal-related, autonomic, affective, sensorimotor, cognitive and linguistic 
functions in a ‗‗meta-systemic‘‘ fashion (MacKay & Murphy, 1979; Xiang et al., 2003). 
These properties shift attention from ‗what‘ the CB computes to ‗how‘ it does so 
(Hazeltine & Ivry, 2002, p. 1980).  
 
However, what is the nature of this multimodal, unitary, metasystemic CB 
computation, and, in particular, how could it apply to language processing? Chapter 2 
will begin with the introduction of a widely adopted framework of CB computations, 































Chapter 2  
The Neocerebellar Kalman  




‗‗It is not clear how to explain recently observed 
cerebellar involvement in cognitive tasks such as 
language […] using the state estimator hypothesis 
(independent of associated motor behaviors or silent 
rehearsal of those behaviors), in large measure because 
the computational mechanisms underlying such tasks 
remain unclear. However, the hypothesis predicts that 
cognitive processes found to involve the cerebellum 
will be found to involve state estimation‘‘ (Paulin, 





Chapter 1 concluded the discussion by leaving two questions open: what is the 
identity of this unitary, domain-general, metasystemic computation of the cerebellum 
(CB)? And how could such computation be employed in language processing? The 
present chapter briefly presents a widely adopted neurocomputational theory of the CB 
(section 2.2), and carries on to synthesize it with psycholinguistic models of language 
perception and comprehension (section 2.3). Clinical and imaging evidence on the CB is 
reviewed in the light of this synthesis, along with a number of psycholinguistic 
processes shown to directly rely on computations supported by NCB circuitry (sections 
2.4 and 2.5). The chapter closes with certain experimental hypotheses directly derived 





2.2. Cerebellar Feedforward Control  
       and State Estimation 
 
 
Despite its well-understood structure, the CB is remarkable for the number of 
conflicting theories put forward to account for its role (Miall, 2001). Treatment of those 
is far beyond the scope of the work here. Rather, the thesis will adopt an empirically 
assessed and widely accepted view that the CB functions as ‗‗the brain‘s fortune teller‘‘ 
(Molinari et al., 2009, p. 401), or as the ‗‗brain‘s virtual reality machine‘‘ (Miall, 2007). 
In other words, the CB ‗‗predicts‘‘ and ‗‗prepares‘‘ the internal conditions required for a 
particular operation, be it sensory, motor, autonomic, memory-related, attention-related, 
affective, or linguistic (Courchesne & Allen, 1997). It does so by acquiring the ‗‗[…] 
predictive relationships among temporally ordered multidimensional sequences of 
exogenously derived […] and endogenously derived […] neural activities‘‘ (ibid, p. 2).  
 
These predictive processes may be executed by altering neural response 
thresholds or cerebral blood flow levels in systems expected to participate in upcoming 
events, and by enhancing signals against noise. The consequences of CB output are fed 
back to it, modifying its associations between events and predictions (Courchesne & 
Allen, 1997). This ‗‗preparatory learning‘‘ (Courchesne & Allen, 1997) consolidates a 
‗‗dynamics memory‘‘, which is reduced neither to procedural, nor to declarative aspects, 
but may optimize processes in both modalities (Ito, 1993 a, b). 
 
From a neurocomputational standpoint, CB microcircuitry functions as such by 
storing ‗‗internal‘‘ (Ito, 1984), or ‗‗forward‘‘ (Kawato et al., 1987) models of dynamic 
systems (see also Kawato & Gomi, 1992; Wolpert et al., 1998), and/or by performing 






2.2.1. Feedforward Control and State Estimation 
 
A brief, non-technical introduction to feedforward control and state estimation is 
now in order. 
 
2.2.1.1. Feedforward Control 
 
In supervised learning, the algorithm is presented with training data consisting of 
examples that include both the inputs and the desired outputs. The target output may be 
provided by an external teacher, or it may be specified internally. The latter case 
involves the acquisition of such an internal forward model, which allows the prediction 
of the consequences of actions made for the accomplishment of a goal. This model is 
then used to transform the input about these consequences into information for making 
the necessary internal modifications (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992). 
 
In control theory-parlance, internal models are systems mimicking the input-
output transformations of the dynamic behavior of controlled objects (Jordan & Wolpert, 
2000). Controlled objects convert a command issued by a controller into an output 
action. In order to mimic these transformations, internal models use a copy of the 
command issued to the controlled object to predict its consequences.
9
 Predicted and 
actual consequences are then compared, and the discrepancy is fed back to the internal 
model to train it. In the context of the central nervous system, internal models may 
mimic the input-output characteristics of the motor apparatus. For instance, a model of 
the arm‘s dynamics, receives, as input, information on the current position and velocity 
of the arm, along with an ‗efference copy‘ of motor commands (‗efference‘) issued by 
the central nervous system, and outputs a prediction of the future position and velocity 
of the arm (Jordan & Wolpert, 2000).  
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 While forward internal models predict consequences from copies of issued commands, ‗‗inverse internal 
models‘‘ calculate necessary feedforward commands from desired trajectory information (Kawato, 




The significance of internal models is best illustrated in biological contexts, 
where the central nervous system is not immediately updated on changes in the 
peripheral motor system (‗afference‘), and any recent motor commands issued may be 
yet to affect the musculature. This is because of conduction delays in efferent and 
afferent pathways that may last for 100-300 ms (see Miall & King, 2008 for references). 
Internal models are employed more rapidly than real-world feedback, and provide 
information about future properties of the controlled object, a fortiori in cases where 
accurate sensory feedback may be totally absent. This internal model ‗feedback‘ allows 
the perceiver to rapidly interpret the perceptual signal and react accordingly, complete 
percepts received incompletely and/or under noise, and disambiguate in situations of 
uncertainty. In motor control, the predictive signal is used to update current 
representations of the body, as well as to plan and coordinate actions, and help control 
ongoing movement by issuing corrective commands for deviations from the planned 
trajectory. Furthermore, the expected sensory feedback (the ‗corollary discharge‘) allows 
for sensory signals from external stimuli in the environment (‗exafference‘) to be 




Therefore, the brain is informed on the current status of the peripheral motor 
system by integrating sensory information with the predictions of internal models on the 
outcomes of motor commands. This shows the close coupling of feedforward control 
with state estimation (e.g. Kawato, 1999; Miall & King, 2008), which the introduction 
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 See Webb (2004, box2), for references and discussion of the current use of these terms. 
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2.2.1.2. State Estimation 
 
In ‗state estimation‘, the term ‗state‘ refers, in general, to the variables 
representing the internal condition, the status of a system at a given point in time. For 
instance, the state of a satellite would include its angular orientation, velocity, and 
position (Simon, 2006). The problem of computing an optimal estimate of a system‘s 
state from measurements of the system‘s inputs and responses was solved by Kalman 
(1960). The solution is called the ‗Kalman filter‘, and has become a standard technique 
used in engineering for tracking and predicting states of dynamical systems (Kalman & 
Bucy, 1961; Gelb, 1974). In general, Kalman filters ‗‗continuously test incoming data 
against expectations‘‘ (Paulin, 1997, p. 529), i.e. they predict a curve consisting of a set 
of the most recently sampled values by recurrently applying a correction based on the 
difference between the most recent value and the prediction for that value. In 
sensorimotor processing, for instance, the Kalman filter adaptively combines two 
processes in order to develop a representation of the state of the peripheral motor 
system: a feedforward process, which uses the efference copies of motor commands 
along with the current state estimate to predict the next state, by replicating the 
movement dynamics with a forward model; and a feedback process, which compares the 
afferent inputs with a prediction of them based on the current state. The sensory error, 
i.e. the difference between actual and predicted sensory feedback, is used to correct the 
state estimate generated by the forward model (Wolpert, 1997; Jordan & Wolpert, 2000; 
Miall & King, 2008). 
 
In order to ensure optimal state estimates, the relative contributions of the 
feedforward and feedback processes to the final estimate are modulated by the ‗Kalman 
gain‘. This is determined on the basis of the relative variance of the prediction and the 
sensor signal errors, and defines the extent to which the sensory residual influences the 
‗‗a priori estimate‘‘, i.e. the degree to which sensory input trumps expectation. Grossly 
put, a Kalman filter processor would be ‗‗top-down‘‘ to the extent that the Kalman gain 
is low: the lower it is, the more a final percept is determined by expectation; and it is 
34 
 
‗‗bottom-up‘‘ to the extent that the Kalman gain is high: the higher it is, the more it is 





2.2.2. Cerebellar Foundations of Feedforward  
          Control and State Estimation 
 
 
The idea that the CB stores internal models and performs computations of state 
estimation is a long- and widely-supported one. Space restrictions do not allow for a 
review of the evidence- the reader is instead prompted to the work cited below.
11
 This 
section briefly presents some highlights illustrating how the CB performs such a role. 
 
While internal models are conceivably located in all brain regions with synaptic 
plasticity that receive and send relevant information for their input and output (Kawato, 
1999), anatomical, imaging, clinical, and modelling work has established the CB as ‗‗the 
most likely site for forward models to be stored‘‘ (Kawato et al., 2003, p. 171). In fact, 
the idea has been supported for a long time in various forms (Ito, 1970, 1984; Kawato et 
al., 1987; Paulin, 1989; Miall et al., 1993; Wolpert et al., 1998), to the extent that the 
CB is nowadays discussed as a neuroanatomical instantiation of computations distinct 
from those of the cerebral cortex and the basal ganglia (e.g. Doya, 1999; Ito, 2000). 
 
Clinical (e.g. Müller & Dichgans, 1994; Nowak et al., 2007) and imaging studies 
(e.g. Blakemore et al., 2001; Desmurget et al., 2001; Miall & Jenkinson, 2005) have 
provided evidence for CB involvement in the prediction of sensory consequences of 
motor actions, as well as in higher cognitive aspects, such as learning to use a new tool 
(Imamizu et al. 2000). 
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 A book-length review of a range of CB computations of adaptive control is provided in Barlow (2002). 
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CB dysmetria has offered a characteristic theoretical example of disrupted 
internal models in the paravermis. In the ‗‗finger-to-nose test‘‘, failure in which is a 
typical sign of CB dysmetria (Dow & Moruzzi, 1958), healthy subjects can quickly and 
accurately bring their index finger to their nose with eyes closed, i.e. without feedback. 
This presupposes a learning process that converts finger control from a feedback mode 
to a feedforward mode, as shown in figure 2.1 below. In the initial stage of learning, the 
motor cortex receives instruction for a finger movement, and acts as a controller of the 
finger-skeletomuscular system by referring to visual feedback. When the motor cortex 
sends command signals to the musculoskeletal system of a limb to perform a voluntary 
movement, an efference copy is sent to the CB model via the cortico-ponto-cerebellar 
pathway. The predictive output of the CB is relayed back to the motor cortex via the 
interpositus nucleus. Corticonuclear microcomplexes (CNMCs) in the paravermal 
cortex-interpositus nucleus develop, through practice, dynamics equivalent to those of 
the skeletomuscular system. The discrepancies between the predictions of the 
paravermal CNMCs and the copied skeletomuscular system are transmitted as error 
signals via the olivo-cerebellar pathway to the CB cortex. CNMCs are thus gradually 
modified via LTD, becoming a reliable copy model of the system. Ultimately, via 
sufficient training, the CB internal model replaces the actual skeletomuscular system in 
receiving commands from the motor cortex, and the external feedback loop may be 
replaced by an internal CB-based one. In this way, quick, precise, and smooth finger 













Figure 2.1: The CB as an internal forward model in motor control; c: climbing fiber 
pathway; CNMC: corticonuclear microcomplex; COB: controlled object; CX: motor cortex; 
efl: external feedback loop; g, g': motor dynamics; i: input; ifl: internal feedback loop; o: 
output. Figure reproduced from Ito (1993a, p. 449) with permission © 1993 Elsevier.  
 
 
In the same vein, the CB has been argued to provide the neuroanatomical 
analogue of the Kalman filter (Paulin, 1989, 1993, 1997). Evidence has been drawn from 
CB comparative anatomy, which can not be explained on the basis of a direct CB 
involvement in motor command generation. The size of the CB and the complexity of 
the motor apparatus correlate but poorly across species: those with advanced sensory-
motor abilities, such as cetaceans, echolocating bats, and electric fishes, in which 
reafference from motor behavior must be analyzed, have larger CB cortices than their 
body and brain mass would predict. In such species, then, the CB is associated with 
purely sensory functions. Primates show a massive expansion of the lateral CB cortex, in 
parallel with neocortical expansion (see previous chapter, section 1.3.2), but this occurs 
without an increase in the number of joints or muscles (Paulin, 1993). 
 
The CB has also been shown to filter out expected peripheral feedback as not 
important to learning. The dorsal cochlear nucleus, a locus much similar to the CB with 
respect to its architecture and connectivity, has been modelled as a system that nulls 
reafference: on the basis of the corollary discharge, i.e. the estimated sensory feedback, 
sensory signals derived from the organism‘s own actions are stripped off of incoming 
signals (Nelson & Paulin, 1995). In the same vein, decreased CB activity has been 
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reported during tickling by oneself, as compared with that shown for the same 
movements with no tickling involved, and further decreased activity, as compared with 
externally produced tickling. The explanation put forth has revolved around the same 
principles (Blakemore et al., 1998). 
 
The poorly coordinated movements in CB ataxia (e.g. Bastian et al., 1996) also 
demonstrate the significance of state estimation in generating compound motor output. 
By predicting the future state of a certain muscle, the CB can allow control signals for 
another muscle to be issued, thus enabling production of simultaneous actions. In the 
absence of such predictions, the coordination of multiple muscles may only proceed in a 
seriatim mode, after measurement of the outcome of each command provided by the 
much slower-arriving external feedback (e.g. Nowak et al., 2002). 
 
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) experiments have recently provided 
evidence for the significance of the CB in state estimation in a direct, causal fashion
12
 
(Miall et al., 2007; Miall & King, 2008). In Miall et al. (2007), for instance, participants 
were asked to make a slow, lateral, untargeted arm movement, before a sudden prompt 
for them to make a rapid pointing movement towards a static target. While stimulation 
of other brain areas during the reaching movement did not disrupt performance, TMS 
over the lateral CB caused reaching errors that were consistent with movements planned 
on the arm‘s position about 140 ms previously. CB TMS was thus discussed as having 
temporarily blocked the CB contribution to state estimation; reaching movements were 
instead planned on the basis of the residual, out-of-date knowledge of the previous state 





                                                          
12
 See sections 4.2 and 4.3 for the capacity of TMS to demonstrate causal relations between task-specific 
behavior and brain activation. 
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2.3. Neocerebellar Language ‘Dynamics Memory’ 
 
The previous section demonstrated that CB circuitry is a well-established 
foundation of feedforward control and state estimation. I now turn to addressing the gap 




2.3.1. The Yawning Gap 
 
On the basis of the cytoarchitectural homogeneity of the CB and its reciprocal 
connectivity with all major subdivisions of the central nervous system (sections 1.2 and 
1.3.2), the extension of CB internal models beyond purely sensorimotor control was 
foreseen quite early (e.g. Ito, 1993a, b; Paulin, 1993; Kawato, 1999). The CB has thus 
been proposed to copy the dynamics of any kind of neural control exerted by the central 
nervous system, not only upon bodily (e.g. limbs) or external (e.g. tools) manipulanda, 
but also upon brain structures per se. In the case of language and thought processes, this 
is putatively achieved in the following way: frontal cortical areas (in the case of 
language, Broca‘s area) issue control signals to the temporo-parietal areas (in the case of 
language, Wernicke‘s area); a CNMC acquires the dynamics of this cortico-cortical 
processing, and becomes a reliable copy of particular operations on the representations 
of the temporo-parietal cortex (figure 2.2). In this way, the frontal cortical areas, i.e. the 
controller, may operate on the CNMC instead, thus avoiding the costlier exploration of 







Despite the plausibility of the idea, research in these domains remains stagnant. 
This is because of the poor insight of CB neuroscientists into the particular language 
processes which CB circuitry may copy the dynamics of – the former comprise the 
ontology of psycholinguistics. The yawning gap between psycholinguistics and CB 
neurocomputations is made apparent in figure 2.2: terms like ‗‗thought model‘‘, 
‗‗words‘‘, ‗‗grammars‘‘, ‗‗action‘‘, ‗‗speech‘‘, indicate the very vague and speculative 
character that such reflections are constrained to take in the absence of interdisciplinary 
discourse. In the same vein, studies of CB-induced agrammatism (see section 1.3.3 here) 
are cited as suggestive evidence for the participation of NCB internal models in 
language processing (e.g. Ito, 2000, 2008). However, such cases may at most support the 
idea of NCB involvement in language processing in a general fashion. If CB lesions 
result in the same language deficits that cortical lesions do, then these language deficits 
cannot provide direct evidence for NCB involvement in language processes particularly 
via internal models. CB-induced agrammatism has other explanations that are equally, if 
not more, convincing (cerebro-cerebellar diaschisis, verbal working memory 
impairment; section 1.3.3); in fact, it is the exception, rather than the rule in CB 
pathology (Daum et al., 2001). Proof for the involvement of internal models in language 
processing thus cannot be drawn from the cortical-like deficits that CB impairments may 
induce. On the contrary, very particular CB language deficits have been observed in the 
absence of such cortical-like signs (e.g. Fiez et al., 1992; Gebhart et al., 2002), which 
deserve closer investigation (section 2.4). However, even these cases have been 
described on the basis of motor-based metaphors for NCB higher cognitive function, 
with terms as abstract as those of ‗‗mental movement‘‘, or of attaching a verb to a noun-








With respect to such demonstranda, then, the recent introduction of internal 
models in psycholinguistic research stands as a very fortunate contingency. In the 
remainder of this section, I will show that independent work in cognitive science and 
psycholinguistics can help identify an ontology of linguistic mechanisms, and replace 
abstract speculation with neurocomputationally-based CB models and experimental 





Figure 2.2: Involvement of a NCB internal model in language and thought processing; i: 
input; o: output. In a feedforward fashion, the NCB becomes a reliable copy of the 
controlled object (temporo-parietal areas). Frontal areas (the controller) may now act on 
the NCB instead, in a faster and less attended fashion. Figure taken from Ito (2000, p. 158) 








2.3.2. Feedforward Control and State Estimation  
  in Language Processing 
 
 
Interestingly, work on internal models has been accommodated in modern 
cognitive science and, in particular, psycholinguistics, outwith the context of CB 
neuroscience. The first significant step in that direction was taken within the scope of 
‗‗the emulation theory of representation‘‘ (Grush, 1996, 2004). ‗‗Emulators‘‘ are neural 
circuits that operate on the same principles as feedforward models and Kalman filters. 
They thus act as models of the body and the environment, and, during sensorimotor 
behavior, they provide expectations for sensory feedback in a pre-emptive and 
enhancing fashion. They can also be driven off-line on the basis of efference copies, in 
order to produce imagery.  
 
These emulative computations have been accommodated in the literature on the 
action-based representations employed in perceiving conspecifics. In a covert, imitative 
fashion, perceivers are held to use their own apparatus for the production of the same 
actions observed. This apparatus crucially involves emulators providing predictions for 
the sensory consequences of these actions. These predictions are adaptively involved in 
the perceptual process, maximizing, in general, its speed and quality (see Wilson & 




In the line of such work, Pickering and Garrod (2007) propose that equivalent 
production mechanisms are employed in language perception-comprehension in a 
facilitatory manner. Production, in other words, holds a causal role in efficiently 
processing noisy and/or ambiguous linguistic input and in generating predictions: 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Characteristically, in the work of Grush (1996, 2004), the CB retained its status as the most plausible 
candidate for the instantiation of such computations. Subsequently, though (e.g. Wilson & Knoblich, 




[…] comprehenders use prediction and imitation to 
construct an ‗emulator‘, using the production system, and 
combine predictions with the input dynamically (ibid, p. 
105).  
 
Their processor thus uses a ‗‗production-based language emulator‘‘, which is 
‗‗controlled by feedback from a Kalman filter‘‘ (ibid, p. 108), weighing predictions 
against analysis of the input at each step at all linguistic levels 
(phonology/syntax/semantics). In cases where the prediction is strong and the input 
noisy (‗‗low Kalman gain‘‘), the emulator exerts strong top-down influence to the 
‗‗input analysis system‘‘. In that way, noisy percepts may be enhanced based on the 
expected input. Furthermore, ‗‗comprehenders can get ahead of themselves and have 





Figure 2.3: State estimation and feedforward control in language comprehension in 
Pickering and Garrod‟s (2007) processor. The emulator is controlled by feedback from a 
Kalman filter, which weighs predictions against analysis of the input at each step. Five 
steps are illustrated in comprehending the end of the sentence „Harry went out to fly his 
red flag.‟ The outputs of the input analysis system and those of the internal model are 
shown in the same color for three different levels of prediction (phonology, syntax and 
semantics) at each step. Figure reproduced from Pickering & Garrod (2007, p. 108) with 
permission © 2007 Elsevier. 
43 
 
2.3.3. The Model 
 
As suggested above, the introduction of state estimation and feedforward control 
in language processing provides the keystone for the articulation of concrete NCB 
neurolinguistic models.
14
 Above all, it may help give a first answer to the question of 
how NCB computations may contribute to language processing, along with a set of 
falsifiable experimental hypotheses. The Neocerebellar Kalman Filter Linguistic 
Processor (henceforth NCBKFLP; figure 2.4 below), as first presented in Argyropoulos 
(2009), is explicitly formulated on the basis of the Pickering and Garrod (2007) 
processor and on the functional principles of CNMCs (Ito, 1984; section 1.2.4 here). It 
thus offers a proxy for synthesizing insights from psycholinguistic processes and CB 





Linguistic internal models of the NCBKFLP receive a copy of the input 
processed at each stage by the cortically instantiated
16
 ‗‗input analysis system‘‘ 
(Pickering & Garrod, 2007) along with the operations performed on it, and output a 
prediction of the next stage that the system will enter. CB predictions would be 
transmitted by the ventrolateral neodentate nucleus via the phylogenetically newer 
parvocellular part of the red nucleus and the ventrolateral nucleus of the thalamus to 
Broca‘s area. The discrepancies between the actual outputs of the input analysis system 
and the models‘ predictions provide the error signals training the latter. These would be 
conveyed by climbing fiber signals, inducing LTD at the synapses of Purkinje cells-
parallel fibers of the NCB cortex (section 1.2.4), thus training NCB predictions via trial 
and error. In low Kalman gain contexts, where input analysis is conducted in noisy 
conditions and/or strong NCB predictions are transmitted, NCB output may override 
                                                          
14
 Feedforward control has been used in the past in psycholinguistic models, but with much narrower 
application, e.g. in auditory feedback for speech production (Perkell et al., 1997).  
15
 Covert imitative language production in perception is compatible with, but not fundamental for the 
model. See section 2.5 for further discussion. 
16
 See section 2.3.4 below for the cortical instantiation of the input analysis system. 
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and/or bypass the output of cortico-cortical processing.
17
 The strength of the transmitted 
prediction may be at least partly determined by the strength of inhibition that the 
neodentate (constantly excited by collaterals of mossy and climbing fibers; section 1.2.3) 
receives from the Purkinje cells of the NCB cortex. The strength of such inhibition is a 
function of the ‗punishment‘ that Purkinje cells receive via LTD for their participation in 
a suboptimal prediction (section 1.2.4). 
 
However, the model assumes that the inferior olive receives projections both 
from CB nuclei and from the temporo-parietal cortex. Despite the evidence for an 
inhibitory projection from CB nuclei to the inferior olive (see Ito, 2008, for references) 
there is no evidence for a direct projection from the temporo-parietal cortex. In fact, the 
inferior olive receives little direct input from the cerebral cortex, and its major input 
arises from the red nucleus that conveys mostly sensorimotor information. However, the 
inferior olive also receives associative cortical input indirectly from brainstem reticular 
nuclei and through the zona incerta. The latter provides input from the rostral cingulate 
cortex (BA 24), prefrontal cortex (BA 9/46d), the posterior parietal cortex, and the 
medial prestriate cortex (Shah et al., 1997). Thus, the associative projections to the zona 
incerta, which in turn projects to the inferior olivary nucleus, maintain the possibility 
that CB microcircuitry may perform the same computations on higher functions 
(Schmahmann, 2000, 2001). In that way, then, the predictions of the NCB linguistic 
internal model can be compared with the actual output of the cortical input analysis 
system. As described above, the discrepancies between the two may train the model to 
adequately copy the dynamics of instances of input analysis. Section 2.3.4 below 
describes in more detail what properties of input analysis may be copied, and how they 
may be overridden and/or bypassed by NCB internal models. 
 
                                                          
17
 No particular commitment is made with respect to the temporal arrangement of these two outputs (see 
section 2.4.4.1 for discussion). 
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Figure 2.4: The NCBKFLP in perception-comprehension of the end of the sentence „John 
slept heavily last noon‟. The predictions of a NCB internal model are dynamically 
combined with the outputs of the cortical input analysis system. For the sake of 
simplicity, only one prediction is presented at each stage. Mossy fiber inputs from the 
pontine nuclei convey, via parallel fibers, information on the part of the sentence 
processed by the cortical input analysis system to Purkinje cells in the NCB cortex and 
the ventrolateral dentate nucleus. The latter, via the parvocellular red nucleus and the 
ventrolateral thalamus, signals the expected state of input analysis back to its language-
related cortical outputs. Because of the strong semantic association between „sleep‟ and 
„night‟, the CB internal model outputs, in steps 1 and 2, strong predictions for the 
phonological, morphosyntactic and semantic representations of „night‟, which are, 
however, not verified by the input analysis system. The discrepancies between the two 
are conveyed as error signals back to the NCB cortex, via the climbing fibers, which 
receive indirect connections from the cortical language-related areas via the zona incerta 
and direct projections from the dentate nucleus. This residual is used to train the internal 
model, via LTD at the parallel fiber-to-Purkinje cell synapses. Figure adapted from 




                                                          
18
 It should be clarified for the discussion to follow that Kalman filters per se do not reduce the Kalman 
gain. Instead, a ‗Kalman regulator‘ provides the adaptive mechanism whereby the Kalman gain and the 
randomness of the residual can be used as cues to improve performance (M. Paulin, personal 
communication, 25 October, 2007). Cerebellar LTD provides the basis for such mechanisms (sections 
1.2.3.3 and 1.2.4). 
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2.3.4. Neocerebellar Linguistic Associative Memory 
 
Expectedly, the model has so far not concentrated on any particular details on 
language processing in cerebral loci, i.e. what was called the ‗cortical input analysis 
system‘, or the ‗cortico-cortical processing‘ modality (figure 2.4). However, the very 
nature of the computations of the NCB, i.e. copying the dynamics of processes 
conducted elsewhere in the brain, makes it almost instructive that cortical linguistic 
operations be considered. In this fashion, briefly discussing how cortico-cortical 
language processing may be performed would provide insight into the nature of the 
control signals that Broca‘s area would exert on the NCB microcomplexes. 
 
Some basic insight into these questions may be offered by the ‗‗Memory, 
Unification, and Control‘‘ model (henceforth, MUC; Hagoort, 2003). In fact, 
incorporating the CB and the basal ganglia
19
 in such a model has been identified as an 
outstanding desideratum (Hagoort, 2005, p. 422). A brief description of the MUC is now 
in order.  
 
 
2.3.4.1. The ‘Memory, Unification, and Control’ Model 
 
The MUC grounds language processing on the basis of the interaction of three 
neurocognitive components: the ‗Memory‘ component, distributed over the left temporal 
cortex, pertains to multi-level language information stored in long-term memory 
(phonological/phonetic features and semantic features of words, as well as syntactic 
features and frames), as well as to the corresponding retrieval operations. The 
‗Unification‘ component performs the selection and integration of information retrieved 
from the Memory component into a representation of larger structures, for all phonetics/ 
phonology, syntax and semantics. Broca‘s area and the adjacent cortex (left inferior 
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frontal gyrus) are assumed to instantiate the Unification component.  Finally, the 
‗Control‘ component, instantiated in the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (BA 46/9), is assumed to relate language to the extra-linguistic 
communicative settings, by involving attentional control in language interaction. This is 
the case in temporospatial deixis (e.g. ‗here‘, ‗now‘), conversational turn-taking, or 
language-selection in the case of bilingualism (Hagoort, 2003). 
 
 
2.3.4.2. Neocerebellar Feedforward Control in the MUC 
 
The idea of unification operations performed by the left inferior frontal gyrus on 
items stored in and retrieved by the left superior temporal cortex (Hagoort, 2003) 
provides ideal grounds to explore the processes of the MUC in terms of recent control-
theoretic accounts – i.e. in terms of ‗control signals‘ of the controller-Broca‘s area being 
sent to the controlled object-Wernicke‘s area (e.g. Ito, 2000, 2008; also here, section 
2.3.1). In fact, this conceptualization of Broca‘s area as the controller and Wernicke‘s 
area as the controlled object has been complemented by recent considerations on the 
neuroanatomical correlates of the ‗‗instructor‘‘. The instructor, i.e. the part of a control 
system that gives a goal towards which a control system should work, is putatively 
instantiated in loci including the anterior cingulate gyrus. In thought contexts, for 
instance, it has been proposed to supply an instruction to the controller in the prefrontal 
cortex, which in turn sends control signals to a mental model stored in the temporo-









There is thus a striking parallelism between the MUC components (figure 2.5.A) 
and those independently identified in Ito‘s (2008) latest reflections on feedforward 
control of higher cognitive operations (figure 2.5.B). The anatomical co-occurrence of 
those two tripartite distinctions makes their integration quite tempting: the Control-
instructor component, the Memory-controlled object component, and the Unification-
controller component form a system that may now invite NCB computations (figure 
2.5.C). Upon the formation of an adequate forward model in the NCB, Broca‘s area may 




Figure 2.5: A synthesis of the MUC framework with NCB internal models. A. The three 
components of the MUC model. Memory (yellow) in left temporal cortex, Unification (blue) 
in LIFG, and Control (grey) in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Figure adapted from Hagoort 
(2005, p. 421) with permission © 2005 Elsevier. B. Feedforward control of thought 
processes. P: Instructor. CT: Controller. MM: Mental Model. FM: Forward Model. The CB 
learns the dynamics of the control signals sent to the mental model by the prefrontal 
cortex. The same principles apply to the control of Wernicke‟s area by Broca‟s area (Ito, 
2000, 2008). Figure reproduced from Ito (2008, p. 306) with permission © 2008 Nature. C. 
Emulation of the Memory component by the CB. C: Control. U: Unification. M: Memory. 
FM: Forward Model. In a cortico-cortical processing modality, upon instruction by the 
Control component, the Unification component operates on the linguistic units of the 
Memory component. The CB forward model receives a copy of the control signals of the 
Unification component and feeds back to it its prediction for the outcome of the cortico-
cortical operation. Future predictions are subsequently trained on the basis of the 
discrepancy between the actual outcome of the cortical operation and the CB prediction. 
In re-occurring unification operations, the CB forward model provides reliable 
predictions, and Unification operations are thus performed on the CB look-up table, and 





2.3.4.3. The Categorical-Associative Trade-off 
 
In what way would the unification operations performed by Broca‘s on 
Wernicke‘s area differ from those conducted by Broca‘s area on the NCB? And how 
could the adaptive significance of the latter be grounded in psycholinguistic terms? In 
answering this question, it is important to first consider the two fundamental ways in 
which CB emulation of cortical processes differs from the very algorithms the latter 
employ.  
 
CB computations differ from cortical ones in ‗‗speed‘‘ and ‗‗flexibility‘‘ (Doya, 
1999; Ramnani, 2006). On the one hand, CB mechanisms show greater speed, accuracy, 
and automaticity as compared with the emulated cerebral ones, which rely on feedback 
control. A striking piece of evidence is the fact that the CB responds to sensory input 
even before the very primary sensory cortical areas (see Ramnani, 2006, for references). 
On the other hand, CB learning algorithms show poor capacities to generalize across 
situations, and are limited to particular contexts (ibid). In the motor domain, for instance, 
it has been independently suggested that the CB would acquire the coordination of only 
specific muscle activities. Similarly, in ‗eye-blink conditioning‘ (see below), redirection 
of the conditioned stimulus from the eye to a finger would not involve transfer of the 
conditioned response in the form of flexion or extension of the finger (Hazeltine & Ivry, 
2002). This is why the CB ‗‗may not be designed for the development of abstract 
representations‘‘ (ibid, p. 1980).
20
 The same argument is also found in the construal of 
the CB as an instantiation of supervised learning algorithms, where learning proceeds on 
the basis of pre-specified input-output pairings (Doya, 1999; see section 2.2.1.1 here).  
                                                          
20
 However, there is no reason to commit CB inputs and outputs to a particular level of abstractness. The 
CB would certainly not be able to generalize over its inputs, or to retrieve particular inputs as instances 
of more abstract representations. However, it may still receive abstract categories as inputs from the 
cerebral loci after the appropriate cerebral retrieval operations, and may transmit such representations 
back to cortical areas. Suffice it for these representations to be reliable predictors of particular outputs of 
a copied cortico-cortical process (Ohyama et al., 2003). Associations between abstract categories, I will 
argue below, might involve NCB circuitry, as in the case of the N-V-N pseudosyntactic heuristic, or of 
schematic transmission (section 2.4.4.5 below). 
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On the contrary, cerebral algorithms are assumed to abstract rules from context 
in an unsupervised learning fashion, and flexibly apply them to different contexts (ibid). 
In unsupervised learning, the algorithm is presented with examples from the input data 
set, and is called to fit these observations in a model – with no pre-specified output, 
much unlike supervised learning. In clustering, for example, a characteristic method of 
unsupervised learning, the algorithm assigns a set of observations into subsets 
(‗clusters‘), so that observations in the same cluster are similar according to some 
criterion (e.g. Pothos & Chater, 2002). However, CB computations are advantageous in 
constrained behavioral contexts: if the same rule is applied to the same context in a 
deterministic fashion elsewhere in the brain, then CB algorithms may arbitrarily 
replicate these reoccurring input-output mappings (Doya, 1999). In this fashion, the CB 
may provide faster solutions with fewer resources, like a ‗‗shortcut‘‘ or a ‗‗look-up 
table‘‘ (ibid; Ramnani, 2006; section 2.4.4.2 here). 
 
In what follows, I argue that this ‗speed/flexibility‘ trade-off between CB and 
cerebral computations is reflected in language processing with the 
‗categorical/associative‘ distinction, respectively. In particular, I would like to propose 
that NCB internal models store multi-level linguistic associative relations, and that the 
Kalman filter of the NCBKFLP regulates the trade-off between the cortico-cortical, 
categorical modality, and the associative, cortico-cerebellar modality. In contexts of 
increased predictability (‗low Kalman gain‘), the associative, cortico-cerebellar 
computations are maximally involved, overriding and/or bypassing the cortico-cortical 
ones. 
 
Evidence for the fundamental role of the CB in the formation and storage of 
associative memory traces is indeed found in a wide range of paradigms, from classical 
conditioning to cognitive tasks. Classical conditioning, in the form of the ‗nictitating 
membrane response‘, also known as ‗Pavlovian eyelid conditioning‘, represents the most 
basic form of long-term associative memory formation. In such tasks, subjects are 
trained to generate an eye-blink (conditioned response) to an initially neutral stimulus, 
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e.g. a warning tone (conditioned stimulus), which is temporally paired to and thus 
predicts another stimulus, e.g. a corneal air puff (unconditioned stimulus). Before 
conditioning, the tone alone does not elicit an eye-blink, but the unconditioned stimulus 
does. During conditioning, however, the tone becomes a reliable predictor of the 
unconditioned stimulus, so that, after conditioning, the tone alone evokes an eye-blink. 
As training proceeds, there is a gradual increase in both the probability and the 
amplitude of conditioned responses (Hazeltine & Ivry, 2002).  
 
If the CB operates as a feedforward control system, then it should display 
associative learning, whereby output is adjusted for sensory inputs that reliably predict 
errors (Ohyama et al., 2003). Indeed, the CB has long been established as the 
fundamental site of classical conditioning (e.g. Thompson et al., 1997; Christian & 
Thompson, 2005) in both comparative (e.g. McCormick & Thompson, 1984) and human 
clinical studies (e.g. Daum et al., 1993; Timmann et al., 1996; Woodruff-Pak et al., 
1996). Deficient eye-blink conditioning has also been reported in populations involving 
CB pathology, e.g. schizophrenics (e.g. Brown et al., 2005), or dyslexics (Nicolson et 
al., 2002). In particular, the conditioned and unconditioned stimulus representations are 
conveyed to the CB via the mossy and climbing fibers, respectively, and CB output via 
the deep nuclei expresses the conditioned response. At first, the anterior interpositus 
nucleus is inhibited, because the conditioned stimulus is passed to the CB cortex via the 
mossy fibers, which activate the inhibitory Purkinje cells. However, when specific 
mossy fibers inputs (conditioned stimulus) reliably co-occur with an error signalled by a 
climbing fiber input (unconditioned stimulus), with a specific time delay, LTD punishes 
those synapses that inhibit the anterior interpositus, and CB output is adjusted to occur at 
the appropriate time (e.g. Ohyama et al., 2003). Such findings have been extended with 
reports of CB impairments in learning associations between visual cues and motor 
commands (Canavan et al., 1994; Tucker et al., 1996), and MRI-assessed CB volume 




More recently, CB involvement has been shown in non-motor associative 
learning. In one such study, patients with isolated CB degenerative disease were asked to 
learn the association between six pairs of colors and numerals by trial and error. In 
comparison with normal control subjects, it took the patients significantly longer to learn 
the correct associations between colors and numerals, and they were impaired in 
recognizing them later on, while two patients showed no associative learning effect at 
all. Additionally, the patients were also tested in two control tasks in order to control for 
the influence of their motor performance in the cognitive task: neither of those tasks 
correlated substantially with their poor cognitive performance (Drepper et al., 1999).  
 
If anything, then, the involvement of CB structures in such multi-level 
associative computations of temporally paired events strongly supports the proposal here 
– i.e. that in language processing, temporally paired relations between linguistic events 
can be acquired, stored, and adapted in NCB circuitry. In other words,  
 
[w]hether activated by a tone, the position of a limb or 
some cognitive process, the cerebellum will process 
mossy fiber inputs as arbitrary signals that do or do not 
reliably predict events (Ohyama et al., 2003, p. 226). 
 
The proposal here is thus that CB ‗‗dynamics memory‘‘ (Ito, 1993a, b) is 
involved in the language domain with the formation and storage of associative linguistic 
relations. At an elementary level, the capacity of the NCB to prepare the language-
related cortical loci for upcoming events should manifest itself in lexical ‗‗associative‘‘, 
and not ‗‗semantic‘‘ priming (see also section 2.6.2 below):  
 
[a]ssociative relatedness is a normative description of the 
probability that one word will call to mind a second word 
[…] Associative relations are assumed to reflect word use 
rather than word meaning (e.g. ‗‗needle-thread,‘‘ ‗‗spider-
web‘‘). The source of these associations might be 
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temporal contiguity in verbal or written language […] or 
co-occurrence within propositions […] On the other hand, 
semantic relatedness reflects the similarity in meaning or 
the overlap in featural descriptions of two words (e.g. 
‗‗whale-dolphin,‘‘ ‗‗duck-chicken‘‘) (Thompson-Schill et 
al., 1998, p. 440; italics mine). 
 
However, this widely used ‗associative/semantic‘ divide silently confounds the 
form/meaning distinction with that of the paradigmatic/syntagmatic axis, or, more 
appropriately, of categorical/associative relations. The ‗form/meaning‘ distinction is 
made between different levels of linguistic analysis, while the ‗categorical/associative‘ 
one describes two different relations linguistic items might be involved in. In other 
words, meaning relations are not necessarily categorical in nature, and form relations 
between words are not necessarily associative. Such a confound would exclude the co-
occurrence relations between semantic representations of (often co-occurring) words, 
such as thematic-role (ζ-role) -bearing verbs and their corresponding ζ-role-filling NPs 
(e.g. ‗customer-buying‘, ‗table-eating‘) on the one hand, and word-lexeme-lemma 
categorical relations (/running/-RUN) on the other.
21
 In an attempt to refine the 
terminology involved and expand the corresponding ontology, a 2 x 2 classification of 
relations is summarized instead in table 2.1. Associative relations may thus hold in both 
formal and semantic levels. In pair-wise lexical relations, ‗formal-associatively related‘ 
items would most aptly correspond to Hutchison‘s (2003) ‗‗forward phrasal associates‘‘ 
(e.g. ‗pigeon-hole‘, ‗couch-potato‘). Apart from ζ-role-based relations, ‗semantic-
associative‘ ones would also involve cases like the ‗‗script relation (orchard-apple)‘‘, or 
the ‗‗instrument (broom-floor)‘‘ relations in Hutchison (2003), or the ‗‗functionally 
related-associated instruments‘‘, e.g. ‗‗pram-baby‘‘ and ‗‗bandage-wound‘‘ in Moss et 
al. (1995). This ontological distinction will be necessary in formulating the experimental 
predictions in the TMS experiments reported here (chapters 5-7). 
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 Unavoidably, processing lexical items that are related in a ‗formal-categorical‘ fashion is confounded 
with repetition and semantic-categorical priming. This is because lexical items in the same formal 
network involve the same morphemes. 
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Direct evidence for NCB involvement in formal-associative computations is in 
fact demonstrated in the first TMS study conducted here (chapter 5). For semantic-
associative relations, supportive evidence is provided by the performance of NCB 
patients in verb-generation tasks (section 2.4.4.5), as well as by the findings of the third 
TMS study reported here (chapter 7). On the other hand, categorical representations will 
be shown to remain intact in CB patients, both in the semantic and in the formal 





























Table 2.1: The associative-categorical, formal-semantic quadripartite distinction. 
 
 
At this point, I would like to introduce ‗‗constructions‘‘ as the control objects for 
the unification-control signals of Broca‘s area. This would be in equivalence with mental 
models in the temporo-parietal areas being controlled by the prefrontal cortical 
controller in thought processes (Ito, 2000, 2008).
22
 Constructions are traditionally 
defined as ‗‗stored pairings of form and function, including morphemes, words, idioms, 
partially lexically filled and fully general linguistic patterns‘‘ (Goldberg, 2003, p. 219; 
see table 2.2 for examples). With respect to the representation of constructions, then, the 
Memory component would be seen as instantiating what Goldberg (2003) calls a 
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 Constructions will also be a valuable tool in exploring the neurolinguistic foundations of 
grammaticalization processes, since constructions are at the same time the units on which such changes 
operate (chapter 3). 
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‗‗construct-i-con‘‘, in the sense that ‗‗[t]he totality of our knowledge of language is 
captured by a network of constructions‘‘ (ibid, p. 219). In fact, their representation 
reflects basic properties of the way semantic nodes of lexical items are organized into 
networks. For instance, similar referents and similar constructions are represented by 
nodes close to one another, and processing of one such node involves spreading 
activation to adjacent nodes (Goldberg, 2003; Diessel, 2004). More abstract, schematic 
constructions, also called ‗‗constructional schemas‘‘ (e.g. Bybee, 1995) stand higher in 
the constructional hierarchy and transmit, via mechanisms of default inheritance, their 
syntactic and semantic specifications to less schematic ones. Less productive-canonical 
patterns are captured at different midpoints of these hierarchies (e.g. the idioms in table 
2.2). Accordingly, language-specific generalization relies on the induction of more 
abstract schemata from more concrete constructions.  
 
 
Table 2.2: Examples of constructions of different sizes and complexity; function is 
provided wherever not transparent. Table adapted from Goldberg (2003, p. 220) with 
permission © 2003 Elsevier. 
 
 
The ‗flexible‘, categorical manner in which cortical learning may proceed would 
be reflected in language processing by the notion of ‗‗schematization‘‘ (Langacker, 
2000). This involves the analogical construction of schemata by extraction of common 
features from the language input data. The particular features extracted from 
distributional data reinforce each other and give rise to more abstract representations 
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(Diessel, 2004). Capacities to generalize over data were seen above to rely selectively on 
cortical unsupervised learning algorithms, and not on CB supervised ones. The linguistic 
nature of the learning input would place the relevant computations in the temporo-
parietal cortical Memory component (see section 2.4.4.4 for evidence). 
 
In sentence processing, then, strings are processed and recognized as potential 
members-instantiations of different constructions. Via vertical, categorical links, the 
corresponding schematic constructions are activated in the cerebral-Memory component, 
along with their syntactic-semantic specifications; these provide the constraints 
according to which unification with subsequent input strings proceeds. On the contrary, 
the CB is blind to such vertical-inheritance relations. Instead, it stores associations, i.e. 
instances of the dynamics of particular unification operations. Over time, it becomes a 
reliable look-up table storing co-occurrences between particular items, or between 
particular items and their structural analyses.  In that way, it provides a constrained 
search space within which the controller, i.e. Broca‘s area, may immediately retrieve 
unification candidates. This can be done without consulting the Memory component, i.e. 
without checking the membership of a particular construction in a particular schema. For 
now, a brief example could be given with the ditransitive construction of the sentence 
‗He gave her a coke‘ in table 2.2 above. The cortical input analysis system may assign a 
structural representation [Obj] to the pronoun ‗her‘ only after the activation of the 
schematic construction [GIVE Obj1 Obj2] and/or the even more schematic [V(ditransitive) 
Obj1 Obj2]‘. On the contrary, the frequent co-occurrence of the phonological 
representations of ‗give‘ and ‗her‘ in discourse, as well as the strong association between 
the phonological input ‗gave her‘ and the structural output [gave(V) her(Obj)] may invite 
maximized involvement of NCB ‗dynamics memory‘. The latter will bias, override, 
and/or even bypass cortico-cortical processing, assigning this structural representation 






In this section, the argument was made predominantly with reference to 
computational properties of the different neuroanatomical components involved, and 
with minimal psycholinguistic insight. In the discussion that follows, those associative, 
non-categorical, possibly pre-emptive multi-level linguistic computations that the CB 
instantiates will be clearly illustrated in the light of evidence in the literature and in the 























2.4. Support for the Model  
 
Support for NCB emulation in language processing predominantly relies on the 
anatomical and computational properties of the CB, and only secondarily on empirical 
evidence. This is owing to both the ‗cerebral chauvinism‘ in the interpretation of NCB-
induced cognitive deficits, as well as to the early infancy of computational approaches to 
NCB cognitive functions (sections 1.3.2, 1.3.3, and 2.3.1). However, certain aspects of 
NCB linguistic functions have been noted in the clinical and imaging fields to reflect 
NCB computations, yet in a sporadic and speculative way. It is thus instructive to 
examine such evidence from the NCBKFLP perspective.  
 
2.4.1. Error Detection 
 
Evidence for NCB error signalling and error-driven learning in the linguistic 
domain was first provided in Fiez et al. (1992). Their NCB patient showed deficient 
supervised learning in a concurrent discrimination word learning task,
23
 and likewise 
failed to detect instances of their erroneous performance in word-generation tasks. In a 
PET study of sentence processing (Stowe et al., 2004), significant NCB activation was 
found at the point of reanalysis in reading ambiguous as opposed to unambiguous 
sentences. However, this finding was interpreted within a framework very limited with 
respect to the overall computations of the CB, whereby the CB is primarily involved in 
error detection and signalling (Jueptner & Weiller, 1998). On the contrary, the 
computational work on the CB and the NCBKFLP hypothesis encompass error detection 
and signalling as only one of CB functions. As shown in figure 2.4 above, the 
discrepancies between the predicted, neodentate-based, and the actual, cortical outputs 
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 In each of the 20 pairs of words used, one word was assigned to be the ‗positive member‘. Subjects 
learned the positive word in each pair through trial and error: after indicating their selection by pointing, 
subjects were informed whether they were correct. Word pairs were repeated until a subject made no 
errors on four consecutive blocks, up to a maximum of twenty (Fiez et al., 1992). 
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of a linguistic operation are transmitted via the olivo-cerebellar pathway, training, via 
LTD, the CB cortex.  
 
 
2.4.2. Practice-Dependent Optimization 
 
If the CB instantiation of the Kalman filter is disrupted, then the Kalman gain 
cannot be lowered on the basis of the residuals, and the CB model may not become a 
reliable copy of the target process. Lack of practice-induced facilitation is characteristic 
in CB patients (see section 3.5.3), and has also been shown in linguistic tasks, yet with 
virtually no reference to the internal models framework. In such tasks, patients reduce 
their response latencies poorly across blocks in comparison with normal controls. For 
example, in a verb-generation task, the reaction times of the patient in Fiez et al. (1992) 
did not improve as a function of practice, whereas normal control subjects reduced theirs 
by approximately 30%. Similar findings have been observed in more recent studies on 
NCB patients (e.g. Gebhart et al., 2002). Recently, CB transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) has been shown to specifically impair the practice-induced 
proficiency increase in a verbal working memory task. On the contrary, stimulation over 
the prefrontal cortex induced an immediate change in task performance, sparing, though, 
the practice-related proficiency changes (Ferrucci et al., 2008).       
 
 
2.4.3. Noise-Resistant Speech Perception 
 
Since state estimators function as optimal noise-rejecting filters for signals 
modelled as outputs of dynamical systems, the CB might in certain circumstances induce 
perceptual enhancements. For example, CB circuitry could be employed for a 
mechanic‘s ‗tuned ear‘ to detect acoustic signatures of particular mechanical 
breakdowns in an engine (Paulin, 1997, p. 527). This should also hold for the outputs of 
60 
 
the NCBKFLP to the language-related cortical loci. Some first suggestive evidence for 
such involvement in language percepts can be drawn from dyslexic populations, where 
CB pathology is arguably involved (e.g. Nicolson et al., 2001; see section 3.5.3 here). 
The pronounced difficulties of dyslexics in perceiving speech in noisy contexts (e.g. 
Sperling et al., 2005; Ziegler et al., 2009) have been speculatively attributed to deficient 





2.4.4. Sentence Processing Habits 
 
So far, the discussion topics have been defined by some general aspects of CB 
computations (practice-induced optimization, error signalling, perceptual enhancement) 
that are reflected in linguistic processes. In what follows, the topics are taken directly 
from the psycholinguistic literature, and sentence processing mechanisms are discussed 
in the light of NCB computations, with emphasis on comprehension. Given that NCB 
language research is still in its early infancy (sections 1.3 and 2.3.1), the appropriate 
tasks allowing insights into linguistic emulation are yet to be integrated in NCB clinical 
and imaging studies. Thus, discussion will often be made on the basis of only indirect 
support from the findings available. Above all, a common thread running through these 
topics will be the striking similarities between the computations underlying the 
psycholinguistic mechanisms discussed and the NCB computational properties (section 
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 See section 2.6.3.1 for further discussion in the contexts of the experimental hypotheses generated. 
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2.4.4.1. Pseudosyntactic Computations  
             and Neocerebellar Output 
 
 
The distinction between categorical and associative computations, mapped in the 
previous discussion to the properties of cortico-cortical and cortico-cerebellar 
processing, respectively (section 2.3.4.3), is often found in the sentence comprehension 
literature. According to the Late Assignment of Syntax Theory (LAST), for instance, 
sentence comprehension involves two different mechanisms that correspond to 
independent computations and representational levels: an ‗‗algorithmic‘‘ syntax, that 
employs ‗‗categorical‘‘ computations and reflects processing ‗‗rules‘‘, and a pre-
emptive, ‗‗heuristic‘‘ ‗‗pseudosyntax‘‘, that employs ‗‗associative‘‘ computations and 
reflects processing ‗‗habits‘‘
25
 (Townsend & Bever, 2001). Low-level cues, such as 
grammatical morphology, provide pseudosyntax the means to segment the sentential 
input into major constituents, assign probable thematic (ζ)-roles (Chomsky, 1981b), and 
form an initial meaning-form hypothesis. The syntax subsequently uses this hypothesis 
to synthesize a detailed syntactic structure (Townsend & Bever, 2001).  
 
The ‗‗rules/ habits‘‘ distinction invoked in such two-stage models meets the one 
often made in cognitive neuroscience between ‗memories and habits‘. In the case of the 
‗‗dual-systems model of retention‘‘, for instance, the memory system is instantiated in 
cortical and limbic loci, whereas the habit system is instantiated in basal ganglionic and 
CB ones (Mishkin & Petri, 1984; Mishkin et al., 1984). The unitary, multimodal nature 
of CB computations promotes such a structure as a promising candidate for the storage 
and adaptation of syntactic and semantic processing habits. Moreover, this dynamic 
definition of the first stage of processing (‗‗habits‘‘) presupposes, apparently, a process 
of ‗habituation‘, in other words, some adaptive mechanism whereby reoccurring 
processes in the second stage may be demoted to the first stage as a result of learning 
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(Argyropoulos, 2008b, June). The capacity of CB circuitry to adaptively copy the 
dynamics of repeated processes of other parts of the brain promotes, once again, the CB 
as a plausible neuroanatomical candidate for the instantiation of certain first-stage 
operations and such adaptive demotions to that stage. In other words, if a certain second-
stage process for certain input reliably delivers a certain output, the NCB may acquire 
the dynamics of this process. Training signals would be derived from the discrepancies 
between NCB predictions for the output of that process (transmitted to the language-
related cortical loci) and the actual output of that process (transmitted back to the NCB). 
The pre-emptive processing capacities of the CB (section 2.3.4) would then provide 
sentence comprehension with a number of pseudosyntactic mechanisms. 
 
Interestingly, in some of these ‗analysis-by-synthesis‘ models, production 
mechanisms are implicitly (Townsend & Bever, 2001) or explicitly assumed (e.g. 
Garrett, 2000) to participate in the first stage of sentence comprehension. In that stage, a 
sentence structure would be generated by the production system, and would shape the 
hypothesis about the sentence under comprehension. This type of process is implied in 
the ‗‗scrambled-egg analogy‘‘ below: 
 
[…] the analysis-by-synthesis model starts with a 
particular hypothetical egg sequence, scrambles and cooks 
them in a virtual kitchen, and then compares the resulting 
virtual omelet with the actual input. When the virtual 
omelet matches the actual omelet, the input and cooking 
sequence producing the virtual omelet is confirmed as the 
correct analysis (Townsend & Bever, 2001, pp. 160-1). 
 
This ‗‗virtual kitchen‘‘ here would arguably be accommodated by the CB, the 
brain‘s ‗‗virtual reality machine‘‘ (Miall, 2007). Moreover, the perception of actions 
produced by conspecifics has been argued to employ the perceiver‘s own CB internal 
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models (Blakemore & Decety, 2001),
26
 which are used for the prediction of the 
consequences of the perceiver‘s own actions (e.g. Miall & Wolpert, 1996; Blakemore et 
al., 2001; section 2.2.2 here). Again, then, this would provide further grounds for the 
involvement of CB computations in processes occurring at such a first stage in sentence 
comprehension.  
 
Another aspect bringing the associative cortico-cerebellar linguistic 
computations proposed above closer to the associative pseudosyntactic ones here is the 
‗‗good-enough‘‘ nature of the representations that the latter culminate in (Ferreira et al., 
2002; see below). In independent work in cognitive science, such ‗good-enough‘ models 
of the perceived environment have been considered to confer significant advantages to 
their bearers: 
 
[n]aturally, the perceptual world is not totally out of synch 
with the ‗real world‘. The perceptual systems have 
evolved in order that organisms may act reliably in the 
real world. They are not concerned with a ‘true model of 
the world’ in the logical sense, but with a ‘world model’ 
good enough to support the planning of actions that in the 
long run lead to better propagation of the genes. Like 
other products of evolution, the perceptual systems are 
full of ‗cheap tricks‘, which is why we see virtual objects: 
these tricks work in the organism‘s normal environment. 
It is only in the context of the laboratory that their 
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 This idea, developed in fact prior to Wilson and Knoblich (2005), could fruitfully provide grounds for 
arguing for a central CB role in emulative covert imitation. However, imitation processes are altogether 
beyond the scope of the investigation here. See section 2.5 for this point. 
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For the organisms to ‗‗act reliably in the real world‘‘ (ibid), then, the CB was 
seen above as fundamental to generating predictions for the sensory outcomes of actions, 
compensating for the conduction delays in updating the status of the peripheral motor 
system, enhancing perception overall on the basis of predictions on the perceived signal, 
or distinguishing reafference from exafference (sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Furthermore, 
examples can be found in the literature on this ‗‗artificiality‘‘ (ibid) of CB-shaped 
percepts (section 2.4.4.6 below). Once again, then, the significance of CB computations 
in such action-oriented efficient perception, their domain-general nature, and the fact 
that this good-enough nature of perception processes is also reflected in those of 
sentence comprehension should all invite a closer look at the involvement of the NCB in 
constructing good-enough representations in sentence comprehension.  
 
In language processing, such representations are often owed to the rapid decay of 
structure in working memory, and/or, crucially, to the susceptibility of the final analysis 
to influence from heuristic computations (Ferreira et al., 2002). An important aspect of 
the latter is the idea that, in certain situations, the algorithmically-based analysis may not 
be obtained at all. This may be due to time pressure, or because the pseudoparse may 
have reached some ‗‗criterion level of confidence‘‘, terminating its operations (Ferreira, 
2003, p. 171). Similar behavior is reproduced by the internal model in a Kalman filter. In 
sensory processing, for instance, Kalman filters are described to  
 
[…] converge until they are weakly coupled to the target. 
At this point they tend to discount sense data more than 
they should because their computations are based on the 
assumption that the internal model is correct. Because the 
internal model can never be perfect, the estimator will 
converge to give suboptimal performance and may 




In sentence processing, this ‗weak coupling‘ of the CB internal model with the 
copied target system can be seen as an aspect of such a criterion level of confidence 
being reached. Similarly, just as the internal model can never be perfect, so ‗‗[i]t is only 
the algorithmic parse that is guaranteed to yield a correct analysis‘‘ (Ferreira, 2003). 
 
Interestingly, Deacon‘s (1997) neurocognitive approach to the semiotic divide 
between ‗symbols‘ and ‗indices‘ reflects a similar perspective on the underlying 
foundation of this ‗syntactic/pseudosyntactic‘ distinction: subcortically localized indices 
may help automate cortically distributed rules. Within a full fledged psycholinguistic 
model, such ‗‗indices‘‘ would correspond to ‗‗surface cues‘‘ triggering surface 
schemata, assigning ζ-roles and separating major phrases (Townsend & Bever, 2001): 
 
[…] grammatical cues, such as are embodied in small 
‗function words‘, may be the primary agents for initially 
tagging and distributing sentence ‗chunks‘ to be 
separately processed. For this reason, it is precisely these 
features of language that need to be subject to minimal 
symbolic analysis. They serve a predominantly indexical 
function. And […] indices can be interpreted in isolation 
as automated, rote-learned skills. […] So, automatization 
of speech production and comprehension is accomplished 
by setting aside a small, closed set of symbols to be used 
as though they were indices. As a result of being stripped 
of semantic links, they can be learned by rote and 
implemented with minimal mnemonic search. And their 
representation within the brain can be highly local, even 
subcortical. The function of these modular operations is to 
implement grammatical rules, but the rules are implicitly 
symbolic and therefore distributed. These automated 
language functions are not grammar modules, but merely 
symbols of the grammar, which is itself probably highly 
distributed (Deacon, 1997, p. 299). 
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At this point, two clarifications are in order before continuing. Emulation in 
language processing is not proposed to exhaust pseudosyntax, but, rather, to only 
participate in such a stage. Correspondingly, from a neurological standpoint, it is not 
suggested that the NCB fully instantiates the pseudosyntactic component, but, rather, 
that it constitutes at least a fundamental site in what would conceivably be a circuit of 
interconnected brain loci (section 2.4.4.4).  
 
Most importantly, however, it is necessary not to commit the above reflections 
exclusively to a constraint-based or a two-stage model of sentence processing. The latter 
may often receive attention in exemplifying CB contributions as opposed to cortical 
ones. However, this is done so as to illustrate the qualitatively different computations 
that are maximally involved in cases of minimum NCBKFLP gain. In other words, 
commitment to different computations here does not necessitate commitment to a 
particular fashion in which these should be temporally arranged (e.g. whether one 
computation operates in parallel with, or pre-empts the other).
27
 On the one hand, for 
instance, the radically pre-emptive capacities of the CB (section 2.3.4) and of internal 
models per se in sensorimotor control (section 2.2.1) make the idea of a ‗CB first stage‘ 
an intuitively satisfactory one. On the other hand, of course, the speed of CB processing 
would still not exhaust its role to a pre-emptive one: the Kalman filter is, in its own 
right, a stochastic state estimating formalism. This would mean that the NCBKFLP 
negotiates the biases of internal model outputs on the ultimate representations in 
language perception and comprehension. Multiple such biases of varying strengths 
would come to play, much as in constraint-based models. Thus, the extent to which 
constraint-based and two-stage models of sentence comprehension are compatible with 
the NCBKFLP is beyond the scope of the present thesis, and should be a topic for 
further investigation.  
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 The Pickering and Garrod (2007) processor, for instance, combines two different types of computations 




2.4.4.2. Cerebellar Constrained Search 
 
A major contribution of associative computations is that they minimize the 
search space in processing. Language comprehension-perception is often performed in 
time-critical and/or noisy conditions (e.g. Ferreira, 2003; Pickering & Garrod, 2007), 
and, for this reason, those constrained search mechanisms become of added significance. 
In some two-stage, analysis-by-synthesis models, for instance, the heuristics used in the 
first stage, such as semantic associations and the N-V-N strategy, limit the hypotheses 
‗‗to sentences that have the indicated words with just those underlying structure roles 
that typically correspond to the conceptual ζ-roles‘‘ (Townsend & Bever, 2001, p. 164). 
In other words,  
 
[t]he pseudo-parser is the component that uses heuristics 
[…] to create a preliminary hypothesis. The true parser 
then uses that preliminary hypothesis to constrain its 
search space, so that when it calls up its syntactic 
procedures it need only consider a small subset of the 
formal possibilities (Ferreira, 2003, p. 170; italics mine). 
 
 
While the specification of the time-course of such particular constrained search 
computations is beyond the scope of the investigation here, a NCB role in performing 
these computations can be defended on the following grounds. As discussed above 
(sections 2.2 and 2.3), CB emulation may function as a ‗‗look-up table‘‘ of past 
input/output instances of the emulated activity. For every relevant action, the system 
creates a new ‗‗entry‘‘ consisting of the initial state of the target system, the actions 
performed, and the final state. Upon receipt of the initial state specification and the 
efference copy of the command, the table searches for a match in its list of stored input-
output pairs, and, upon retrieval, produces the ‗‗final state‘‘ specification on that entry as 
output. Such an implementation, of course, would constrain the generalization to new 
instances (Grush, 2004; Ramnani, 2006; also section 2.3.4.3 here). Purkinje cells in the 
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CB cortex, in view of the massive synaptic input they receive by granule cells, are often 
considered to play such role (Thach, 1996a). Similarly, in Doya‘s (1999) approach,  
 
[…] a cerebellar mapping can work as a short-cut circuit 
or a look-up table for a mapping that was originally 
developed by the time-consuming cortico-cortical 
processing. Such a mechanism is especially useful when 
the same mapping is used repeatedly for time critical 
tasks […] (ibid, p. 970; italics mine). 
 
 
Interestingly, imaging and clinical evidence has implicated NCB circuitry in 
constrained search in language processing, independently, though, from the 
computational literature on the CB. For instance, increases in activation in left-frontal 
cortex and NCB were found in an fMRI word-stem completion task (Desmond et al., 
1998). Stems with many (MANY condition; e.g. ‗STA_‘) or few possible completions 
(FEW condition; e.g. ‗PSA_‘) were presented, and subjects were asked to covertly 
complete each stem with a word. Prominent increases in activation in the MANY 
(relative to the FEW) condition were observed in the left middle and inferior frontal gyri 
(BA 9/10/46), left anterior cingulate (BA 24/32) and left caudate nucleus. In contrast, 
right NCB vermal and hemispheric lobules showed increases in the FEW (relative to the 
MANY) condition. Desmond et al. (1998) interpret this double dissociation on the basis 
of distinctive contributions of the two areas to cognitive performance: left-frontal and 
striatal activations reflect response selection, which increases in difficulty when there 
are many appropriate responses; NCB activation reflects search for responses, which 
increases in difficulty when even a single appropriate response is hard to retrieve. 
However, in the task involved, the FEW and MANY conditions were not matched for 
difficulty, as the FEW condition involved longer response latencies. Thus, for Desmond 
et al. (1998), NCB involvement in the FEW condition could conceivably reflect 
increased working memory demands associated with articulatory rehearsal.  
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The above findings have been replicated in a clinical study for a schizophrenic 
population (Marvel et al., 2004), where NCB, especially NCB vermal pathology is 
predominantly involved (see section 5.4.7.2.1 here for references). The results 
demonstrated a selective deficit for schizophrenics in producing stem completions in the 
FEW condition. Contrary to the Desmond et al. (1998) study, the two conditions here 
were matched. In fact, latencies for control subjects were shorter in the FEW than in the 
MANY condition, suggesting that the FEW condition did not involve an increased 
demand for working memory. Moreover, working memory ability for the patients was 
not significantly correlated to their impaired performance in the FEW condition. For 
Marvel et al. (2004), these findings suggest that working memory does not fully explain 
the patients‘ deficits and that the NCB role in word search in schizophrenia may not be 
related specifically to working memory processes and articulatory rehearsal. This would 
add further weight to the interpretation here, namely, that the NCB is involved in 
constrained search in language processing. 
 
A recent study on NCB patients has explicitly considered the size of the search 
space as a factor affecting patients‘ performance (Gebhart et al., 2002). The range of 
appropriate responses in the antonym- (e.g. stimulus: ‗KIND‘, response: ‗rude‘) and 
verb-generation tasks reported (e.g. stimulus: ‗CHEF‘, response: ‗cook‘), on which 
patients showed deficits, was much more constrained than that in the subordinate term-
generation task (e.g. stimulus: ‗MONEY‘, response: ‗dollar‘), where they showed spared 
performance. This pattern encouraged the interpretation that ‗‗the element of constraint 
in semantic association responses may be a key factor in eliciting a right CB language 
deficit‖ (ibid, p. 332). 
 
In the light of the NCBKFLP (section 2.3.4), stem completion in the FEW 
condition and word-generation tasks with equally few appropriate responses (e.g. verb 
generation) involve unification in a limited search space. The NCB would provide such 
a limited search space for re-occurring, routine operations, thereby attenuating the 
categorical search of the temporo-parietal memory component. There is, moreover, no 
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reason to limit NCB involvement to stems or simple lexical items. NCB constrained 
search would conceivably extend to higher-order constructional templates, ranging from 
lexical morphemes to particular constructions for unification. The homogeneity of CB 
architecture and its projections to the areas undertaking such unification operations adds 
weight to such a hypothesis. These NCB constrained-search linguistic processes are 
proposed in the next chapter to be of added significance in motivating 
grammaticalization phenomena (section 3.6.2). Sections 2.4.4.3 and 2.4.4.5 below 
discuss findings in the light of NCB constrained search in sentence processing. 
 
 
2.4.4.3. Processing Passives without the Cerebellum 
 
As mentioned above, research in NCB language functions is both in its early 
infancy and is heavily concerned with the frontal-like language symptoms that NCB 
damage may occasionally result in. The work in Pickett (1998), however, stands out as a 
characteristic case of CB deficits in sentence processing that cannot be explained on the 
basis of cortical-like patterns. Unsurprisingly, those findings have attracted very little 
attention,
28
 and have not had any further impact on CB language pathology.  
 
Pickett (1998) provides the first report in the literature of CB impairments in 
sentence comprehension (ibid, p. 103). In the two tasks reported, participants listened to 
the stimulus sentence (a description of a simple transitive event), and had to select the 
correct picture corresponding to the event described. The dependent measure was error 
rates. In the first task, where active and passive sentences were contrasted, normal 
control subjects made errors in 4% of the actives, and in 10% of the passives. On the 
contrary, CB patients made errors in 11% of both actives and passives, strikingly 
showing, unlike normal controls, no effect of Voice manipulation. Interestingly, the two 
patients with right NCB damage of the seven total patients performed better than normal 
control subjects.  
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 A ‗Google Scholar‘ search (25
 
May 2010) shows but 5 citations of the work. 
71 
 
From a ‗frontal-like‘ perspective, such lack of Voice effect was seen as ‗‗difficult 
to interpret‘‘ (Pickett, 1998, p. 91), ‗‗disappointing‘‘ (ibid, p. 90), and as providing 
‗‗mixed results‘‘ (Justus, 2004, p. 1128). The pattern expected was that the more 
complex and difficult-to-process passive constructions would be the ones to show the 
impairment in the patient population. In such a framework, though, the lack of Voice 
effect would remain unexplained.  
 
This pattern was difficult to attribute to a general cognitive impairment: no 
subject had below normal performance on the cognitive task (‗Digit Span Backwards‘), 
the means and ranges on which were the most closely matched of the tasks for the two 
groups. This suggests, for Pickett (1998), that the two subject groups had roughly 
comparable cognitive-intellectual levels. Furthermore, in the second task, which 
compared simple sentences (‗The fireman kicks the chair‘), sentences with sentence-
final (‗The fireman kicks  the chair that is soft‘), and center-embedded relative clauses 
(‗The fireman that is fat kicks the chair‘), the patients showed the expected effects of 
structural complexity, with higher error rates on more complex structures. Patients also 
showed the expected effects of semantic constraint like normal controls in both tasks: 
they made more mistakes in semantically unconstrained sentences (equivalent to 
Ferreira‘s (2003) ‗‗symmetrical‘‘ ones; e.g. ‗The sister hugged the brother‘), than in 
semantically constrained ones, where the two ζ-roles could not be reversely assigned to 
the two nouns involved (like Ferreira‘s (2003) ‗‗nonreversible‘‘ ones; e.g. ‗The child 
pulled the wagon‘).
 29 
Patients were thus able to recruit semantic information in sentence 
comprehension. These findings suggested that the CB is not implicated in the processing 
of syntactic rules or lexical and sentential semantics.  
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 A closer look at the materials for both experiments reveals that all the stimuli manipulated belonged 
either to the equivalent of the ‗‗symmetrical‘‘ or of the ‗‗non-reversible‘‘ cases. In other words, unlike 
Ferreira‘s (2003) stimulus sets, there were no ‗‗biased reversible‘‘ sentences (e.g. ‗The dog was bitten by 
the man‘). This last type is the one where semantic associations heavily invite schematic interference in 




In view of such unexpected results, Pickett (1998) speculates that the voicing 
distinction may be associated with an automaticity distinction; active sentences, being 
more frequently employed than passives, would allow more automatic processing: 
 
[…] the cerebellars do not find the passive sentences 
difficult, but […] they find even active sentences difficult. 
For example, it could be the case that active sentences 
normally are processed much more automatically than 
passive, while passive sentences may require more 
attention or perhaps more of a word by word rather than 
phrasal parsing. If the CB subjects are impaired, they 
may use the same more effortful strategy on all sentences 
and thus do not benefit from the relative simplicity of the 
active sentences […] So perhaps the linguistically 
impaired cerebellar subjects […] can perform the full 
range of linguistic processing, but their mental shortcuts 
have been disrupted, so that processing ‗easy‘ sentences 
requires more conscious effort and is performed less 
automatically (ibid, pp. 91-103; italics mine). 
 
Pickett‘s (1998) considerations above on the ‗‗phrasal‘‘, more ‗‗automatic‘‘ 
parsing of active sentences, as opposed to the more ‗‗word by word‘‘, ‗‗attended‘‘ 
parsing of passives, presuppose and implicitly promote a ‗rules/habits‘ distinction. Such 
a divide is explicitly assumed in two-stage models of sentence comprehension discussed 
above (section 2.4.4.1).
30
 Characteristically, one of the important tenets in LAST is that 
word sequences that conform to canonical sentence templates are easier to comprehend. 
For example, in sentence acceptability-judgment tasks (e.g. Forster & Olbrei, 1973), 
active sentences (e.g. ‗the boy liked the girl‘) receive judgments at a fast rate, as 
opposed to simple passives (e.g. ‗The girl was liked by the boy‘). This is partly 
                                                          
30
 Once again, the ‗rules-habits‘ distinction adopted here need not commit to a particular temporal 
arrangement of these two types of computations. Thus, in a constraint-based model, similar 
computations could be represented as competing biases of different strengths (see also section 2.4.4.1). 
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accounted for by the N(oun)-V(erb)-N(oun) heuristic that pseudosyntax applies 
(Townsend & Bever, 2001; Ferreira, 2003), according to which N-V-N sequences bias 
interpretation in favor of an ‗agent-action-patient‘ output. For Pickett‘s (1998) CB 
patients, then, it seems that the ‗‗cost for the passive structure overall‘‘ (Ferreira, 2003, 
p. 177) becomes tantamount to that for the active structure. This would be due to the 
abolishment of a CB-based N-V-N heuristic, which otherwise guarantees fast and 
accurate processing of active voice sentences.  
 
In particular, CB patients may show an ‗advantageous inaccessibility‘ of the 
internal models in the NCBKFLP. In a healthy CB, the highly entrenched ζ-role 
assignment of [Agent = N1, Action = V, Theme = N2] would be transmitted by the 
neodentate in response to efference copies of sentential inputs of the form of [N1V N2] 
sent from the cortical input analysis system to the NCB cortex via the cerebro-ponto-
cerebellar pathway. Disruption of internal models copying ζ-role assignment in these 
sentences would not result in impairments in processing their syntactic and semantic 
aspects, as it did not for Pickett‘s CB patients above. This would be because, in many 
tasks, CB contributions are of an optimizing yet unnecessary nature, and non-CB 
strategies might in fact be more efficient. Conceivably, ‗‗[a] CB patient would be unable 
to use the CB-based strategy, but may be better at solving the problem‘‘ (Paulin, 1997, 
p. 531). The non-CB strategy developed here in processing active structures may have 
made the two right NCB patients better than normal controls, and the rest of the (more 














2.4.4.4. The Cerebellum, Broca’s Area,  
     and Pseudosyntax 
 
 
As discussed above, the NCBKFLP is not committed to a two-stage or a 
constrained-based model of sentence comprehension (section 2.4.4.1). Instead, both 
types provide insights into the properties of NCB computations in language processing. 
In this section, agrammatic aphasic
31
 sentence comprehension is discussed in the light of 
a spared pseudosyntactic component that may partly employ NCB circuitry.   
 
The distinction between ‗‗rules‘‘ and ‗‗habits‘‘ (Townsend & Bever, 2001), or 
between ‗‗algorithms‘‘ and ‗‗heuristics‘‘ (Ferreira, 2003) has been predated (and 
inspired) by that introduced in aphasiology to account for the performance patterns of 
Broca‘s agrammatic aphasics (Caramazza & Zurif, 1976; Saffran et al., 1998). The latter 
seem to operate in sentence comprehension based on default patterns, such as the N-V-N 
strategy, or semantic associations among lexical items in sentences (‗‗schema-
transmission‘‘; Ferreira & Stacey, 2000). In fact, the performance patterns of Pickett‘s 
(1998) CB patients are the very opposite of those for both normal control subjects 
(Ferreira & Stacey, 2000; Ferreira, 2003), and Broca‘s agrammatic aphasics in 
comprehending passive sentences (e.g. Saffran et al., 1998). In sentence comprehension 
tasks, both healthy normal controls, and, to a greater extent, agrammatic patients have 
shown high error rates on sentences with semantic constraints conflicting with the 
syntactically-based assignments (e.g. ‗The hunter was shot by the deer‘). The 
explanation proposed is that ζ-transmission in passives produces a weaker (for normal 
controls, and impaired for agrammatic aphasics) binding between ζ-role and syntactic 
positions. The resulting interpretation is thus vulnerable to schematic influence from 
semantic associations (e.g. the routine association of hunters with the act of shooting, 
and that of deer with the patient role; Saffran et al., 1998; Ferreira & Stacey, 2000; 
Ferreira, 2003). The pattern of aphasics exhibiting the qualitatively same and 
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 Since no particular distinctions are discussed between ‗agrammatic aphasia‘ and ‗Broca‘s aphasia‘, the 
two terms are used here interchangeably. 
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quantitatively exaggerated performance patterns is suggestive of the fact that such 
semantic associations influencing ζ-role assignment are preserved in Broca‘s 
agrammatic aphasia, and are thus not computed by Broca‘s area. 
 
Assuming a different perspective, Townsend & Bever (2001) speculate that 
pseudosyntactic operations are instantiated in Broca‘s area, and dismiss the N-V-N 
pattern that Broca‘s aphasics reproduce as post-comprehensional strategic reasoning. 
However, there are a number of issues with this interpretation. If such pseudosyntactic 
component is (fully) instantiated in Broca‘s area, then it would be difficult to explain 
how a patient population other than Broca‘s aphasics exhibit selective deficits in such N-
V-N heuristics, and not in syntactic and semantic aspects of sentence comprehension. 
This is precisely the case observed in Pickett‘s (1998) CB group above. This pattern, the 
very reverse of which is found in agrammatic aphasics (Saffran et al., 1998) certainly 
poses a problem for the instantiation of pseudosyntax in Broca‘s area. 
 
Townsend and Bever‘s (2001) proposal heavily relies on the findings of 
Linebarger et al. (1983) on the preservation of grammatical knowledge in Broca‘s 
aphasics: allegedly, these patients cannot understand sentences in ζ-role- or plausibility-
judgment tasks, yet can judge whether or not these sentences are grammatical. This 
suggests, for Townsend and Bever (2001), that Broca‘s aphasics have lost the ability to 
use pseudosyntax to develop an initial meaning, but have not lost the full grammar. This 
finding, however, is not commonly accepted. Other experiments have shown that 
agrammatic aphasics exhibit severe deficits in grammaticality judgment tasks involving 
passives.
32
 This shows then that the agrammatic deficit depends on syntactic structure, 
and not on the linguistic task involved, e.g. grammaticality judgment vs ζ-
role/plausibility-judgment tasks (Grodzinsky & Finkel, 1998). 
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 In Grodzinsky and Finkel (1998), the deficit is observed in a larger set of structures, i.e. those with 
dependencies between traces and their antecedents. The discussion here need not commit to the 
particular interpretation provided in that study for the deficits observed. 
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Another counterargument could be made on the basis of lexical priming studies 
on Broca‘s aphasics. If the pseudosyntactic schemata (most fundamentally, semantic 
associations) are applied by Broca‘s area, then deficits should be found in associative 
priming in agrammatic aphasics. However, studies on ‗associative‘ and ‗semantic‘ 
priming in Broca‘s and Wernicke‘s aphasia show no impairments in automatically 
accessing lexical and/or semantic information (Hagoort, 1997). On the other hand, while 
no associative priming studies have been reported for CB populations, NCB patients 
have shown deficits in verb-generation, but spared performance in verb-selection tasks, 




Another issue would be the one-to-one identification of particular 
neuroanatomical loci with instantiations of psycholinguistic components. As already 
suggested, pseudosyntax need not employ computations of a single neuroanatomical 
locus (section 2.4.4.1). Rather, if Broca‘s area is to be viewed as a mechanism involved 
in pseudosyntactic processes, then it should do so by its participation in the cortico-
cerebellar and cortico-striatal circuits that form the ‗‗procedural‘‘ component of 
language processing (Ullman, 2004).  
 
In the context of two-stage models, then, the CB would be but one 
neuroanatomical structure supporting pseudosyntactic operations, such as schema-
transmission and N-V-N heuristics. Some first clinical and imaging evidence on the CB 
would also suggest that this structure is not involved in processing grammar in a 
categorical, ‗rules‘-based fashion, thus further corroborating the cerebral-categorical/ 
CB-associative distinction made above (section 2.3.4.3) To begin with, findings from 
neuropsychological experiments employing artificial grammar learning paradigms 
suggest that Broca‘s area, and not the CB, is involved in the acquisition of grammatical 
structure. ‗‗Artificial grammar learning‘‘ (Reber, 1967) is a form of implicit rule-
learning. After viewing a series of letter strings formed according to a finite state rule 
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system, subjects are capable of classifying new letter strings as to whether or not they 
are formed according to these grammatical rules, despite little conscious insight into the 
rule per se. A patient study employing artificial grammar learning has shown no implicit 
learning deficits in rule extraction for CB patients (Witt et al., 2002). On the other hand, 
several studies, involving fMRI (e.g. Forkstam et al., 2006; Petersson et al., 2004, 
2010), TMS (Udden et al., 2008) and tDCS (de Vries et al., 2010), or clinical data 
(Christiansen et al., in press), implicate Broca‘s area in artificial grammar learning. 
 
Furthermore, unlike left hemispheric perisylvian lesions, CB ones are not 
strongly related with acquired aphasias and dyslexias. This suggests that the CB is not 
integral to the access and representation of orthographic, phonological, semantic and 
syntactic information, but instead that it exerts a more indirect influence (Desmond & 
Fiez, 1998). Indeed, CB-induced aphasias are the exception rather than the rule in NCB 
pathology (Daum et al., 2001), and often involve cortical deafferentization (section 
1.3.3). And whenever they occur, CB language deficits are milder than classical aphasic 
syndromes, such as Broca‘s or transcortical motor aphasia, owing to the 
‗‗neurofunctionally redundant‘‘ nature of representations stored there (Fabbro et al., 
2004). Pickett‘s (1998) findings above also suggest that syntactic and semantic 
representations are preserved in CB language pathology (section 2.4.4.3).  
 
Suggestively, the CB patient of Fiez et al. (1992) failed to provide semantic-
associatively appropriate verbs for given nouns in a verb-generation task (see next 
section for discussion); however, their responses were semantic-categorically related 
with the presented word stimuli. For instance, when asked to generate an appropriate 
verb for the noun ‗pill‘, they responded with the adjective ‗small‘, instead of the 
prominent for normal controls response ‗take‘; similarly, for ‗dog‘, they responded with 
‗cat‘, instead of ‗bark‘ (Fiez et al., 1992, p. 161). This supports the idea that CB damage 
leaves semantic networks intact (Fiez & Raichle, 1997). In the same vein, the NCB 
patients in Gebhart et al. (2002) showed impairments in producing an appropriate verb 
in response to a noun (see section 2.4.4.5 below), but when asked to select the 
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appropriate verb among alternative ones for a particular noun, they showed spared 
performance. The patients were also able to produce appropriate subordinate term (e.g. 
‗apple‘)-responses to a superordinate term (‗fruit‘) presented to them. These results 
suggested that lexical semantic representations were spared; they are, moreover, 
qualitatively different from the direct disruptions in semantic networks associated with 
temporal cortical pathology in semantic dementia and Alzheimer‘s disease (e.g. Rogers 
& Friedman, 2008, for references). 
 
Finally, the metasystemic nature of CB contributions to processes of other parts 
of the central nervous system (section 1.4) makes it ideal for the performance of such 
‗pseudosyntactic‘ operations: the latter function outwith the syntactic system, yet they 
are defined by what the latter performs routinely. To the best of my knowledge, no 
imaging or clinical study has ever sought an explicit dissociation between Broca‘s area 
and the CB with respect to such automatization processes. However, the decomposition 
of motor synergies, the deficits in conditioning, and the dual-tasking impairments 
accompanying CB pathology have been described as quite intrinsic to CB disorders, and 
have not been likened to any motor deficits involved in Broca‘s area pathology (see 
section 3.5.3). Similarly, CB lesions make performance in sensorimotor tasks only 
suboptimal. In movement control, CB lesions affect compound movements, but 
selectively spare those of single muscles/limbs, allowing patients to adopt a seriatim 
mode of execution for the more complex ones (sections 2.2.2 and 3.5.3). Even in the 
case of eye-blink conditioning, responses have been argued to remain relatively spared 
after CB lesions, but to be made largely suboptimal (Courchesne & Allen, 1997). This 
suggests that only a few tasks fundamentally rely on CB computations (Paulin, 1997; 
section 2.4.4.3 here). 
 
The NCB may thus arguably instantiate a subset of associative computations 
observed in sentence comprehension. Further research in the field should attempt to 
establish the necessary dissociations among different structures and different operations 
in sentence processing.  
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2.4.4.5. Neocerebellar Schema-Transmission 
 
Turning to semantic aspects of sentence comprehension, both the computational 
properties of the CB and some first suggestive neuropsychological evidence support the 
significance of the NCB in ‗‗schema-transmission‘‘ (Ferreira & Stacey, 2000). In two-
stage models (section 2.4.4.1), schema-transmission represents a characteristic first-
stage, heuristic process, involving the activation of event schemata upon encountering 
the relevant concepts (e.g. the association of a dog with the agent-role in a biting event; 
see Ferreira & Stacey, 2000; Ferreira, 2003; Townsend & Bever, 2001). Schema-
transmission of course influences sentence processing across two-stage and constraint-
based models (McRae et al., 2005), and thus deserves closer attention. 
 
According to the theory on (event) schemata, stereotypical knowledge about the 
world is organized into units, including information about sequences of objects, 
situations, events, or states. While early work on schemata involved highly structured 
information stored in memory and accessed directly from it, more flexible mechanisms 
have recently been proposed: schemata are not the products of inferential manipulation 
of declaratively encoded representations, but are activated below the level of awareness 





The emulative properties of the CB are ideal to undertake the fast retrieval and 
online application of schemata. Despite the representation of events in long-term 
memory in temporo-parietal cortical areas, NCB ‗‗dynamics memory‘‘ (Ito, 1993a, b) 
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 The reader may notice that the notion of a ‗schema‘ used in the sentence comprehension literature 
differs significantly from that used in the construction grammar framework (section 2.3.4.3). In the 
former, a ‗‗(constructional) schema‘‘ refers to abstract constructions, which are roughly equivalent to 
generativist rules (Diessel, 2004). In the latter, an ‗‗(event) schema‘‘ reflects real-world knowledge, and 
is close to the idea of a ‗script‘ and action-based routines (e.g. Hurford, Flaherty, & Argyropoulos, 
2007). This is an important clarification, as, in the former notion, a schema is discussed as a categorical, 
cortically-stored representation, whereas, in the latter, as involving CB expectancy-generation 
mechanisms. These quite confounding terminological contingencies are suggestive of the pervasive use 
of the term ‗‗schema‘‘ (Rumelhart, 1980) in cognitive science. 
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would guarantee their fast online application in sentence processing. For a sentence like 
‗the dog was bitten by the man‘, the NCBKFLP, in a low Kalman gain modality, may 
output an interpretation (dog´(x), man´(y), bite´(x, y)) based on the predicted, 
statistically prominent arrangement of the semantic representations of lexical items, 
whereby the dog occupies the agent position in a biting event. By doing so, the CB 
would compensate for the often noisy, ambiguous, or computationally demanding 
linguistic input by overriding and/or bypassing the slower cortical computations of the 
syntax/semantics interface – only the latter guarantee the correct, yet slower and 
infrequent interpretation (dog´(x), man´(y), bite´(y, x)). 
 
Suggestively, priming phenomena observed in perceiving pairs of nouns (e.g. 
‗dog‘) and appropriate ζ-related verbs (e.g. ‗biting‘) have been accounted for in terms of 
‗‗expectancy generation‘‘ (McRae et al., 2005). As discussed above, the domain-general 
role of the CB in prediction and preparation for upcoming neural events (e.g. 
Courchesne & Allen, 1997) promotes it as an ideal candidate foundation for these 
mechanisms (section 2.2).  
 
From a similar perspective, knowledge of ‗‗dynamic events‘‘ has been argued to 
impact ζ-role assignment (Ferretti et al., 2003). These events are construed as having a 
period that leads up to a change of state, a period in which this change occurs, and a 
period that follows. Entities associated with particular events become salient in 
particular time points of the event. For example, agents are typically associated with the 
initiating conditions and the ongoing event, as they tend to cause the event to occur (e.g. 
‗The cop arrested…‘). Patients are associated with the resultant states and the ongoing 
event, as they often undergo a change of state (e.g. ‗…arrested the crook‘). As discussed 
above, CB feedforward control involves the acquisition of internal models for dynamic 
systems, i.e. systems the states of which change over time (section 2.2). If the perception 
of a particular entity is a reliable predictor of a change of state in an event (e.g. an 
agent), or vice versa (e.g. a patient), the low NCBKFLP gain conditions in processing 
such an event will invite maximal involvement of the NCB internal model. The latter 
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may override and/or bypass the perceptual-comprehensional input analysis system to 
provide a rapid arrangement of these entities and events into the scene in which they 
habitually occur (e.g. arrest΄(x, y), x = cop΄, y = crook΄). 
 
The strikingly identical nature of CB computations with those underlying the 
psycholinguistic mechanisms above makes it once again instructive to examine the 
neurolinguistic evidence available in the literature. Given that CB language research is 
still in its early infancy (sections 1.3.2, 2.3.1), it is hardly surprising that ζ-role priming 
experiments have not been conducted on NCB patients. However, insights can be gained 
into the issue from the methodologically much easier to apply verb-generation tasks. 
 
One of the first examples of CB activation during a clearly cognitive task came 
from a PET study reported by Petersen et al. (1989; also section 1.3.2 here), where 
subjects were asked to generate aloud semantically appropriate verbs in response to 
visually or aurally presented nouns (e.g. ‗eat‘ in response to ‗cake‘). During the control 
scan, subjects were asked to read aloud or repeat auditorily presented nouns. Activation 
of an area within the right lateral CB was found when subjects generated verbs, but not 
when they read or repeated nouns. Thus CB activation was difficult to account for on a 
purely motor basis. Similar results have been found in a recent study, where activations 
of right posterolateral CB loci were shown to be rather selectively involved in a verb-
generation task (Frings et al., 2006; see section 4.3 for more discussion). 
 
The first clinical case study to support a CB role in the selection of lexical 
concepts was that of Fiez et al. (1992). They examined an English-speaking patient with 
a large right CB infarct, who generated inappropriate responses in a number of word-
generation tasks, involving verb generation. As discussed in section 2.4.4.4 above, their 
responses were semantic-associatively inappropriate, but remained semantic-
categorically related (e.g. ‗small‘, instead of ‗take‘ or ‗swallow‘, in response to ‗pill‘). 
This could not be attributed to overall cognitive impairment, since the patient‘s 
performance on tests of memory, intelligence, ‗frontal function‘, and language skills was 
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excellent. Similar findings have been reported in subsequent studies (e.g. Fabbro et al., 
2000). 
 
Stronger evidence is provided in Gebhart et al. (2002), where a striking 
dissociation is shown between spared performance of NCB patients in the verb selection 
task and pronounced difficulties in the verb-generation task. Patients performed poorly 
in generating appropriate verbs for a given noun, but were able to select the correct verb-
response to a noun-stimulus from a list of alternative verb-responses. This suggests that 
the lexical semantic/syntactic representations of noun-verb associations were preserved 
in memory, however, the online ‗‗internal generation‘‘ of verb-responses to noun-stimuli 
was compromised (ibid). This dissociation between verb selection and verb generation 
could also be interpreted as a selective sparing of cerebral-stored lexical and syntactic 
information, along with a disruption in the CB-based online generation of habitual 
semantic associations. Furthermore, the dissociation between CB patients‘ spared 
performance in subordinate term generation (stimulus: fruit; response: apple) and their 
impaired performance in verb generation suggests that ‗‗[t]he right posterolateral 
cerebellum may be more involved in associative semantics than in categorical 
semantics‘‘ (Gebhart et al., 2002, p. 332). This would directly add weight to the model 
here, and to the distinction made between cortico-cortical, categorical processes, cortico-
cerebellar, associative ones (section 2.3.4.3). Finally, the third TMS study reported here 
(chapter 7) provides some rather suggestive evidence in support of selective involvement 
of NCB circuitry in schema-transmission. 
 
 
2.4.4.6. Neocerebellar Shallow Processing  
 
Insights on the linguistic contributions of NCB computations can be gained by 
another central feature of sentence comprehension, namely, ‗‗shallow processing‘‘ 
(Sanford & Sturt, 2002) or ‗‗underspecification‘‘, whereby  
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[…] the comprehender rarely constructs a precise and 
complete semantic analysis because the information 
explicitly offered in the text is incomplete or because a 
precise complete interpretation would not be worth the 
processing effort (Sanford & Graesser, 2006, p. 100). 
 
 Cases of ‗‗pragmatic normalization‘‘ (Fillenbaum, 1974) and ‗‗verbal illusions‘‘ 
(Wason & Reich, 1979) provide some characteristic examples. The sentences in (1a) and 
(2a) are systematically misprocessed and assigned the plausible but not actual meanings 
of (1b) and (2b), respectively, instead of the consistent with respect to the syntax-
semantic interface, yet absurd with respect to the semantics-pragmatics interface 
meanings along the lines of (1c) and (2c), respectively.  
 
(1a)  ‗Don‘t print that or I won‘t sue you‘                                                       (Fillenbaum, 1974) 
 
(1b)   If some item is printed, the result will be a lawsuit. 
 
(1c)   If some item is printed, the result will not be a lawsuit. 
 
(2a)  ‗No head injury is too trivial to be ignored‘                                    (Wason & Reich, 1979) 
 
(2b)   Every head injury should be treated, no matter how trivial 
 




These cases reflect the application of an interpretational routine triggered by the 
construction ‗don‘t X or Y‘ (1) and ‗no X is too Y to be Z-ed‘ (2), respectively. They 
thus involve a top-down effect from pragmatics to semantics that overrides the 
computations of the syntax-semantics interface necessary for arriving at the correct 






 [i]t is likely […] that the plausible meaning may suppress 
the need for verification of the syntactic and semantic 
relation in the sentences by the subjects, beyond a certain 
point, simply because they cannot see the reason for such 
verification (Natsopoulos, 1985, p. 390).  
 
For these illusions, the Pickering and Garrod (2007) production-based emulator 
has been considered to override the processes of the syntax-semantics interface in the 
input analysis system and provide an interpretation based on the habitual arrangement of 
the semantic components of these sentences. Verbal illusions thus reflect defining 
features of NCB feedforward control and state estimation. Reoccurring associations 
between inputs and outputs of certain processes (stored in the CB) may override and/or 
bypass these very (cerebral) processes, biasing or altogether tramping their ‗actual‘ 
output, and inhibiting further analysis of their input (sections 2.2.2 and 2.3.4.3). 
 
Further insight may be gained from another perspective, whereby verbal illusions 
are outputs of incorrectly constructed ‗‗mental models‘‘
35
 (Garnham & Oakhill, 1996). 
As mentioned above, one of the most insightful considerations so far on CB internal 
model contributions to thought processing has been the idea that the NCB copies the 
dynamics of the construction of mental models. The prefrontal association cortex acts as 
a controller on the temporo-parietal cortical areas, i.e. the controlled object. By 
routinization of a particular thought operation, NCB internal models may copy the 
mental model and allow the controller to operate on the NCB rather than on the 
temporo-parietal cortex. In that way, thought may occur rapidly and well below the level 
of awareness (e.g. Ito, 2000, 2008; sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.4 here). 
 
 
                                                          
35
 The idea that people rely on mental models is traced back to Kenneth Craik‘s (1943) suggestion that the 
mind develops ‗‗small-scale models‘‘ of reality to anticipate events. They are constructed from 
perception, imagination, or the comprehension of discourse, with varying degrees of abstractness. 
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In the case of the verbal illusion here, the NCB internal models would receive a 
copy of the sequences of the representations of the individual lexical items that the 
cortical input analysis system is processing to construct the particular mental model as 
an output. In the processes of the cortical input analysis system, the prefrontal controller 
may unify the individual conceptual representations of the lexical items activated in 
temporo-parietal loci according to the specifications of the syntactic structure of the 
sentential input. On the contrary, the internal models will output, via the dentato-
thalamo-cortical tract, the statistically reliable, habitual arrangement of those conceptual 
representations that is routinely generated by cortical loci (section 1.2.4). Low Kalman 
gain conditions are established here both due to the strength of the association between 
lexical semantics and habitual interpretation, and due to the heavy computational 
demands posed by the syntactic structure of such inputs. These conditions invite 
maximized NCB involvement, with neocerebello-cortical computations overriding 
and/or bypassing the slower cortico-cortical ones.  
 
‗‗Semantic illusions‘‘ provide another characteristic phenomenon involving 
underspecification and shallow processing. A series of different factors affect detection 
rates and thus the strength of the illusion (see Sanford & Graesser, 2006, for a review). 
For instance, in the famous ‗‗Moses illusion‘‘ (Erickson & Mattson, 1981), the illusion 
effect has been shown to reach a maximum when the critical impostor word is out of 
linguistic focus. This is because detection rates increase when reformulating the original 
sentence in (3a) as a focused cleft construction and directly probing its interpretation, as 




(3a)   How many animals of each kind did Moses put on the ark? 
 
(3b)   It was Moses who put two of each kind of animal on the ark. True or False? 
 
        




Crucially, a significant factor for the strength of anomaly detection in semantic 
illusions is the ‗‗the extent to which the scenario predicts the [anomalous] item‘‘ (Barton 
& Sanford, 1993, p. 477), since ‗‗[…] detectability is a function of scenario-based 
expectation‘‘ (ibid, p. 483). For instance, in the ‗survivors anomaly‘ below (4), detection 
rates are significantly lower when the term ‗survivors‘ is used in a plane crash scenario 
(4a), but are higher when the term is used in the context of a bicycle crash scenario (4b).  
 
(4a)   When an airplane crashes, where should the survivors be buried? 
 
(4b)   When a bicycle accident occurs, where should the survivors be buried? 
 
          (Barton & Sanford, 1993) 
 
 
In (4a), low Kalman gain conditions are established by the strength of the 
associations between lexical semantics and routine interpretations. By maximized 
involvement of cerebro-cerebellar computations in determining the final output of the 
interpretational process, extensive cortico-cortical analysis of the properties of the 
linguistic input is inhibited. Just as low Kalman gain conditions in perception leave 
room for Kalman filters to over-discard sensory data on the basis of internal model 
predictions (section 2.4.4.1) so would the NCBKFLP here inhibit complete semantic 
analysis. Furthermore, as in the case of schema-transmission above (section 2.4.4.5), 
these ‗‗scenario-based expectations‘‘ here reflect CB computations of prediction and 
preparation, operating well beyond fully specified inputs and outputs: 
 
[c]omplete knowledge of upcoming events is not 
necessary to trigger specific preparatory actions. What is 
important is the probabilistic relevance of a particular 
sequence or stimulus as a predictor of an upcoming event 




Suggestively, CB pathology has been associated with some striking violations of 
default economy principles in cognitive performance. For instance, when asked to write 
a sentence, a CB patient wrote eight lines; when asked to draw a clock with numbers on 
it, they drew two intricate diagrams, one of a wrist watch and one of a wooden tower 
clock (figure 2.6). This ‗‗cognitive overshoot‘‘ provides a characteristic case of the 
cognitive-affective abnormalities following CB pathology that fall under the term 
‗‗dysmetria of thought‘‘ (Schmahmann, 1998). In general, these involve disruptions in 
the universal function of the CB ‗‗as an oscillation dampener, maintaining function 
steadily around a homeostatic baseline‘‘ (ibid, p. 367). On the basis of the above, then, 
pragmatic normalization would represent an instance of NCB oscillation dampening in 
sentence comprehension. 
 
                          
Figure 2.6: Responses of a CB patient to requests to write a sentence and draw a clock 





On a more speculative basis, Deacon (1997) has suggested that the CB may 
undertake a ‗‗rapid‘‘ but ‗‗shallow‘‘ search for word associations, the results of which 
are subsequently selected by the prefrontal cortex. The CB may thus 
 
[…] be very important for the generation of word 
associations at a rate sufficient for speech. At the rate 
words are presented in speech, the speaker or listener 
must be able rapidly to generate associated words and 
avoid letting earlier associations interfere. The cognitive 
search process must be as rapid but as shallow as 
possible. Any slight tendency to perseverate would 
entirely derail the process […] The cerebellum may 
provide an independent generator of novel but predictable 
shifts of associations from one context to another, while 
prefrontal cortex is providing a selective inhibition of all 
but the one sample that fits the new criteria (ibid, p. 277; 
italics mine). 
 
This CB ‗‗shallow cognitive search‘‘ then may be at least partly accountable for 
underspecified semantic analyses. For instance, in the survivors anomaly above (4a), the 
CB-generated ‗‗predictable shifts of associations‘‘ from ‗airplane crash‘ to ‗survivors‘ 
would provide biasing factors for the illusion to occur.  
 
Perhaps the strongest piece of suggestive evidence comes from independently 
motivated studies on the role of the CB in prediction-based illusions. The CB is 
involved, for instance, in the ‗‗size-weight illusion‘‘, whereby the smaller of two objects 
of equal weight is perceived as heavier (Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2004). This has 
been explained as a mismatch between predicted and actual sensorimotor feedback. 
Resistance to such illusions has been shown in both CB patients and schizophrenic 
populations. In Hubbard and Ramachandran (2004), normal control subjects and patients 
were initially tested for their accuracy in discriminating different weights. They were 
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presented with a pair of cans differing in weight by 50 grams and were asked to state 
which of the two was heavier. All subjects showed accurate weight discrimination in 
control conditions. The magnitude of the illusion was assessed by asking subjects to 
determine among the number of small cans of different weights which one matched the 
apparent weight of a large, heavy one. Control subjects showed clear effects of the 
illusion, matching the large can with one weighing substantially less. The illusion was 
not due to an inability to discriminate the weight of the cans, since the magnitude of the 
illusion was far greater than the minimum difference that could be discriminated. On the 
other hand, five of their seven CB patients showed a reduction of the illusion, despite 
intact weight discrimination. Similarly, the reduced size-weight illusion found for 
schizophrenic subjects in a more recent study has been discussed in the context of 
disrupted forward internal models involving the CB (Williams et al., 2010).  
 
To a certain extent, then, phenomena like verbal illusions can be fruitfully 
understood as the linguistic equivalents of this ‗‗predictive sensorimotor illusion‘‘ 
(Hubbard & Ramachandran, 2004, p. 407) here. The cytoarchitectural homogeneity of 
the CB, its reciprocal connectivity with language-related cortical loci, along with the 
evidence for resistance to such illusions because of CB disruptions, and the fact that the 
same basic predictive computations are employed in sentence comprehension, all add 
weight to the idea that NCB circuitry may be fundamentally involved in the sentence 













2.5. The Neocerebellum, Mirror Neurons,  
       Emulation and Imitation 
 
 
As already suggested, the accommodation of feedforward control and state 
estimation in cognitive science and psycholinguistics has progressed outwith the context 
of CB neuroscience (section 2.3.1). Instead, the mirror neuron system, and, for language 
processing, its compartments in BA 44/45, have received emphasis to a smaller (Wilson 
& Knoblich, 2005) or larger (e.g. Iacoboni, 2005; Hurley, 2008; Glenberg, 2009) extent 
as the candidate instantiation of such computations,
36
 neglecting CB circuitry as their 
fundamental site (see discussion in Miall, 2003). The discussion turns briefly now to the 
relation of the NCBKFLP with imitation mechanisms and mirror neuron functions in 
language perception-comprehension. 
 
To begin with, the idea of premotor mirror neurons instantiating feedforward 
control has recently been met with skepticism. For instance, it has been argued that the 
impetus for this idea is partly motivated by the emphasis placed on the perception of 
grasping actions. Grasping involves a multi-state operation, the production of which per 
se involves feedforward control. However, observing simple activities-states, e.g. 
holding an object, which do not necessitate these computations, also involves premotor 
mirror neuron activation. This then makes prediction mechanisms an unlikely function 
for such a locus (Rizzolatti, 2009).  
 
Above all, however, the hypothesis here does not need to refute the role of mirror 
neurons or of any other structure in covert imitation in language perception-
comprehension. This is because the desideratum of this thesis has been to investigate 
how CB feedforward control and state estimation may be manifested and explored in 
language processing, whether within or outwith the context of covert imitative 
production mechanisms. This is why the NCBKFLP is not proposed to directly 
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 The Pickering and Garrod (2007) model remains compatible with, but uncommitted to mirror neuron 
involvement (Pickering & Garrod, 2009b). 
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instantiate the mechanisms of Pickering & Garrod (2007) or of any other related 
cognitive model, but only to gain the necessary psycholinguistic insight from them. As a 
result, the question of production mechanisms and the extent to which they are involved 
in emulative language processing is almost entirely beyond the scope of this 
investigation.  
 
Rather, if any insights may be afforded at all into the neural grounding of 
production-based emulative language perception-comprehension, the claim would be a 
rather conservative one; namely, that only its emulative component has NCB circuitry as 
the strongest neural candidate. The idea then that the emulator is provided by the 
production system at the psycholinguistic level (Pickering & Garrod, 2007) should 
perhaps not exhaust its neuroanatomical foundations to language production-specific 
loci. Despite the adaptive coupling of emulation and covert imitation in cognitive 
repertoires, the underlying neuroanatomical foundations of the two processes might in 
fact be distinct. Conceivably, in the imitative perception of conspecifics, language 
production-related cortical loci may employ the CB as the par excellence, modality-
independent locus of emulation (section 2.2.2), by their reciprocal connectivity (section 
1.3.2). In Argyropoulos (2009), for instance, the NCB and frontal cortical mirror 
neurons were explicitly proposed to provide the grounds for Pickering and Garrod‘s 
(2007) processor in toto. A cooperation of imitation and emulation mechanisms could be 
thus undertaken by the frontal cortical-NCB circuits respectively. 
 
Indeed, the current literature provides some first suggestive evidence for the 
involvement of the CB in emulative imitation: While the properties of the connectivity 
of BA 44/45 mirror neurons with the right posterolateral CB have not yet been 
researched, CB afferents via the dentato-thalamic tract to the F5, i.e. Broca‘s homologue 
in monkeys (Petrides & Pandya, 1994) have been held to have input-output relations 
with the mirror neurons in that area, representing the ‗‗desired state‘‘ in tool-use learning 
(Imamizu et al., 2003). The connectivity between mirror neurons in Broca‘s area and the 
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right posterolateral CB would thus guarantee the imitation-emulation cooperation 
proposed above.  
 
Certain issues in dyslexia also lie at the intersection of the motor theory of 
speech perception and CB functions. In the former, the core premise is that speech 
perception involves access to the speech motor system, and that the efficient perception 
of the invariant events of the speech stream in the variable acoustic signal may employ 
connections between production and perception (Liberman et al., 1967; Galantucci et 
al., 2006). In this context, the phonological deficit in dyslexia has been argued to result 
from an articulatory problem, promoting the CB as a ‗‗neural instantiation of the motor 
theory of speech perception‘‘ (Ivry & Justus, 2001, p. 513). Future research could thus 
fruitfully combine insights from CB deficits in dyslexia (Nicolson et al., 2001; section 
3.3.5 here) with those provided by the motor theory of speech perception to investigate 
CB involvement in the production-perception links. 
 
Some imaging findings also implicate CB circuitry in imitative processes. In a 
functional imaging study, subjects were scanned while they watched actions for later 
imitation. Activations were found in the CB, as well as in the same parietal and premotor 
regions that are involved in producing actions. These activations indicated that, during 
observation of action, the neural networks subserving motor representations are already 
tuned for imitation (Decety et al., 1997). This would be expected if, during imitative 
action perception, the brain recruited the CB-stored associations of the perceiver‘s own 
intentions with the same contexts and consequences for those actions (see Blakemore & 








In this respect, then, covert imitative language production in perception-
comprehension may be fully compatible with the more general treatment of NCB 
emulation here. Future research would be required to dissociate the contributions of the 
language production-related cortical loci from those of the modality-independent NCB 
feedforward control and state estimation. The thesis now turns to a set of experimental 
























2.6. Experimental Predictions 
 
The phenomena grounding the psycholinguistic mechanisms of interest here 
(section 2.4) may offer the testing grounds for the neurolinguistic hypothesis presented. 
The predictions below constitute an agenda much larger than the purposes of the thesis, 
and are thus bound to be part of future research (section 8.2).  
 
At an elementary level, all predictions below refer to selective lesions on one of 
two basic CB sites: the deep CB nuclei or the CB cortex.
37
 With a certain degree of 
abstraction, the dynamic trade-off in the strengths of the outputs of these two areas 
(section 1.2.3.1) would indicate that a lesion on one would make the output of the other 
prevail. Conceivably, a lesion of the deep CB nuclei should abolish transmission of the 
linguistic prediction to the cortical input analysis system. This would result in a ‗bottom-
up‘ processing of the stimuli, heavily based on the sensory and categorical properties of 
the input. Overall, this would be captured with lower amenability to prediction-based 
illusions for CB patients, as already observed in the sensory domain (section 2.4.4.6). 
On the contrary, a selective lesion in the CB cortex would result in insufficient inhibition 
of the deep CB nuclei (which are constantly excited by mossy fiber and climbing fiber 
collaterals; section 1.2.3) and would thus involve a suboptimal over-reliance of 
processing on predictive signals via the dentato-thalamic tract to the language-related 
cortical loci; this could translate into increased amenability to such illusions.  
 
However, currently available evidence does not suffice to strongly commit to 
associations of particular lesions with a particular direction of an effect, as above. For 
instance, it remains unclear whether state estimates are expressed either in the CB cortex 
or in the nuclei or in both (see Miall & King, 2007, for discussion). Thus, the primary 
commitment of the predictions below pertains to the qualitatively different performance 
that CB patients are expected to show from healthy normal controls. 
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 Sentence Comprehension 
 
The cases of sentence comprehension discussed above (section 2.4.4) can all be 
studied in experimental settings, with abnormal performance resulting from a 
compromised (silenced or disinhibited) predictive, top-down processing modality. 
 
 
2.6.1.1. Garden-Path Amenability 
 
Given that ‗‗eager‘‘, ‗‗predictive‘‘ top-down parsing supports strong 
incrementality (see discussion in Sturt & Lombardo, 2005), and that strong 
incrementality underlies garden-path effects (e.g. Frazier & Rayner, 1982), the 
impairment of neural components of a top-down processing modality will arguably have 
an impact on the amenability to these effects. As discussed above, a low NCBKFLP gain 
modality would invite maximized NCB involvement: in such case, syntactic predictions 
and schematic knowledge may override a syntax-based ζ-role assignment (sections 2.3 
and 2.4). A lesioned neodentate and a subsequent disruption of a top-down processing 
modality would translate here into stronger resistance to garden-path effects in 
processing sentences like (5a-b) below. On the contrary, selective CB cortical lesions 
would induce disinhibited neodentate signalling to cerebral output loci, inviting an 
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 The term ‗abnormal‘ is preferred, because differences in the localization of the CB deficit may involve 
effects in opposite directions with respect to performance, either in the form of ‗enhancements‘, or of 
‗impairments‘ as compared with normal control subjects.  
39
 From another perspective, the ‗‗Intonation Unit storage hypothesis‘‘ predicts that constructions that are 
‗‗precompiled‘‘ (not analytically computed) are the Grammatical Units that normally occur in a single 
Intonation Unit. The hypothesis further predicts that incorrect parses in garden-path sentences are made 
on the basis of such precompiled grammatical-intonation units (Croft, 1995). The significance of the 
NCB in processing such units was discussed above (section 2.3.4.3), and is also treated from another 
perspective in the next chapter (section 3.6.3.1.2). 
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(5a)    The patient persuaded the doctor that he was having trouble with to leave 
  
       *  [NP            V              NP            that S΄]                     
VS:  
           [NP            V              NP            that RC                                       VP] 
 
 
(5b)    I      told the boy the dog bit Sue would help him. 
 
      *   [NP   V    NP        S΄]    
VS:  
           [NP   V    NP        RC              S΄] 
  
 
         (Croft, 1995) 
 
 
2.6.1.2. Misinterpretation of ‘Non-Canonical’ Sentences 
 
Earlier in this chapter, suggestive evidence was discussed for NCB-induced 
impairments in schema-transmission and/or syntactic pseudoparses (sections 2.4.4.1, 
2.4.4.3, and 2.4.4.5). Sentences often misinterpreted on the basis of such mechanisms by 
normal control subjects as in (6) below would receive a qualitatively different treatment 
by CB patients. A disrupted dentato-thalamic tract would leave the system to operate on 
the basis of the categorical properties of the sentence input, without the influence of such 
schematic information or pseudoparses. On the contrary, a selectively disrupted CB 
cortex would fail to inhibit the predictive output of the constantly excited neodentate, 
thus resulting in a superfluous employment of such pseudoparses and schematic 
knowledge, in the expense of the cortically-based analysis.  
 







2.6.1.3. Semantic Illusion Amenability 
 
In the same vein, selective neodentate pathology would disrupt the ‗‗scenario-
based predictions‘‘ that normally affect the depth at which sentences like (7) below are 
processed (section 2.4.4.6). In that way, such CB patients would show higher success 
rates than normal controls in detecting the anomaly. On the contrary, selective disruption 
of the CB cortex would maximize amenability to semantic illusions, because of the 
disinhibited transmission of such expectations by the neodentate. 
 
 
(7)   ‗When an airplane crashes, where should the survivors be buried?‘  
 
        (Barton & Sanford, 1993) 
 
   
 
2.6.1.4. Verbal Illusion amenability 
 
Neodentate disruption is also expected to minimize reliance on the 
interpretational routines involved in verbal illusions (see section 2.4.4.6 here). The 
interpretational burden would instead be allocated to the slower yet more precise 
bottom-up processor of the syntax-semantics interface. This would translate into 
significantly higher success rates in paraphrasing sentences like (8). This would not 
result from any increased processing capacities per se for CB patients,
40
 but would 
instead be owed to increased reliance on bottom-up processing, in the face of smaller 
interference of any interpretational routines. Selective pathology of the CB cortex, on 
the other hand, would induce maximized reliance on interpretational routines, and would 
thus be associated with lower accuracy rates than those of normal control subjects. 
 
 
(8)   ‗No head injury is too trivial to be ignored‘                                     (Wason & Reich, 1979) 
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 In fact, the global cognitive impairments in CB patients might make such stimuli far from ideal for a 
sentence comprehension task (see section 4.3 for discussion). 
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2.6.2. Abnormal Lexical Associative Priming 
 
As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the CB is involved the prediction 
and preparation of the nervous system for a neural event B based on its reliable temporal 
contiguity with the detected event A (Courchesne & Allen, 1997; see section 2.1 here). 
In language processing, one of the most elementary phenomena in which such processes 
manifest themselves was discussed to be that of ‗lexical associative priming‘: a prime 
word A facilitates recognition of target word B, given the frequent co-occurrence of 
their phonological and/or semantic representations in discourse (section 2.3.4.3). 
 
 
2.6.2.1. Formal-Associative Priming 
 
In the case of formal associates, as in the lexical pairs in (9) below, CB cortical 
disruptions would result in insufficient inhibition to the deep CB nuclear predictions. In 
such case, increased associative priming sizes would be a conceivable pattern in lexical 
decision task settings. In fact, this was the finding in the first TMS study reported here 
(chapter 5). On the other hand, disruptions in the dentato-thalamic tract would offer no 
room for prediction to influence processing at the cortical level. In such case, 
recognition of the temporal contiguity of the two items would rely on slower cortical 
processes. This would be reflected by smaller associative priming sizes.  
 








2.6.2.2. Semantic-Associative Priming 
 
The same mechanism could be tested for semantic associations. Online 
application of schematic knowledge would involve NCB computations. Thus, 
encountering particular components (e.g. ζ-role fillers) pertaining to ‗‗dynamic events‘‘ 
(e.g. referents of verbs) should trigger CB expectancy generation for this event to be 
processed (section 2.4.4.5). This is the case in the ζ-related noun-verb pairs in (10) 
below. In a priming paradigm, a CB patient group with selective dentate pathology 
would show disrupted access to expectancy-generation mechanisms, demonstrating little 
facilitation in processing such pairs, and thus small priming sizes. On the contrary, 
selective CB cortical disruption would invite disinhibited associative predictions by the 
neodentate. Conceivably, the latter case could manifest itself in larger priming sizes for 
that particular type of priming. This pattern was observed in the third TMS study 
reported here (chapter 7). 
 
(10)   assassin-KILLING, merchant-SELLING, chef-COOKING           (e.g. McRae et al., 2005) 
 
 
2.6.3. Abnormal Phonological Predictions 
2.6.3.1. Phoneme Restoration 
 
Phoneme restoration reflects a phenomenon whereby the phonemes that 
correspond to the missing or noisy segments of perceived speech are restored by the 
hearers on the basis of expectations from the surrounding acoustic context.  In other 
words, ‗‗[…] the stronger the contextual constraints, the greater the expectations should 
be, and the less bottom-up confirmation that should be needed‘‘ (Samuel, 1981, p. 476).  
In (11) below, for example, the speech sound removed was the first ‗s‘ in the word 
‗legislatures‘, along with portions of the adjacent phonemes, and was replaced by a 
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cough. The sentential predictability of the word, as well as the intra-lexical, syllabic 
predictability, compromised the perception of the cough as a sound other than an [s].  
 
(11)   ‗The state governors met with their respective legiSlatures convening in the capital city‘    
           
         (Warren, 1970) 
 
Phoneme restoration has already been discussed as reflecting emulative 
computations in speech perception (Pickering & Garrod, 2007). Evidence for the 
involvement of CB internal models in auditory enhancement in noisy contexts was 
presented in section 2.4.3 above. Conceivably, then, deep CB nuclear lesions would 
result in poor predictions on the upcoming speech segments. The percept would thus be 
analyzed solely on the basis of its sensory properties. In phoneme discrimination settings 
(Samuel, 1981), this would be reflected in elevated accuracy in detecting excised and 
replaced phonemes. In contrast, normal control subjects would perceptually enhance the 
noisy signal and thus restore it. Top-down factors, such as the number of syllables, the 
position of the selected phone, or the frequency of the word where such noise is 
introduced (ibid) would not affect the performance of those patients. On the contrary, 
selective CB cortical pathology would leave the NCBKFLP operating in a low Kalman 
gain modality. For such patients, the actual percept would be sub-optimally tramped by 
the disinhibited interference of sensory expectations, thus making the discrimination of a 
phoneme from the noise much more difficult. 
 
 
2.6.3.2. Speech Reduction 
 
As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, state estimation extends well 
beyond perception: for example, in contexts of low Kalman gain, it ensures a relatively 
feedback-free, rapid and accurate execution of limb movements in noisy and/or time-
critical conditions (section 2.2.1.2). In the same vein, in phonetic-phonological 
processing, CB predictions are involved in speech production to the same extent as 
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speech perception. This is reflected in phenomena of articulatory reduction in cases 
where the planned items are predictable in their sentential contexts.
41
 In other words, 
 
[…] both the acoustic realization and auditory perception 
of a given word in a meaningful sentence may be a 
function of the speaker‘s and listener‘s knowledge of the 
semantic and grammatical information contained in the 
entire sentence (Lieberman, 1963, p. 172).  
 
Independently of the accompanying dysarthrias (sections 1.3.1, 1.3.3), CB 
lesions might show selective impairments in speech reduction phenomena in a number 
of ways. Selective CB cortical lesions would result in disinhibited predictions in 
planning the articulation of a predictable lexical item as in (12a), as opposed to that of 
the same item in non-predictive contexts (12b). This may result in significantly more 
reduced articulatory gestures for the particular item in comparison with a normal control 
group in a sentence like (11a). On the contrary, silenced internal model predictions due 
to deep CB nuclear impairments would involve no facilitatory preactivation of the 
representation of the particular item in planning the corresponding speech segment. For 
such a patient group, no differences should be expected in the articulation of the item 
between sentence (12a) and (12b). 
 
 
(12a)   A stitch in time saves nine.                                                         (Lieberman, 1963) 
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 See also section 3.6.3.1 for a discussion of phonetic attrition in grammaticalization changes as involving 





The lack of interdisciplinary discourse between research on CB feedforward 
control/state estimation and psycholinguistics has left the former in a stagnant status 
with respect to the involvement of these computations in language processing. Their 
recent introduction in independent work in psycholinguistics offers a unique opportunity 
to identify mechanisms the dynamics of which can be copied by NCB circuitry. In the 
context of the model proposed above, the first steps were taken to bring the two 
disciplines in fruitful discourse. In particular, neocerebello-cortical processes were 
argued to provide associative computations that may bias, override and/or bypass 
cortico-cortical categorical ones. A number of psycholinguistic mechanisms were shown 
to rely on computations the instantiation of which fundamentally involves CB circuitry. 
Clinical and imaging findings were also discussed in the light of this synthesis. The first 
experimental predictions were finally formulated, thus making the hypothesis a directly 



















‗‗[O]ur ultimate goal is […] to uncover the 
actual mechanisms of change that operate in 
everyday language use that eventually give rise 






There are no ‗synchronic‘ or ‗diachronic phenomena‘; rather, there are different 
perspectives one may assume on the time-scale of different phenomena (Lehmann, 
2004). In the same vein, the fact that grammaticalization
42
 is predominantly studied from 
a diachronic perspective does not deprive the process from its synchronic aspect. In 
Argyropoulos (2008a), it was proposed that the neocerebellum (NCB) and the basal 
ganglia provide the neural grounding for the domain-general automatization phenomena 
that underlie the ontology of grammaticalization when examined from such a 
‗synchronic‘ perspective (see section 3.5.2 below, for references). It was further argued 
that current research on those structures allows the first steps towards constructing a 
neurolinguistics of grammaticalization. This is the line that I will expand on in this 
chapter. What I will argue in particular is that grammaticalization changes, at the intra-
generational level of routinized adult dialogical interaction, show a gradual involvement 
of cerebellar (CB)-based associative computations, overriding and/or bypassing cortical, 
categorical ones in online processing. The Neocerebellar Kalman Filter Linguistic 
                                                          
42
The term also appears in other forms, e.g. ‗grammaticization‘, ‗grammaticisation‘, ‗grammaticalisation‘, 
or ‗grammaticalization‘. The term used here is ‗grammaticalization‘. See Hopper & Traugott (1993, pp. 
xv-xvi), and Lehmann (2002, pp. 8-10) for discussion.  
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Processor (NCBKFLP) is proposed to control the changes in the trade-off between those 
two computational types (section 2.3.4.3). After a brief description of the ontology of 
grammaticalization operations (section 3.2) and the underlying cognitive mechanisms 
(sections 3.3-3.5.2), I go on to show the fundamental importance of CB circuitry for 
such mechanisms (section 3.5.3), and discuss how the NCBKFLP could ground the 
particular neurolinguistic processes of grammaticalization (section 3.6). I finally discuss 
in brief the relation of other brain structures with this historical process, namely, that of 

















3.2. Defining Grammaticalization 
 
‗‗Grammaticalization‘‘, a term introduced by Meillet (1912), traditionally refers 
to ‗‗the increase of the range of a morpheme advancing from a lexical to a grammatical 
or from a less grammatical to a more grammatical status‘‘ (Kurylowicz, 1965, p. 52). 
Such definitions, nearly half a century later, remain at the core of standard 
grammaticalization theory: ‗‗[g]rammaticalization concerns the evolution from lexical to 
grammatical forms and from grammatical to even more grammatical forms‘‘ (Heine & 
Kuteva, 2002, p. 377).  
 
 
3.2.1. Constructional Contexts 
 
However, with the advent of construction grammar as a new promising paradigm 
for linguistic description, ‗‗[t]he constructional tail has come to wag the syntactic dog: 
everything from words to the most general syntactic and semantic rules can be 
represented as constructions‘‘ (Croft, 2001, p. 17; also section 2.3.4 here). 
Correspondingly, in historical linguistics, grammaticalization is considered to be more 
accurately defined as the process by which a lexical item becomes a grammatical 
morpheme only within the morphosyntactic context of a particular construction (e.g. 
Bybee, 2002a; Heine, 2003; Himmelmann, 2004, p. 31). In other words, it is 
constructions that become grammaticalized, and not individual lexical items. The 
grammaticalization of the latter is, in fact, ‗‗a by-product of the grammaticalization of a 
construction‘‘, and grammaticalization may occur without a particular item mediating 
between the constituents of a grammaticalizing construction (Lehmann, 2002, p. 7). This 
can be seen in the comparison between (1a) and (1b) below. The subjunctive in (1a) 
expresses the speaker‘s distance from the content of his utterance, whereas in (1b) it is 





(1a)   Erwin entschuldigte sich; er habe mich nicht absichtlich getroffen. 
         ‗Irvin apologized, he didn't hit me on purpose.‘ 
 
 (1b)  Erwin sagte, er habe mich nicht absichtlich getroffen. 
         ‗Irvin said he didn‘t hit me on purpose.‘                                             (Lehmann, 2002, p. 7) 
 
 
With the above in mind, it is instructive, at this point, to present a basic ontology 
of grammaticalization. The presentation is far from exhaustive of the range of 
phenomena involved, and is rather meant as a short list of selective highlights for the 
purposes of the investigation here.
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 Furthermore, the phenomena below cannot be 
identified completely beyond theoretical commitments, especially in the context of 
grammaticalization studies and the much heated debates often involved – in different 




3.2.2. Basic Ontology 
 
Before the ultimate development of a new construction, grammaticalization 
changes operate on particular instances of more schematic constructions, i.e. 
constructions filled with particular lexical items. For instance, while several movement 
verbs instantiate the English constructional schema in (2), the only construction that has 
grammaticalized into a future marker is (2a), undergoing phonological, morphosyntactic, 
semantic, and pragmatic changes. Such changes isolate the particular construction from 
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(2)   [[movement verb + Progressive] + purpose clause (to + infinitive)]  
 
(2a)   I am going to see the king  
 
(2b)   I am travelling to see the king  
 
(2c)   I am riding to see the king                                                                  (Bybee, 2003) 
 
 
These multi-level changes that make the particular construction deviate from its 
corresponding schema include, among others, the following:  
 
The grammatical items in grammaticalizing constructions are often derived from 
metaphorically extended lexical source concepts. Body parts, for example, on account 
of their relative location, are used as structural templates to express deictic location, as 
in (3) below. Temporal concepts often originate from prepositions expressing spatial 
relations, as in the transition from (4a) to (4b). 
 
(3)   dori-    tutuo                                                       (Mursi) 
        house-mouth:of                                                 (Turton & Bender, 1976, p. 543;         
       ‗in front of the house‘                                         in Heine & Kuteva, 2002, p. 214) 
 
(4a) na‘o-na ‘ifi                                                         (Kwaio)      
       ‗in front of the house‘                                         (Keesing, 1991, p. 335. 
                                                                                    in Heine & Kuteva, 2002, pp. 141-2) 
(4b) na‘o-na omea  
       ‗before the mortuary feast‘  
 
 
A central mechanism of semantic-pragmatic changes in grammaticalization is 
that of ‘‘inference’’, or of the ‗‗conventionalization of implicature‘‘. If a 
grammaticalizing expression routinely occurs in an environment in which a certain 
inference is made, the expression may gradually become associated with such inference, 
to the extent that it is incorporated in the meaning of the expression (see Bybee et al., 
1994 for references and discussion). This is the case in the development of a causal 
meaning out of the originally temporal connective ‗since‘ (Traugott & König, 1991, pp. 
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194-5; Bybee et al., 1994, pp. 196-7) below. In (5a), only temporal meaning is 
expressed. However, the frequent occurrence of sentences like (5b) offered the contexts 
allowing a causal inference out of the temporal meaning, to the extent that sentences 
involving only a causal interpretation of the connective may nowadays be produced (5c). 
 
(5a)   I have done quite a bit of writing since we last met. 
 
(5b)   Since Susan left him, John has been very miserable. 
 
(5c)   Since you are not coming with me, I will have to go alone. 
        
         (Bybee et al., 1994, pp. 196-7) 
 
 
Grammaticalizing expressions also show a shift from encoding some particular 
semantic content to encoding generalized, reduced semantic content. This semantic 
change has been widely termed ‘‘semantic bleaching’’ (Givón, 1975), 
‗‗desemanticization‘‘, or ‗‗loss in meaning content‘‘ (Heine, 2003, pp. 578-9). The 
construction in (6a), for example, has lost the semantic component of volition, as traced 
in (6b), and expresses future events in a less constrained fashion, involving inanimate 
subjects, as in (6c). 
 
(6a)   [WILL VPinf] 
 
(6b)   I will marry you. 
 
(6c)   The bomb will explode. 
 
 
In the same vein, there is a gradual increase in generality in the range of 
contexts in which grammaticalizing phrases occur (Heine, 2003; Bybee, 2006). In 
Shakespearean English, for example, the meaning of ‗be going to‘ involved a subject 
literally travelling to a location in order to do something. The subject position could thus 
be occupied only by a noun phrase denoting an animate, mobile entity, and the following 
verb was required to be a dynamic verb, as in (7a). Via grammaticalization, a broader 
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range of appropriate noun and verb phrases were made available for the subject and verb 
positions, respectively. Thus, non-animate and non-mobile entities may nowadays fill 
the subject slot, and a broader range of predicates may fill the verb slot (Bybee, 2006), 
as in (7b). 
 
 
(7a)   I am going to see the king. 
 
(7b)   The tree is going to lose its leaves.                                                                  (Bybee, 2006) 
 
 
‘‘Chunking’’ (e.g. Boyland, 1996; Bybee 1998), or ‗‗coalescence‘‘ (Lehmann, 
1995[1982]), involves the increase in ‗‗syntagmatic bondedness‘‘, or ‗‗cohesion‘‘ 
(Lehmann, 1995, p. 147-8) of the signs with frequently co-occurring ones in the 
syntagmatic axis. Chunking may involve ‗‗cliticization‘‘, i.e. the transition of a sign 
from a juxtaposed relation with another one to its subordination to the adjacent accent. 
In (8a), the once independent Latin coordinator ‗que‘ turns into an enclitic attached to 
the first word of the second conjunct in the sentence. Chunking may also involve 
‗‗agglutination‘‘, i.e. the affixation of the sign to another, co-occurring one as a bound 
grammatical morpheme. In (8b), the Romance synthetic future was grammaticalized 
from the [infinitive + have] periphrastic construction. Finally, chunking may involve 
‗‗fusion‘‘ or ‗‗merger‘‘, i.e. the complete syntagmatic unification of the sign with an 
adjacent element (Lehmann, 1995 [1982]). In (8c), a verb of volition, in the course of 
becoming a future marker from Ancient to Modern Greek, has been merged with its co-
occurring subjunctive marker ‗na‘ into a single item (e.g. Tsangalidis, 1999). 
 
(8a)   Qui              ex       patre                  filioque                   procedit.                        (Latin) 
          REL.1SG.   from   father.SG.ABL son.SG.ABL-and    proceed.PRES.1SG 
         ‗Who proceedeth from the Father and the Son‘ 
 
 
(8bi) cantare               habet             (Latin) > cantar ha        >      cantará                     (Spanish) 
         sing.INF.PRES  have.3SG                     sing.fut.3SG 




(8bii)  cantare                habeo            (Latin) >  je                     chanter-ai                 (French) 
           sing.INF.PRES   have.1SG                      PRO.1SG        sing.fut.1SG 
          ‗I will sing‘ 
 
(8biii) cantare                habeo            (Latin) >  cantar-ei                                           (Portuguese) 
           sing.INF.PRES   have.1SG                      sing.fut.1SG 
          ‗I will sing‘ 
 
          (Fleischman, 1982, p. 115) 
 
 
(8c)    (ε)ζέιφ                ‗ίλα (A. Greek)  > ζέιφ ίλα > ζέιφ λα > ζέλα  > ζελα > ζα    (M. Greek)                         
          (e)'t
h
elō                 'hina                   >'ζelo 'ina  >'ζelo na  > 'ζena  > ζena > ζa 
           want.1SG.PRES   to 
          ‗I want to‘ 
 
 
Similarly to chunking, ‘‘phonetic attrition’’ (Givón, 1979), ‗‗erosion‘‘, or 
‗‗phonetic reduction‘‘, represents a reductive formal change, a ‗‗loss in phonetic 
substance‘‘ (e.g. Heine, 2003, pp. 578-9; Heine & Kuteva, 2003), this time, inside the 
sign per se. For instance, the definite direct object marker ‗ra‘ in Farsi is reduced to ‗-o‘ 
after consonants, as in (9) below:   
 
(9)   in         ce'tαb-   rα        xæri'dæm      >  in ce'tαb-o xæri'dæm                       (Farsi) 
        DEM   book     OBJ     bought.1SG. 
       ‗I bought this book‘ 
 
 
Because of changes like the above, linguistic units ‘‘decategorialize’’ (Hopper 
& Traugott, 1993), i.e. they lose morphosyntactic properties characteristic of the class of 
their source forms/syntactic categories, often including their previously independent 
word status, and become members of more grammatical categories (Heine & Kuteva, 
2002; Heine, 2003, pp. 578-9). For instance, full verbs may become auxiliaries (e.g. 
‗have‘, ‗do‘) or prepositions (e.g. ‗during‘), and demonstrative pronouns may become 




3.3. From Grammaticalization to Neuroscience 
 
However, the attempt to investigate the neurolinguistic foundations of such 
processes meets a lack of interdisciplinary discourse among grammaticalization theory, 
psycholinguistics and, a fortiori, cognitive neuroscience. The reflections of 
grammaticalizationists on the psycholinguistic foundations of their own ontology remain 
quite poor – some bright exceptions are found in the work of Bybee (e.g. Bybee, 2007a), 
as well as Kempson and Cann (2007), and Rosenbach and Jäger (2008). Psycholinguists, 
in the same vein, have not dealt much with the manifestation of linguistic phenomena at 
larger historical time-scales – work by Jurafsky and colleagues (e.g. Jurafsky et al., 
2001) is a characteristic exception. Finally, while research on the neurocognitive 
foundations of psycholinguistic phenomena is certainly much richer, little has been said 
about the involvement of dynamic neurolinguistic components in historical language 
change – Givón‘s work (recently summarized and updated in Givón, 2009) marks the 




3.3.1. The Psychological Demonstrandum 
 
While it is a well-acknowledged fact that ‗‗[h]istorical linguists aim to explain 
language change, ultimately in terms of properties of the human mind‘‘ (Aitchison, 
2003, p. 736), psychology remains far from becoming a sister discipline of historical 
linguistics. Awareness of this lack of discourse is often manifested in the field of 







[…]what we are actually talking about is the observable 
result that is based on our comparison between distinct 
uses, the historically earlier and the historically later […] 
What remains uninvestigated is the unobservable aspect 
of the psychology of language use, i.e. the 
psycholinguistic mechanism that triggers the process […] 
(Kuteva, 2001, p. 167f). 
 
Those ‗‗psycholinguistic mechanisms‘‘ remain, overall, elusive, and pleas have 
often been made for their investigation (e.g. Bybee et al., 1994; Kuteva, 2001; 
Tomasello, 2003; Hoefler & Smith, 2008, 2009). In the following sections, a preliminary 




3.3.2. The Neurocognitive Demonstrandum 
 
Constructing a neurolinguistics of grammaticalization is tantamount to 
identifying the causal chain running through the different ontological domains presented 
in figure 3.1: neurocomputations, psycholinguistic processes, and grammaticalization 
phenomena. In view of the poor discourse between grammaticalization theory and 
psycholinguistics-neurolinguistics, the endeavor here needs to follow two basic steps.  
 
The first step in such direction would be the identification of the neural 
foundations of the domain-general cognitive mechanisms underlying grammaticalization 
operations. Grammaticalizationists have often made, systematically or not, 
considerations on the domain-general mechanisms that their ontology reflects (see 
section 3.5.2 below). Those mechanisms are based on particular neural computations – a 
basic materialist commitment of modern cognitive neuroscience. One may thus arrive at 
the neural foundations of such domain-general mechanisms (figure 3.1.A). The second 
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step, which is toward the ultimate desideratum in this chapter, would be to identify the 
particular psycholinguistic mechanisms underlying grammaticalization phenomena, and 
construct a neurolinguistic grounding for them (figure 3.1.B).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: The ontological-epistemological chain. A. The first step: The neurocognitive 
grounds of the psychological changes reflected by grammaticalization operations 
provide some first insight into the neurocognition of grammaticalization. B. The 
desideratum: A concrete neurolinguistic model explaining the intra-generational 
psycholinguistic mechanisms introducing grammaticalization variants. 
 
 
3.3.3. On Grammaticalization as an Explanandum 
 
However, a number of clarifications are necessary on what such an approach can 
and cannot explain. To begin with, the account here remains safely far from acquiring a 
psychological or biological reductionist stance that would ignore the social aspects of 
grammaticalization or its multigenerational depth. Factors like literacy, for example, 
might have a direct impact on the material with which the psycholinguistic apparatus 
interacts, by accelerating or inhibiting the propagation of grammaticalized variants. In 
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the same vein, a central psychological factor in grammaticalization, such as the 
cognitive effects of repeated instances of processing (sections 3.4 and 3.5.2 below) 
would not predict the particular semantic properties of the constructions undergoing 
grammaticalization:  
 
[r]epetition alone […] cannot account for the universals of 
grammaticization. The fact that the same paths of change 
are followed in unrelated languages has multiple causes. It 
is not just the fact of repetition that is important but in 
addition what is repeated that determines the universal 
paths. The explanation for the content of what is repeated 
requires reference to the kinds of things human beings 
talk about and the way they choose to structure their 
communications (Bybee, 2003, p. 622). 
 
Furthermore, an explanation of such a multigenerational linguistic process 
should at all times be constrained to the neurolinguistic mechanisms available in the 
ontogenetic timescale of the interlocutors. This would save the approach from any 
teleological fallacies. Evidently, the historical time-scale that these processes necessitate 
to become manifest cannot allow any particular neuroanatomical structure to foretell the 
psycholinguistic or sociolinguistic phenomena that will occur in subsequent generations.  
 
Most importantly, the psycholinguistic phenomena presented above (section 
3.2.2) need not be particular to grammaticalization. Phenomena accompanying the 
historical emergence of new constructions appear independently, outwith 
grammaticalization contexts. For instance, items may lose their formal independence 
(10a-c) or any components of their original semantic representations (10b-c) within the 
context of lexicalization and idiomatization,
44
 with no particular construction 
undergoing grammaticalization. 
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 Lexicalization and idiomatization refer in general to the historical process by which morphologically 
complex (words and) constructions tend to behave unpredictably with respect to their compositional 
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(10a)   Baby sitter > babysitter; trouble shooter > troubleshooter 
  
(10b)   God be with you > Goodbye! 
 
(10c)   qor'bαn -e                šo'mα                                                                                            (Farsi)        
            sacrifice.SGEZ      POSS.2PL. 
           (lit. ‗I am your sacrifice‘) 
           ‗thank you/ goodbye‘  
 
 
Such observations have in fact added credibility to the idea that ―there is no such 
thing as grammaticalization, at least in so far as it might be regarded as a distinct 
grammatical phenomenon requiring a distinct set of principles for explanation‖ 
(Newmeyer, 1998, p. 226), or that ―[…] grammaticalization is derivative, 
epiphenomenal, and has no independent status of its own‖ (Campbell, 2001, p. 151; 
similar claim in Janda, 2001, p. 266). According to this view, linguists should not 
‗‗invite the conclusion that some dynamic is at work in grammaticalization that cannot 
be understood as a product of [independently occurring semantic/phonetic changes]‘‘ 




Against these claims, the uniformity of grammaticalization has been defended in 
grossly two ways, epistemologically, and ontologically. On the one hand, it is argued 
that grammaticalization theory is a unified field of research in that it involves questions 
around the emergence of new constructions and the transformation of ‗lexical items‘ into 
‗grammatical‘ ones. Grammaticalization theory is thus ‗‗not one single monolithic 
system […], but describes a range of related approaches and basic issues‘‘ (Haspelmath, 
2004, p. 23). On the other hand, in a stronger fashion, it is argued that 
                                                                                                                                                                           
properties, and eventually acquire representation as a unit in the mental lexicon. The reader will notice in 
the following discussion that the same neurocognitive mechanisms may apply to a great extent to 
idiomatization. For a discussion of the strong relationship between idiomatization and 
grammaticalization, see Himmelmann (2004). 
45
 The issue of the uniformity of grammaticalization often co-occurs with that of its unidirectionality, i.e. 
whether historical change always proceeds from lexical to grammatical and from less to more 
grammatical. These issues are beyond the scope of the investigation. Suffice it, though, to mention that 
evidence of ‗degrammaticalization‘ is multiply less frequent than that for grammaticalization (e.g. 
Haspelmath, 2004). This has in fact been attributed to the nature of the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
grammaticalization (e.g. Lehmann, 2004; see section 3.5.2 here). 
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grammaticalization comprises a uniform ontology, i.e. ‗‗a macro-level phenomenon 
which cannot be reduced to the properties of the corresponding micro-level phenomena‘‘ 
(Haspelmath, 2004, p. 26). Instead, this phenomenon would involve ‗‗strong correlations 
between phonological, syntactic and semantic-pragmatic changes‘‘ (ibid), suggestive of 
a common cognitive core (e.g. Lehmann, 2004; see section 3.5.2 below).  
 
Would the neurolinguistic mechanisms discussed below necessitate the 
ontological uniformity of grammaticalization? Not necessarily. To begin with, these 
mechanisms are not proposed to monopolize the grounding of grammaticalization. 
Conceivably, the latter may comprise a heterogeneous range of processes, with different 
such mechanisms involved to different extents. However, certain conditions of language 
use may invite processes of the same computational properties. The extent to which 
these conditions are fundamental in grammaticalization adds equivalent explanatory 
significance to the neurolinguistic mechanisms they involve. Indeed, the common 
cognitive core that is often found in the literature to underlie these ‗‗strong correlations‘‘ 
will provide the foundation for step 1 of the approach (section 3.3.2). Similarly, this 
cognitive core and the neurolinguistic mechanisms discussed below need not exclusively 
ground grammaticalization processes. The extent to which these mechanisms may apply 
to other historical processes is open for future investigation. The lack of 
grammaticalization-particular phenomena would thus remain far from suggesting that a 
neurolinguistics of a historical phenomenon is impossible. Above all, the aim of the 
endeavor here is not simply to explain those phenomena accompanying 
grammaticalization (e.g. chunking, phonetic and semantic attrition), which can also be 
found in other historical changes. The goal is rather to seek the neurolinguistic 
foundations of the processes by which particular constructions, in certain conditions of 
language use, gradually deviate from their generic schemata and give rise to new, 









Before continuing with the two basic steps for the neurocognitive grounding of 
grammaticalization (section 3.3.2 above), it is important to consider what in particular 
those neurocognitive mechanisms will instantiate. Will they ground processing 
limitations and learning biases that compromise the transmission fidelity of language 
inputs that fail to adaptively abide by them? Or will they instantiate computations that 
adaptively modify the processing of language input in a direct fashion? This does not 
boil down to an issue of different perspectives on the same ontology. As it shall be 
shown below, different cognitive mechanisms are involved in each case, triggered in 
different conditions, with different outcomes in historical language change.  
 
 
3.4.1. The Glossogenetic Functionalist Framework 
 
Advocating the former, ‗‗glossogenetic functionalist‘‘ principles of language 
evolution (e.g. Kirby & Hurford, 1997) have been recently suggested to provide a 
fruitful explanation for grammaticalization changes (e.g. Christiansen & Chater, 2008). 
Contrary to this position, I will argue that the incorporation of grammaticalization 
processes in this ontology is far from unproblematic, and that grammaticalization is an 
explanandum fundamentally incompatible with the glossogenetic functionalist 
explanans. A briefer version of the argument presented here can be found in 
Argyropoulos (2010a). 
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 The term ‗glossogenetic‘ is not used here in its broadest sense, by which it refers to the entirety of 
mechanisms involved in diachronic language change (e.g. Hurford, 2009). Instead, it denotes the 
principles of adaptation through cultural transmission, which is often termed ‗‗glossogeny‘‘ (Hurford, 
1991; Christiansen & Kirby, 2003). It thus refers here to the principles of ‗‗glossogenetic‘‘, as opposed 




According to the principles of glossogenetic functionalism, the evolution of 
linguistic structure is owed to mechanisms by which languages themselves, much like 
organisms (Christiansen, 1995; Deacon, 1997), are subject to selection pressures. In 
particular, languages adapt to pressures of transmission in the ‗‗the arena of use‘‘ 
(Hurford, 1987), where learning and processing constraints are of catalytic importance: 
in the absence of sufficient exposure, linguistic input challenging such constraints does 
not propagate through the transmission ‗‗bottleneck‘‘ (Hurford, 2002). In this respect, 
‗‗it is languages, not language users that are adapting‘‘ (Kirby et al., 2004, p. 599), since 
the emergence of more functional forms of communication is ‗‗merely a happy bi-
product [sic] of the adaptive mechanism at work‘‘ (ibid, p. 602), which adds weight to 
the idea that ‗‗language has been shaped by the brain, not the reverse‘‘ (Christiansen & 
Chater, 2008, p. 498). Thus, properties of ‗performance‘, such as processibility and 
frequency of exposure gain significant explanatory power for the construction of 
‗competence‘. A similar idea is found in the ‗‗Performance-Grammar Correspondence 
Hypothesis‘‘, according to which ‗‗[g]rammars have conventionalized syntactic 
structures in proportion to their degree of preference in performance, as evidenced by 
frequency of use and ease of processing‘‘ (Hawkins, 2004, p. 3). 
 
Glossogenetic functionalism has thus provided a radical alternative to 
‗‗phylogenetic functionalism‘‘ (e.g. Kirby & Hurford, 1997). The latter explains 
language evolution on the basis of the phylogeny of the ‗‗Language Acquisition 
Device‘‘ (Chomsky, 1965), which adapts to pressures in an environment where 
successful communication is advantageous. Thus, in the glossogenetic functionalist 
approach, 
 
[…] the constraints on variation are not assumed to arise 
directly from the structure of our innate language learning 
mechanism. Instead, the universals emerge over a 
historical/cultural timescale from the process of language 
acquisition and use. This type of explanation relies on the 
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principle that language learner [sic] does not necessarily 
converge on the same grammatical system as the adults in 
the population. Crucially, the triggering experience that 
the learner uses will not accurately reflect the linguistic 
competence of the adults because it is filtered through the 
‗‗arena of use‘‘[…] There are various pressures that 
operate during communication that will have a selective 
effect on the different linguistic variants that are being 
transmitted from generation to generation (Kirby & 
Hurford, 1997, p. 494). 
 
Accordingly, in computational simulations of cultural transmission, linguistic 
‗agents‘ form hypotheses on the ‗meaning‘ of the data that they produce and observe 
from other agents. Language, then, changes through misconvergences between the 
hypothesis that ‗Agent 2‘ generates, and the hypothesis based on which ‗Agent 1‘ 
outputs the data that ‗Agent 2‘ will eventually observe (e.g. Brighton et al., 2005). In the 
absence of sufficient training examples, particular form-meaning mappings fail to pass 
through the bottleneck, and are marginalized or regularized by more learnable and 
processible mappings. These mechanisms have been used to simulate a growing range of 
patterns of historical language change, e.g. the emergence of word order universals, 
where word orders of different processing complexity compete in the arena of use 
(Kirby, 1999), or the emergence of asymmetric distribution of regular and irregular 
forms according to frequency, whereby regular forms and irregular ones of high 









3.4.2. Beyond Formal Misconvergence 
 
I would like now to argue that such mechanisms are problematic when employed 
for the explanation of grammaticalization operations. In particular, they are susceptible 
to the same arguments addressed against generativist accounts of grammaticalization 
(especially Haspelmath, 1998; Lehmann, 2004). 
 
Work on language change explicitly assuming the ‗‗Principles and Parameters‘‘ 
(Chomsky, 1981a) framework (e.g. Clark & Roberts, 1993; Niyogi & Berwick, 1997; 
Briscoe, 2002) has been of paradigmatic value for glossogenetic functionalist models, 
since it adds weight to the claim that language change is driven by considerations arising 
‗‗directly […] from misconvergences […] during language acquisition‘‘ (Brighton et al., 
2005, p. 301). In those studies, such misconvergences occur because the language 
processor meets severe costs in assigning a particular structure to certain instances of 
ambiguous input. In view of these difficulties, the processor ‗reanalyzes‘ such input 
according to a considerably more acquirable and/ or processible structure, as in Roberts‘ 
(1993, p. 228-9) ‗‗Least Effort Strategy‘‘ (see also Lightfoot, 1979, for similar 
accounts), and a different grammar is thus employed for the acquisition-comprehension 
of the particular input. More explicitly, Hashimoto and Nakatsuka (2006) assume the 
position that ‗‗reanalysis‘‘ and ‗‗analogy‘‘ underlie grammaticalization (Hopper & 
Traugott, 1993; Campbell, 2001), and instantiate them in the operations that linguistic 
agents perform in learning and generalizing their grammar in computational models 
(Kirby, 2002).  
 
Reanalysis is traditionally defined as a change ‗‗in the structure of an expression 
or class of expressions that does not involve any immediate or intrinsic modification of 
its surface manifestation‘‘ (Langacker, 1977, p. 59). This is accompanied by ‗‗analogy‘‘, 
with ‗‗the attraction of extant forms to already existing constructions‘‘ (Hopper & 
Traugott, 1993, p. 56). Lexical morphology offers some suggestive examples, as the 
backformations in (10) below (e.g. Becker, 1993): the morphological structure of 
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‗software‘, ‗hamburger‘, and ‗alcoholic‘ is reanalyzed as consisting of ‗soft-ware‘, 
‗ham-burger‘, ‗alco-holic‘, and, via analogy, new words are created on the basis of this 
reanalyzed structure. A characteristic case of reanalysis in the syntactic level is shown in 
(11), whereby a prepositional phrase headed by ‗for‘ (11a) is reanalyzed as belonging to 
the following infinitival clause (11b) in English (see also Lehmann, 2004, for the same 
example in German).  
 
(10a)   Software: hardware, courseware, netware, wetware,  
 
(10b)   Hamburger: cheeseburger, tofuburger,  
 
(10c)   Alcoholic: workaholic, chocoholic  
 
(11a)   [It would beV [betterA [for me]PP]AP [to slay myself]S-INF [than to be violated thus]S-THAN]S 
 
(11b)   [It would beV betterAP [for me to slay myself]S-INF [than to be violated thus]S-THAN]S. 
 
(Haspelmath, 1998, p. 324-5; originally from Harris & Campbell, 1995, p. 62) 
 
 
The insufficiency of reanalysis to explain grammaticalization has been discussed 
elsewhere (especially Haspelmath, 1998; Lehmann, 2004). In what follows, I briefly 
provide a number of highlights, and emphasize only those that are central for the 
argument here. To begin with, grammaticalization has adult language users as the 
primary agents of change, and not language-acquiring infants (see Croft, 2000, for 
arguments and references). The contribution of the latter has been instead regarded as 
catalytic in reanalysis and analogical levelling (Hooper, 1976; Haspelmath, 1998).
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Independently of the agent carrying out the change, reanalysis and grammaticalization 
have been shown to often act independently from each other; reanalysis also involves 
contracting new syntactic relations with sentence elements not related before, whereas 
grammaticalization does not involve any real change in constituent structure 
(Haspelmath, 1998; Lehmann, 2004). Furthermore, putative examples of reanalysis in 
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 Schematization mechanisms precisely reflect the analogical nature of such computations (sections 
2.3.4.3 and 3.6.4). 
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grammaticalization are often shown to occur as a relabeling of nodes in constituent 
structure trees. In the Swahili example in (12b) below, the perfect prefix ‗me‘ originates 
by the grammaticalization of a verbal head ‗meele‘ (12a) into a verbal affix- this 
development has been described as a product of reanalysis (Heine & Reh, 1984, p. 102). 
However, those reanalyses are theory-dependent and epiphenomenal, since they are 
immediately done away with when described in other syntactic theories (e.g. 
dependency grammar). Instead, these examples are best described in terms of a gradual 





(12a)   [[mtoto]NP [a-meele v [ku-ja]NP]VP]S                                    (Heine & Reh, 1984, p. 102; 
            child         3SG-finish come.INF                                         Haspelmath, 1998, p. 334)                       
           ‗The child finished coming‘  
 
(12b)   [[mtoto]NP [a-me-kujaV]VP]S 
            child         3SG-PERF-come 
           ‗The child has come‘ 
 
 
For the purposes of the present investigation, the key differences to note are that, 
unlike grammaticalization, reanalysis presupposes structural ambiguities in the input, 
and is an abrupt, categorical phenomenon, which can only operate on already available 
categories (Haspelmath, 1998). On the contrary, grammaticalization does not result from 
‗misprocessing‘-‗misacquiring‘ the input, and it is a gradual process that may lead to 
structures and categories that have not existed: ‗‗[…] reanalysis cannot create anything 
genuinely new. Grammaticalization is capable of exactly this‘‘ (Lehmann, 2004, p. 11). 
A typical example of the latter would be the development of definite articles in Romance 
languages out of the Latin demonstrative, as in (13) below. A reanalysis account would 
fall short in identifying an already available structural analysis whereby the new 
‗DET(erminer)‘ category emerges. 
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 See section 3.6.2 for an example, where the increase in such ‗‗bondedness‘‘ arguably translates into an 
increase in transitional probabilities in processing. 
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(13a)   lupus     ille                 (Latin)   >   lupul                                                 (Romanian) 
           wolf.      DEM                                wolf.DET 
          ‗that wolf‘                                      ‗the wolf‘ 
 
(13b)   ille         canis             (Latin)   >    le      chien                                       (French) 
            DEM.    dog                                    DETdog 
           ‗that dog‘                                         ‗the dog‘ 
 
 
Similarly to reanalysis, many phenomena of grammaticalization are often seen as 
cases of structural ‗‗reinterpretation‘‘ (Heine & Kuteva, 2002). For example, the 
development of complementizers out of demonstratives as in (14) below, has been 
described as an instance of 
 
[…] reinterpretation of certain patterns of direct speech 
(e.g. She said that: there is no money) as a main clause + 
complement clause combination (She said that there is no 
money), where the demonstrative object of the matrix 
clause, referring cataphorically to the next clause, is 
reinterpreted as a marker introducing a complement 
clause (ibid, p. 106).  
 
As above, explaining this transformation as an instance of misinterpretation 
silently assumes that the representation of a ‗marker + complement clause‘ construction 
is already available in the interlocutors‘ grammatical representations. 
 
(14a)   Eg sigi tadh: hann  kemur                                                        (Lockwood, 1968, pp. 222-3) 
            I    say that:  he     comes 
           ‗I say this: he comes.‘ 
 
(14b)   Eg sigi at    hann kemur. 
            I    say that he     comes 






Instead of addressing the very sufficiency of glossogenetic functionalist 
mechanisms to explain grammaticalization, criticism so far has rather emphasized the 
need to simply abandon vertical, language acquisition-based models of transmission for 
the simulation of historical change (Croft, 2004). However, this premise has been 
identified as only a methodologically justified simplification (Smith et al., 2003). The 
problem thus persists, since the ‗reanalytic‘ mechanism of misconvergences in 
transmission, which is explicitly considered irrelevant in grammaticalization 
(Haspelmath, 1998), may still be employed in a horizontal transmission model. Change 
would still be introduced with agents misattributing an underlying syntactic-semantic 
representation to linguistic strings because of processing and learning limitations that the 
input strings exceed. The horizontal transmission model in Batali (2002, p. 115) would 
offer a characteristic example: the sender transmits a signal S to express a meaning M1, 
following a particular analysis A1 of the mapping from the structure of M1 to the signal 
S. However, the receiver derives an interpretation M2 for the signal S according to 
analysis A2 of the mapping from the signal structure to M2. Language change is thus 
initiated by a discrepancy between A1 and A2, where A2 is more optimal than A1 with 
respect to the processing capacities of the language agent. This is the case in reanalysis 
and analogical levelling – not in grammaticalization, unless one adheres to the heavily 
criticized generativist models like the above. 
 
 
3.4.3. Beyond Semantic Misconvergence 
 
It has similarly been suggested that representational misconvergences between 
interlocutors in semantic aspects of discourse provide a trigger for grammaticalization. 
In some recent proposals, for example, the metaphorical extension often involved in 
grammaticalization (e.g. from physical to temporal movement in the ‗be going to‘ 
construction) has been discussed as the production-equivalent of a process of a 
pragmatic ‗‗reanalysis‘‘ from the hearer‘s side (Hoefler & Smith, 2008, 2009). However, 
mechanisms like metaphorical extension are far from intrinsic to grammaticalization 
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processes, as they pertain to a radically broader range of lexical items, only a minority of 
which eventually acquires grammatical functions (as example 3 above). For instance, the 
metaphorical extension of body-part terms to express spatial concepts is arguably not an 
instance of grammaticalization. In (15) below, for example, some English body-part 
terms are used to express spatial relations. However, none of these expressions is 
currently under grammaticalization (Bybee et al., 1994). Metaphorical extension and 
semantic bleaching rather allow expressions to increase in frequency of occurrence and 
acquire basic discourse status so as to undergo the formal and semantic 
grammaticalization changes. However, they do not suffice to explain the core transition 
from ‗lexical‘ to ‗grammatical‘ that items in grammaticalizing expressions undergo 
(Haspelmath, 1999, p. 1062). Other researchers similarly find ‗‗no case of generalization 
changing a lexical to a grammatical expression […], suggesting that generalization as a 
mechanism of semantic change is not itself the mechanism by which grammaticalization 
is activated‖ (Nicolle, 1998, p. 22-23). Furthermore, much like lexical change, and much 
unlike the conventionalization of new inferences (section 3.2.2), the metaphorical shift 
from the source (e.g. physical progression) to the target domain (e.g. temporal 
progression) is rather innovative and abrupt in nature (Bybee et al., 1994, p. 197) – this 
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 In contrast to metaphor, which innovatively introduces a novel form-meaning mapping (a ‗competence‘ 
representation), ‗metonymy‘, or ‗the conventionalization of inference‘, will be seen as a shortcut 
behavior in discourse processing, and thus as a ‗performance change‘ (section 3.6.3.2.2). 
126 
 
3.4.4. Ontological Dissociation 
 
 
In delimiting the ontology of glossogenetic functionalist and grammaticalization 
mechanisms, it is valuable to consider the distinction between the ‗‗conserving‘‘ and the 
‗‗reducing effects‘‘ of repetition in historical language change (Bybee & Thompson, 
2000), respectively. The glossogenetic functionalist approach to language evolution is 
best construable as objectifying the changes introduced by the conserving effects of 
repetition.
50
 Unlike high-frequency and easy-to-process form-function mappings, lower-
frequency and less processible mappings are changed on the basis of analogy with more 
productive ones (Bybee & Thompson, 2000; Bybee, 2007a). For instance, high-
frequency verbs, as in (16a), retain their irregular past-tense morphology, unlike lower-
frequency verbs, as in (16b), that are assimilated into a stronger morphological schema 
(‗-ed‘; Bybee, 1985). On the same grounds, English pronouns show a conservative 
syntactic behavior, and maintain distinct forms for nominative vs dative and accusative 
case marking, while such case distinctions have become extinct from nouns (Givón, 
1979).  
 
(16a)   keep/kept, sleep/slept    
(16b)   weep/wept-weeped, creep/crept-creeped  
 
 
Suggestively, in their brief discussion of grammaticalization processes, 
Christiansen and Chater (2008) use Hare and Elman‘s (1995) simulation as an example 
of historical language change explained by learning and processing constraints: In Hare 
and Elman (1995), a connectionist network modelled the historical development of the 
English verb inflection from its past-tense system in Old English up until the modern 
times. A network was taught a data set of the Old English verb classes, but learning was 
stopped before reaching asymptote, and the output of each such network was used as the 
teacher of a new net. In that way, vertical language transmission was modelled.  As a 
result, the errors in the first network were passed on to become part of the data set of the 
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 Haspelmath‘s (2004) principle of ‗‗survival of the frequent‘‘ offers similar insights. 
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second. Certain input-output mappings were easier to acquire, such as the highly 
frequent patterns, and those sharing phonological regularities. The patterns that were 
hardest to learn led to the most errors, and over time were ‗‗regularized‘‘ to fit the more 
regular and more productive patterns. The phenomenon thus described is an example 
case of analogical levelling and/or conservation processes in the acquisition of verbal 
morphology. As such, it is far from relevant with grammaticalization processes to 
encourage a similar approach to the latter, as Christiansen and Chater (2008) imply. 
 
Grammaticalization changes, on the other hand, are products of the multi-level 
‗‗reducing effect‘‘ of repetition (Bybee & Thompson, 2000).
51
 Automatization of 
performance in language processing represents the most widely supported cognitive core 
of grammaticalization (see section 3.5.2 below). It reflects domain-general, non-species-
specific adaptive responses of the brain to repeated behavioral repertoires generated by 
particular neurocognitive mechanisms (see sections 3.5.1, and 3.5.3 below). Here, 
linguistic change does not amount to misprocessing of ambiguous input, but is the result 
of the user‘s adaptive minimization of cognitive and sensorimotor costs in language 
processing. The dissociation of those two kinds of change is summarized in figure 3.2. 
This is illustrated by Hooper‘s (1976) observation that low-frequency items are affected 
by analogical levelling first (16 above), whereas sound change in the form of phonetic 
attrition affects high-frequency items first. For instance, deletion of final /t/ and /d/ in 
American English is (at least partly) determined by frequency (Bybee, 2002d), with 
high-frequency words (17a) being more susceptible to this change than low-frequency 
ones (17b). 
 
(17a)   just, child, grand 
(17b)   conformist, cuckold, blend 
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 The two processes are not directly mapped to the ‗conserving/reducing effects‘ divide, but only to the 
changes involved in each case: in grammaticalization, language changes as a product of multi-level 
reduction, whereas, in the glossogenetic functionalist framework, language changes as a result of 
unsuccessful conservation: in the latter, mechanisms of analogy, reanalysis, and generalization kick in. 
This is not incompatible then with the fact that grammaticalization requires and richly interacts with the 




         
Figure 3.2: Dissociation between „glossogenetic functionalist‟ and „grammaticalization 
theory‟ mechanisms, on the basis of the distinction between unsuccessful conservation 
and successful reduction. The „sufficient vs high frequency of occurrence‟ distinction 
here is in line with that made in Bybee (2006): constructions of „„high frequency‟‟ are 
simply conventionalized, whereas constructions of „„extremely high frequency‟‟ undergo 
grammaticalization (see section 3.5.2 below). Figure adapted from Argyropoulos (2010a, 
p. 7) with permission © 2010 World Scientific. 
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Thus, despite their emphasis on ‗performance‘ properties
52
 (e.g. frequency, 
processing difficulty of items), glossogenetic functionalist approaches crucially remain 
‗‗competence-based‘‘, much like the generativist explanation of grammaticalization: 
strings of input are re-assigned and/ or are produced according to a different structural 
representation. In other words, language change in the glossogenetic functionalist 
framework is necessarily seen as the product of competence changes owing to the 
performance properties of the transmitted input. On the contrary, ‗‗performance 
changes‘‘, without the precedent of a corresponding ‗‗competence change‘‘, are beyond 
the scope of the glossogenetic functionalist approach. However, grammaticalization 
relies precisely on ‗‗performance changes‘‘ (Haspelmath, 1998), that do not result from 
altered competence representations. Changes in the latter may only follow after the 
coding of the introduced variant by a new cohort of speakers (see section 3.6.4 below). 
 
In closing this section, then, the question in the beginning can now be answered: 
the nature of grammaticalization is such that its underlying neurolinguistic components 
should account for direct, optimizing changes in processing – not for the learning and/or 
processing biases and limitations by which misconvergences in transmission occur. The 
adaptive responses of the brain to reoccurring instances of behavior, described in the 
literature as ‗automatization‘ or ‗routinization‘, will be examined in the next section as 
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 The ‗competence-performance‘ distinction, is, of course, far from accepted in the functionalist camp, 
and, a more appealing distinction could be made on the neutral grounds of ‗‗cognitive representations 
and usage‘‘ (J. Bybee, personal communication, 5 December 2007). However, Haspelmath‘s (1998) 
‗‗competence/performance change‘‘ distinction is adopted here, in a similar attempt to establish 
common grounds for discussion among Chomskian, ‗glossogenetic functionalist‘, and functionalist 
accounts of grammaticalization. 
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3.5. Grammaticalization, Automatization,  
and the Cerebellum 
 
 
In constructing the neurolinguistic foundations of grammaticalization, the first 
step, as proposed earlier (section 3.3.2), is to examine the cognitive mechanisms 
underlying the historical phenomenon, and search for their candidate neurocognitive 
foundations. Automatization has been in the spotlight of cognitive considerations on 
grammaticalization, and offers a characteristic case of a performance change (section 
3.4.4). After defining automatization, I briefly present such considerations on 
automatization and grammaticalization, and then discuss some highlights on the 
significance of the CB for automatization. This will provide the grounds to closely 






Automatization involves the practice-induced minimization of cognitive-
attentional and mechanical-executional costs in task-performance. Similarly, an 
‗automatic process‘ is traditionally defined in terms of the activation of a sequence of 
nodes that ‗‗nearly always becomes active in response to a particular input 
configuration‘‘, and that ‗‗is activated automatically without the necessity for active 
control or attention by the subject‘‘. In general, automatic processes ‗‗operate through a 
relatively permanent set of associative connections […] and require an appreciable 
amount of consistent training to develop fully‘‘ (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977, p. 2). An 
automatized modality has often been contrasted with an attended processing one, which 
is manifest in the acquisition of new skills. A fully automatized skill does not require 
conscious effortful monitoring or guidance, and shows little or no decrement in the 
presence of other demands upon conscious processing. Automatic process thus allow for 
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the parallel execution of a (usually less automatized) task, such as having a conversation 
while skillfully typing a text (Rumelhart & Norman, 1982).  
 
By contrast, a cognitively controlled procedure requires increased levels of 
attention and guidance of performance. This is demonstrable in the initial phase of skill 
acquisition and novice performance: a new pianist, at every single key they strike, they 
have to rely on attentional-perceptual cues from the environment for the next key they 
should press. Along with such capacity limitation, however, controlled processes have 
the significant advantage of allowing for flexible alteration and application of a behavior 
in novel situations, much unlike the context-particular automatic repertoires (Schneider 
& Shiffrin, 1977, p. 2-3). 
 
 
3.5.2. Grammaticalization as Automatization 
 
As already suggested, grammaticalization processes involve a multi-level 
reduction (section 3.4.4), in other words, ‗‗an evolution whereby linguistic units lose in 
semantic complexity, pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom, and phonetic 
substance‘‘ (Heine & Reh, 1984, p. 15). A conditioning factor for those reductions, also 
discussed above, is the high frequency of repetition of the grammaticalizing 
construction: ‗‗[i]n grammaticization, changes in phonology, semantics, and structure 
occur in extremely high-frequency constructions‘‘ (Bybee, 2006, p. 730).  
 
This property has provided the grounds for the definition of grammaticalization 
as ‗‗the process of automatization of frequently occurring sequences of linguistic 
elements‘‘ (Bybee, 2007b, p. 969). Indeed, these mechanisms, termed 
‗‗automatization‘‘, ‗‗routinization‘‘, ‗‗ritualization‘‘, ‗‗habituation‘‘, comprise the most 
widely held cognitive core of grammaticalization processes (e.g. Givón, 1979; Haiman, 
1994; Bybee, 1998; Haspelmath, 1999; Lehmann, 2004). For instance, several 
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similarities have been noted between habituation in organisms and ritualization in social 
practice on the one hand, and grammaticalization processes on the other. ‗Habituation‘, 
i.e. the process by which an organism ceases to respond to the same extent to repeated 
stimuli, and ‗ritualization‘, i.e. the process by which a cultural artifact loses its original 
force and significance, have been discussed as the behavioral-cultural foundations of 
semantic bleaching (Haiman, 1994; section 3.2.2 here). In the same vein, formal changes 
occurring in grammaticalization, such as phonetic attrition and chunking (section 3.2.2), 
closely resemble changes in the ontogenetic course of skill automatization (Boyland, 
1996). With the repetition of particular behavioral sequences, formerly separate gestures 
are integrated into an automated unit, and forms are reduced through the weakening of 
the individual gestures comprising the act (e.g. Haiman, 1994; Bybee, 1998).  Similarly, 
in Lehmann‘s (1995[1982]) multi-parametric, semiotic approach, grammaticalization is 
defined as the minimization of the independence of the linguistic sign, the cognitive 
equivalent of which is the loss of the freedom to manipulate it (Lehmann, 2004). 
Automatization, then, stands as a ‗‗[…] psychological correlate to grammaticalization as 
a structural notion‘‘ (ibid, p. 25). These automatization processes then arguably 
comprise an explanatorily promising cognitive core of grammaticalization. Their neural 
grounding would thus provide the first insights into the neurolinguistic foundations of 
grammaticalization. 
 
3.5.3. Cerebellar Foundations of Automatization 
 
Despite the findings on the neural structures responsible for the genre of 
automatization mechanisms, their very connection with linguistic processes, from either 
a synchronic or a diachronic perspective, remains a poorly addressed desideratum. 
Suggestively, in the context of grammaticalization theory, chunking-automatization has 
been seen as a ‗‗physiologically mysterious process‘‘ (Haiman, 1994, p. 10), and, 
similarly, it has been suggested that ‗‗[…] the physiology of ritualization in human 
beings is unknown‘‘ (ibid, p. 25).  
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From a cognitive neuroscience standpoint, such statements have been far from 
the truth for quite a few decades, and can only indicate the lack of interdisciplinary 
discourse.
53
 I thus briefly turn to the description of the widely held view that the CB 
provides a strong candidate locus for automatization operations. In chapter 2, some basic 
information was presented on the role of the CB in feedback-free, accurate, and timely 
motor control, especially in the context of the CB instantiating internal models (section 
2.2). Such functions are of outmost importance in the automatization of behavioral tasks, 
and have explicitly promoted automatization as an instantiation of the ‗‗universal 
cerebellar transform‘‘ (Schmahmann & Caplan, 2006). 
 
To begin with, the cognitively controlled and automatic processing circuits have 
been distinguished on the basis of imaging evidence: the former mainly relies on 
prefrontal regions, as well as on activity in the right premotor cortex and bilateral 
supplementary motor area and left CB, while the latter relies on motor circuits, which 
crucially involve the right CB, along with the supplementary motor area, the left 
sensorimotor cortex, the left thalamus and the basal ganglia (Lewis & Miall, 2003). In 
the automatization of a motor task, the motor loop becomes involved, disentangling the 
prefrontal cortex to employ attentional resources for another task (Jueptner & Weiller, 
1998). 
 
On its own, the CB has been for a long time considered a candidate foundation 
for behavioral automatization. The acquisition of complex, skilled movements has been 
described to begin as a conscious act almost exclusively under cerebral control, and to 
involve, via learning, CB circuitry, that takes control of the task (Brindley, 1964). In 
other words, the CB 
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 The work of Givón (1979-2009) has been the brightest and perhaps only exception in the literature to 
consistently discuss grammaticalization in the light of the neurobiology of automatized processing. See 
section 3.8 for further discussion. 
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[...] recognizes the contexts in which each ―piece‖ of 
consciously initiated movement occurs. After repeated 
tries, it links that context within itself to the movement 
generators so that the occurrence of the context 
automatically triggers the movement. Thus, with time and 
practice, the cerebellum largely controls the process, with 
little or no help from the cerebrum. The cerebrum and the 
conscious mind are free to do and think about other 
things. Control of the task has been shifted from a 
conscious cerebral cortical process to a subconscious one 
mostly under the control of the cerebellum (Thach, 1997, 
p. 600). 
 
Neuroimaging and clinical evidence supports the significance of the CB in 
shifting pre-training movement performance to a more skilled and automatic stage. This 
is often captured in the context of dual-task paradigms, where one of the two tasks 
involved is automatized, and attentional resources for conscious monitoring are allocated 
to the other. In such paradigms, CB patients are able to improve a learned movement 
with practice only to a very limited extent, and cannot perform the task in a more 
automatic stage. Moreover, when attention is focused away from one task, their 
performance deteriorates to pre-practice levels. Normal controls, on the contrary, show 
an expected insensitivity to interferences in dual tasks after practice (Lang & Bastian, 
2002). The same automatization deficit has been observed in CB disruptions in working 
memory and word-generation tasks (section 2.4.2 above). 
 
In imaging studies, strong CB activations have been reported in different stages 
of automatization. In some studies, CB activity is greatest early in motor learning, 
supporting the idea that the CB is exclusively involved in shifting performance to a more 
automatic state (Jenkins et al., 1994; Doyon et al., 1996; Jueptner et al., 1997; Toni et 
al., 1998). In other studies, CB activity is found to increase only when a practiced 
movement is performed at a later stage (Shadmehr & Holcomb, 1997). Such findings 
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would entertain the possibility that the CB is directly involved in the execution of a more 
automatic movement after its acquisition, with early performance of a novel motor task 
relying more on frontal cortex. The two roles of course are not mutually exclusive and 
such a dual role for the CB is tenable (see Lang & Bastian, 2002). 
 
As suggested above, a sign of automatized learned movements is their very 
performance in units comprising of composite synergies of individual moves (section 
3.5.2). A characteristic clinical indication of CB deficit, noted very early in the 
literature, is the ‗‗decomposition of movement‘‘ (Holmes, 1939), whereby compound 
movements are broken down into individual moves, and executed in a seriatim fashion. 
Strikingly, focal cortical lesions give rise to focal motor dysfunctions, pertaining to one 
or a few joints and muscles, whereas CB lesions spare single-joint movements, but 
induce such incoordination in multijoint movement (see Thach, 2007, for references). 
This has given grounds to the proposal that the CB combines single-joint movements 
into composite ones (e.g. Bastian et al., 1996; Goodkin & Thach, 2003). A closely 
related proposal has been that the cerebrum specializes in ‗‗propositional‘‘, consciously 
planned and initiated movements, and the CB in ‗‗automatic‘‘, compound movements, 
triggered immediately in response to particular experiential contexts (Thach et al., 1992; 






Moreover, within the framework of the ‗‗dyslexic automatization deficit‘‘ 
hypothesis (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990) and the suggestively concomitant ‗‗cerebellar 
deficit hypothesis‘‘ (Nicolson et al., 2001), behavioral evidence has been provided for 
abnormal CB function in a high percentage of dyslexic children. Classic indices of this 
have been deficits in skill automatization, time estimation, balance, tone, and eye-blink 
conditioning (e.g. Fawcett et al., 1996; Fawcett & Nicolson, 1999). Within a range of 
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 The CB mechanism underlying this combining operation is debatable (see the Paulin (1996)-Thach 
(1996b) debate). Some support the idea that parallel fibers compound by trial and error (LTD) particular 
experiential contexts to the responses, and single response elements into composite units (see Thach, 
2007). CB state estimation, on the other hand, in low Kalman gain conditions, would minimize reliance 
on external feedback, and would thus allow the execution of compound movements (section 2.2.2). 
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dual-task paradigms, significant difficulties have been shown selectively for dyslexic 
children in dual-, as opposed to single-task conditions (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1990). 
Furthermore, in the acquisition and execution of sensorimotor sequences, dyslexics 
appear to activate the CB less than controls, instead relying significantly more on frontal 
lobe functions (Nicolson et al., 1999). Recent studies also provide neuroanatomical 
evidence indicative of CB abnormalities in dyslexic brains. In particular, significant 
differences have been found in Purkinje cell size in medial areas of the posterior CB 
lobe, and also in the Purkinje cell size distribution in the anterior and posterior CB lobe 
and the cells in the inferior olive (Finch et al., 2002). 
 
   This section thus completed the first step of the approach (section 3.3.2). 
Grammaticalization changes are widely held to rely on automatization processes in 
language processing at the intra-generational level of language transmission (section 
3.5.2). CB computations were shown to be a major component of neurocognitive 
automatization processes (section 3.5.3).  Given the cytoarchitectural homogeneity of 
the CB (section 1.2.3) and its reciprocal projections to language-related cortical loci 
(section 1.3.2), CB computations may arguably have the same contribution to language 
processes. The striking lack of practice-induced facilitation that NCB patients show in 
word-generation task-performance (see section 2.4.2) already stands out as a meeting 
point for the three disciplines here, namely, NCB computations, language processing, 
and grammaticalization operations. Moreover, the fact that the CB has a metasystemic 
role in a wide range of behavioral domains (section 1.4), and the fact that CB lesions 
make task performance only suboptimal (section 2.4.4.4), promote the CB as a 
‗competence-peripheral‘, ‗performance-optimizing‘ machine. That was a necessary 
premise in identifying a suitable neuroanatomical foundation for grammaticalization 
operations (section 3.4.4). The discussion so far thus provides the grounds for 
investigating the hypothesis below, namely, that the NCBKFLP has a fundamental role 
in introducing formal and semantic grammaticalization changes as a product of 




3.6. Neocerebellar Neurolinguistics  
       of Grammaticalization 
 
 
The next section reflects a preliminary attempt to take the second step in 
constructing a neurolinguistics of grammaticalization (see section 3.3.2), on the basis of 
the preceding discussion. In what follows, I discuss how grammaticalization phenomena 
involve psycholinguistic mechanisms that arguably employ the NCBKFLP. A common 
thread running through the argument below will be that a shift occurs from categorical 
towards associative computations in routinized multi-level language processing. The 
instantiation of associative processes, as well as the control of the trade-offs between the 
two, were argued in the previous chapter to be the core functions of the NCBKFLP 
(section 2.3.4.3).  
 
 
3.6.1. Neocerebellar Memory of Dialogue Dynamics   
 
The origins of these multi-level changes described in the beginning of the 
chapter (section 3.2.2) have been held, especially in the functionalist camp, to occur at 
the intra-generational level of routinized adult dialogical interactions (sections 3.4 and 
3.5.2). Dialogue involves, at first blush, a very demanding task. For example, 
interlocutors are required to both comprehend and produce in turns or even in tandem, to 
respond rapidly, and to comprehend elliptical utterances, often under noisy 
environments. However, there are psycholinguistic mechanisms that make almost 
everyone capable of holding a conversation (Garrod & Pickering, 2004). Due to the 
mediation of covert imitation mechanisms (Pickering & Garrod, 2007) and the 
unconscious multi-level priming of representations (Pickering & Garrod, 2004), 
interlocutors quickly develop similar activation patterns for sounds, words, grammar, 
and interpretations – i.e. their representations become aligned. Words and constructions 
are repeated, and, eventually, routinization phenomena occur, whereby interlocutors 
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converge on consistent interpretations of forms with great speed, often without explicit 
negotiation (e.g. Garrod & Anderson, 1987; Garrod & Doherty, 1994).  
 
Dialogue may thus provide an empirically tangible process to capture the more 
macroscopic grammaticalization phenomena. This has been recently entertained in 
grammaticalization literature: dialogical routinization has been considered to provide 
‗‗the microstructure of linguistic change‘‘ (Rosenbach & Jäger, 2008), and ‗‗a formal 
reconstruction of grammaticalization‘‘ (Kempson & Cann, 2007, p. 76).  Repetitious 
contexts increase predictability of the items perceived-comprehended and articulated-
produced.
55
 Particular instances of constructions are repeated within the same and across 
different dialogical contexts, in the same form, inviting the same inferences. This sets up 
repeated, deterministic input-output relations in processing, e.g. between acoustic 
stimuli, word strings, and lexical semantics on the one hand, and phonological 
representations, syntactic structures, and utterance interpretations on the other:  
 
[…] utterances involve an increasing proportion of 
expressions whose form and interpretation is partly or 
completely frozen for the purposes of the conversation 
[…] Such routinized expressions are similar to stock 
phrases and idioms […], except that they only ‗live‘ for 
the particular interaction (Garrod & Pickering, 2004, p. 
10). 
 
Thus, if historical phenomena like idiomatization and grammaticalization rely on 
casual adult language use, and if dialogue represents the fundamental context of 
language use, then it is only conceivable that certain routinization effects live well 
beyond ‗‗the particular interaction‘‘ (ibid). Word sequences, structural assignments, and 
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 Note that in Pickering and Garrod (2007), emulative processes are predominantly discussed in the 
context of their contributions to interactive alignment and in establishing a ‗‗shared reality‘‘, by 
representing one‘s interlocutor‘s mental states (Pickering & Garrod, 2009a). This aspect of imitative 
language emulation is beyond the scope of the present investigation (section 2.5); on the contrary, the 
emphasis here is on the computations of internal models after such repetitious contexts are established.  
139 
 
interpretations occurring frequently across dialogical contexts would be the strongest 




3.6.2. The Neocerebellar Associative Shift 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, NCB internal models may acquire the 
dynamics of the linguistic processes where particular inputs frequently co-occur with 
particular outputs (sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). In dialogical contexts, the aforementioned 
mechanisms of repetition priming, alignment and covert imitation give rise to such 
highly repeated formal and semantic-pragmatic processing sequences. NCB internal 
models may copy the input-output dynamics of unification processes of repeatedly 
processed constructions. Reference to categorical properties of these constructions, i.e. 
to their schematic constructions, is thus attenuated: instead of searching the ‗construct-i-
con‘ instantiated in the Memory component, the controller-Broca‘s area may now 
perform a constrained search on the compact NCB associative look-up table to perform 
its unifications (section 2.3.4.3).  
 
In Argyropoulos (2008b, June), I had argued that the very dynamic construal of 
‗‗pseudosyntax‘‘ as the process stage of ‗‗syntactic habits‘‘ (Townsend & Bever, 2001) 
presupposes the involvement of adaptive ‗demotions‘ from stage 2 to stage 1 operations 
that routinization of language processing would induce. In LAST, highly inflected 
languages employ such rich grammatical morphology as ‗‗surface cues‘‘ to complete the 
first stage of sentence processing, which works toward the minimization of the search 
space for the retrieval of a particular form-meaning mapping (Townsend & Bever, 
2001).
56
 On the other hand, grammatical morphology is the product of 
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 Once again, it should be emphasized that the hypothesis is not inherently committed to a two-stage 
model of sentence comprehension. Instead, properties of the first stage in such models are used here to 
illustrate those of a low Kalman gain modality of processing (see section 2.4.4.1). 
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grammaticalization processes, and grammaticalization processes are triggered in intra-
generational dialogical contexts (sections 3.4.4, 3.5.2, and 3.6.1). Thus, in order to 
explain how lexical items have been transformed into such surface cues, a necessary 
trade-off is required to be at work between those two stages, which may lead eventually 
to an adaptive demotion. These first-stage processes were argued to involve NCB 
computations (section 2.4.4). The trade-off, in the same vein, is a function of the 
adaptive combination of categorical, cortico-cortical, and associative, cortico-cerebellar 
computations that the NCBKFLP performs (section 2.3.4.3). Suggestive evidence for the 
possible involvement of NCB circuitry in constrained search in language processing was 
also presented in the previous chapter (section 2.4.4.2). 
 
A similar transformation is assumed in Deacon‘s (1997) cognitive-semiotic 
framework. Historical language change is discussed as having stranded certain symbolic 
items to indexical, subcortically instantiated ‗‗cues‘‘;
57
 as described in the previous 
chapter, the latter help automatize language processing by minimizing the search space 
for the application of the highly distributed, ‗‗symbolic‘‘ grammatical rules (see section 
2.4.4.1 above): 
 
[i]n the interest of rapidly and efficiently organizing such 
highly distributed associative processes, some symbols 
had to be stripped of all but the vaguest symbolic in order 
to provide a set of automatic ―switches‖  for shuttling 
symbolic work to the appropriate regions of the brain. 
(Deacon, 1997, p. 299). 
 
 
Interestingly, constrained search mechanisms have been explicitly proposed to 
underlie language processing changes initiating grammaticalization operations. In a 
more concrete, computationally-based and psycholinguistically-oriented parsing 
                                                          
57




framework, Kempson and Cann (2007) assume a distinction between ‗‗a generally 
available tree-growth process‘‘ (ibid, p. 76) and a ‗‗lexical look-up mechanism‘‘ (ibid, p. 
95). A shift from the former to the latter is used to account for the procliticization of 
object pronouns in the transition from Medieval to Renaissance Spanish, as in the 
example (18) below. This shift is ‗‗[…] a natural subsequent step of routinization‘‘, 
involving the calling up of ‗‗[…] actions associated with the verb together with those 
associated with the clitic with a single lexical look-up mechanism‘‘ (Kempson & Cann, 
2007, p. 95). 
 
 
(18)   mas   los  rompan      luego                                           (in Kempson & Cann,  2007;  
          but    CL  break.3PL afterwards                                              from Bouzouita, 2002). 
  
         ‗But break them afterwards.‘  
 
 
The distinction between those two computations, and the shift in processing 
modalities proposed are directly equivalent to those between the categorical, cortico-
cortical, and the associative, cortico-cerebellar computations in language processing, 
along with the reduction of the NCBKFLP gain proposed here. The conditions in which 
this shift is triggered are also the same, i.e. routinization, repeated exposure to the same 












3.6.3. Multi-Level Reduction 
 
In processing reoccurring constructions, the reduction of the NCBKFLP gain and 
the increased involvement of cortico-cerebellar processes minimizes reliance on the 
temporo-parietal Memory (section 2.3.4). A result would be the decay of the constraints 
imposed to these constructions by default inheritance from their corresponding 
schemata. The decay of such constraints is accompanied by a range of formal and 
semantic-pragmatic phenomena. Some of these phenomena are discussed below as 
reflecting adaptive reductions in cognitive and sensorimotor costs, owing to maximized  
involvement of cheaper NCB computations. 
 
 
3.6.3.1. Formal Aspects 
 
The most central aspects of formal changes in grammaticalization involve 
phonetic attrition and chunking (section 3.2.2). It is interesting to see how both 
phenomena, either from a perception- or from a production-based perspective, explicitly 
rely on prediction mechanisms.  
 
 
3.6.3.1.1. Phonetic Attrition 
 
Phonetic attrition is the macroscopic result of online articulatory reduction. The 
latter, in turn, has often been treated as the product of automatized language production. 
This is reflected in Bybee‘s work, whereby the origins of reduction are found in ‗‗the 
automatization that comes from repetition of neuromotor sequences‘‘ (Bybee, 2002b, p. 
217). From an articulation perspective, studies of CB-induced dysarthria have attracted 
considerations on the importance of the CB in the acceleration of orofacial gestures, 
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along with Broca‘s area (Ackermann & Hertrich, 2000; see also sections 1.3.3 and 
5.4.7.2.2 here). 
 
Most importantly, however, phonetic reduction fundamentally relies on the 
predictability of the reduced form in sentential contexts:  
 
[r]eduction can be inhibited by the speaker‘s sensitivity to 
the predictability of words in the context. If the speaker 
knows that the word will be easily accessed in the context, 
because it or related words have already been activated, 
the reductive automating processes will be allowed to 
advance. If the word is less predictable in discourse, the 
speaker is likely to suppress the reductive processes and 





Corpus-linguistic and psycholinguistic research concurs that increased ‗‗signal 
redundancy‘‘ (i.e. predictability) of the articulated item provides the contexts that allow 
articulatory reduction to occur (e.g. Lieberman, 1963). This is in line with the 
‗‗Probabilistic Reduction Hypothesis‘‘, whereby ‗‗word forms are reduced when they 
have a higher probability‘‘ (Jurafsky et al., 2001, p. 229).  Prediction mechanisms in 
coarticulation effects should come as no surprise. As discussed above, fast, smooth, and 
compound movements cannot be executed relying solely on external feedback, as there 
are significant delays involved in both efference and afference. Such movements are 
made possible by using CB internal feedback (e.g. Wolpert et al., 1998; sections 2.2.1 
and 3.5.3 here). 
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 In fact, psycholinguistic evidence suggests that such articulatory reductions occur in speech production 




Similar computations are necessary for perception processes to tolerate such 
articulatory reductions and to prevent communication from breaking down. Prediction 
mechanisms thus allow for sufficient comprehension of a degraded-reduced acoustic 
input, to the extent that phonetic reduction has been considered a ‗‗hearer-based 
phenomenon‘‘ (e.g. Haspelmath, 2008, p. 60). The significance of top-down factors in 
efficient speech perception was discussed in the previous chapter. Phoneme restoration 
provided a characteristic example of a general, adaptive property of the perception 
system to employ available information to map poor or missing information onto the 
intended speech input (sections 2.4.3 and 2.6.3.1). This is why articulatorily reduced 
lexical items are comprehended with relative ease within constraining sentential 
contexts, where predictive, top-down processing is invited (Samuel & Troicki, 1998). 
The capacity of the perceiver to tolerate such degraded speech input was proposed in the 
previous chapter to rely on the perceptual enhancements that internal models may 




Chunking involves the same computations in both language perception-
comprehension and production. In grammaticalization, it manifests itself in syntagmatic 
coalescence, involving cliticization, affixation, or univerbation (section 3.2.2 for 
examples). The basic principle of chunking is summarized in the ‗‗Linear Fusion 
Hypothesis‘‘ whereby ‗‗items that are used together fuse together‘‘ (Bybee, 2002c, p. 
112). In other words, chunking is a process whereby 
 
[…] a frequently repeated stretch of speech becomes 
automated as a processing unit. The original internal 
structure becomes less important and can be obscured by 
phonological change, making the unit more efficient to 




At a generic level, chunking is a characteristic sign of automatized processes; it 
involves individual actions merging with other, spatiotemporally contiguous ones, into a 
larger, more efficiently performed unit (e.g. Boyland, 1996), as in reach-to-grasp moves, 
throwing a ball, or writing. Chunking was discussed above as a ‗par excellence‘ CB 
process (section 3.5.3). In the context of motor output-based metaphors of NCB 
cognitive functions (see section 2.3.1), NCB structures have been discussed as important 
for the storage and production of prefabricated, rote-memorized, idiomatic sequences, as 
opposed to propositionally composed ones. Cases of the former have been thought to 
include mnemonic sayings, nursery rhymes, songs, childhood jingle, recitation of the 
alphabet, or even multiplication tables (e.g. Thach, 1997, 2007): 
 
[w]e learn and can recite ‗‗Jabberwocky‘‘ as movement 
and not at all as language […] We rote- memorize 
something that has so little linguistic or logical connection 
among the elements that it is learned as a movement. We 
can listen to what we say in order to get at what we 
otherwise can‘t remember […] But it is not something we 
know. It is buried in a rote- learning movement sequence 
(Thach, 1997, pp. 91-2). 
 
The discourse of children with Williams‘ syndrome (Bellugi et al., 1990), as 
opposed to that of children with Down‘s syndrome and CB disease, has provided an 
elementary dissociation adding weight to the idea above (Thach, 1997, 2007). The 
former, exhibiting an atrophic cerebrum with a spared CB, excel in their fluent, socially 
extrovert discourse, which is, however, ‗‗devoid of propositional content‘‘ (Thach, 2007, 
p. 166). The latter, on the contrary, show deficits in speech development, yet relative 
sparing of other intellectual activities. Indeed, maybe corroborating the above, NCB 
activations have been found in an fMRI study of a task involving silent recitation of the 




However, the linguistic insights gained from such motor-based metaphors of CB 
contributions are quite limiting (section 2.3.1). Furthermore, there is no reason to 
assume that these ‗non-propositional‘ contributions are non-semantic or non-linguistic in 
nature, as suggested in the passage above. The verb-generation impairments in CB 
pathology are semantic in nature (section 2.4.4.5), and the same type of routinization is 
arguably involved in inferential processing (see section 3.6.3.2.2 below). Moreover, the 
organization of motor and cognitive output into larger units may be alternatively 
explained as a by-product of reliable state estimation of the sensory and cognitive 
consequences of the action produced (sections 2.2.2 and 3.5.3). In the domain of 
language, this would mean that such ‗idiomatic‘ modality is equally involved in 
perception-comprehension and articulation-production.  
 
Indeed, the importance of a predictive component for efficient perception-
comprehension is exemplified by the idea of ‗‗automated chunks‘‘ for hearers:  
 
[t]he boy had learned cannon only in the context of the 
compound cannonball and that was the only context in 
which he could access the word. Hearers have automated 
chunks as well, with analogous priming effects. In the US, 
upon hearing supreme, one can expect court as the next 
word; or upon hearing sesame one can expect street 
(Bybee, 2002c, p. 112). 
 
Such ‗hearer-based chunks‘ and their ‗‗analogous priming effects‘‘ precisely reflect the 
associative relations between items, established by their frequent temporal contiguity, 
and provide the perception-comprehension equivalent of CB idiomatic speech output. 
The generation of the lexical expectations involved was argued in the previous chapter 
to fundamentally rely on the neodentato-thalamo-cortical component of the NCBKFLP 
(sections 2.3.4.3 and 2.4.4). The first TMS study reported in this thesis provides some 
first evidence for selective NCB involvement in such idiomatic phrasal associates, e.g. 
‗gift-horse‘, or ‗pigeon-hole‘ (chapter 5).  
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From another perspective, the involvement of prediction mechanisms in 
phenomena of syntagmatic coalescence is arguably reflected in the trade-off between 
‗‗language redundancy‘‘, i.e. predictability of items from multi-level linguistic factors 
and ‗‗acoustic redundancy‘‘, i.e. predictability based on acoustic salience, in signalling 
the boundaries between words. According to the ‗‗Smooth Signal Redundancy 
Hypothesis‘‘ (Aylett & Turk, 2004), prosodic structure controls the phonetic realization 
of language redundancy, in a way that recognition likelihood is distributed evenly in 
utterances. This is achieved by an inverse, complementary relationship between 
language and acoustic redundancy. In a recent extension of the theory, it has been 
proposed that the acoustic redundancy of words may be manipulated by signalling their 
boundaries, and that the occurrence and strength of these boundary markers correlate 
inversely with language redundancy. Thus, if a word sequence is unpredictable, speakers 
will be likely to signal the boundary between the words, while frequently co-occurring 
items, such as subject pronouns and verbs, would not require boundary signalling. In the 
latter case, the acoustic redundancy provided by the phonetic segments of the words and 
the relative prominence of their component syllables would suffice for word recognition 
(Turk, 2010). The way in which such predictions are generated and adaptively modified 
in the neocerebello-cortical circuits was explained in the previous chapter (sections 2.3.3 
and 2.3.4). 
 
The significance of prediction in word-boundary signalling sheds light on the 
strong correlations noted between ‗‗grammaticalizability‘‘ of an expression and the 
occurrence of its grammatical units in a single intonation unit. Constructions that are 
subject to grammaticalization occur in single intonation units significantly more 
frequently than their non-grammaticalizable counterparts (Croft, 1995). This is the case 
for verb-complement structures in English that evolve into auxiliary structures, or into 
bound tense, aspect and mood inflections in other languages, as the true modal 
auxiliaries in (19a) or the quasimodals in (19b), or the appearance verbs in (19c) below. 
This correlation also holds for coordinate structures in English that develop into serial, 
compound and affixed constructions in other languages, like the motion-action event 
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coordination in (19d). This adds credibility to the hypothesis that the historical shift 
from two grammatical units occurring consistently in two intonation units to two 
grammatical units occurring consistently in a single intonation unit may be another 
criterion of grammaticalization (ibid). In summary, then, language redundancy within a 
sequence of grammatical units would translate into low NCBKFLP gain conditions in 
processing the particular sequence. Increased predictability would, in turn, attenuate 
word-boundary signalling. This would allow the production of that sequence within a 
single intonational unit, which would in turn pave the way for its grammaticalization.  
 
(19a) would have, should have 
 
(19b) go Ving, start to V, end up Ving, be supposed to V,  
 
(19c) look like NP, seem to VP 
 
(19d) ‗he goes and takes the hat to the kid‘                                                                  (Croft, 1995) 
 
 
If anything, examples like those in (19) demonstrate that spontaneous speech is 
in fact replete with formulaic and semi-productive phrases, and that formulaicity is far 
more pervasive in language use than CB neuroscientists envisage in discussing 
childhood jingles and multiplication tables. This is because prefabricated utterances are 
accessed without the activation of a high-level schema and provide ‗‗a short cut in 
processing‘‘ (Wray & Perkins, 2000, p. 15). While constructional schemata allow for the 
use of novel expressions and the productivity of grammar, the production of novel 
expressions is computationally costly, involving processing decisions that language 
users have to make online under time pressure. On the contrary, prefabrications have 
been computed so often that processing decisions occur with minimal effort. By 
reducing the amount of utterance planning and sentence processing, attentional resources 
can be allocated to other communicative aspects (Diessel, 2004). This is why 
prefabrications are selected, whenever available. For instance, expressions such as ‗I 
don‘t know __‘, ‗I don‘t think __‘, and ‗why don‘t you __‘ in (20a-c), because of their 
extremely high frequency, have become prefabricated chunks, and they are produced 
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and comprehended without a constructional schema (Bybee & Scheibman, 1999). This is 
manifested in the fundamental differences of these constructions from the less frequent 
ones they used to share categorical status with. In the former, the pronunciation of 
‗don‘t‘ is reduced, and, while the clauses are formally negated, they do not actually 
negate a proposition: ‗why don‘t you_‘ marks a suggestion; ‗I don‘t know_‘ expresses 
the speaker‘s uncertainty or polite disagreement; ‗I don‘t think_‘ expresses an epistemic 
stance toward an associated proposition. On the other hand, their less frequent 
categorical coordinates, as ‗we don‘t eat __‘ in (20d) are pronounced with an initial stop 
and a full vowel and serve as negation markers.  
 
(20a)  S: no salad? O will you finish the salad darling? 
          O: I don‘t know. not now. 
 
(20b) ‗…I‘ll drink it but, I don‘t think about taking it.‘ 
 
(20c)  ‗I said why don‘t you sit down…‘                                            (Bybee & Scheibman, 1999) 
 
(20d)  We don‘t eat potatoes. 
 
 
In this respect, formulaic utterances provide a characteristic case where cortico-
cerebellar computations may override and/or bypass cortico-cortical ones in processing 
an utterance without resorting to the temporo-parietal Memory component. These 
routinized constructions will thus be computed independently of the structural 
information they inherit from their corresponding schemata in the temporo-parietal 
‗construct-i-con‘ (section 2.3.4). After frequent repetition of the processing of such 
constructions in dialogical contexts, NCB internal models may accurately acquire the 
dynamics of processing their phonological-syntactic and semantic-pragmatic properties. 
The NCB models can then provide the constrained search space for the controller-
Unification component to process such formulae on the basis of the co-occurrence of 
their constituents and according to the interpretational routines associated with them (see 




3.6.3.2. Semantic Aspects 
 
In grammaticalization, the shift from ‗lexical‘ to ‗grammatical semantics‘ 
regularly predates the formal phenomena discussed above (e.g. Givón, 1991; Nicolle, 
1998; Kuteva, 2001), or occurs in tandem with them (e.g. Bybee et al., 1994; Bybee, 
2007b).
59
 Disappointingly, though, despite the claims that grammaticalization constitutes 
a multi-level reductive change (section 3.5.2), its core semantic component is hardly 
discussed as a product of these reductions. Instead, semantic bleaching is the aspect 
promoted as such (e.g. Bybee, 2003), while, at the same time, metaphorical extension 
and semantic bleaching have been seen as non-central mechanisms for 
grammaticalization (Bybee et al., 1994; Haspelmath, 1999; section 3.4.3 here). The 
appeal of semantic bleaching is perhaps better understood in the light of its resemblance 
to the well-studied processes of cultural ritualization and biological habituation 
(Haiman, 1994; see section 3.5.2 here). However, it is also because other types of 
automatization-based semantic change remain elusive. In what follows, I consider some 
cognitive/ psycholinguistic candidates for this change in the light of NCB computations. 
 
 
3.6.3.2.1. Cognitive Backgrounding 
 
From a cognitive and discourse-oriented perspective, Boye and Harder (2009) 
map a widely used in cognitive science ‗‗foreground/ background‘‘ distinction onto that 
of ‗‗primary/secondary‘‘ in discourse processing. They argue that grammaticalized 
categories reflect ‗‗coded secondary information status‘‘, and come about as ‗‗the 
diachronic result of persistent use of a given meaning as secondary information‘‘ (ibid, 
p. 34). The change in the ‗‗structural status‘‘ from ‗‗lexical‘‘ to ‗‗grammatical‘‘ is thus 
motivated by that in ‗‗usage status‘‘, from ‗‗primary-foregrounded‘‘ to ‗‗secondary-
backgrounded‘‘ (Boye, 2008, August; Boye & Harder, 2009). In sentence processing, 
                                                          
59




two pieces of information are seen as competing for foregrounded status, with the loser 
becoming backgrounded as secondary information. For example, in (21a), the 
competition is resolved with the information yielded by ‗going‘ winning the competition 
and preserving primary, foregrounded status. In (21b), the information of ‗going‘ loses 
in competition, acquiring secondary, backgrounded status. It is precisely in cases like 
(21b) that the foundations of grammaticalization are found.  
 
(21a) He is going (in order) to fix the room 
 
(21b) He is going to fix the room (tomorrow)                                               (Boye, 2008, August) 
 
 
Considerations of neuroscientists on the possible NCB contributions to thought 
processing involve strikingly similar terms and concepts. The NCB has been proposed to 
adaptively provide a mental ‗‗background‘‘ in contexts requiring extensive processing 
by a cognitively attended ‗‗foreground‘‘. A characteristic example used in the literature 
is that of planning out a successful chess strategy: the skilled player would have the 
problem, the intended strategy, and future moves of the chessmen in the attended 
foreground, employing the memory of moves below the level of awareness. While this 
information would be stored in the cerebrum, when planning a winning strategy, it 
would be fed through the CB as a ‗‗subconscious mental subroutine‘‘ to the 
foregrounded conscious processes (Thach, 1997, 1998). Moreover, the significance of 
the CB in supporting dual-task performance, as discussed above, is also quite suggestive. 
In such paradigms, one of the two tasks gains backgrounded status with the help of the 
CB, so that attentional resources can be allocated to the foregrounded one (section 
3.5.3). Efficient discourse processing would similarly require adaptive NCB 
backgrounding of certain information, and allocation of cortical attentional resources to 
the foregrounded one. These CB-based optimizations in discourse processing would 
initiate the change in usage status of an expression, which in the long run motivates the 




3.6.3.2.2. Pragmatic Routines 
 
 The cognitive-semiotic properties of metaphor and metonymy add another point 
where grammaticalization changes meet NCB computations. As discussed above, 
semantic change by metaphorical extension broadly pertains to lexical semantic change, 
and occurs in the initial stages of grammaticalization (Bybee et al., 1994; section 3.4.3 
here). On the contrary, the semanticization of ‗‗pragmatic associations that arise in the 
flow of speech‘‘ (Traugott & Dasher, 2005, p. 58), termed ‗‗inference‘‘, or 
‗‗(conceptual) metonymy‘‘
60
 (Hopper & Traugott, 1993), has often been emphasized to 
play the central role in the evolution of grammatical meanings (Bybee et al., 1994; 
Nicolle, 1998; Bybee, 2007b).  
 
At this point, I would like to argue that the cognitive properties of metonymy 
allow the involvement of NCB computations, whereas those of metaphor are selectively 
suitable for cerebral computations. To begin with, metonymy represents ‗‗semantic 
transfer through contiguity‘‘, and is ‗‗indexical‘‘, while ‗‗metaphor is semantic transfer 
through a similarity of sense perceptions‘‘, and is analogical and iconic (Antilla, 1989 
[1972], pp. 141-2). As discussed in the previous chapter, the CB does not have the 
capacity of the cerebrum to store representations on the basis of shared features and 
similarities. Rather, it stores predictive relations between temporally contiguous events 
(section 2.3.4.3). This immediately promotes it as a strong candidate for acquiring and 
processing an indexical sign,
61
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‗Metonymy‘ primarily refers to changes based on ‗non-linguistic‘ contiguity: e.g. Latin coxa ‗hip‘ > 
French cuisse ‗thigh‘. However, it is extended to contiguities in the conceptual-inferential domain, e.g. 
since (temporal precedence) > since (causation). See Hopper and Traugott (1993, pp. 81-2) for discussion 
of the term and further examples. 
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 Pairings of phenomena and their physical consequences are characteristic examples of indexical 
signification: smoke-fire, clouds-rain, fever-illness, odor-disintegration.  
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a sign, or representation, which refers to its object not so 
much because of any similarity or analogy with it, nor 
because it is associated with general characters which 
that object happens to possess, but because it is in 
dynamical […] connection both with the individual 
object, on the one hand, and with the senses or memory of 
the person for whom it serves as a sign, on the other hand. 
[…] Indices may be distinguished from other signs, or 
representations, by three characteristic marks: first, that 
they have no significant resemblance to their objects; 
second, that they refer to individuals, single units, single 
collections of units, or single continua; third, that they 
direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion 
(Peirce, 1931-58, Vol. 2, pp. 305-306; italics mine). 
 
Arguably, then, temporal contiguity and ‗non-generalizability‘ are defining 
properties for both indexical signalling and CB processes. The fact that ‗‗[i]t makes no 
difference whether the connection is natural, or artificial, or merely mental‘‘ (Peirce, 
1931-58, Vol. 8, p. 368) provides the ground for the extension of these mechanisms to 
higher cognitive domains. This is in parallel guaranteed by the cytoarchitectural 
homogeneity of the CB and its massive reciprocal connectivity with all major 
subdivisions of the central nervous system, which promote a uniform, domain-general 
CB computation (section 1.3.2).  
 
To begin with, in the transfer from the source to the target concept, inferential 
processes hardly even involve any shifts in semantic domain; this is because the change 






[…] inferential change […] does not resemble change by 
metaphor in the least. It is not even clear that it represents 
a change from a more concrete domain to a more abstract 
domain […] More importantly, there appears to be no 
way in which this semantic change can be regarded as a 
change that transfers an image-schema structure from one 
domain to another (Bybee et al., 1994, p. 289). 
 
Instead, metonymic transfers involve the acquisition of strong temporal 
contiguities of interpretational steps. These need to frequently co-occur in order for the 
inferred meaning to start competing with the conventional one for its subsequent 
semanticization. For instance, in the transition from Old to Modern French, the 
unstressed marker of negation ‗ne‘ was supplemented with an emphatic particle ‗pas‘ 
(originally meaning step, Latin ‗passus‘). The frequent co-occurrence of the two led to 
the conventionalization of the Modern French construction ‗ne…pas‘, and to the further 
grammaticalization of the construction, with the dropping of ‗ne‘ and the metonymic 
absorption of the negation component by ‗pas‘ (Bybee et al., 1994; Traugott & Dasher, 
2005). This non-categorical, associative, frequency-conditioned nature of metonymy 
offers ideal grounds for NCB involvement. By repeated exposure to the dynamics of the 
inferential chains in the interpretation of particular constructions, a linguistic NCB 
model may acquire, via trial and error, the input-output relations of such processes. 
Upon perception of the particular construct, it may rapidly preactivate the representation 
of the terminal inferential step; at the same time, it may attenuate the much slower and 
costlier exploration of temporo-parietal cortex that a step-wise inferential process would 
involve.  
 
On the contrary, metaphor operates on the basis of similarity and analogy, i.e. by 
featural overlaps between concepts belonging to different semantic domains. For 
example, the feature of ‗frontness‘ in the representation of a body part like ‗mouth‘ 
allows the metaphorical mapping from the ‗body‘ (source) domain to the ‗space‘ (target) 
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domain (see example 3, section 3.2.2). The CB does not store categorically organized 
representations, and is thus unable to compute the similarities between subordinate terms 
of different categories on the basis of such featural overlaps. Mechanisms of similarity-
based learning were shown in the previous chapter to reflect cortical algorithms of 
unsupervised learning (section 2.3.4.3). Furthermore, metaphorical extension has been 
seen as a process that, unlike metonymy, may occur abruptly (Bybee et al., 1994). On 
the contrary, it is only through repeated exposure to the dynamics of a certain process 
that the CB is trained (section 2.2.2). Thus, by its very nature, metaphor is less suited for 
NCB involvement. Furthermore, while metaphor involves the quite innovative creation 
of a novel form-meaning mapping (and thus a ‗competence change‘), ‗metonymy‘ 
arguably reflects a shortcut behavior in the inferential process: the stored input-output 
sequences may override the very process by which these outputs are yielded. This 
distinction would include metonymy in the ‗performance changes‘ proposed to comprise 
grammaticalization (sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 above). 
 
This shortcut behavior brings the discussion to the notion of ‗‗pragmatic 
routines‘‘; these represent the ‗‗[…] tendency of the mind, in its search for relevance, to 
use assumptions and inferential processes which have been used in processing the 
stimuli on previous occasions‘‘ (Vega Moreno, 2007, p. 117). Re-occurring pragmatic 
inferences may become so accessible that minimal effort would be required for their 
execution. Thus, pragmatic routines would operate by ‗‗compiling or short-circuiting the 
inferential steps involved in comprehension‘‘ (Vega Moreno, 2007, p. 117), directly 
reflecting NCB computations. In other words,  
 
 
[t]he more familiar the hearer is with a particular 
combination of words […] the more likely is that the most 
highly activated assumptions will be those which had 
been considered or derived in processing the string on 
previous occasions (ibid). 
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‗Familiarity‘, translated into low NCBKFLP gain in processing, would involve 
maximized NCB involvement in determining the output of the emulated process. In the 
case of a precompiled construct, interpretation would be biased to output the same 
assumptions as those generated in previous occasions of its processing, with little access 
to the representations of other concepts involved in the inferential process. Such cases 
would fall under the semantic-associative computations held to rely on the NCB in the 
previous chapter (sections 2.3.4.3 and 2.4.4.5). The third TMS study reported here 
(chapter 7) also provides some first evidence for NCB involvement in semantic-
associative relations in the comprehension modality. 
 
 
3.6.4. Micro-Reanalysis and Cortical Schematization 
 
The discussion now briefly turns to the notion of ‗cortical schematization‘ as a 
necessary component for ‗CB-optimized‘ constructions to gain categorical status and 
ultimately give rise to new schematic constructions.  
 
 
3.6.4.1. Cortical Schematization in Acquisition 
 
In functionalist grammaticalization theory, child language acquisition has been 
proposed to contribute to the coding and the productivity of a grammaticalized variant 
via processes of ‗‗micro-reanalysis‘‘ (Haspelmath, 1998).  By such process, the 
diachronically elder variant is marginalized; the newer, grammaticalized one, on the 
basis of its higher frequency in the learning set the infant is confronted with, acquires 
basic, ‗unmarked‘ status, and becomes productive. Hooper (1976) independently 
employs the same mechanism to describe the conventionalization of phonetically 




[a]fter the initial stages, the language acquisition process 
begins to play a role, for it is probably in the transmission 
of the language that restructuring takes place. A very 
frequent word such as every may be variable for an adult 
speaker, but a new learner may take the schwa-less 
pronunciation to be the norm or base form. The younger 
speaker will have a schwa-less underlying form, and the 
process will be complete for that word. The change in 
underlying forms will progress similarly over several 
generations (Hooper, 1976; reprinted in Bybee 2007, p. 
31). 
 
For the grammaticalizing construction to acquire schematic status, analogical 
mechanisms of rule generalization should be operand. For instance, in the example of 
the procliticization of object pronouns in Spanish above (18), it would be only particular 
sequences of verbs and co-occurring pre-verbal object pronouns that become routinized 
into the same intonational contour. Apparently, this construction could not have 
developed as a product of routinization for each separate ‗object pronoun-verb‘ 
sequence- some of these combinations are simply far from frequently used in dialogue. 
Instead, the highly entrenched ones, argued here to involve NCB circuitry in their 
processing, would form the foundations for the formation of a new categorical 
representation of a schematic construction, on the basis of which a much larger set of 
verbs and pronouns may be processed. The same generalization mechanism would be 
seen in the development of the Romance perfect. In (22a), agreement between the object 
(‗vos‘) and the adjectival participial (‗fatigatos‘) is overt. In the perfect tense 
construction, though, in (22b), agreement between the object (‗omnia‘) and the participle 
(‗probatum‘, instead of ‗probata‘) has decayed. The construction formed in (22b) was 
apparently derived by instances of the construction in (22a) where the object, and, via 
agreement, the participial as well, were in neuter singular form. After this decay in 
agreement, the generalization that occurred in the object slot from neuter singular 
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contexts to those of all numbers and genders in the perfect tense construction (22b) was 
a product of ‗‗analogy‘‘ or ‗‗rule generalization‘‘ (Hopper & Traugott, 1993). 
 
(22a)   Metuo        enim ne     ibi     vos                   habebam   fatigatos 
            Fear.1.SG  for    lest   there  you: ACC.PL  have-1SG  tired-ACC:PL 
           ‗For I fear that I have tired you.‘ 
 
(22b)   Haec                  omnia           probatum         habemus 
            Those:ACC:PL all-ACC-PL tried-PART(?) have-1PL 
           ‗We have tried all those things.‘ 
 
          (Fleischman, 1982, p. 120; found in Hopper & Traugott, 1993, pp. 57-8) 
 
For this to occur, I would like to suggest that mechanisms of schematization in 
child language acquisition are necessary. The latter involves an analogical learning 
process by which categories are formed on the basis of their featural overlaps 
(Langacker, 2000; Diessel, 2004). As argued in the previous chapter, schematization is a 
function of cortically-based, unsupervised learning algorithms, and cannot be 
accommodated by CB supervised ones. This is corroborated by findings involving 
Broca‘s area (and not the CB) in the extraction of schematic representations of letter 
strings in artificial grammar learning paradigms (sections 2.3.4.3 and 2.4.4.4). A 
characteristic instance of schematization is the over-regularizing behavior of infants, 
which is a powerful driving force for reanalysis and analogical levelling. As discussed 
above, those two phenomena are described as ‗‗categorical‘‘, and are contrasted with the 
‗‗gradual‘‘ nature of grammaticalization (Lehmann, 2004; section 3.4 here).  
 
The distinction between ‗schematization‘ and ‗routinization‘ promoted here, and 
that between ‗cortico-cortical‘ and ‗cortico-cerebellar‘ processing, respectively, are 
compatible with the ‗‗analytic‘‘ vs ‗‗formulaic‘‘ distinction promoted in Wray and 
Perkins (2000). In the initial ontogenetic phase, where the analytic processing modality 
prevails, the cognitive apparatus of language-acquiring infants 
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[…] identifies, selects and stores a sufficient and requisite 
number of salient formulaic linguistic items to activate a 
specifically language-oriented analytical mechanism 
which, through identifying commonalities among the 
stored formulas, begins the process of creating a 
generative grammar for the language of the child's 
environment somewhere between 20 and 30 months of 
age. The process continues until roughly the age of 8, and 
this stage of development is marked by a preference for 





 year of age, the holistic modality becomes heavily involved in 
carrying out the processing bulk in casual linguistic interaction. In doing so, it offers a 
range of ‗‗processing short-cuts‘‘, which are ‗‗crucial to managing an over-demanding 
on-line processing system‘‘ (ibid, p. 17). In such cases, comprehension  
 
 […] becomes a top-down pragmatically driven process of 
formulaic `macro-processing', with the bottom-up 
grammatical `microprocessing' mechanism only being 
used as a default in cases where macroprocessing fails to 
yield a sufficiently relevant interpretation (ibid, p. 21). 
 
 
Interestingly, the CB shows a delayed postnatal developmental maturation 
compared with the cerebrum (e.g. Hossain et al., 2004), and it does not reach its full 




 year of age (Leiner et al., 1986). While research on the 
maturation of particular NCB lobules is underresearched (C. Miall, personal 
communication, 24 June 2010), this general pattern adds weight to the idea of cerebral 




3.6.4.2. Cortical Schematization within Single Cohorts 
 
But would the micro-reanalysis of newly introduced grammaticalization variants 
rely on schematization exclusively in the language acquisition phase? An intriguing 
possibility is offered by the notion of ‗forced CB-to-cerebrum learning‘, whereby, in the 
long run, the CB trains its cortical output loci, making the representations in the latter 
more efficient: 
 
[o]n the one hand, these [CB-induced] alterations would 
serve to modify the collective computations being 
performed by the cortical network […] On the other hand, 
the same alterations would promote changes in the 
weights of the Hebbian synapses on pyramidal neurons, 
that, in the long run, would move the network‘s 
attractors closer to the points being forced by cerebellar 
and basal ganglia modifications. As a consequence, the 
frontal cortex would become trained to perform, in a 
highly efficient and automatic fashion, those particular 
functions being forced on it by its subcortical [CB and 
BG] inputs (Houk & Wise, 1995, p. 106). 
 
Unfortunately, direct evidence is not yet available, though the plausibility of this 
idea is implied in assumptions of cerebello-cerebral interactions. For example, the 
changes in cerebral metabolism consequent on CB cortical lesions, e.g. in crossed 
cerebro-cerebellar diaschisis (section 1.3.3), imply that reduced CB outflow affects long-
term cerebral processing. But if the cerebrum receives modified CB inputs in the longer 
term, it would be highly surprising if there was no change in the cerebrum to reflect that 
(C. Miall, personal communication, 22 December 2009). Suggestively, in a recent study, 
individuals with damage to their left, dominant for speech, cerebral hemisphere, 
activated, during recovery, their previously non-dominant, right cerebral hemisphere, 
along with the crossed left CB hemisphere. The new patterns of functional connectivity 
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that emerged were proposed to result from the CB assisting the right cerebral 
hemisphere to subserve mental activity (Connor et al., 2006; see Thach, 2007, for some 
discussion). 
 
Conceivably, then, the associative representations of particular constructions 
developed in the CB might be copied back to the cerebral language-related loci. The 
hypothesis would be that the cerebrum may then systematize and schematize these CB-
acquired associative copies. In that way, traces of new categories would be made 
possible within a single cohort of adult speakers. For instance, in (23) below, the 
cerebral memory representations (C) of the construction ([X[YZ]]) in (23a) below are 
instantiated, among others, with the frequently occurring ‗constructs‘ (physical 
instantiations of particular constructions) [x2y1z3] and [x2y1z4]; ‗X, Y, Z‘ would represent 
categories of items, and ‗x, y, z‘, would represent members of such categories.  CB 
memory (CB) may acquire the dynamics of formal and semantic processing of these 
constructs, and store associative representations that bear no categorical, and thus no 
structural information of the items involved (23b). By being processed on the grounds of 
their formal co-occurrence and their routine interpretation, these constructs develop 
properties absent from their schematic category and from their categorical coordinates. 
Via forced CB-to-cerebral learning, such associative representations may be acquired in 
turn by the cortical memory component (23c). This may provide input for the 
construction of new categorical representations, by the analogy-driven schematization 
processes, thus giving rise to new schematic constructions, on the basis of these 
constructs [x2y1Z΄], with new formal and semantic properties. By further analogical 
levelling, the paradigmatic breadth of Z΄ may expand to the much larger Z (23e), 








(23a)  C = {[X[YZ]]}                                                          CB =  { } 
        
           X = {x1, x2, x3,..., xp} 
           Y = {y1, y2, y3,..., yn} 
           Z = {z1, z2, z3,…, zm} 
 
(23b)  C = {[X[YZ]]}                                                         CB =  {[x2y1z3], [x2y1z4]} 
 
(23c)  C = {[X[YZ]], [x2y1z3], [x2y1z4]}                             CB =  {[x2y1z3], [x2y1z4]} 
 
(23d)  C = {[X[YZ]], [x2y1Z΄]}                                          CB =  {[x2y1z3], [x2y1z4]} 
           Z΄= {z3,z4} 
 






















3.7. Basal Ganglionic Computations  
       in Grammaticalization 
 
 
As already suggested, particular brain structures are only relevant with 
grammaticalization to the extent that they implement computations that support the 
psycholinguistic mechanisms underlying grammaticalization (3.3.3). Hence, while NCB 
circuitry was argued above to hold a central place in such grounding, other aspects of 
grammaticalization may involve different psycholinguistic processes; these may employ 
different computations that may be performed by different brain structures. In 
Argyropoulos (2008a), I had suggested that both CB and basal ganglionic computations 
are involved in grammaticalization changes. In fact, in a number of neuropsychological 
models, the basal ganglia are shown to contribute, along with the CB, to multimodal 
automatization processes. In the context of motor automaticity, for instance, the CB has 
been proposed to associate experiential contexts with compound motor responses, 
whereas the basal ganglia to fluently gate competing alternative responses by selecting 
the most appropriate ones (Thach et al., 1993). The strong relationship between 
automatization and grammaticalization (section 3.5.2) thus encourages the investigation 
of the role of this structure in language processing. Briefly, here, I present how the basal 
ganglia may be involved. 
 
Grammaticalization studies have offered insight into the cognitive representation 
of constructions (Bybee 2005, p. 10), and, importantly here, into the categorical 
gradedness of grammatical representation. Usage changes are concomitant with changes 
in cognitive representation, and thus more flexible and gradient grammatical categories 
are required (e.g. Givón, 1979; Haspelmath, 1998; Bybee 2007b, pp. 973-4). For 
instance, the ‗‗verbality/ prepositionality‘‘ scale in English ranges from less 
grammaticalized, verb-like items, e.g. ‗preceding, facing, considering‘, to more 
grammaticalized, preposition-like ones, such as ‗during, pending, past, ago‘ (Kortmann 
& König, 1992, p. 684; see discussion in Haspelmath, 1998).The desideratum of 
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gradedness has recently attracted researchers from computational and psycholinguistic 
probabilistic modelling (Zuraw, 2003 for a review), encouraging the definition of 
categoricity on the basis of the particular constructions that each item occurs in (Croft, 
2001; Goldberg, 2004). Similarly, in Pulvermüller‘s (2002) neuronal syntax, lexical 
categories are defined by the set of the very complements lexical categories require, i.e. 
by their ‗‗sequence regularities‘‘.  
 
If assignment of categorical status to a particular item relies on recognition of the 
particular constructional context, then, in online processing, the representations of these 
contexts may be activated once the item is encountered. These representations would 
assign different candidate analyses to the particular item, and their competition may be 
resolved with subsequent input. In (24a-b), for instance, the verb representation of 
‗considering‘ competes with its prepositional representation, and disambiguation may 
require further input, even beyond the sentential context. A necessary component of an 
efficient parser thus becomes the gating of competing structural analyses. One such 
mechanism may be found in recent lexicalist processing models, where competing 
analyses send each other inhibitory signals, reducing the competitor‘s strength (Vosse & 
Kempen, 2000; Hagoort, 2003).  
 
(24a)   Considering retirement, I still have years to come. 
(24b)   Considering retirement, I called my manager. 
 
Such inhibitory processes among competing variants may be undertaken by 
cortico-striatal circuits. This is indeed reflected in what Pulvermüller (2002) en passant 
calls ‗‗striatal regulation of cortical activity‘‘, operating in cases where more than one of 
these ‗‗sequence regularities‘‘ become available for an item online. Recent evidence 
implicates basal ganglionic inhibition in sentence processing. Subjects with Tourette‘s 
syndrome have shown speeded processing of procedural (both linguistic and non-
linguistic) knowledge, which has been attributed to their basal ganglionic abnormalities 
in the inhibition of frontal cortical activity (Walenski et al., 2007). Correlations have 
been found between sentence comprehension and Stroop task performance in 
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Parkinsonians (Grossman et al., 2002), while their compromised capacity of parsing 
relative clauses has been attributed to ‗‗deficits in cognitive set-switching‘‘ or to 
‗‗underlying inhibitory processes‘‘ (Hochstadt et al., 2006). In general, inhibition and 
reinforcement are taken to underlie probabilistic representation: basal ganglionic patients 
exhibit deficient probabilistic category learning (Knowlton et al., 1996), while in the 
acquisition phase of such tasks, striatal activation is involved for normal individuals 
(Poldrack et al., 1999). Basal ganglionic activation in the comprehension of syntactically 
ambiguous sentences has also been discussed as reflecting a process of ‗‗unchoosing‘‘ 
the initial syntactic commitment upon reception of incompatible syntactic input (Stowe 
et al., 2004).  
 
At the intra-generational level, then, changes in the distributional patterns of 
particular items would be efficiently tracked by a constant, dopamine-mediated 
regulation of the inhibitory strengths among competing syntactic contexts. This fuzzy 
view of grammatical categoricity would translate into sets of item-particular ‗cortico-











    
Figure 3.3: Cortico-striatal negotiation of linguistic categoricity. Cortico-striatal circuits 
regulate the competition between candidates for unification in online sentence 
processing. Changes in the distributional properties of linguistic items are efficiently 
translated into changes of inhibitory strengths among the competing alternatives that the 
item unifies with in processing. A, B, C, D, G: preceding and following morphosyntactic 
environments of linguistic item (*); x. y, z, w, v, u: values of the frequency in which a 
particular item (*) occurs in a particular environment. The function „f‟ translates those 
distributional strengths into strengths of inhibitory signals that the representations of the 
different morphosyntactic constructions send to one another in online processing; 
t(1,2,3): different arbitrary stages in the ontogenetic (intra-generational) timescale. Figure 













3.8. The Cerebellum, Broca’s Area,  
and Grammaticalization  
 
 
In his pioneering work bringing historical linguistics and neuroscience together, 
Givón has drawn attention to the significance of Broca‘s area in the diachronic 
emergence of grammatical structure.
62
 The cortex around Broca‘s area is involved in a 
wide range of non-language-particular cognitive functions, such as motor skills, action-
planning routines, and complex hierarchic object-combination, visual-tracking, and tool-
using routines (e.g. Givón, 1995, pp. 420-1). Comparative surveys of non-human 
primates and human children support the idea that ‗Broca‘s area as a grammatical 
processor‘ reflects the late ontogenetic and phylogenetic extension of pre-linguistic uses 
of the primary motor cortex for sequential-hierarchic skills (Greenfield, 1991). The idea 
is thus promoted that grammaticalization as automatization primarily involves increased 
involvement of Broca‘s area in communication. However, there are certain issues that 
need addressing at this point. 
 
Throughout his research, Givón has used the term ‗grammaticalization‘ in a 
much broader fashion than the way it is employed here and the way typically used in the 
literature. In particular, Givón‘s definition is based on the striking similarities among the 
contrasts between creole and pidgin, adult and child language, or healthy and aphasic 
adult speech (e.g. Givón, 1979, p.223). Those two modes of communication, described 
as ‗‗grammaticalized vs pre-grammatical speech‘‘ (Givón, 1989, p.262), fundamentally 
differ with respect to the information load/speed trade-offs, and reflect differences 
between automatic and attended processing. The same distinction is preserved in 
Givón‘s most recent work, where ‗‗pre-grammatical pidgin before grammaticalized 
language‘‘ is described as one of the major trends in language ontogeny (Givón, 2009, p. 
123). 
 
                                                          
62
 Needless to say that Givón‘s ecology has never exclusively committed to a particular brain locus, and is 
openly pluralistic (see Givón, 2009, for an up-to-date account). 
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Grammaticalization, for Givón, then, pertains in general to the transition from a 
pre-/non-grammatical to a grammatical mode of communication and information 
processing. On the contrary, the definition of grammaticalization adopted here is much 
stricter: it refers to the evolution of constructions within an already established 
(cognitively and socially) grammatical mode of communication. The two definitions 
assumed can actually be seen as radically different from each other: 
‗grammaticalization‘ as the introduction of the grammatical mode of communication, in 
contrast to ‗grammaticalization‘ as the ‗overriding/bypassing‘ of such a mode, with 
constructions deviating from their categorical properties in online processing because of 
cheaper emulative computations. Givón‘s broad definition is exemplified in the 
emphasis lent in his work to instances of ‗‗syntacticization‘‘, i.e. the development of 
syntactic complexity out of loose, paratactic speech. The shift of the loose paratactic 
topic-comment construction (25a) into one of subject-verb agreement (25b) would be 
such an example. In the stricter construal of grammaticalization, syntacticization 
represents a ‗‗non-prototypical‘‘ case (e.g. Boye, 2008, August).  
 
(25a)   My ol‘ man,  he rides with the Angels.  
            Topic           Comment 
 
(25b)   My ol‘ man he-rides with the Angels.  
            Subject        Agreement 
 
         (Givón, 1979, p. 209; cited in Boye, 2008, August) 
 
Above all, this broad definition of grammaticalization as the transition from a 
pre- or non- grammatical to a grammatical mode of communication would accommodate 
computations of child language acquisition within those underlying 
‗grammaticalization‘. The present account, on the contrary, assumes a much stricter 
distinction on the learning mechanisms between child language acquisition and adult 
language use, in line with work in grammaticalization and child language acquisition 
studies (e.g. Hooper, 1976; Haspelmath, 1998; Diessel, 2004).
63
 In particular, child 
language acquisition was proposed above to involve the schematization of linguistic 
                                                          
63 See chapter 7 in Givón (2009) for an account against this distinction.  
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input, and thus to heavily rely on cortical unsupervised learning algorithms (section 
3.6.4). On the contrary, the routinization of language processing in adult dialogical 
contexts was argued to primarily involve NCB feedforward control, overriding and/or 
bypassing the slower cerebral categorical processes (sections 3.6.2 and 3.6.3). Future 
imaging and clinical research should help dissociate between the conditions of the 
involvement of Broca‘s area and those of the CB in language processing. Encouragingly, 
currently available evidence suggests that Broca‘s area, and not CB circuitry, is 
significant for artificial grammar learning (sections 2.3.4.3 and 2.4.4.4). On the contrary, 
the deficits of CB patients in practice-related performance optimization (sections 2.4.2 
and 3.5.3) do not reflect any known cerebral impairments. In other words, while both 
Broca‘s area and the CB belong to the motor, non-attended processing loop (section 
3.5.1), their contributions to these broadly defined ‗automatization‘ operations may 
arguably be different. Along with further neuropsychological research, more refined 
















In this chapter, the idea of automatization as the cognitive core of 
grammaticalization provided the necessary bridge between language diachrony and 
neurolinguistics. The significance of the CB for automatization allowed us to explore the 
particular psycholinguistic aspects of grammaticalization in the light of the NCBKFLP. 
In particular, grammaticalization was argued to rely on the adaptive minimization of the 
NCBKFLP gain, as induced by the routinization of processing particular constructions in 
casual adult dialogical interactions. Grammaticalization changes were thus discussed as 
the product of maximized involvement of associative neocerebello-cortical computations 






















Conclusion of Volume I 
 
In the first, theoretical part of the thesis (chapters 1-3), neocerebellar 
computations of feedforward control and state estimation were brought together in a 
synthesis with psycholinguistic work on language perception and comprehension, along 
with historical linguistic work on grammaticalization processes. Neocerebellar 
compartments were argued to provide associative (predictive) linguistic computations 
capable of biasing, overriding, and/or bypassing the cerebral categorical ones. 
Neocerebellar processes were proposed to underlie a wide range of psycholinguistic and 
historical linguistic phenomena, thus making possible the empirical investigation of the 
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Introduction to Volume II 
 
In the first, theoretical part of the thesis, the neurolinguistic model of the 
Neocerebellar Kalman Filter Linguistic Processor was developed (sections 2.3.3 and 
2.3.4). Within this context, a number of experimental hypotheses were formulated 
(section 2.6). The thesis now turns to the first steps taken here towards the validation of 
these hypotheses, employing transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of neocerebellar 
loci. After discussing the motivation for the particular methodology and the stimulation 
protocols applied (chapter 4), the thesis goes on to report the three TMS studies 
conducted, which are the first to combine cerebellar stimulation with linguistic tasks 
(chapters 5-7). Despite the considerable technical limitations, these three studies provide 































‗‗As any schoolboy with a toolkit or a broken toy soon 
appreciates, to find out how a machine works you need 
to take it apart, and to put it back together again, you 
need to know how it works. The next lesson is that, no 
matter how hard you try, you always end up with a 
handful of leftover nuts and bolts. These remaining 
components can be informative: will your machine still 






This chapter provides a brief introduction to the general features of the 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) framework, and, subsequently, the reasons why 
TMS experimentation was preferred over clinical studies for the empirical investigation 
of the hypotheses formulated in the first part of the thesis. The chapter then continues 
with the explanation of the methodological parameters pertaining to the studies 









4.2. Introduction to TMS 
 
A comprehensive introduction to TMS would be beyond the scope of the present 
thesis; the reader may instead refer to the introductory articles to TMS cited in this 
section. 
 
TMS is a non-invasive technique for the electrical stimulation of neural tissue in 
conscious human subjects. According to Faraday‘s principle of electromagnetic 
induction, when a pulse of electrical current is introduced through a coil of wire, a 
magnetic field is generated (Faraday, 1965). If its magnitude changes in time, the 
magnetic field induces a secondary electrical current flow in a second wire, i.e. a nearby 
conductor. The rate of change of the field determines the size of the current induced. In 
TMS, the ‗first wire‘ is the copper-wire, encased in plastic stimulating coil and the 
‗second wire‘ is a targeted region of the brain (Pascual-Leone et al., 1999). The 
stimulating coil is held over a subject‘s head, and applied over the scalp at a point 
overlying a specific brain area. When a capacitance is discharged through it by a 
magnetic stimulator, a brief pulse of large, rapidly changing current flows through its 
windings, generating a transient magnetic field oriented orthogonally to the plane of the 
coil. Unlike transcranial electrical stimulation, the magnetic field passes through the 
subject‘s skin, scalp and skull with negligible attenuation (Rothwell, 1997), at a depth of 
approximately 1.5-2 cm beneath the scalp (Rudiak & Marg, 1994; Wassermann, 1998; 
Keenan & Pascual-Leone, 1999), only decaying by the square of the distance. This time-
varying magnetic field induces a much smaller, oppositely directed secondary ionic 
current perpendicularly to the magnetic field in the subject‘s brain, flowing tangentially 
with respect to the skull and inducing a physiological response in the underlying neural 
tissue. Thus, ‗‗strictly speaking, transcranial magnetic stimulation is a misnomer, as the 
magnetic field appears to simply represent a bridge between the current in the 
stimulating coil (primary current) and the current induced in the subject‘s brain 
(secondary current). Therefore, TMS might be best seen as a form of ‗electrodeless, non-
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invasive electric stimulation‘.‘‘ (Pascual-Leone et al., 1999, p. 1230). In general, the 
secondary current induced by TMS triggers activity changes, excitatory or inhibitory, 
that are effectively random with respect to the organized signals required to perform a 
task. This transient ‗neural noise‘ is thus introduced to the neural computation being 
performed; its disruptive effects can be manifested in longer reaction times (RTs), or 
even errors (Pascual-Leone et al., 1999; Walsh & Rushworth, 1999). 
 
TMS provides a valuable tool for cognitive neuroscience in a number of different 
ways. Most importantly, ‗‗among the many methods now available for imaging the 
activity of the human brain, magnetic stimulation is the only technique that allows us to 
interfere actively with brain function.‘‘ (Pascual-Leone et al., 2000, p. 232). This is 
because TMS can be employed as a ‗‗lesion technique‘‘ by transiently disrupting focal 
brain activity and causing ‗‗virtual lesions‘‘ (Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003). It can also 
be used to study the timing of the contribution of an accessible brain region in a 
behavior. Moreover, it can be combined with functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), single unit recording, and high-resolution electroencephalography, for the 
investigation of task-related networks and changes in effective brain connectivity. 
Furthermore, since the neural noise introduced by TMS often leads to transient 
performance enhancements, it also has promising clinical utility, and, since it can 
influence brain function if delivered repetitively, it may be employed diagnostically, 
prognostically, and even therapeutically (Kobayashi & Pascual-Leone, 2003). 
Unsurprisingly, then, since its introduction, TMS has been extensively used for the 
stimulation of peripheral nerves and brain tissue involved in a wide range of functions, 
such as motor control, swallowing, vision, attention, memory, speech and language, as 
well as in movement disorders, epilepsy, depression, stroke, motor conduction in human 






4.3. Methodological Significance  
    of Cerebellar TMS  
 
 
I now turn to the methodological advantages of TMS as a lesion technique 
compared with clinical and other imaging techniques with respect to the study of NCB 
cognitive functions. Those advantages provide the reasons for which TMS methodology 
was preferred in taking the first steps for the assessment of the NCBKFLP hypothesis 
(chapter 2; Argyropoulos, 2009). 
 
Compared with the rest of the human brain-imaging techniques, TMS has the 
significant advantage of the capacity to demonstrate ‗‗causal structure- function 
relationships‘‘ (Sack, 2006, p. 593). A non-invasive mapping technique such as fMRI 
provides evidence for transient local changes in neural activity during task performance, 
without, however, proving that the loci activated are actually used for the task. In other 
words, fMRI would merely provide evidence for an association, but not a causal link 
between the activated region and the behavior. The combination of TMS and functional 
neuroimaging provides a novel solution to this problem: activity in brain areas 
associated with a behavior in fMRI or PET can be disrupted by TMS in order to 
investigate subsequent alterations in this behavior, and thus assess the causality of these 
relationships (Paus, 1999). In this fashion,  
 
TMS provides a unique methodology for determining the 
true functional significance of the results of neuroimaging 
studies and the causal relationship between focal brain 
activity and behavior (Pascual-Leone et al., 1999, p. 
1229). 
 
The significant role that TMS could play in exploring CB language functions 
becomes apparent when seen in the light of the problems in CB neuroimaging studies; a 
fortiori since the latter have provided the leading paradigm in advocating a CB 
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involvement in higher cognitive aspects (Desmond & Fiez, 1998; Timmann & Daum, 
2007). Imaging results have often been met with skepticism, since changes in CB 
activation may easily be attributed to involvement in sensorimotor aspects of the task, 
instead of any putative cognitive ones (Timmann & Daum, 2007). For example, 
inconclusive evidence persists on the role of CB regions in word reading and word-
generation tasks. Comparing activations between verb generation and verb reading, 
Frings et al. (2006) found activations in the right posterolateral cerebellar (PLCB) lobule 
HVI and Crus I as a measure of verb generation; these were lateral from the paravermal 
activation of lobule VI, which was associated with speech articulation. Their findings 
were in line with those of Petersen et al. (1989), who had compared noun reading with 
verb generation. However, in contrast to Petersen et al. (1989), no CB activations were 
found comparing verb generation with noun reading by Frings et al. (2006). 
Furthermore, these PLCB activations were also found as a measure of noun reading in 
inner speech, and could thus provide counterevidence for CB involvement in higher 
linguistic functions (Frings et al., 2006). Similarly, in another fMRI study, activation 
within the same region was found during silent recitation of the names of the months of 
the year; this was interpreted on the basis of PLCB involvement in timing aspects of 
both inner and overt speech production, rather than in cognitive operations (Ackermann 
et al., 2004). In cases like the above, TMS methodology would help dissociate causal 
relationships from simple associations between CB activations and task performance. 
Different, neighboring areas could also be targeted, allowing precise, dissociative 
mapping of a brain area to a particular behavior. This has already been applied, for 
instance, in studying CB motor functions, by contrastive vermal and hemispheric CB 
stimulation (Théoret et al., 2001).  
 
Importantly, TMS bypasses some of the most common obstacles posed in CB 
clinical research.  CB patients differ with respect to the depth of the lesion, which might 
be constrained only to the CB cortex or might extend to the nuclei. The nature and extent 
of the diseases is often such that it is not possible to draw any conclusions about possible 
correspondences between lesion location and specific deficit (e.g. Pickett, 1998). Most 
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studies also involve chronic CB patients, where compensation for and plastic 
reorganization of the lesioned circuits might obscure the interpretation of findings 
(Timmann & Daum, 2007). CB-induced language deficits, for example, are quite mild 
and transient, and might involve significant compensation from cortical language-related 
areas (Fabbro et al., 2004). On the other hand, while impairment may be more 
prominent in patients with acute CB damage, patients with selective CB lesions are 
extremely rare. Even in such cases, the heterogeneity of deficits and lack of specificity 
of their effects, such as hydrocephalus, depression or global effects on brain metabolism 
might significantly affect cognitive function (Timmann & Daum, 2007). In fact, most 
CB groups show a certain degree of extra-cerebellar dysfunction, e.g. brainstem damage 
and increased intracranial pressure accompanying CB stroke and tumors. Even purer 
degenerative CB disorders, such as spinocerebellar ataxia type 6, or sporadic adult onset 
ataxia show mild extra-cerebellar symptoms (Frank et al., 2007). This picture has made 
neuroscientists to consider data from patients with combined CB and extra-cerebellar 
damage to be of limited value for the issue of CB involvement in cognition (e.g. Daum 
& Ackermann, 1997). It has also made researchers turn to the very rare patients with 
pure CB disorders to determine the specific CB contribution to cognitive impairment, as 
well as to validate the findings in patients with a less focused disease (Timmann & 
Daum, 2007).  
 
The restricted subject pool of selective CB lesions, along with the great 
heterogeneity of the larger non-restrictive ones make the replicability of findings a major 
issue. For instance, studies reporting deficits in frontal lobe function, visuospatial 
processing or non-motor skill learning have been found difficult to replicate (Daum & 
Ackermann, 1997). The debatable presence of a verb-generation deficit in PLCB 
patients provides a characteristic example. Impairments in verb generation (Fiez et al., 
1992; Gebhart et al., 2002) have not been shown in every study with PLCB patients. For 
example, Helmuth et al. (1997), and Richter et al. (2004) found effects of dysarthria 
only. Richter et al. (2004) emphasize the small subject pool size in Gebhart et al. (2002), 
as well as the high average age of subjects as confounding factors. On the other hand, 
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the patient populations in Helmuth et al. (1997) and Richter et al. (2004) were arguably 
more heterogeneous, including patients with lesions in broader CB areas, as well as 
patients with CB degeneration. There was also a difference in the amount of time 
between the CB damage and the time of testing across the articles: in Gebhart et al. 
(2002), patients with recent CB damage were tested, while Richter et al. (2004) involved 
patients with CB atrophy (A. Gebhart, personal communication, 15 May 2008). 
 
These issues, bound to the properties of ‗naturally occurring‘ CB lesions, do not 
arise in the case of TMS-induced virtual lesions. TMS studies allow a considerably non-
restrictive subject pool, where the experiment may be repeated in the same subject, 
providing an opportunity for careful, strictly controlled experimental design. TMS 
studies are also conducted acutely, avoiding ‗‗the specter of neural compensations‘‘ 
(Lomber, 1999; Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003): time is insufficient for functional 
reorganization to occur during single TMS events, and thus no substantial confounds are 
expected due to recovery processes (Walsh & Cowey, 2000). Furthermore, TMS is 
conducted on normal subjects and is more focal than naturally occurring lesions, thus 
eliminating the confounding factors of the heterogeneity and extension of such lesions 
seen in patient studies. The fact that focal TMS coils usually affect the first cortical areas 
of the neural tissue, and, in the case of the CB, the Purkinje cell cortical layer allows 
more consistent explanations of the effects according to the microcircuitry of the neural 
area (see section 4.4.9 below).  
 
The subtlety of CB cognitive deficits also makes the selection of well-matched 
control groups over several variables (e.g. age, IQ, education level) both a 
methodological necessity and, wherever this is not the case, a confounding factor (Daum 
& Ackermann, 1997). Potential differences in the premorbid ability of individual 
patients may further compromise the validity of the results: the patient‘s performance is 
compared with the average performance of a control group, and not with their own 
premorbidly. On the contrary, the reversibility of TMS-induced virtual lesions provides 
the possibility of employing individual subjects as their own controls: non-TMS trials 
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are compared with TMS trials in online protocols, or, in the case of offline, distal TMS 
(section 4.4.3), trials before TMS are contrasted with trials after TMS, in a within-




Basic processes involved in response production may also be affected in patient 
populations, either due to dysfunction of the area of interest per se, or due to the extent 
of the brain damage. This is a recognized problem in CB clinical studies, where the well-
established significance of CB structures for eye and finger movements and overt 
speech, motor impairments means that CB impairment may compromise performance on 
cognitive tasks, in a rather confounding fashion. Suggestively, it has been argued that 
the attentional deficits observed in CB patient studies pertain only to the test procedures 
with increased oculomotor, motor, and/or working memory demands (Timmann & 
Daum, 2007). Indeed, unlike general intellectual capacities or memory, deficits in motor 
learning or temporal processing are consistently observed in CB patients (Daum & 
Ackermann, 1997). For instance, acquired dyslexias and dysarthrias often accompany 
vermal-paravermal damage, along with dysmetria, rendering response production in the 
form of button presses or oral responses in the simplest of tasks (providing ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ 
responses to a lexical decision task) very difficult; it also often makes the use of a more 
sensitive measure such as RTs problematic (e.g. Pickett, 1998). As mentioned above, 
global cognitive impairments after brain lesions may occur without direct association 
with the insulted area, and many experimental designs may be too subtle and demanding 
to be used with such patients. On the contrary, the sensorimotor effects of TMS are far 
from compromising the ability of subjects to participate in behavioral tasks or from 
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4.4. Methodological Considerations   
 
CB TMS has been employed in a wide range of settings. Ugawa et al. (1991) and 
Amassian et al. (1992) first indicated that the CB may successfully undergo transcranial 
stimulation. CB TMS has been shown to interfere with visually guided saccades 
(Hashimoto & Ohtsuka, 1995), smooth pursuit eye movements (Ohtsuka & Enoki, 
1998), coordinated eye and head movements (Nagel & Zangemeister, 2003), paced 
finger tapping (Théoret et al., 2001), procedural learning (Torriero et al. 2004, 2007), 
state estimation of arm movements (Miall & Christensen, 2004; Miall et al., 2007; Miall 
& King, 2008), and temporal processing of millisecond time intervals (Koch et al., 
2007). CB TMS has also indirectly modulated the excitability of the contralateral 
primary motor cortex (Oliveri et al., 2005; Fierro et al., 2007a; Koch et al., 2008). It has 
moreover been exploratorily employed with therapeutic perspectives on patients affected 
by refractory epilepsy (Brighina et al., 2006), and Parkinson‘s disease (Koch et al., 
2009). 
 
Space restrictions do not allow for a review of CB- or language-related TMS 
studies. Work on the former has been recently conducted by Oliveri et al. (2007), while 
for the latter Devlin and Watkins (2007) provide a recent review. It is worth pointing 
out, however, that the studies reported here are the first linguistic TMS studies on the 
CB. The only two studies of CB TMS of some relevance would be Desmond et al. 
(2005) and Ferrucci et al. (2008); both reported disruptions of performance in the 
Sternberg verbal working memory task (Sternberg, 1966) after stimulation of lateral CB 
loci. Apparently, the level of language processing in such tasks (encoding and retrieval 
of letter sequences) is quite low with respect to the richness of properties of linguistic 
input and output. It also means that the design of the CB TMS linguistic experiments 
reported here, to which I now turn, had to be made in the absence of any pre-established 
set-ups. Decisions as those on the size and shape of the stimulating coil, on the 
localization method of the site of stimulation, on the choice of suitable control sites, on 
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the frequency, intensity, and duration of stimulation are common to all TMS studies, 
regardless of the content of the experimental hypotheses, and have a direct impact on the 
extent and direction of the behavioral changes induced. 
 
 
4.4.1. Control Conditions 
 
In general, TMS represents a rather painless method of stimulating brain loci 
through the scalp (section 4.2). However, it still produces a wide range of sensory inputs 
that may interfere with task performance. Discharge of the stimulator through the coil 
produces a loud click which is very difficult to conceal. Moreover, there is a definite 
tactile sensation on the scalp that may be due to stimulation of cutaneous nerves under 
the coil; stimulation of motor nerves in the scalp also induces muscle twitches. 
Especially in areas with large masses of muscle nearby, the sensation produced may be 
quite strong and even unpleasant, a fortiori with trains of high frequency stimuli, as 
those used here (section 4.4.5 below). Facial and trigeminal nerves may be also 
activated, while stimulation at any scalp site may also produce a blink reflex. In the 
region overlying the CB in particular, a range of adjacent muscles and nerves are liable 
to co-stimulation, making CB TMS far from devoid of sensation: lateral CB TMS may 
directly stimulate neck muscles, the brachial plexus, muscles in the neck or shoulder, 
and is sufficiently loud that it can provide a startling stimulus affecting speed of 
movement onset (Miall et al., 2007).  
 
The experimental design should apparently exclude such phenomena as holding 
any explanatory significance for changes in the dependent measures (Walsh & 
Rushworth, 1999). Three basic designs can control for such effects. A ‗‗control time‘‘, a 
‗‗control site‘‘, and a ‗‗control task‘‘ design (Jahanshahi & Rothwell, 2000). In a control 
site design, the effects of TMS at a target and a control site are compared, with TMS 
predicted to induce an effect on the target, but not on the control site. In the control task 
design, the effects of TMS on experimental and control tasks are compared, with TMS 
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predicted to induce a performance effect on the target task employing the process of 
interest, but not on the control task. In a control time design, the effects of TMS are 
compared at several points in time during task performance, with TMS predicted to 
induce an effect at particular times during task performance, and not at other times. 
Unlike the control site and control task designs, a control time design presupposes an 
online rTMS design (section 4.4.3 below). Another control condition frequently 
employed in TMS studies is ‗sham TMS‘, in which all parameters of TMS are 
maintained, with the exception that no effective magnetic field is directed toward the 
brain of the participant, who is not aware of the difference. 
 
In the experiments performed here, the basic parameter setting that minimized 
the nonspecific effects of CB TMS on performance is the offline/distal protocol 
preferred (section 4.4.3). Stimulation occurred in a discrete event after the first phase of 
the task, and before the second. Thus, the sensory, nonspecific effects of the machine 
output were temporally far from influencing performance in the phase after stimulation. 
All experiments also employed a design combining a control site with a control stimulus 
type. In the first and second studies (chapters 5 and 6), participants completed the task 
twice in two different sessions. After the first half of each session, participants 
underwent TMS, and, after the end of the TMS, they completed the second half of each 
session. Instead of a temporally distinct control task, participants completed only one 
task, where their performance in two different phenomena was assessed, one of which 
was expected to remain unchanged after TMS (see section 4.4.11 for details). As the 
experiments applied a distal TMS protocol, control time conditions were a de facto 
unavailable option. Instead, performance before stimulation provided baseline 
conditions for the performance after TMS. In the third study reported (chapter 7), for 
task-particular reasons, participants completed only one session and underwent TMS in 
one of the two CB sites stimulated (section 4.4.8). A ‗no TMS‘ group of subjects was 
included as a third group, that participated in the experiments in exactly the same 
settings but without TMS. Thus, control sites were included in the third study as a 
between-subjects factor (e.g. Miall & Christensen, 2004; Torriero et al., 2004). 
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Furthermore, sham TMS was not employed, primarily because a sham coil was not 
always available in the laboratories. Moreover, sham TMS is often unsuccessful, 
especially for experienced participants, who are familiar with the sensation 
accompanying real TMS (G. Pobric, personal communication, 15 March 2009). Further 




4.4.2. rTMS Protocol 
 
In setting up the TMS experiments, it was also necessary to decide between two 
basic types of TMS protocols: single/ paired pulse TMS, and repetitive TMS (henceforth 
rTMS). 
 
In single-pulse TMS, the effect is similar to stimulating a peripheral nerve with a 
conventional electric stimulator. Repeated pulses are not applied faster than once every 
few seconds. The pulse causes a population of neurons to depolarize and discharge an 
action potential, evoking measurable effects. Application of single pulses at variable 
times during task execution allows the investigation of the time point at which the neural 
activity of the stimulation site is critical for successful performance. For example, if 
used in the primary motor cortex, single-pulse TMS produces a motor-evoked potential 
(MEP), recordable on electromyography. If used on the occipital cortex, ‗phosphenes‘ 
(flashes of light) might be detected by the subject. In most other areas of the cortex, the 
participant does not consciously experience any effect, but behavioral changes may be 
manifested in greater RTs, and changes in brain activity may be detected with PET or 





While initial applications of TMS involved delivery of single magnetic pulses 
with an approximate duration of 1 ms every few seconds, technical advancements have 
allowed the application of rTMS protocols, involving trains of TMS pulses at different 
frequencies and durations over a selected brain region (Wassermann, 1998). The higher 
the stimulation frequency and intensity, the greater is the disruption of brain function 
during the train of stimulation. Apart from the immediate effects during the train itself, 
rTMS modulates the excitability of the stimulated area, even beyond the duration of its 
application (Chen et al., 1997; Pascual-Leone et al., 1998). Depending on other 
parameters, it is possible to potentiate or depress cortical excitability (Pascual-Leone et 
al., 1998). The general pattern is that low-frequency (1-2 Hz) rTMS reduces motor 
cortical excitability, while high-frequency (> 5 Hz) rTMS may increase excitability; the 
latter case, however, is remarkably less robust (see Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2002).
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Long-term potentiation and long-term depression (LTD) of cortical synapses or closely 
related mechanisms have been suggested as candidate explanations for the effect of 
high- and low-frequency rTMS, respectively (Chen et al., 1997). The experiments here 
all employed a rTMS protocol. 
 
 
4.4.3. Distal rTMS Protocol  
 
The experimental design should also cater for setting the parameter of the TMS 
protocol by which control trials are distinguished from test trials. In ‗online rTMS‘, 
subjects perform the task and, at a specific time-point of certain trials (usually in the 
order of 1-200ms), a TMS pulse is administered. This is expected to affect task-specific 
performance selectively in the TMS trials. In ‗offline/ distal rTMS‘, performance at a 
task before rTMS (applied for a few seconds or minutes) is compared with performance 
after it. The apparent advantage of the online TMS protocol is its significance in 
identifying the time in which a particular area of brain is active in a task- the rationale 
being that, if the TMS pulse is administered to an area that is active at the time and is 
                                                          
65
 Theta-burst stimulation (section 4.4.5) is one of the many exceptions. 
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processing relevant information, then performance should be affected. However, a 
disadvantage would be the very interference of the somatosensory/ auditory input 
accompanying TMS and its nonspecific effects on performance (section 4.4.1 above). 
 
The experiments here used an offline/distal rTMS protocol: the modulatory 
effect of offline rTMS on a brain area beyond the duration of the rTMS train allows the 
study of TMS-induced changes without any non-specific disruptions by TMS during 
task performance. In this design, behavior is evaluated before and after rTMS, rather 
than during rTMS. Furthermore, the opportunity to assess the particular timescale of 
brain processes with online TMS becomes a disadvantage where no such hypothesis is 
possible – a fortiori when the involvement of the area investigated is still a 
demonstrandum, as in the case for CB language processing. 
 
 
4.4.4. Shape, Size, and Orientation of the Coil 
 
 
The focus and, partially, the depth of the magnetic field depend on the shape of 
the stimulation coil. Two different shapes of coils are most commonly used—a circular 
coil and a figure-of-eight (‗butterfly-shaped‘) coil. The former belongs to the first 
generation of coils and is quite powerful, inducing a non-focal, more widely distributed 
electric field. The latter involves more focal stimulation, with the field under the coil 
producing maximal current at the intersection of the two round components, where the 
currents flow in the same direction, converge and summate (e.g. Roth et al., 1991). For 
CB stimulation, however, the choice is most of the time limited between a figure-of-
eight coil, and a ‗double cone coil‘, i.e. a figure-of-eight coil with the two components at 
an angle, and thus with increased power at the intersection. 
 
CB stimulation has been originally performed with a double cone coil (Ugawa et 
al., 1995), which is admittedly more adequate for deeper stimulation (Werhahn et al., 
1996) and thus often preferred (e.g. Ugawa et al., 1995; Daskalakis et al., 2004; Miall et 
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al., 2007; Miall & King, 2008).  However, most CB TMS studies have successfully used 
the figure-of-eight coil (e.g. Hashimoto & Ohtsuka, 1995; Miall & Christensen, 2004; 
Oliveri et al., 2005; Torriero et al., 2004, 2007; Fierro et al., 2007a, b; Koch et al., 2007, 
2008, 2009). 
 
The experiments conducted here were constrained by the unavailability of a 
double cone coil in the laboratories where they were performed. Use of this coil is also 
marked by certain disadvantages, one being the elevated discomfort that participants 
often experience (N. Muggleton, personal communication, 4 May 2010). Moreover, for 
CB TMS, the wings tend to activate the ear and lateral neck muscles and for some head 
shapes, it is impossible to get the center of the coil adjacent to the scalp (C. Miall, 
personal communication, 16 April 2009). For instance, in the 90-mm radius double cone 
coil centered 3 cm lateral and 1 cm below the inion that was used by Miall et al. (2007), 
one wing of the coil overlapped the participant‘s right ear. Given a fortiori that the 
lateral site of stimulation used here is more lateral than 3 cm to the right from the inion 
(see sections 5.4.3 and 7.4.3), its adjacency to the right ear and face could have become 
a greater concern.  
 
On the other hand, it has been further suggested that choosing a flat figure-of-
eight coil over a double cone coil increases the probability that CB rTMS will be 
confined to the outermost CB cortical layers (Brighina et al., 2006); this could be 
translated as a methodological advantage in favor of using the former. Behavioral 
changes induced could be explained with added certainty on the basis of the modulation 
of the excitability of the Purkinje cell layer of the CB cortex and the increased/decreased 
inhibitory input that it provides to the deep CB nuclei (section 4.4.9).  
 
With respect to its size, the figure-of-eight coil used in all experiments had a 
diameter of 70 mm on each loop. Coils of this size have been used in most CB TMS 
studies (e.g. Torriero et al., 2004, 2007; Koch et al., 2007, 2009). A few studies have 
used coils of a diameter of 50 mm (e.g. Hashimoto & Ohtsuka, 1995). The broader 
192 
 
magnetic field generated by the larger coil was primarily motivated by the unavailability 
of any known CB coordinates relevant with the tasks employed here; smaller diameter 
coils provide more focal stimulation, which is bound to precise knowledge of brain 
coordinates for stimulation. Thus, selecting the latter would have constituted a 
methodologically unnecessary commitment. On the contrary, the larger spread of 
activation that a larger coil would induce in the CB cortex was considered to provide an 
advantage, in view of the depth of the targeted areas (M. Oliveri, personal 
communication, 15 May 2009). Moreover, larger coils generally have more depth of 
penetration than smaller ones (The Magstim Company Ltd, 2009). Thus, the size of the 
coil also catered for additional power in reaching the rather deep CB loci stimulated. 
 
The coil was positioned tangentially to the scalp, with the handle pointing 
superiorly. The current in the coil was thus directed upward, which induced a downward 
current in the CB cortex. This coil position has been found to be optimal for suppressing 
the contralateral motor cortex in single-pulse TMS investigations (Hashimoto & 
Ohtsuka, 1995; Ugawa et al., 1995; Daskalakis et al., 2004; Oliveri et al., 2005) and to 
interfere with cognitive processes, such as procedural learning and millisecond timing in 
1 Hz rTMS paradigms (Torriero et al., 2004, 2007; Koch et al., 2007). 
 
 
4.4.5. TMS Frequency 
 
The frequency in which the magnetic stimuli are delivered critically determines 
the effects of TMS on the targeted region of the brain, both qualitatively (facilitation or 
disruption), and quantitatively (size of effect on dependent measure).  
 
The rTMS protocol used here was ‗continuous theta-burst stimulation‘ 
(henceforth cTBS). All experiments employed in particular the ‗offline‘ TBS procedure 
(section 4.4.3 above), which has recently been applied in physiological (e.g. Di Lazzaro 
et al., 2005) and cognitive studies (e.g. Vallesi et al., 2007). In particular, for the first 
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and third TMS studies reported here (chapters 5 and 7), a Magstim ‗Super Rapid
2
‘ 
stimulator (The Magstim Company Ltd, Whitland, Dyfed, United Kingdom) was 
available, and thus the standard  cTBS protocol (Huang et al., 2005) was applied. This 
protocol employs a brief burst of 3 low intensity, high frequency (50 Hz, i.e. 20 ms 
among each stimulus) TMS pulses every 200 ms, repeated five times per second, i.e. 
delivered at a 5 Hz rhythm (at ‗theta-frequency‘, in electroencephalographic 
terminology). On the contrary, the second study used a modified cTBS protocol 




that was available could not 
support the Huang et al. (2005) protocol (see section 6.2.3 for more details). 
 
In only two years after its publication, ‗‗cTBS has become the preferred method 
for inducing ‗‗virtual brain lesions‘‘ […] to study brain-behavior relationships in motor 
and cognitive studies‘‘ (Gentner et al., 2008, p. 2046). It is particularly attractive 
because even short periods (20-40 seconds) of low-intensity TBS result in changes in 
cortical excitability with larger effect sizes and smaller interindividual variability than 
those in rTMS protocols (Huang et al., 2005). In particular, when applied continuously 
(cTBS), it depresses cortical excitability, whereas when given in an intermittent form, 
i.e. ‗i(ntermittent) TBS‘,
66
 excitability is increased (Huang et al., 2005). CB cTBS has 
only recently been applied in two studies, inducing changes in the excitability of the 
contralateral primary motor cortex in healthy subjects (Koch et al., 2008) and, 
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4.4.6. Stimulus Intensity 
 
Stimulation needs to be potent enough to induce a physiological response, 
resulting in effective interference with processing. The operator of TMS can control the 
intensity of the stimuli by changing the amplitude of current flowing in the coil, thus 
alternating the magnitude of the induced magnetic field and of the secondary electrical 
field induced. However, this involves quite an arbitrary decision, given the lack of a 
systematic method for determining an appropriate intensity (see Devlin & Watkins, 2007 
for discussion). Some studies define the intensity on the basis of individual subjects‘ 
motor thresholds, and in particular, either the resting motor threshold, or the active 
motor threshold.
67
 There is, however, no systematic relationship between the threshold 
needed to evoke an MEP and the threshold needed to evoke phosphenes in visual 
cortical TMS, suggesting that, outside of the motor system, motor thresholds may not be 
particularly appropriate (Stewart et al., 2001).  
 
A fortiori for a subcortical and even more distant locus like the CB, motor 
thresholds  should be seen as even less significant, despite the fact that the majority of 
CB rTMS studies arbitrarily define intensities on the basis of motor thresholds. Here, 
given that most studies choose a stimulation intensity that appears to work (Devlin & 
Watkins, 2007), stimulus intensity was kept steady across participants to a 45% of 
maximum machine output; this also helped economize on the time spent for each 
experimental session. It is, of course, instructive to consider whether the intensity levels 
employed here are comparable with those used in equivalent TMS studies reporting 
reliable effects. In cTBS, 40% machine output is often effectively used as a fixed inter-
subject stimulus intensity level, roughly corresponding to 80% of active motor threshold 
(N. Muggleton, personal communication, 25 August 2009). Indeed, most cTBS studies 
use an 80% (e.g. Huang et al., 2005; di Lazzaro et al., 2005, Vallesi et al., 2007) or 70% 
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 The resting motor threshold is typically defined as the lowest intensity that produces MEPs of >50 lV in 
at least five out of 10 trials with the muscles relaxed (Rossini et al., 1994). The active motor threshold is 
defined as the lowest intensity that produced MEPs of >200 lV in at least five out of 10 trials when the 
subject made a 10% of maximum contraction using visual feedback (Rothwell, 1997). 
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of active motor threshold stimulus intensity (Todd et al., 2009). The first CB cTBS 
studies reported in the literature have also used the standard 80% of active motor 
threshold (Koch et al., 2008, 2009). This means that the 45% machine output used here 
roughly corresponds to a 90% of a typical mean active motor threshold. The intensity 
used can also be roughly calculated with respect to average resting motor thresholds 
reported. Miall and Christensen (2004), for example, have used a mean stimulation level 
of 58% of maximum machine output for a 1 Hz rTMS protocol, corresponding 
approximately to 120% of subjects‘ resting motor threshold. Thus, 100% of the mean 
resting motor threshold corresponded to a 48% machine output, and 45% of machine 
output roughly corresponds to an intensity of over 90% of resting motor threshold. 
Indeed, such stimulation levels have been successfully used even for 1 Hz offline CB 
rTMS (e.g. Torriero et al., 2004), which employs much higher stimulation intensities 
than cTBS protocols altogether. This increased machine output was used here to 
compensate for the depth of the areas stimulated (C. Miall, personal communication, 16 
April 2009). Using stronger machine output was not considered, as 45% of machine 




4.4.7. Duration of Stimulation 
 
In the first and third TMS studies reported here, cTBS lasted 40 seconds. The 
majority of cTBS studies use a stimulation duration of 20 seconds (e.g. Di Lazzaro et al., 
2005; Vallesi et al., 2007), whereas those using 40 seconds are significantly fewer (e.g. 
Todd et al., 2009).The increased duration chosen here translates into double the number 
of TBS pulses delivered, i.e. 600 pulses instead of the 300 pulses for 20 seconds. 
Encouragingly, the first CB cTBS studies reported in the literature have also used 40 




With respect to the window of opportunity provided by cTBS, 20 seconds of 
stimulation are known to reduce the amplitude of MEPs for 20-30 minutes (Di Lazzaro 
et al., 2005), and, in general, to reduce excitability for up to 20 minutes (Huang et al., 
2005; Vallesi et al., 2007). Given that the experiments reported here involved a post-
TMS phase that lasted no more than 20 minutes, the window of opportunity provided by 
40 seconds of TBS was more than sufficient. However, an increase in the number of 
pulses has induced no manifested difference in the size of the TMS effect (Y.- Z. Huang, 
personal communication, 10 March 2010). Still, though, the longer period of stimulation 
was selected, in order to establish a longer (flatter) effect peak, with TMS effects fading 
out well after the session. 
 
Moreover, in all experiments reported here, the rest period between the end of 
cTBS intervention and the beginning of the post-TMS block was set to 5 minutes. This 
was in view of the fact that reduction of cortical excitability of the motor cortex reaches 
a maximum from 7 to 14 min after TBS (Di Lazzaro et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2005). 
Certain cTBS studies set the rest period between TBS intervention and the post-TMS 
block to 10 minutes (e.g. Voss et al., 2008), while other ones often do not report such 
rest periods (e.g. Vallesi et al., 2007). The experiments here followed common practice 
in allowing for a 5-minute rest period after TMS (N. Muggleton, personal 
communication, 25 August 2009). 
 
 
4.4.8. Sites of Stimulation 
 
All experiments reported here involve contrastive stimulation of the two basic 
NCB sites: a right medial NCB compartment, i.e. the right superior posterior CB vermis, 
also known as the right ‗oculomotor vermis‘, or ‗neocerebellar vermis‘ (NCBV), and a 
right lateral NCB compartment. Contrastive activation of the lateral CB and vermis has 
been performed before in a paced finger-tapping task (Théoret et al., 2001). The two 
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sites belong to the two broader areas found to be activated in linguistic tasks in imaging 
studies, and are marked with the red elliptical circles in figure 4.1 below. An apparent 
disadvantage for the TMS experiments reported here is that the two sites were defined in 
the absence of any known CB activations particular to the tasks used (see section 8.2.1). 
 
Anatomically, the oculomotor vermis, which belongs to the superior posterior 
vermis, is one of the compartments closest to the TMS coil (Miall & Christensen, 2004), 
and its stimulation has induced behavioral effects with high spatial precision (Hashimoto 
& Ohtsuka, 1995). On the contrary, the depth of PLCB loci often makes the use of focal 
coils an issue (section 4.4.4 above). This might explain why in the first and second study 
TMS of the lateral site provided a satisfactory control condition (sections 5.4.3 and 
6.2.3). On the contrary, in the third study, a different lateral site was stimulated, with 
smaller depth from the scalp surface, yielding effects after TMS (section 7.4.3). 
Regarding the retrieval of the sites for stimulation, previous investigations have 
demonstrated that CB TMS predominantly affects the posterior and superior lobules 
(Hashimoto & Ohtsuka, 1995; Ugawa et al., 1995). This is encouraging, given that the 
areas of interest are found in the superior posterior CB compartments, as shown in figure 
4.1 below.  
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Figure 4.1: Schematic diagram of the unfolded CB with activation sites in the review of 
Desmond & Fiez (1998). Roman numerals appearing in the cerebellar vermis denote the 
lobule identification based on Larsell & Jansen (1972). The line separating IV+V from VI 
represents the primary fissure. The two red elliptical circles in the right CB are also the 
two NCB language-related sites that were stimulated in the experiments reported here. 




With respect to successful targeting of the TMS sites, accurate positioning of the 
stimulating coil is achieved on the basis of functional, anatomical, or heuristic criteria 







One approach is to identify the stimulation site using a ‗functional localizer‘ task 
over various sites within a predefined region. Upon observing the expected TMS-
induced effect, the site is marked and used for subsequent stimulation. The apparent 
disadvantage with this approach is the very absence of a quick-and-easy task applicable 
for identifying a relevant locus for CB linguistic function.  
 
Alternatively, functional imaging can be used to identify activated brain regions 
in participants which can be subsequently targeted with TMS. Interestingly, however, 
Desmond et al. (2005) represents the only known CB TMS study that has utilized this 
method. While establishing accuracy in stimulation, this approach is considerably 
demanding with respect to the available resources (time required, fMRI availability, staff 
with technical expertise in operating the fMRI equipment). 
 
Another method uses head-surface digitization and registration of the stimulation 
sites onto three-dimensional reconstructed head MRIs. In that way, the actual brain 
target is individually specified for each experimental subject. While this method 
provides high spatial resolution, availability of MRI images for participants would 
translate into a further exclusion criterion on the subject pool – the requirement for the 
participants to be native speakers of English was already quite constraining. Another 
reason was the lack of any coordinates for CB activations in the imaging literature for 
the tasks employed here. 
 
Finally, the ‗heuristic approach‘ employs population-based estimates of the 
underlying anatomy, where TMS is applied in relation to specific individual scalp 
landmarks, such as the vertex or the inion. This approach is certainly disadvantaged in 
different ways; for example, it does not account for interindividual differences in the 
correspondence between scalp landmarks and underlying brain anatomy; furthermore, it 
is blind regarding any interindividual differences in the functional organization of the 
brain. Thus, this approach is bound to introduce errors in the targeted brain region 
(Meyer et al., 1991). Procedurally, however, the heuristic approach is arguably the most 
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flexible one, as it does not require available brain images for participation or 
neuronavigational software. As such, the heuristic approach was preferred here.
68
 
Indeed, the majority of CB TMS studies do not use a neuro-navigation system (e.g. 
Hashimoto & Ohtsuka, 1995; Ohtsuka & Enoki, 1998; Daskalakis et al., 2004; Miall & 
Christensen, 2004; Koch et al., 2007; Miall et al., 2007; Miall & King, 2008). Instead, 
they often rely on suggestive evidence of scalp-brain correspondences yielded from a 
small number of pilot subjects that undergo head surface digitization and registration 
(e.g. Brighina et al., 2006; Del Olmo et al., 2007; Koch et al., 2007). Similarly, here, the 
registered MRI image of a volunteer was recruited in order to convert any relevant 
Talairach coordinates used into scalp-based coordinates, or reversely, to calculate 
approximate Talairach coordinates from scalp-based ones (see sections 5.4.3 and 7.4.3). 
For all transformations, the Brainsight™ TMS-MRI co-registration system (Rogue 
Research, Montreal, Canada) was used.
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 For higher precision, stimulation sites were 
marked with non-permanent colored markers on participants‘ scalps, instead of the 
often-used lycra caps where stickers are attached. 
 
 
4.4.9. Cerebellar Mechanism Affected 
 
I now turn to considerations on the changes that cTBS might induce on CB 
microcircuitry. Any direct effect of rTMS on the deep CB nuclei is considered 
implausible: especially when using a focal coil, the effects are limited to the first cortical 
layers of the stimulated area (Oliveri et al., 2005, 2007), and do not go beyond 2-3 cm 
below the scalp
70
 (e.g. Fierro et al., 2007b). TMS effects on the CB are primarily 
explained on the basis of the potentiation or depression of Purkinje cell activity. For 
example, single-pulse TMS on the CB has been used to condition the excitability of 
motor cortex; this is consistent with the brief excitation of Purkinje cells that induces a 
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brief silencing of CB nuclei, leading to CB inhibition over the motor cortex via 
cerebello-thalamo-cortical pathways (Ugawa et al., 1995; Werhahn et al., 1996). 
 
With respect to the particular TMS protocols used here, direct cTBS on the 
motor cortex has been found to temporarily depress cortical activity, similarly to 1 Hz 
rTMS (Di Lazzaro et al., 2005; Huang et al., 2005; Silvanto et al., 2007; Vallesi et al., 
2007). In the same vein, 1 Hz rTMS on the CB has been proposed to disrupt activity of 
the inhibitory Purkinje cells, thus reducing the drive from the dentate and interposed 
nuclei to the cortex via the thalamus (Daskalakis et al., 2004). For example, 1Hz rTMS 
over the left CB cortex has been found to increase intracortical facilitation of the right 
motor cortex, with low-frequency rTMS conceivably decreasing Purkinje cell inhibition 
on deep CB nuclei, thus ultimately enhancing thalamo-cortical facilitation of cortical 
outputs (Oliveri et al., 2005).  
 
Based on the similar effects of 1 Hz rTMS and cTBS, it would be assumed that 
temporary reduction of Purkinje cell excitability should result in reduced inhibition of 
the deep CB nuclei, ultimately leading to increased excitation of their cortical outputs 
via the thalamus. However, the first results of cTBS on the CB have been in the very 
opposite direction: MEP amplitude obtained from the contralateral primary motor cortex 
decreased after PLCB cTBS. This unexpected finding has been speculatively explained 
on the basis of plastic changes induced in both excitatory and inhibitory synapses of the 
cerebello-thalamic and thalamo-cortical pathways, involving sub-populations of 
interneurons with lower thresholds of excitability. Such effects would eventually lead to 
different changes in the excitability of the primary motor cortex, as compared with those 
induced by 1 Hz rTMS (Koch et al., 2008).  
 
According to the NCBKFLP hypothesis here, the Purkinje cell layer receives a 
copy of the state of the language-related cortical loci and regulates, via inhibition, the 
output of the deep CB nuclei; the latter will transmit, via the thalamus, the linguistic 
prediction of the NCB internal models back to the cortex (section 2.3.3). Thus, CB TMS 
202 
 
is expected to affect this process of linguistic emulation by modulating the excitability of 
the Purkinje cells of the CB cortex and thus indirectly interfering with the deep CB 
nuclear output to the cortex.  
 
However, as seen above, the first CB cTBS study has unexpectedly yielded 
effects in the opposite direction of those with 1 Hz rTMS. This means that the direction 
of the effects induced in the studies reported here cannot be explained with much 
certainty. Rather, the primary emphasis will be placed on the selective nature of the 
effects (for some linguistic stimuli and not others; see section 4.4.11 below).  
 
At an elementary level, though, an idea that will be entertained below is that of 
performance enhancement due to disrupted Purkinje cell inhibitory functions. 
Enhancement in cognitive performance is best explained on the grounds of neural noise 
introduced into an inhibitory component of the processing system, rather than as 
potentiation in processes directly contributing to the output of the task (Walsh & 
Pascual-Leone, 2003, p. 93; section 4.4.2 here). As seen above, the Purkinje cell layer is 
the fundamental inhibitory component that is accessible to the TMS coil. Thus, the 
enhancements found in linguistic performance in the subsequent chapters will be briefly 
discussed in the light of a possible disruption of Purkinje cell inhibition to the constantly 










4.4.10. Dependent Measures 
 
Regarding the selection of the appropriate dependent measure, ‗‗the choice of 
dependent variable in a TMS experiment depends on the function to be disrupted, but 
reaction time is proving to be a more versatile dependent measure than error rates‘‘ 
(Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003, p. 65). In TMS language studies in particular, the 
primary dependent measure is bound by the very nature of the paradigm to RTs. In 
contrast to patient studies, which typically measure behavioral deficits in terms of 
reduced accuracies, the virtual lesions induced by TMS generally become manifest as 
changes in RTs. This would be because TMS does not inactivate a region in the same 
way that a lesion does; instead, it introduces ‗neural noise‘ into the computation, leading 
to RT increases or decreases, rather than error rates. Conceivably, the spared information 
in the neural circuit suffices to overcome the noise by means of additional processing 
time, hence the increased RTs (Devlin & Watkins, 2007). On the other hand, decreased 
RTs would most probably relate with explanations of disrupted inhibitory processes 
(section 4.4.9, above). 
 
 
4.4.11. Priming Paradigm 
 
However, the employment of RTs as the primary dependent measure in TMS 
paradigms imposes quite directly here a constraint on the employable tasks. Many 
phenomena that would be of relevance for the central hypothesis are in fact captured on 
the basis of accuracy rates as the primary dependent measure (section 2.6). For example, 
Ferreira‘s (2003) misinterpretation of non-canonical sentences or semantic illusion 
studies (Erickson & Mattson, 1981) would not be the optimal choice for conducting a 





Furthermore, an experimental paradigm with sentential stimuli would introduce a 
wide range of factors that could be affected by TMS, but would not be directly relevant 
with the neurolinguistic hypothesis (chapter 2), e.g. working memory or 
morphosyntactic complexity. Given that the experiments reported here were the first 
linguistic CB TMS studies in the literature, it was necessary to narrow down the aspects 
that TMS would conceivably influence. These constraints motivated the adoption of a 
lexical priming paradigm, as studied in a standard lexical decision task (Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971). Lexical priming paradigms may yield findings with far-reaching 
consequences for processing at the sentence level, a fortiori beyond the constraints 
involved in the latter: 
 
the priming task […] represents a lower bound on the 
information available to the comprehender by eliminating 
constraints offered by the other nouns in the sentence, 
case marking, context, and so on. Word-word priming, as 
a measure of what is activated in the absence of other 
constraints, thus offers a stringent test for studying these 
phenomena (McRae et al., 2005, p. 1176). 
 
 
Lexical decision tasks involve the presentation of letter strings, on which a 
subject is required to decide whether they form a word or not (by button presses or oral 
decisions). The presentation of a related word (the prime) prior to the target string of 
letters makes the decision faster and more accurate relative to the previous presentation 
of an unrelated word (e.g. Cañas & Bajo, 1994). The lexical decision paradigm offers 
the possibility of establishing a dissociation within a unitary task between two or more 
different cases of priming, instead of introducing a distinct control task, as is often done 
in TMS research (section 4.4.1). In all studies reported here, the control stimulus type 
involved categorically related pairs (e.g. ‗penny-coin‘), while the experimental stimulus 
type involved associatively related pairs (e.g. ‗gift-horse‘). Thus, the possible issues that 
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might arise for the addition of another task, such as counterbalancing the order of the 
two tasks, were simply avoided here. 
 
Following a standard convention in neuropsychological research employing 
priming paradigms, the dependent measure was the difference between the mean RTs for 
the unrelated items minus the mean RTs for the related items per condition (e.g. Ober, 
2002; Rogers & Friedman, 2008). The same calculation was performed over accuracy 
rates. In each case, the ratios between the two means were also calculated; analyses 
based on ratios did not compromise the significance or the effect sizes reported. For the 
first and third TMS studies, the results of pilot experiments are also presented, showing 
significantly shorter latencies for related as compared to unrelated pairs, thus confirming 
that priming occurred. In the second study, the number of participants of the main study 
sufficed to show that priming occurred directly on the basis of such latencies. 
 
In all experiments reported, lexical decision latencies longer than 3 SD from the 
mean reaction time for correct ‗word‘ responses (right-hand index finger responses) 
were excluded; the same trimming was applied for the correct ‗nonword‘ responses (left-
hand index finger responses). Word- and nonword-latencies were trimmed separately, 
given that TMS on the right CB could selectively affect right-hand index finger control 
via its projections to the contralateral (left) motor cortex, which in turn controls its 
contralateral (right) limbs. Latencies longer than 1200 ms were also excluded 
beforehand, as reflecting low familiarity with the stimulus or distraction, rather than 
lexical access (e.g. Perea & Gotor, 1997). Including the trials that received latencies 
longer than 1200 before applying the 3 SD cut-off point in trimming did not compromise 
the size or the significance of the effects reported in these analyses in any of the 
experiments. Accuracy rates per condition were arcsine transformed and submitted to a 
separate ANOVA (e.g. Moss et al., 1995). Finally, as in similar experiments (e.g. 
McRae et al., 2005), the lists across which participants and items were rotated were 
included as between-subjects and -items dummy variables, in order to stabilize variance 
resulting from such rotation (Pollatsek & Well, 1995). Analyses performed without 
206 
 
those dummy variables did not compromise the size or significance of the effects 
reported overall, unless otherwise stated. Also, wherever applicable, the Greenhouse-
Geisser, Huynh-Feldt, and lower-bound corrections for violations of sphericity did not 
yield considerably different effect sizes or significance levels. 
 
 
4.4.12. Subject Selection Criteria 
 
In the experiments reported, a number of subject selection criteria were applied. 
These were dictated both by TMS-related safety issues, and by the nature of the tasks 
involved.  
 
During a TMS session, subjects may experience headaches or nausea, or may 
find the face twitches and other peripheral effects of TMS considerably uncomfortable; 
in such case, subjects are released from any obligation to continue in the experimental 
session. Above all, unlike single-pulse TMS, rTMS carries a serious risk of epileptic 
seizures (Pascual- Leone et al., 1993). In fact, seizures may even be induced in subjects 
not associated with any risk factors (Wassermann, 1998; Anand & Hotson, 2002). 
Adherence to safety guidelines was thus crucially important, and subjects falling under 




Pregnant or breastfeeding women, or women not using a reliable method of birth 
control; subjects with a history of epileptic seizures, both for themselves and for their 
first degree relatives; subjects with a history of neurosurgery or head injury; subjects 
with a history of chronic medical conditions of any sort; subjects with a history of 
migraines or  frequent headaches; subjects with a history of hearing loss and cochlear 
implants; subjects with a history of current hypertension, heat convulsion, or systemic 
and metabolic disorders; subjects with a cardiac pacemaker, intra-cardiac lines, 
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 See also Appendices E and F for the questionnaires used for the TMS on native speakers of English and 
Modern Greek, respectively. 
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implanted neurostimulators, or any other implanted electronic device (the field pulse 
would disturb nearby electronic devices), as well as intracranial metallic implants, 
surgical clips, medical pumps, or other metallic implants outside the mouth, or metallic 
particles in the eye (the magnetic field would generate forces on objects exposed to it); 
subjects with a history of alcohol abuse, drug dependency, or significant psychiatric 
illness; subjects with inadequate communication skills or under custodial care.  
 
Subjects were not allowed to have participated in another TMS experiment 
earlier on the same day. This was required both to avoid any confounding effects of 
stimulation of another brain area, as well as for safety reasons (N. Muggleton, personal 
communication, 25 August 2009). In the first and second TMS study (chapters 5 and 6), 
where each participant underwent TMS in two different sessions on two different sites, a 
minimum distance of 2 days mediated between the first and second TMS session. This 
was required in order to avoid confounding effects of the stimulation of the initial site on 
that in the second session (e.g. Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003). 
 
With respect to the tasks at hand, participants were required to have normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, since the tasks involved reading of letter strings. For the 
same reason, dyslexic subjects could not participate. Subjects were also required to have 
normal motor functions, since the task involved rapid button presses in response to the 
visual stimuli. Only right-handed participants were recruited. This constraint, often 
applied by default in TMS experiments (G. Pobric, personal communication, 10 March 
2009), helps keep factors like hemispheric dominance for both motor and language 
functions steady across participants. Subjects were also asked if they had any attentional 
deficits. No such participants were included, as stimulus perception and response 
generation could be compromised. Similarly, subjects that participated in the pilot 
experiments before the main TMS study were all right-handed, with normal or 







In this chapter I provided the reasons why TMS experimentation was preferred 
over a clinical approach. I described the particular settings of TMS that were selected 
and the reasons for doing so. As the following studies reported are the first TMS studies 
on CB language functions, their TMS setup had to be constructed de novo, in the 


















TMS Study 1: Effects of Theta-Burst 
Stimulation of the Right Neocerebellar 
Vermis on Formal-Associative Priming 
 
 
‗‗Tonight's the night I shall be talking about of flu the subject of word 
association football. This is a technique out a living much used in the 
practice makes perfect of psychoanalysister and brother and one that has 
occupied piper the majority rule of my attention squad by the right 
number one two three four the last five years to the memory. It is quite 
remarkable baker charlie how much the miller's son this so-called while 
you were out word association immigrants' problems influences the 
manner from heaven in which we sleekit cowering timrous beasties all-
American speak, the famous explorer. And the really well that is 
surprising partner in crime is that a lot and his wife of the lions' feeding 
time we may be c d e effectively quite unaware of the fact or fiction 
section of the Watford Public Library that we are even doing it is a far, 
far better thing that I do now then, now then, what's going onward 
christian Barnard the famous hearty part of the lettuce now praise 
famous mental homes for loonies like me. So on the button, my 
contention causing all the headaches, is that unless we take into account 
of Monte Cristo in our thinking George the Fifth this phenomenon the 
other hand we shall not be able satisfact or fiction section of the 
Watford Public Library againily to understand to attention when I'm 
talking to you and stop laughing, about human nature, man's 
psychological make-up some story the wife'll believe and hence the very 
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This chapter presents the first TMS study conducted. This is, moreover, the first 
linguistic cerebellar (CB) TMS study in the literature, and it is also reported in 
Argyropoulos (2010b). 
 
At an elementary level, a direct prediction generated by the NCBKFLP 
hypothesis (Argyropoulos, 2009; section 2.3.3 here) is that phenomena traditionally 
termed as ‗lexical associative priming‘ should fundamentally involve NCB circuitry 
(section 2.3.4.3). In other words, non-attended expectancy generation for upcoming 
word B based on currently processed word ‗A‘, where ‗A‘ and ‗B‘ are temporally 
contiguous in speech, should provide one of the simplest cases of NCB prediction in 
language processing (section 2.6.2.1). 
 
With respect to the neuroanatomical aspects of lexical priming, research in 
Alzheimer‘s disease and semantic dementia has established that ‗(categorical) semantic‘, 
but not ‗associative‘ priming is disrupted, with the latter type often providing the 
unaffected baseline conditions (e.g. Rogers & Friedman, 2008). However, the reverse 
dissociation has not been established in any clinical population; for instance, both 
Wernicke‘s and Broca‘s aphasia involves preserved ‗semantic‘ and ‗associative‘ priming 
(Hagoort, 1997; section 2.4.4). On the other hand, as reviewed above, there is 
considerable evidence supporting CB involvement in associative linguistic computations 
(section 2.3.4.3). Representative highlights would be the NCB deficits in sensorimotor 
and cognitive associative learning (Drepper et al., 1999), and in generating semantic-
associatively-related verbs for noun-stimuli (e.g. chef-cook, pill-take; Gebhart et al., 
2002; section 2.4.4.5 here). The same idea has also been entertained in Deacon‘s work, 
where the CB is thought to contribute to language ‗‗by providing access to relatively 




However, the evidence available on NCB involvement in verb generation tasks 
could only support the significance of the NCB in processing semantic-associative 
relations; formal-associative ones, though, have not been investigated. Moreover, these 
findings could be misleading with respect to the nature of the deficit per se. Gebhart et 
al. (2002), for example, in the line of Thach (1996a), promote the view that the PLCB is 
responsible for the production of linguistic responses in a stimulus-response modality, 
corroborating a ‗motor output‘-based metaphor of CB functions (e.g. section 2.3.1 here). 
On the contrary, establishing that the CB computations pertain equally to production and 
perception in language processing as in other behaviors (sections 2.2.2 and 3.5.3) would 
favor a computation-based, modality-independent approach, in line with the NCBKFLP 
here. 
 
Thus, in order to investigate the involvement of the NCB in processing formal-
associative relations from a perception-comprehension standpoint, a lexical decision task 

















5.2. Pilot Experiment 1 (Experiment 1) 
 
In order to demonstrate that the related pairs in the task involved priming 




Each session contained 600 trials (word/nonword-word/nonword pairs). In order 
to avoid onset effects (Forster & Davis, 1991), primes and targets always differed in the 
first phoneme; for instance, a pair like ‗bread-BUTTER‘ could not be selected. It was 
also ensured that primes and targets were not orthographically similar (e.g. Rogers & 
Friedman, 2008). This was quantified here by excluding any pairs that had a sequence of 
at least two letters shared. It was also ensured that the graphemic structure of the 
nonwords resembled that of orthographically legal words.  
 
The session was divided in two blocks of 300 trials each. Each block consisted of 
two ‗miniblocks‘ of 150 trials each, containing 60 word-word, 60 nonword-nonword, 15 
nonword-word, and 15 word-nonword trials. This yielded an equal number of ‗yes‘ and 
‗no‘ responses, as well as an equal number of words and nonwords. In the second and 
fourth miniblocks, the same word and nonword pairs were presented as those of the first 
and third miniblocks, respectively. This enabled the study of any changes in practice-
related effects after CB TMS. Printed frequency was taken from the British National 
Corpus (BNC, written part; Leech, 1992), a 90-million-word collection of samples of 
written British English from a wide range of sources in the later 20th century. Prime and 
target words did not differ in frequency or length across blocks or miniblocks (all Fs, F 
< 1; table A.2 in appendix A).  
 
The first and third miniblocks contained 15 target pairs and 15 control pairs for 
each of the two different priming sets-types (see table A.1 in appendix A): semantic-
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categorically related pairs, where the prime word is a subordinate term of that in the 
target position, but does not form a phrase in speech with it (e.g. apple-FRUIT); and 
formal-associatively related pairs, where the prime word co-occurs in speech with but is 
categorically unrelated to the target word (e.g. gift-HORSE). Two lists were created, 
across which subjects were rotated. The stimuli of the second half of the first list were 
the stimuli of the first half of the second list, and vice versa (table 5.1). Changes in 
priming sizes were captured by comparing priming sizes between the first and third 
miniblocks. These were calculated according to the description in section 4.4.11. Given 
that pairs were not counterbalanced for relatedness, but belonged either to the unrelated 




The relatedness proportion, i.e. the ratio of related per unrelated words was 0.2, 
as in other experiments (e.g. Rogers & Friedman, 2008). Such low proportion minimizes 
predictability and maintains an automatic level of priming, given that strategic 
components may be introduced otherwise, affecting priming sizes (e.g. Cañas & Bajo, 








Unrelated Related Unrelated Related 
First 
Half 
Semantic-Categorical apple-gem penny-coin pants-toy knife-cutlery 
Formal-Associative computer-roof pigeon-hole tomato-path gift-horse 
Second 
Half 
Semantic-Categorical pants-toy knife-cutlery apple-gem penny-coin 
Formal-Associative tomato-path gift-horse computer-roof pigeon-hole 
Table 5.1: Task conditions (experiments 1, 2, and 3). 
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 In lexical decision tasks, it is not necessary to rotate items across related and unrelated pairs-conditions; 
this is the case, for instance, in randomly composed lists generated for each subject (e.g. Perea & Gotor, 
1997). Such a rotation would introduce additional conditions, which would be difficult to cater for with 
the small TMS subject pool size available. An items-based analysis was made possible only by using raw 
latencies as a dependent measure, entering ‗relatedness‘ as a between-items variable. A subjects-and 
items-based analysis of raw latencies for the TMS study (experiment 3 here) is provided at the end of 




As in other lexical decision tasks, target words of the formal-associative group 
were not matched with those of the semantic-categorical group (e.g. Ferrand & New, 
2003): while the former were not less frequent (stimulus set: F < 1), they were shorter 
than the latter (stimulus set: F (1,112) = 11.62, MSe = 2.97, p < .005). Word frequency 
and length for primes and targets were thus matched across miniblocks separately for 
each priming type (miniblock: all Fs, F < 1; tables A.3 and A.4 in Appendix A).  
 
As often noted in the priming literature, it is difficult to separate association 
strength from semantic-featural overlap. This is because associative and categorical 
norms ‗‗are not nearly as pure as has been assumed‘‘ (Hutchison, 2003, p. 787). For 
instance, semantic similarity ratings based on behavioral normative studies are often 
influenced by associations of items; highly-associated items tend to share semantic 
relations as well, and the dominance structure of categorical norms may reflect 
association strength between the stimuli (ibid). This is often why very few studies of 
pure associative priming have been conducted so far. Following one of these few 
studies, association values and semantic similarity for both ‗‗pure semantic‘‘ and ‗‗pure 
associative‘‘ pairs (Ferrand & New, 2003) were controlled for. 
 
Associative strength was determined on the basis of free word generation norms 
provided in the Edinburgh word Association Thesaurus (Kiss et al., 1973), and by the 
frequency of co-occurrence of these pairs in the BNC. As the experimental hypothesis of 
this study pertained to formal-associative priming, it was ensured that all associated 
pairs co-occurred in speech in an immediate fashion. For example, a pair like ‗gift-
HORSE‘ was selected, but not a pair like ‗storm-TEACUP‘. Formal-associatively 
related pairs co-occurred as phrases much more frequently in the BNC than the 
semantic-categorically related ones across the two miniblocks (stimulus set: F (1, 56) = 
15.23, MSe = 23.82, p < .001; rest of Fs, F < 1), and had higher word-association values 
(stimulus set: F (1, 56) = 165.83, MSe = 0.13, p < .001; rest of Fs, F < 1; see table A.5 
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for mean values in appendix A).
74
 Backward priming strength for the lexical associate 
set was kept quite low: the EAT response strength for the prime word, given the target 




Semantic-categorically related pairs were drawn from the published category 
norms of McEvoy and Nelson (1982), and Van Overschelde et al. (2004); only a subset 
of these contained non-periphrastic superordinate terms (e.g. ‗grammatical part of 
speech‘ vs ‗rodent‘). The non-periphrastic pairs selected were assessed on the grounds of 
their semantic similarity, which was determined using the ‗‗WordNet::Similarity‘‘ 
software (Pedersen et al., 2004).
76
 Semantic-categorically related pairs received much 
higher similarity ratings than the formal-associatively related ones across the two 
miniblocks (stimulus set: F (1, 56) = 263.12, MSe = 0.26, p < .001; rest of Fs, F < 1; see 
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 An apparent disadvantage for stimulus construction here was that no explicit criterion was used to 
distinguish between semantically and formally associated pairs. The degree of semantic association of 
formally associated words is a poorly explored issue (see Hutchison, 2003 for discussion). Thus, certain 
pairs in the set of formal associates could also involve words that are semantic-associatively related: e.g. 
‗swan-lake‘ involves an association between swans and the location where they can be found. However, 
all word pairs of this set were formal associates, i.e. they formed idiomatic phrases. 
75
These numbers represent the ‗‗proportion of occurrence‘‘ (Kiss et al., 1973), which is the number of 
times a certain word was produced in response to a certain stimulus, divided by the number of people 
that were given the particular stimulus. 
76
‗WordNet::Similarity‘ contains similarity measures making use of different aspects of ‗WordNet‘ 
(hierarchy and graph structure; Fellbaum, 1998). These measures are implemented as Perl modules, 
taking as input two concepts, and returning a numerical value that represents the degree to which the two 
concepts are similar in terms of their categorical relatedness. WordNet is a lexical database where each 
meaning of a word is represented by a ‗synonym set‘. Each synonym set has a gloss that defines the 
concept that it represents. For example the words ‗car‘, ‗auto‘, ‗automobile‘, and ‗motorcar‘ constitute a 
single set that has the gloss: ‗four wheel motor vehicle, usually propelled by an internal combustion 





Prime and target stimuli were presented in green colors at the center of a black 
screen of a MacBook using the ‗DirectRT‘ (Jarvis, 2008) software. Each trial consisted 
of a sequence of three stimuli presented at the same screen location. First, a fixation 
point (‗+‘) was presented for 400 ms, followed by the prime in lower-case letters for 100 
ms, which was followed by the presentation of the target word. The targets remained on 
the screen until participants responded. No masking mediated the presentation of the 
prime and the target word, and thus the SOA value was confounded with that of the 
prime duration (100 ms). SOAs longer than 200-250 ms are generally considered to 
involve strategic effects (e.g. Perea & Rosa, 2002), and thus were avoided. There was an 
intertrial interval of 600 ms. 
 
Participants were instructed to focus on the fixation point, read the first letter 
string, and respond only to the second one. The order of stimulus presentation was 
randomized for each subject. Subjects were instructed to press one of two buttons on the 
keyboard (‗j‘ for yes and ‗f‘ for no) to indicate whether the target letter string was an 
English word or not, as rapidly and accurately as possible. They used their dominant 
right-hand index finger for the word responses. Each subject received a total of 20 
practice trials prior to the 600 experimental trials. The whole session lasted 
approximately 35-40 minutes, depending on the time participants took in between 
miniblocks. Participants were tested individually in a silent and dimly lit room. They 
received written instructions explaining the task; they provided informed consent and 










18 students of the University of Edinburgh participated in this experiment; they 
were recruited according to the selection criteria in section 4.4.12, and were rotated 




The dependent measure here was lexical decision latencies. A 2 x 2 x 2 within-
subjects design was employed: the pairs could be unrelated or related (relatedness); they 
belonged to the formal-associative or to the semantic-categorical group (priming type). 




The analysis was performed according to the specifications in section 4.4.11. 
Excluded trials comprised 2.4% of the data. Latencies per condition can be seen in plot 
5.1 and table 5.2 below. 
 
As demonstrated by a three-way ANOVA (relatedness, priming type, phase), 
latencies were longer for the pairs (related or unrelated) of the semantic-categorical set, 
significantly by subjects and marginally by items (priming type: F1 (1, 16) = 2.07, MSe 
= 975.25, p < .05; F2 (1, 112) = 3.71, p = .06). Latencies also became significantly 
shorter in the second half of the session (phase: F1 (1, 16) = 4.65, MSe = 2245.90, p < 
.05; F2 (1, 112) = 13.68, MSe = 1248.51, p < .001) independently of priming set 
(priming type*phase: both Fs, F < 1). Most importantly, related items received shorter 
latencies than unrelated ones, but significantly only by subjects and marginally by 
items (relatedness: F1 (1, 16) = 12.91, MSe = 356.26, p < .005; F2 (1, 112) = 2.90, MSe 
= 8616.95, p = .09). Priming occurred independently of priming type or phase in the 
session (all Fs, F < 1, or p > .2).  
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Plot 5.1: Mean latencies for unrelated and related pairs for pilot group per condition. Error 










Unrelated 580.92 104.81 
Related 562.36 85.07 
Second Half 
Unrelated 559.25 101.25 




Unrelated 584.24 89.28 
Related 579.92 107.07 
Second Half 
Unrelated 571.58 109.20 
Related 561.10 94.34 






The results demonstrated priming effects independently of priming type. Such 
direct differences in lexical decision latencies between unrelated and related trials were 
necessary to show, as the main TMS experiment employed a smaller number of 
participants that did not independently suffice to demonstrate significant priming effects 
across conditions; the dependent measure there was priming size, calculated on the basis 
of the description in section 4.4.11. The fact that priming was only significant by 
subjects may suggest that only a subset of items was responsible for the priming effects, 
or that the number of participants was not big enough to stabilize variances for the 
analysis by items. However, this finding sufficed here, as in the main experiment the 
design was such that priming sizes could only be calculated by subjects (section 5.2.1). 
Importantly, priming sizes did not change in the second phase, suggesting that any 
changes after TMS in the main study should be interpreted as genuine effects induced by 














5.3. Pilot Experiment 2 (Experiment 2) 
 
As the participants in the main TMS study were asked to complete the same task in 
two different sessions, a pilot group completed the two sessions in the same fashion, in 
order to observe any learning-related differences in the priming sizes between the first 












8 participants were recruited according to the selection criteria in section 4.4.12, 
and were rotated across the two stimulus lists. Participants underwent the same protocol 
as those in the main TMS experiment (section 5.4) without the employment of TMS, 
completing two sessions on two different days. Participants also took a necessary break 
after the first half of each session for 7 minutes, corresponding to the time required to 
apply TMS and to the subsequent 5-minute break time for participants in the main TMS 
experiment. The two subject groups did not differ with respect to the mediating time 
distance between the first and second session (here: mean time distance: 14.5 days, SD: 
12.39; F < 1). TMS participants (section 5.4.4) were not significantly older than the 







A 2 x 2 x 2 within-subjects design was employed: participants completed the task 
twice, in two different sessions (session number); priming sizes were assessed in the first 
and in the second half of each session (phase); priming sizes pertained to two different 
priming types: formal associative and semantic-categorical priming (priming type). 
Priming size was measured as the difference between the RT mean for unprimed target 





The trials excluded according to the criteria in section 4.4.11 amounted to 2% of 
the data. The mean priming sizes per condition can be seen in table 5.3 and plot 5.2 
below. A three-way ANOVA (session number, priming type, phase) showed no 
difference in priming sizes between sessions, priming types, or phases (all Fs, F < 1). 
There was only a marginal session number*phase interaction (F (1, 6) = 4.24, MSe = 
370.97, p = .09) and a nonsignificant priming type*phase interaction (F (1, 6) = 3.17, 
MSe = 1274.25, p = .13; rest of Fs, F < 1). These were largely due to a weak tendency 
for formal-associative priming size to decrease in the second phase across sessions. This 
was demonstrated by a two-way ANOVA for formal-associative priming sizes (phase: F 
(1, 6) = 3.74, MSe = 797.87, p = .1; rest of ps, p > .25), which was not found for 










Session Priming Type Phase (Half) Mean Priming Size (ms) SD (ms) 
First 
Formal-Associative 
First 17.91 23.37 
Second -7.85 26.42 
Semantic-Categorical 
First 11.07 32.35 
Second 5.33 41.14 
Second 
Formal-Associative 
First 10.11 29.61 
Second -1.69 20.46 
Semantic-Categorical 
First 1.87 44.65 
Second 15.96 19.04 
Table 5.3: Mean priming sizes across conditions for pilot group (experiment 2). 
 







The pilot study above demonstrated that there were no significant changes in 
priming size between the two sessions or between the two phases. This was important to 




5.4. TMS Experiment (Experiment 3) 
 
 
The TMS experiment was conducted in the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience 




The same stimuli were used as those in the first and second pilot experiments 




The same procedure was employed as that in the second pilot experiment 
(section 5.3.2), but with the involvement of TMS. Participants completed the first two 
miniblocks, received 40 seconds of cTBS on one of the two CB sites, and, after a 5-
minute break, completed the last two miniblocks. Each miniblock lasted approximately 7 
minutes. Participants could take a 2-minute break after the completion of each 
miniblock. The whole session thus lasted 45-50 minutes. 
 
5.4.3. TMS Setup 
 
This TMS study involved stimulation of the right neocerebellar vermis (NCBV), 
and of a right posterolateral cerebellar (PLCB) site. The vermal lobules of interest here, 
i.e. VI and VII, have been successfully stimulated in Hashimoto and Ohtsuka (1995), 
applying the scalp-based coordinates of 1 cm below the inion and 1 cm laterally to the 
right. The vermis is one of the most accessible structures for CB TMS (Miall & 
Christensen, 2004), and the superior posterior CB compartments are those closest to the 
surface of the scalp (see section 4.4.8). These lobules are included in areas 2 and 
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especially 3 in figure 5.1 below, and, importantly, comprise the NCB compartment of 
the vermis (see also figure 1.3). Scalp coordinates of 1 cm below the inion and 2 cm 
laterally to the right have been considered to correspond to a paravermal site, or to a CB 




           
Figure 5.1: Quadripartite division of the vermis by MacLullich et al. (2004); area 1: lingula 
and lobulis centralis (lobules I-III of Larsell & Jansen, 1972); area 2: culmen, bordered by 
the preculminate fissure and the primary fissure (lobules IV and V); area 3: declive, 
folium, and tuber, bordered by the primary and the prepyramidal fissure (lobules VI and 
VII); area 4: pyramis, uvula, and nodulus (lobules VIII-X). Vermal areas 2 and particularly 3 
are part of the NCB; they are apparently closer to the scalp and thus more exposed to the 





With respect to the lateral site of stimulation, language-specific activations are 
primarily located in HVI (see figure 4.1 in chapter 4). The scalp coordinates of 1 cm 
below the inion and 3 cm to the right have been amply used in the CB TMS literature 
(Théoret et al., 2001; Torriero et al., 2004, 2007; Koch et al., 2007, 2008; Miall et al., 
2007; Miall & King, 2008). They have been suggested to averagely correspond to parts 
of right lobules HV and HVI, their cerebral cortical afferents including the right-hand 
area of the left motor cortex (Koch et al., 2008; Miall & King, 2008). MRI 
reconstruction and neuronavigation systems in previous studies have confirmed that CB 
TMS in this site predominantly targets the posterior and superior lobules of the lateral 
CB (Del Olmo et al., 2007; Koch et al., 2007). Given that the phylogenetically elder, 
dorsal part of the dentate nucleus projects to motor areas (including primary motor 
cortex), and that the ventral, phylogenetically recent part projects to prefrontal and 
premotor areas (e.g. Middleton & Strick, 1998), a more lateral CB site was selected. 
This site was defined only 1.5 cm further laterally to the right (thus, 1 cm below the 
inion, and 4.5 cm laterally to the right), since, in terms of straight line distance to scalp, 
more lateral placement would grossly translate into further distance from the CB cortex 
(C. Miall, personal communication, 16 April 2009).  
  
In order to estimate the depth of each site and thus the possibility of their 
successful stimulation, a volunteer was recruited, whose brain image was already 
registered with the Brainsight™ TMS-MRI co-registration system (Rogue Research, 
Montreal, Canada).
77
 The scalp-based coordinates were transformed into Talairach brain 
coordinates. For the NCBV site, transformation yielded the coordinates of x = 9 mm, y = 
-87 mm, z = -21 mm (figure 5.2). The medial site is thus successfully localized below 
the primary fissure and above the prepyramidal fissure below, and corresponds to the 
right vermal lobules VI and VII: declive, folium, tuber, i.e. part of the superior posterior 
cerebellar vermis.  
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Figure 5.2: Localization of the right NCBV site. Image taken from a Brainsight ™ window, 
showing the CB area underlying the position of 1 cm below the inion and 1 cm laterally to 
the right in a volunteer. 
 
For the PLCB site, the transformation yielded the coordinates of x = 33 mm, y = 
-87 mm, z = -27 mm, corresponding to a significantly deeper right posterior superior 
hemispheric area, located between the same fissures (figure 5.3). 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Localization of the right PLCB site. Image taken from Brainsight ™ window 
showing the CB area underlying the position of 1cm below the inion and 4.5 cm laterally 






The cTBS protocol was applied according to the description in section 4.4. 
Ethical approval was granted by the local ethics committee. All subjects provided their 
informed consent. All subjects but one (who found the TBS session painful and was not 
subject to the full 40 seconds, and thus discarded) tolerated TMS well, and all reported a 





All subjects (n = 8) were recruited according to the criteria in section 4.4.12 
(mean age: 26.9 years; min: 19; max: 43; SD: 8.6). They all underwent TMS in alternate 
sites (PLCB, NCBV) in two different sessions, performing the exact same task. A mean 
time distance of 13.5 days (min 3; max 26 days; SD: 9.1) separated the two sessions. A 
considerable number of subjects were not recalled for the second session, or were 
automatically discarded from the analysis, due to certain violations of the protocol: five 
subjects were not native English speakers despite enrolling as such; in one session, a 
mechanical error occurred in triggering the TMS machine; in another session, the 5-
minute break after the stimulation was not abided by; finally, five subjects failed to 





For the analysis of TMS effects on priming sizes, a 2 x 2 x 2 within-subjects 
design was followed: participants were stimulated on two different CB sites: on the right 
NCBV and on the right PLCB site (site). Priming sizes were calculated before and after 
TMS (phase). Two different types of priming were examined (priming type): formal-




For the analysis of TMS effects on sensorimotor performance, a 2 x 2 x 2 within-
subjects design was also followed: Latencies and accuracy rates were analyzed for both 
words and nonwords (‗wordness‘) for the phase before and after TMS (phase) of either 
the PLCB or NCBV (site). 
 
For the TMS effects on processing repeated trials, a similar 2 x 2 x 2 design was 
followed. The difference in the speed and accuracy of lexical decisions between the first 
and second (repeated) miniblock of the block before TMS was compared with the same 
difference after TMS (phase) of the NCBV or of the PLCB (site), both for words and 
nonwords (wordness).  
 
Full counterbalancing was achieved for the order in which the two sites were 






5.4.6.1. Effects on Priming Size 
5.4.6.1.1. Lexical Decision Latencies 
 
 
Trials were excluded according to the criteria in section 4.4.1, and amounted to 
1.2% of the data. Mean priming sizes per condition are shown below in table 5.4 and 
plot 5.3. The analysis demonstrated a selective enhancement of formal-associative 
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 As mentioned above, the design of the experiment did not allow for effects on priming sizes to be 
calculated by items An items-based analysis was only possible by using RTs as a dependent measure. 
This analysis is presented at the end of appendix A. 
229 
 
A 3-way ANOVA (priming type, site, phase) only showed a strong 
site*priming type*phase interaction (F (1, 6) = 20.25, MSe = 331.10, p < .005; also, a 
non-significant site*phase interaction: F (1, 6) = 2.25, MSe = 191.10, p = .18; rest of ps, 
p > .2). This was primarily owed to the selective increase in formal-associative priming 
size after NCBV TMS. 
 
2-way ANOVAs: Formal-Associative Priming (site, phase): An analysis for 
formal-associative priming sizes showed no difference between sites or phases (both Fs, 
F < 1), but only a site*phase interaction (F (1, 6) = 19.10, MSe = 275.72, p < .01). As 
observed in plot 5.3 below, this was because of the selective increase in formal-
associative priming size after NCBV TMS,  
 
2-way ANOVAs: Semantic-Categorical Priming (site, phase): An analysis for 
semantic-categorical priming sizes also demonstrated a site*phase interaction (F (1, 6) = 
7.58, MSe = 246.47, p < .05; rest of Fs, F < 1), which relied, though, on marginal effects 
(see below). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: before TMS (site, priming type): Priming sizes before TMS 
did not differ across the two sites (site: F < 1). A marginal site*priming type interaction 
(F (1, 6) = 4.34, MSe = 697.81, p = .08) was noted though, which once again relied on 
only marginal differences (see below).  
 
2-way ANOVAs: after TMS (site, priming type): For priming after 
stimulation, sizes after NCBV TMS were overall larger than those after PLCB TMS 
(site: F (1, 6) = 8.66, MSe = 118.73, p < .05), but even more so for formal-associative 
priming (site*priming type: F (1, 6) = 8.13, MSe = 454.36, p < .05).  
 
2-way ANOVAs: NCBV conditions (priming type, phase): An analysis of 
priming sizes in NCBV conditions showed a selective increase for formal-associative 
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priming (priming type*phase interaction: F (1, 6) = 14.31, MSe = 381.91, p < .01), 
and not independently of priming type (phase: F < 1).  
 
2-way ANOVAs: PLCB conditions (priming type, phase): An analysis of 
priming sizes in PLCB conditions showed no change independently of priming type 
(phase: F < 1), and an only marginal priming type*phase interaction (F (1, 6) = 4.62, 
MSe = 379.76, p = .08), which did not rely, though, on any significant effects (see 
below). 
 
1-way ANOVAs (phase): An analysis of formal-associative priming sizes in 
NCBV TMS conditions showed a significant increase after TMS (phase: F (1, 6) = 
7.64, MSe = 543.73, p < .05). No significant change was introduced for formal-
associative priming after PLCB TMS (phase: F (1, 6) = 2.41, MSe = 604.98, p = .17). 
For semantic-categorical priming sizes, there was a marginal decrease after NCBV 
TMS (phase: F (1, 6) = 5.02, MSe = 320.46, p = .07), and no change after PLCB TMS 
(phase: p > .3).  
 
1-way ANOVAs (site): Formal-associative priming size after NCBV TMS 
was also much larger than that after PLCB TMS (site: F (1, 6) = 21.19, MSe = 
203.38, p < .005). Sizes did not differ significantly between the two sites for formal-
associative priming before TMS (site: F (1, 6) = 2.73, MSe = 583.89, p = .14) or for 
semantic-categorical priming before (F (1, 6) = 3.01, MSe = 554.44, p = .13), or after 
TMS (p > .3). 











Priming Type TMS Site TMS Phase Mean priming sizes (ms) SD (ms) 
Formal-Associative 
NCBV 
Before TMS -3.34 18.62 
After TMS 28.88 24.70 
PLCB 
Before TMS 15.15 29.24 
After TMS -3.95 12.98 
Semantic-Categorical 
NCBV 
Before TMS 15.84 28.70 
After TMS -4.21 30.04 
PLCB 
Before TMS -4.58 32.52 
After TMS 5.94 17.89 




Plot 5.3: Mean priming sizes per condition for TMS sessions. Error bars represent + 1 






5.4.6.1.2. Lexical Decision Accuracy 
 
Priming sizes were calculated here as the difference between mean accuracy 
rates for unrelated items and those for related items per condition (4.4.11). The analysis 
showed a selective decrease in size for formal-associative priming after TMS in the first 
session of participation (yet independently of site). However, subsequent comparisons 
with no-TMS groups demonstrated that the change did not reflect a TMS effect, but a 
general trend in task performance (see Appendix A for the full analysis). 
 
 
5.4.6.2. Effects on Sensorimotor Performance 
5.4.6.2.1. Lexical Decision Latencies 
 
The mean latencies per condition for words and nonwords before and after 
stimulation of the two sites are shown below in table 5.5 and in plot 5.4. The analysis 
showed a tendency for RTs to show a smaller decrease after NCBV TMS than after 
PLCB TMS, selectively for word targets. 
 
A 3-way ANOVA (site, phase, wordness) showed a clear reduction of RTs in 
the second phase of each session (phase: F1 (1, 6) = 11.57, MSe = 1252.43, p < .05; F2 
(1, 296) = 124.66, MSe = 2077.07, p < .001). Words received significantly shorter 
latencies across sessions (wordness: F1 (1, 6) = 8.27, MSe = 4749.98, p < .05; F2 (1, 
296) = 71.09, MSe = 7240.31, p < .001). Crucially, the analysis also showed a 
significant by-items site*phase*wordness interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 2.93, p = .14; F2 (1, 
296) = 6.27, MSe = 1890.44, p < .05), due to a tendency for RTs to decrease poorly after 
NCBV TMS for word targets (also, a non-significant wordness*phase interaction: F1 < 




2-way ANOVAs: word targets (site, phase): An analysis for word targets 
showed the expected reduction of RTs in the second phase, marginally by subjects and 
significantly by items (phase: F1 (1, 6) = 4.66, MSe = 1079.20, p = .07; F2 (1, 148) = 
45.68, MSe = 2092.28, p < .001; site: both Fs, F < 1). Crucially, it also showed a 
significant by-items site*phase interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 1.3, MSe = 593.65, p > .3; F2 
(1, 148) = 7.65, MSe = 1623.68, p < .01). As seen in the plot below, this was due to a 
smaller reduction of RTs after NCBV TMS than after PLCB TMS for word targets.  
 
2-way ANOVAs: nonword targets (site, phase): On the contrary, an analysis 
for nonwords showed no such interaction (site*phase: both Fs, F < 1), but only the 
expected reduction of RTs across sites in the second phase (F1 (1, 6) = 9.64, MSe = 
1022.83, p < .05; F2 (1, 148) = 81.71, MSe = 2061.86, p < .001). Nonword latencies did 
not differ between the two sites overall (site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 148) = 2.20, MSe = 2146.58, 
p = .14). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: NCBV conditions (phase, wordness): A comparison of 
latencies for NCBV TMS conditions showed the expected reduction in RTs in the 
second phase (F1 (1, 6) = 13.27, MSe = 461.83, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 62.66, MSe = 
1689.23, p < .001), and the expected difference in latencies between words and 
nonwords (F1 (1, 6) = 12.05, MSe = 1483.36, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 49.01, MSe = 
4576.25, p < .001). Importantly, though, it also showed a significant by-items 
wordness*phase interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 1.6, MSe = 649.17, p > .2; F2 (1, 296) = 9.64, 
MSe = 1689.23, p < .005), with a smaller reduction of RTs for words than for nonwords 
in the phase after NCBV TMS.  
 
2-way ANOVAs: PLCB conditions (phase, wordness): No such interaction 
was observed in PLCB TMS conditions (wordness*phase: both Fs, F < 1), apart from 
the marginal by-subjects and significant by-items main effect of wordness (F1 (1, 6) = 
5.49, MSe = 3921.08, p = .06; F2 (1, 296) = 65.42, MSe = 4474.84, p < .001), and that of 
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phase, significantly by items  and marginally by subjects (F1 (1, 6) = 4.76, MSe = 
1773.98, p = .07; F2 (1, 296) = 68.24, MSe = 2278.29, p < .001). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: conditions after TMS (site, wordness): Comparing latencies 
in the conditions after TMS, words once again received shorter latencies than nonwords 
(wordness: F1 (1, 6) = 12.97, MSe = 1224.24, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 45.76, MSe = 
4557.50, p < .001). Latencies after NCBV TMS were not larger than those after PLCB 
TMS overall (site: both Fs, F < 1), but only selectively so for words; this was shown by 
a significant by-items site*wordness interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 1.6, MSe = 332.77, p > .2; 
F2 (1, 296) = 6.81, MSe = 1799.73, p < .05). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: conditions before TMS (site, wordness): No such interaction 
was shown for the conditions before TMS (wordness*site: both Fs, F < 1), apart from a 
significant by-items main effect of wordness (F1 (1, 6) = 5.45, MSe = 4375.34, p = .06; 
F2 (1, 296) = 65.40, MSe = 4759.88, p < .001). Latencies between the two sites did not 
differ before TMS (site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 296) = 2.54, MSe = 1901.49, p = .11). 
 
1-way ANOVAs (for words): phase: Suggestively, the decrease in latencies for 
words after PLCB TMS (phase: F1 (1, 6) = 4.04, MSe = 1142.68, p = .09; F2 (1, 148) = 
46.45, MSe = 1904.28, p < .001) showed larger effect sizes than for those after NCBV 
TMS (phase: F1 (1, 6) = 1.6, MSe = 530.18, p > .2; F2 (1, 148) = 10.79, MSe = 
1811.68, p < .005).   
 
1-way ANOVAs (for words): site: However, the interactions above were at 
least partly due to the significantly by-items longer latencies before PLCB than 
those before NCBV TMS (site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 148) = 4.52, MSe = 1406.68, p < .05). 
Latencies after NCBV TMS were but marginally longer (by items) than those after 
PLCB TMS (site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 148) = 3.59, MSe = 1691.97, p = .06).  The analysis 





Target Type TMS Site TMS Phase Mean Latencies (ms) SD (ms) 
Words 
NCBV 
Before TMS 536.33 43.84 
After TMS 520.14 51.94 
PLCB 
Before TMS 547.97 75.61 
After TMS 514.02 58.20 
Nonwords 
NCBV 
Before TMS 595.10 83.35 
After TMS 555.93 62.75 
PLCB 
Before TMS 598.37 117.25 
After TMS 567.32 86.11 










5.4.6.2.2. Lexical Decision Accuracy  
 
Accuracy rates per condition were also analyzed, shown below in plot 5.5 and 
table 5.6. A three-way analysis of accuracy rates (wordness, site, phase), without 
including the ‗session number‘, showed a significant by-items main effect of site, with 
more mistakes occurring in NCBV conditions overall (site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 296) = 4.03, 
MSe = 0.05, p < .05), and a marginal by-items wordness*phase difference (F1 < 1; F2 (1, 
296) = 2.86, MSe = 0.05, p = .09; non-significant wordness*site*phase interaction: F1 (1, 
6) = 3.30, MSe = 0.00, p = .12; F2 < 1; wordness: F1 (1, 6) = 2.56, MSe = 0.00, p = .16; 
F2 < 1; rest of Fs, F < 1). However, the analysis for either before or after TMS in 
particular showed no wordness*site interactions (all Fs, F < 1).  
 
Factoring in the session number in the analysis showed a selective decrease of 
accuracy rates after NCBV TMS in the first session of participation. 
 
A 4-way ANOVA (site, phase, session number, wordness) showed a clear 
learning effect, with significantly less mistakes occurring in the second session of 
participation (session number: F1 (1, 4) = 9.72, MSe = 0.01, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 5.93, 
MSe = 0.06, p < .05). There also was a significant by-items difference between the two 
sites, with more mistakes occurring in NCBV conditions (F1 < 1; F2 (1, 296) = 5.75, 
MSe = 0.07, p < .05). Crucially, however, the analysis showed a significant by-subjects 
site*phase*session number interaction (F1 (1, 4) = 20.28, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 (1, 
296) = 1.73, MSe = 0.09, p = .19). As it will be shown below, this was due to the lower 
accuracy rates in the condition after NCBV TMS in the first session, independently of 
target type (site*phase*session number*wordness: both Fs, F < 1). The analysis also 
showed a number of interactions that are not further discussed, for the sake of brevity 
(wordness*session number: F1  (1, 4) = 10.33, MSe = 0.01, p < .05; F2 < 1; site*session 
number: F1  < 1; F2 (1, 296) = 8.21, MSe = 0.09, p < .005; phase*wordness: F1 < 1; F2 
(1, 296) = 4.16, MSe = 0.09, p < .05; site*session number*wordness: F1  < 1; F2 (1, 296) 
= 6.64, MSe = 0.09, p < .05; wordness*site*phase interaction: F1 (1, 4) = 5.82, MSe = 
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0.00, p = .07; F2 (1, 296) = 2.25, MSe = 0.08, p = .14; session number*phase: F1 (1, 4) = 
1.76, MSe = 0.00, p > .25; F2 (1, 296) = 2.23, MSe = 0.07, p = .14; rest of Fs,  F < 1, or 
p > .2). 
 
The non-selective nature of this site*phase*session number interaction for 
words or nonwords is demonstrated in the two separate ANOVAs for words and 
nonwords below: 
 
3-way ANOVAs: Words (site, phase, session number): An analysis for 
accuracy rates for word targets showed a significant by-subjects site*phase*session 
number interaction (F1 (1, 4) = 13.96, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 < 1). The analysis also 
showed a marginal by-items site difference, with higher accuracy rates for NCBV 
conditions overall (F1 (1, 4) = 2.04, MSe = 0.00, p > .2; F2 (1, 148) = 3.07, MSe = 0.08, 
p = .08), and a significant by-subjects learning effect (session number: F1 (1, 4) = 26.12, 
MSe = 0.01, p < .01; F2 (1, 148) = 2.75, MSe = 0.07, p = .1; also: site*session number: F 
< 1; F2 (1, 148) = 17.30, MSe = 0.08, p < .001; phase*session number: F1  (1, 4) = 3.28, 
MSe = 0.00, p = .14; F2 (1, 148) = 1.10, MSe = 0.06, p > .3; rest of Fs, F < 1, or p > 
.25). 
 
3-way ANOVAs: Nonwords (Site, phase, session): An analysis for nonword 
targets showed the same, significant by-subjects site*phase*session number 
interaction (F1 (1, 4) = 17.71, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 (1, 148) = 1.08, MSe = 0.09, p > 
.3), along with a number of marginal or non-significant effects (session number: F1 < 1; 
F2 (1, 148) = 3.21, MSe = 0.06, p = .08; phase: F1  < 1; F2 (1, 148) = 3.11, MSe = 0.10, 
p = .08; site*phase: F1 (1, 4) = 2.89, MSe = 0.00, p = .16; F2 (1, 148) = 1.12, MSe = 
0.08, p > .25; site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 148) = 2.68, MSe = 0.07, p = .1; rest of Fs, F < 1, or p > 
.25). 
 
Subsequent analysis including the wordness factor showed that the effects in 
two- and one-way ANOVAs did not reach significance separately for words or for 
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nonwords. Thus, for the sake of brevity, and on the grounds of the above non-selective 
nature of the site*session number*phase interaction with respect to wordness 
(word/nonword), the following analysis is reported instead, collapsing on the wordness 
distinction. 
 
2-way ANOVAs: NCBV conditions (phase, session number): An analysis for 
NCBV TMS conditions showed a significant by-subjects and marginal by-items 
phase*session number interaction (F1 (1, 4) = 11.28, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) 
= 3.35, MSe = 0.08, p = .07), with more mistakes occurring selectively after NCBV 
TMS for the first session. No effect of NCBV TMS on accuracy was observed 
independently of session number (phase: both Fs, F < 1). The analysis also showed an 
expected session number effect, with fewer mistakes occurring for the second sessions 
(F1 (1, 4) = 6.06, MSe = 0.01, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 13.45, MSe = 0.09, p < .005).  
 
2-way ANOVAs: PLCB conditions (phase, session number): No such 
interaction was observed for PLCB TMS conditions (both Fs, F < 1); there was only a 
significant by-subjects learning effect (session number: F1 (1, 4) = 7.63, MSe = 0.00, p < 
.05; F2 (1, 296) = 1.2, MSe = 0.09, p > .3). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: After TMS (site, session): Comparing the accuracy rates after 
TMS of the two sites showed a significant site*session interaction (F1 (1, 4) = 8.20, 
MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 9.74, MSe = 0.08, p < .005), with lower accuracy 
rates in the condition after NCBV TMS in the first session. Accuracy rates after TMS 
did not differ between the two sites independently of session number (site: both ps, p > 
.2). As above, there was a session number effect, with fewer mistakes occurring in the 
second session of participation (F1 (1, 4) = 8.85, MSe = 0.01, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 6.02, 
MSe = 0.06, p < .05).  
 
2-way ANOVAs: Before TMS (site, session): On the contrary, comparing 
accuracy rates before TMS of the two sites, no such interaction was observed 
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(site*session: both ps, p > .25). Instead, there was a significant by-items effect of site, 
with NCBV conditions involving higher accuracy rates before TMS (site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 
296) = 4.00, MSe = 0.07, p < .05). Accuracy rates in the second session were marginally 
higher by subjects (session: F1 (1, 4) = 5.03, MSe = 0.00, p = .07; F2 < 1). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: first session (site, phase): An analysis for the first session of 
participation showed a significant by-subjects decrease in accuracy rates after TMS 
(phase: F1 (1, 2) = 13.9, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 < 1), which was stronger after NCBV 
TMS – this was demonstrated by a significant by-subjects site*phase interaction (F1 (1, 
2) = 9.95, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 1.2, MSe = 0.06, p > .25). NCBV 
conditions also involved lower accuracy rates overall, significantly so by items (F1 (1, 2) 
= 1.2, MSe = 0.00, p > .3; F2 (1, 296) = 16.17, MSe = 0.00, p < .001).  
 
2-way ANOVAs: second session (site, phase): Unexpectedly, a comparison of 
accuracy rates of participants in their second sessions showed a significant by-subjects 
site*phase interaction (F1 (1, 2) = 25.62, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 < 1; phase: F1 < 1; F2 
(1, 296) = 1.9, MSe = 0.06, p = .17; site: both Fs, F < 1). However, this interaction did 
not rely on any significant effects of TMS in the second session, as seen below. 
 
1-way ANOVAs (phase): A comparison of accuracy rates before and after TMS 
for participants that underwent NCBV TMS for the first session showed a strong 
effect of phase by subjects (F1 (1, 2) = 62.50, MSe = 0.00, p < .005; F2 (1, 296) = 1.3, 
MSe = 0.08, p > .3), with accuracy rates dropping after NCBV TMS for the first session. 
On the contrary, no significant change was introduced in accuracy rates after NCBV 
TMS in the second session (phase: F1 (1, 2) = 1.6, MSe = 0.00, p > .25; F2 (1, 296) = 
2.80, MSe = 0.05, p = .1). No change was introduced in accuracy rates after PLCB TMS 




1-way ANOVAs (site): Similarly, the accuracy rates in the condition after 
NCBV TMS in the first session were significantly lower by items than those after 
PLCB TMS for the first (F1 (1, 4) = 1.8, p > .2; F2 (1, 296) = 9.21, MSe = 0.10, p < 
.005) or for the second session (F1 (1, 4) = 9.36, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 
5.07, MSe = 0.08, p < .05). 
 
 
Plot 5.5: Mean accuracy rates per condition for TMS sessions. Error bars represent +1 
SEM (experiment 3). 
 
Site Phase Session Mean accuracy rates (%) SD (%) 
NCBV 
Before 
1 93.25 2.84 
2 95.38 1.32 
After 
1 91.00 2.71 
2 96.25 1.85 
PLCB 
Before 
1 92.75 1.76 
2 95.88 1.11 
After 
1 93.25 1.94 
2 95.38 1.38 
Table 5.6: Mean accuracy rates per condition for TMS sessions (experiment 3). 
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5.4.6.3. Effects on Practice-Induced Facilitation 
 
No changes were observed in the speed or accuracy of lexical decisions in 
repeated trials selectively after TMS of a particular site (see section 5.4.5 for design). 
 
5.4.6.3.1. Lexical Decision Latencies 
 
A three-way ANOVA on differences in latencies showed significantly larger by-
items facilitation sizes for NCBV conditions across phases (site: F1 (1, 4) = 3.64, MSe = 
2756.12, p = .1; F2 (1, 296) = 8.59, MSe = 3353.15, p < .005), along with a decrease in 
facilitation after TMS across sites, significantly by items (phase: F1 (1, 4)= 1.19, MSe = 
3555.12, p > .3; F2 (1, 296) = 6.93, MSe = 3312.03, p < .01; rest of Fs, F < 1). However, 
a comparison of the TMS group with the pilot group above (section 5.3), collapsing on 
the site variable, yielded no differences between the two (all Fs, F < 1). This 
demonstrated that the changes after TMS were not due to a TMS effect.  
 
 
5.4.6.3.2. Lexical Decision Accuracy  
 
Similarly, no changes in practice-related effects could be shown after TMS of 
any particular site. The same three-way ANOVA showed a wordness*site*phase 
interaction by subjects (F1 (1, 4) = 11.56, MSe = 0.39, p < .05; F2 < 1), and a marginal 
by-items site*phase interaction (F1 (1, 4) = 2.2, MSe = 0.39, p > .2; F2 (1, 296) = 2.96, 
MSe = 0.11, p = .09). However, the interaction was due to differences between the two 
sites before TMS (site: F1 (1, 4) = 15.36, MSe = 0.69, p < .05; F2 (1, 296) = 4.07, MSe = 
0.11, p < .05), and not to the phase after TMS (site, site*wordness: all ps, p > .2). 
Including the session number in the analysis yielded effects of the same size and 
significance. Collapsing on the site variable, no differences were found between the 





The results above demonstrated a selective drop in accuracy rates after NCBV 
TMS in the first session of participation, and also a tendency for longer latencies for 
word responses after NCBV TMS (section 5.4.7.1). Above all, they showed a selective 
enhancement of formal-associative priming after NCBV TMS, while TMS on the PLCB 
site provided adequate control conditions. No priming-related changes in accuracy rates 
were captured, and no effects of TMS in processing repeated trials (section 5.4.7.2). 
 
5.4.7.1. Sensorimotor Effects 
 
The results above provided some evidence for a disruption of lexical decision 
performance after NCBV TMS that could be due to TMS effects on reading and/or 
button presses.  
 
To begin with, there was a selective drop in accuracy rates after NCBV TMS for 
the first session of participation. Familiarity (learning effects) with the stimulus set 
conceivably annulled any such effects when participants underwent NCBV TMS for the 
second session. However, these effects were not selective for words or nonwords, and 
could only be demonstrated by collapsing on the wordness (word/nonword) distinction; 
the number of participants conceivably did not suffice to show significant effects 
separately for words and nonwords, or to demonstrate whether the effect was stronger 
for one of the two types. 
 
Vermal pathology is indeed associated with reading deficits. Reading errors have 
been observed in a group of selectively vermal patients that were expert readers before 
the onset of the lesion (Moretti et al., 2002). The vermis may support reading in a 
number of different ways. Briefly, here, visual information conveyed by mossy and 
climbing fibers is integrated in the vermal Purkinje cells; the flocculonodular lobe and 
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the vermis modulate the nictitating membrane response (section 2.3.4.3); vermal lesions 
may cause saccadic dysmetria, incapacitating ocular vergence movements (see Moretti 
et al., 2002, for more details). Moreover, the posterior vermis in particular accelerates 
saccades in the ipsilateral horizontal direction (Ohtsuka & Enoki, 1998, for discussion), 
and TMS in that region briefly disrupts saccades, smooth pursuit eye movements and 
eye-head gaze shifts (Hashimoto & Ohtsuka, 1995; Ohtsuka & Enoki, 1998; Nagel & 
Zangemeister, 2003). Thus, given that portions of the right posterior vermis were 
stimulated here, and that reading in English is performed from left to right, reading may 
have been disrupted. Another explanation of these mistakes would be that CB TMS 
selectively disrupted the elementary associations made between buttons and lexical 
decisions, i.e. ‗left-hand button: nonword‘, ‗right-hand button: word‘. Evidence was 
discussed earlier for the significance of the CB in forming elementary associations 
(section 2.3.4.3). The current design does not allow for a dissociation between the two 
mechanisms. 
 
Moreover, latencies for word targets did not tend to be as short after NCBV TMS 
as after PLCB TMS. If such tendencies were observed independently of string type 
(word/nonword), then the most suitable interpretation would have been that the 
disruption pertains to visual, rather than to motor processing. The motoric explanation of 
the disruption is based on the reciprocal connections of the right CB with areas of the 
contralateral (left) motor and premotor cortex, which are responsible in turn for the 
control of contralateral (right) limb movement. Thus, the motoric explanation 
accommodates disruptions selectively for the ‗word‘ response, which is confounded here 
with right-hand index finger button presses. The tendencies for relatively slow right-
hand index finger responses (word strings) after NCBV TMS may in fact require a 
motor-based explanation. The data do not allow for a dissociation between the two main 
explanations, and might as well be explained by a combination of limb-motor and 
saccadic-reading disruptions. More participants would be required to clarify the nature 




5.4.7.2. Cognitive Effects 
5.4.7.2.1. The Neocerebellar Vermis and Associative Priming 
 
The major finding of this study is that NCBV TMS selectively enhanced formal-
associative priming. This cannot be explained on the basis of disruptions in reading or in 
button presses. All such explanations would predict that both targets and controls of both 
priming types should receive lower accuracy and/ or longer latencies in the post-NCBV 
TMS conditions. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that this enhancement involved 
a strategic compensation for some other disruption: the short SOAs and the low 
relatedness proportion employed make strategic involvement highly unlikely; such 





This calls us to examine NCBV involvement in cognitive tasks independently of 
reading mechanisms. The neurofunctional explanation here would be similar to that 
provided for CB TMS-induced facilitations in other studies. Purkinje cells, which are 
responsible for inhibiting and dampening the constant excitation that deep CB nuclei 
undergo (section 1.2.3.1), are highly accessible to TMS. The latter introduces neural 
noise to the inhibitory activity of this layer in the NCBV, and allows inappropriate levels 
of excitatory output to the cortical targets (through the thalamus) of the deep CB nuclei 
(section 4.4.9). The findings here were thus in line with the predictions made in the 
second chapter, where it was hypothesized that disruption of CB cortical activity would 
amount to disinhibited predictions in phonological-syntactic processing (section 2.6.2.1). 
However, the particular neuroanatomical details of CB cTBS are still relatively 
unexplored to commit to a particular explanation of the direction of the effect here (see 
section 4.4.9 for discussion). Thus, the discussion below is also strongly motivated by 
the selective nature of the effect for a priming type (formal-associative priming). 
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 The same effect was shown in a ratio-based analysis (section 4.4.11); thus the change was not because 




The explanation put forth here stands at the intersection of two largely 
independent strands of research in schizophrenic cognitive-linguistic deficits: one on 
selective NCBV impairment, and one on abnormally strong lexical priming effects. 
Correlations between the two have not been extensively studied, but have been reported 
before. For instance, increased vermal white-matter volume in schizophrenic males has 
been associated with poorer immediate verbal memory and severity of positive 
symptoms (Levitt et al., 1999). 
 
Vermal atrophy is the most widely cited structural CB abnormality in 
schizophrenia (Picard et al., 2008). Brain-imaging research has lately established a 
selective NCBV volume reduction in schizophrenics (e.g. Martin & Albers, 1995; 
Ichimiya et al., 2001; Okugawa et al., 2007); interestingly, this is not accompanied by 
PLCB volume reduction (Okugawa et al., 2003). However, much unlike the PLCB loci, 
the anatomical details supporting NCBV cognitive functions are poorly investigated. For 
instance, NCBV-related cognitive deficits in schizophrenics have been recently 
discussed (Ichimiya et al., 2001) with reference to studies on the connectivity of the 
vermis with the thalamus, limbic systems, and frontal lobe regions via the fastigial 
nucleus in the cat (Harper & Heath, 1973). According to other considerations, impaired 
vermal Purkinje cell inhibitory output to the fastigial nuclei induces overactivity of 
dopaminergic basal ganglionic neurons, which may in turn deregulate frontal cortical 
function via the cortico-striatal loop (Martin & Albers, 1995). Indeed, enhanced priming 
of various types has been independently reported in schizophrenic populations, in both 
lexical decision and word pronunciation paradigms, and is commonly attributed to a 
disinhibited activation spread in the semantic network (see Moritz et al., 2001, for a 
brief review).  
 
However, the effects induced may arguably reflect a direct disruption of NCB-
based language functions. There is imaging and clinical evidence implicating the NCBV 
in non-motor-related linguistic processes (e.g. Desmond et al. 1998; section 2.4 here). In 
that study, for instance, the ‗FEW‘ condition of the stem completion task was thought to 
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reflect NCB (both NCBV and PLCB) constrained search mechanisms for unifications at 
the sublexical level (e.g. stem: ‗PSA‘; completion: ‗LM‘; section 2.4.4.2). By analogy, 
here, the selective effect of NCBV TMS on formal-associative priming would reflect 
constrained search mechanisms at the supralexical, phrasal level, between words that co-
occur in idiomatic phrases (e.g. prime: ‗gift‘; target: ‗horse‘). Most importantly, the 
selective nature of the TMS effects on formal-associative priming would prompt 
explanations on the basis of CB associative computations (sections 2.3.4): upon 
perception of the prime-word, the strong transitional probabilities to the following target 
word would establish low Kalman gain conditions, inviting maximized involvement of 
NCB internal models in processing the upcoming target word. On the contrary, if the 
disruption induced was a product of disinhibited cerebral functions (indirectly caused by 
CB cortical disruption), then enhancements would have occurred for both formal-
associative and semantic-categorical priming. 
 
Thus the study here pertains to selective disruptions of particular lexical priming 
types – this is very poorly explored in schizophrenia research. The latter is 
predominantly conducted within the study of thought-disordered types, and 
predominantly revolves around semantic-categorical priming (e.g. Picard et al., 2008, 
for a meta-analysis), with poor emphasis on the linguistic aspects of the disruption. On 
the other hand, the boosted formal-associative priming here reflects a linguistic deficit in 
a clearer fashion, in the sense of computing the co-occurrence relations of word pairs 
forming idiomatic phrases. There is indeed some first supportive evidence for a selective 
impairment in associative priming in schizophrenics. A poorly cited study
80
 (Nestor et 
al., 2006) showed that, while healthy matched controls were primed more for lexical 
decisions on target words related with primes via two relations (‗‗semantic-and-
associated‘‘, e.g. ‗doctor-nurse‘) than for pairs related only semantically (e.g. ‗deer-
pony‘) or only associatively (e.g. ‗bee-honey‘), schizophrenics showed greater priming 
for associated-only words than for words related only semantically or both semantically 
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 This was interpreted on the basis of ‗‗an associational bias that leads 
to restricted semantic integration and contributes to disturbed thinking‘‘ (ibid, p. 142). In 
this respect, then, it would be interesting to examine whether NCBV pathology involves 
‗associational biases‘ as direct effects, and semantic-categorical deficits as only by-
products. The latter could be either due to interference from these associational biases, 
or due to the deregulated cortical operations that disinhibited fastigial output would 
induce, as discussed above. TMS could offer further insights into such dissociations, by 
contrastive stimulation of different cerebral and CB loci.  
 
Such disinhibited associative priming would arguably underlie the 
symptomatology of ‗‗positive disordered discourse‘‘. This traditionally involves 
excessive and incoherent speech, and, crucially, tangentiality (i.e. responses related to 
more superficial aspects of the conversation and not to the essence of the topic) and 
derailment (i.e. a tendency for discourse to move off track; Andreasen, 1986). In this 
respect, the ‗schizophrenic-like‘ associative boost observed here is reminiscent of the 
extravagantly tangential, hyper-associative discourse of the spokesman in Monty 
Python‘s ‗‗Word Association Football‘‘ (Cleese, 1973) cited in the epigram at the start 
of this chapter.
82
 In fact, these discourse impairments have been accounted for in terms 
of deficient suppression of memory nodes irrelevant to the current discourse 
(Gernsbacher et al., 1999). A deficient NCBV cortex might thus provide only weak 
inhibitory signals to the deep CB nuclei, thus allowing for superfluous suboptimal 
associations to continue activating cerebral representations that are irrelevant with the 
information currently processed. Thus, the hypothesis developed here about the 
psycholinguistic/cognitive functions of the NCBV could bring together discourse 
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 As in most studies, Nestor et al. (2006) do not clarify whether the associatively related pairs were 
particularly associated in the formal or semantic level.  
82
 The term ‗word association‘ refers to the psychological technique invented by Jung in which patients 
are asked for an immediate response to words given to them. By extension, it also refers to the word 
game in which the first player starts with a word and subsequent players have to follow with a related 
word and so on. The term ‗word association football‘, on the other hand, involves a disinhibited merger 
of two different word compounds, that of ‗word association‘ and that of ‗association football‘. 
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These findings would seem to support the idea that NCBV Purkinje cells are 
involved in the inhibition of the expression of particular associations in inappropriate 
contexts. However, inhibitory Purkinje cell function supports much more than simple 
behavioral inhibition. Acquisition of associative properties of neural events by the CB is 
achieved with climbing fiber signals depressing parallel fiber-to-Purkinje cell signalling, 
thus releasing deep nuclei from Purkinje cell inhibition and allowing output signals from 
the CB microcomplex, which may be further adapted (sections 1.2.3; 2.3.3). 
Modification of Purkinje cell activity underlies expression, adaptation, and inhibition of 
the learned response. Suggestively, the metaphor of ‗‗sculpting‘‘ (Eccles et al., 1967) 
has been used to describe the function of the inhibitory output of the CB cortex to the 
nuclear neurons:  
 
[l]ike a block of marble, activity within the nuclei is 
relatively amorphous and theoretically multi-dimensional 
until it is given form by the inhibitory ‗sculpting‘ of the 
cortical input (Thach, 2007, p. 164). 
 
The findings also have far-reaching consequences for the neural foundations of 
psycholinguistic mechanisms of sentence processing, as studied in experimental 
psycholinguistic (chapter 2), or historical linguistic contexts (chapter 3). The 
involvement of the right NCBV in formal-associative priming promotes its significance 
in phenomena like articulatory reduction, chunking, and phoneme restoration (see 
sections 2.6 and 3.6 for references). NCBV predictions would allow for the acceleration 
of articulatory gestures in producing a sentence with contextually predictable items, and 
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 The involvement of NCBV circuitry in formal-associative priming need not suggest that NCBV 
circuitry is restricted to a formal level of analysis. Arguably, the lack of coherence in schizophrenic 
discourse would involve disinhibited semantic associations as well (sections 2.4.4.5 and 2.4.4.6), which 
are, however, beyond the scope of this TMS study. 
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would allow for the rapid co-articulation of co-occurring items; the macroscopic effects 
of these may be seen in phonetic attrition and chunking in the contexts of 
grammaticalization and idiomatization (section 3.6.3.1). In sentence comprehension and 
perception, NCBV predictions may be used to restore noisy percepts, on the basis of 
transition probabilities in a sublexical phonological-syllabic level (Samuel, 1981), or in a 
supralexical one, as in sentential contexts (Warren, 1970; section 2.6.3.1 here). 
 
5.4.7.2.2. On Covert Speech Production 
 
Conceivably, an alternative interpretation of this enhanced associative priming 
would be based on CB involvement in ‗‗silent/covert speech‘‘ (e.g. Ackermann et al., 
1998), and on the emulative employment of such processes in language perception-
comprehension (Pickering & Garrod, 2007; section 2.3.2 here). While stimulation of 
right paravermal compartments are more likely to be activated by placing the coil 2 cm 
laterally to the right from the inion instead of 1cm (e.g. Miall & Christensen, 2004), the 
scalp coordinates used here for targeting the right NCBV may concomitantly stimulate 
portions of the right superior posterior paravermis (e.g. Hashimoto & Ohtsuka, 1995). In 
this case, the premotor cortical outputs of the paravermal afferents via the interpositus 
nucleus (e.g. Middleton & Strick, 2001) might have affected the language production 
system, especially its lower phonetic/phonological representation. Characteristic 
examples would be the ataxic dysarthria observed in paravermal lesions (see Ito, 2000), 
and the cases of mutism reported after vermal malformations (e.g. Al-Anazi et al., 
2001). Moreover, the premotor cortex (one of the output loci of these CB compartments) 
has been argued to participate in speech perception via the emulative employment of the 
speech production system (Iacoboni, 2008). Thus, upon perception of the prime word, 
the strong transitional prime-to-target-word probabilities would establish low Kalman 
gain conditions, inviting maximized, predictive involvement of the production system in 
the perception of the target word. In that way, then, disruption of vermal-paravermal 
function would result in abnormalities in predictive functions, due to impairments in the 
language production circuit (Pickering & Garrod, 2007).  
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While this explanation cannot be directly falsified here, assuming that NCB 
compartments are involved in language perception via their participation in language 
production stands as both a rather parsimonious and a rather over-specifying 
assumption. This interpretation would overlook two important aspects of CB function: 
its domain-general, modality-independent (perception, production) contributions, 
supported by its massive reciprocal connectivity with all major areas of the CNS; and its 
widely accepted role in directly grounding feedforward control, state estimation, and/or 





5.4.7.2.3. On the Absence of Lateral Cerebellar TMS Effects 
 
The absence of effect after TMS of the PLCB site is interpretable in different 
ways. To begin with, while the scalp coordinates for the NCBV are precise enough, 
there has been no strictly language-related TMS study of the PLCB (section 4.4.8). The 
CB hemispheres constitute a much larger area for stimulation, thus maximizing the 
range of candidate stimulation coordinates. The PLCB coordinates used here also 
corresponded to a significantly deeper site: while the medial site had a Talairach z value 
of -21 mm, the lateral one had a z value of -27 mm. Thus, the possibility that the PLCB 
is involved in formal-associative relations in the same way as the NCBV can not be 
excluded. It may thus be that stimulation with more penetrative coils might induce the 
same enhancing effects observed (see section 8.2.1 for discussion). The same pattern 
(present medial CB but absent lateral CB TMS effects) has been found before in a finger 
tapping task, and has received the same interpretation (Théoret et al., 2001). 
Alternatively, the PLCB might perform the same computations with the NCBV, but with 
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 While further research would be required, the absence of associative priming deficits in Broca‘s or 
Wernicke‘s pathology (Hagoort, 1997) would also suggest that deficits in language production-related 
loci need not necessarily yield disruptions in language prediction-emulation. 
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5.4.7.2.4. On the Lack of Change of Practice Effects 
 
No effects were found on performance in repeated trials after TMS of any 
particular site. This would probably suggest that the particular loci stimulated were not 
relevant with practice-induced facilitation processes. Alternatively, while such 
impairments are associated with PLCB lesions (e.g. Fiez et al., 1992; Gebhart et al., 
2002; section 2.4.2 here), the PLCB site stimulated here might be relevant but not 
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 As discussed above, the semantic-associative strength that some of the formally associated pairs could 
have was not directly measured (section 5.2.1). Instead, as all pairs formed idiomatic phrases, they were 





The CB TMS experiment presented above is the first linguistic CB TMS study in 
the literature; it promotes the association of particular schizophrenic brain pathology 
with purely linguistic impairments, and, above all, it provides suggestive evidence for 
the selective involvement of a NCB locus in associative linguistic mechanisms. This is 
in line with the theoretical framework and the model developed in chapter 2, whereby 
the neocerebello-cortical circuit performs associative linguistic computations that are 

















TMS Study 2: Effects of Theta-Burst 
Stimulation of the Right Neocerebellar 
Vermis on Semantic-Categorical Priming 
 
 
‗‗Doctor, I have pains in my chest and hope and 
wonder if my box is broken and heart is beaten 
for my soul and salvation and heaven, Amen‘‘ 
(schizophrenic patient; in Maher, 1968, 




The first study (chapter 5) showed a selective enhancement of formal-associative 
priming after TMS of the right neocerebellar vermis (NCBV), whereas the posterolateral 
cerebellar (PLCB) site provided adequate control conditions. The present study, also 
reported in Argyropoulos et al. (2010), attempted to replicate these findings, using 
stimuli and native speakers of another language, Modern Greek. 
  
In the first study, half of the stimuli were repeated, in an attempt to capture any 
differences that cerebellar (CB) TMS might have on the practice-related decrease in RTs 
and error rates in processing repeated items. However, no such differences were found. 
Thus, no repeated items were included in the present experiment. This allowed for a 
greater number of related pairs to be used. It was also possible to recruit a larger subject 
pool, given the availability of a TMS apparatus in a hospital in the researcher‘s home 
city (‗Papanikolaou‘ Hospital, Thessaloniki, Greece). This allowed for a 





6.2. TMS Experiment (Experiment 5) 
 
The TMS experiment was conducted in the premises of the 3
rd
 Neurological 
Clinic of the ‗Papanikolaou‘ Hospital in Thessaloniki, Greece, hosted by Prof. V. 
Kimiskidis and Dr. S. Papagiannopoulos (November-February 2009). Ethical approval 




An apparent disadvantage in the construction of the stimulus set was the very 
unavailability of published free word-generation norms or similarity measures, or of any 
known Modern Greek lexical decision studies with reported stimulus sets. Whereas 
these circumstances would normally prompt the experimenter to perform a free word-
generation normative study, as in other lexical decision experiments (e.g. Rogers & 
Friedman, 2008), such a study was not preferred here. This was because immediately co-
occurring nouns in the form of [N[nom] N[nom]] sequences are already rare in Modern 
Greek, to the extent that a sizeable set would hardly be obtained from any such word-
generation study.  
 
In fact, many idiomatic [N1N2] constructions in English are translated in Modern 
Greek with the amply used [N2[nom]N1[gen]] sequence, as in the examples (1a-c) below. 
 
(1a)   βόκβα                         σδρογόλοσ 
         'vomva                        iδro'γonu 
         bomb.SG.NOM.         hydrogen.SG.GEN. 
        ‗hydrogen bomb‘ 
 
(1b)   θοηιίδα                      πεηρειαίοσ 
          ci'liδa                        petre'leu 
          slick.SG.NOM.        oil.SG.GEN. 






(1c)   θούρλος                   κηθροθσκάηφλ 
         'furnos                      mikroci'maton 
          oven.SG.NOM         microwave.PL.GEN. 
        ‗ microwave oven‘ 
 
 
Despite that, N[nom]-N[nom] sequences were preferred over N[nom]-N[gen] ones, as 
nominative case was assumed to have a lower recognition threshold than other cases; 
prime and target words were also attempted to stay equal in all features. Thus, the 
formal-associatively related items were taken from idiomatic phrases in Modern Greek 
abiding by the case restriction above. The co-occurring word pairs were allowed to have 
a range of 0-2 words mediating between them, given the very low frequency of 
immediately co-occurring N-N sequences of the same case in Modern Greek. On the 
contrary, the set of semantic-categorically related pairs was constructed on the basis of 
their lower co-occurrence frequency, and with the same length and word frequency as in 
the associates set. The stimuli are shown in tables B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B. 
 
The co-occurrence frequency for the words in each pair was determined by the 
web-pages retrieved by Google.
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 Formal associate pairs were found in the particular 
idiomatic expression where they co-occurred in an average of 58,340.00 Google pages 
(min: 3,040.00, max: 316,000.00, SD: 77,450.00). On the contrary, words in semantic-
categorical pairs co-occurred in significantly fewer web pages (mean: 25.17, min: 0.00, 
max: 254.00, SD: 43.38; stimulus set: F (1, 198) = 56.69, MSe = 2.999E9, p < .001). 
The co-occurrence frequency of semantic-categorically related pairs was assessed in 
four different paratactic constructions for the two nouns of each pair: [N[nom], N[nom]], 
[N[nom] θαη (‗and‘) N[nom]], [DET[nom] N[nom], DET[nom]N[nom]], [DET[nom] N[nom] θαη (‗and‘) 
DET[nom]N[nom]], where DET was the Modern Greek definite article. The mean number 
of pages retrieved determined the value of formal co-occurrence of each pair.    
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 Using the ‗advanced search‘ utility, web pages containing the queried terms of the ‗exact wording or 





Word frequency measurements were taken from the ‗‗Hellenic National Corpus‘‘ 
(HNC; Hatzigeorgiu et al., 2000), which currently contains more than 47.000.000 words 
of written texts. The task was comprised of 500 pairs/trials, with 250 trials having a 
word, and 250 trials having a nonword for a target string. The former 250 trials consisted 
of 100 unrelated, 100 related word-word pairs, and 50 nonword-word filler pairs. The 
latter 250 trials included 200 filler nonword-nonword pairs and 50 filler word-nonword 
pairs. Thus the composition of the stimuli yielded a low relatedness proportion of 1:5, 
which was far from inducing strategic effects in performance, and invited an equal 
number of ‗yes‘ and ‗no‘ responses (e.g. Rogers & Friedman, 2008). The semantic-
categorical relatedness type tested here was one of coordinates of a certain semantic 
category (e.g. ασιή (‗yard‘) - τφράθη (‗field‘)). Control pairs were constructed by re-
arranging the prime and target words of the related pairs into unrelated pairs, and were 
thus matched with the related ones in prime/target word length and frequency.  
 
The 200 items of the formal-associative and semantic-categorical sets were 
rotated across four lists; these were generated for counterbalancing their relatedness 
(they could either appear in an unrelated or related version), and their order of 
appearance (they could appear in the first half of the session, before TMS, or in the 
second half, after TMS), as shown in table 6.1 below. Formal-associative and semantic-
categorical items were matched for prime and target word length and frequency, and 
were all counterbalanced across the four lists: (priming type, list, priming type*list: all 
Fs, F < 1; table B.3 in Appendix B). Similarly, pairs with word targets were matched 
across two lists (generated for counterbalancing their order of appearance) for prime and 
target word frequency and length (list: F < 1; table B.4 in Appendix B). Pairs with 
nonword targets were also matched across the two lists for prime word frequency and 
length, and target word length (list: F < 1; table B.5 in Appendix B). Nonword targets 
however were significantly longer than word-targets (wordness: F (1, 496) = 14.53, MSe 
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Prime and target stimuli were presented in black letters at the center of a white 
screen of a MacBook using the ‗E-Prime 2‘ (version 2.0; Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc, 2009) software in a silent, brightly lit room. Each trial consisted of a sequence of 
three stimuli presented at the same screen location. First a fixation point (‗+‘) was 
presented for 400 ms, followed by the prime in lower-case letters for 100 ms, which was 
followed by the target, also in lower-case letters. Unlike the first study, target strings 
were not presented in upper-case letters. This was because in Modern Greek only lower-
case letters receive accent marking (e.g. ‗κεταλή‘, but: ‗ΜΗΧΑΝΗ‘), and using upper-
case letters would thus reduce information for word recognition. Furthermore, the target 
string in each trial stayed on the screen for 1500 ms, and not indefinitely, as in the first 
study. This setting was preferred in view of the absence of any organized subject pool of 
experienced participants in online psycholinguistic, or, a fortiori, TMS experiments. It 
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was thus deemed that pressures for fast (hence non-strategic) responses should be 
elevated in the task protocol. As in the first study, no masking mediated the presentation 
of the prime and the target word, i.e. the SOA value was confounded with that of the 
prime duration of 100 ms. The duration of the intertrial interval was kept at 600 ms. 
 
 
6.2.3. TMS Setup 
 
Unlike the other two TMS studies (chapters 5 and 7), where a ‗Super Rapid
2
‘ 
stimulator was used, only a ‗Standard Rapid
2
‘ stimulator (The Magstim Company Ltd, 
Whitland, Dyfed, United Kingdom) was available in the lab. This meant that the Huang 
et al. (2005) continuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) protocol (section 4.4.5) could not 
be applied: While for the ‗‗Rapid
2
 option 2‘‘ (‗‗Super Rapid
2
‘‘; The Magstim Company 
Ltd, 2006, p. 49) a 45% of maximum machine output would correspond to a maximum 
frequency of 63 Hz, for the ‗‗Rapid
2
 option 1‘‘, i.e. the ‗‗Standard Rapid
2
‘‘ (ibid), a 45% 
maximum machine output corresponds to a maximum frequency of 33 Hz. Even for the 
40% stimulus intensity often used in applying the Huang et al. (2005) cTBS protocol (N. 
Muggleton, personal communication, 27 August 2009), the maximum frequency 
allowable with a Standard Rapid
2
 was 37 Hz, far from the 50 Hz required to reproduce 
the Huang cTBS. For the latter to be applied with a Standard Rapid
2
, an output power of 
30% at most should be used- this would represent a significant decrease, as compared 
with both the power used in the experiments reported, and the one often applied (40% 
maximum machine output).  
 
Hence, the ‗‗modified cTBS‘‘ protocol (Nyffeler et al., 2006) was employed 
instead, consisting here in a continuous train of 801 pulses delivered in 267 bursts, each 
burst consisting of 3 pulses at 30 Hz, and 100 ms mediating between bursts. As in all 
studies, stimulus intensity was maintained at 45% of maximum machine output across 
participants (section 4.4.6). The modified cTBS protocol has been delivered at 80% 
(Schindler et al., 2008), 90% (Nyffeler et al., 2008), or 100% of resting motor threshold 
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(Nyffeler et al., 2009). As discussed above, the 45% of maximum machine output would 
averagely correspond to over 90% of resting motor threshold (section 4.4.6). 
 
In each session, subjects were required to have a 5-minute break after completion 
of the TMS train. They completed the first block within 12 minutes, received TMS 
(scalp coordinate marking and TMS piloting required 5 minutes), and, after the post-
TMS break, completed the second block within 12 minutes. There was an optional break 
time that participants could take in the middle of each block. Each session thus required 
35-40 minutes to complete. All subjects tolerated TMS well, reporting mild discomfort 
on the surrounding area of stimulation. They provided informed consent and received 





24 native speakers of Modern Greek (age mean: 26.42 years; min: 18; max: 52; 
SD: 9.25) were recruited according to the selection criteria in section 4.4.12. They were 
tested in two different sessions, with 2 to 28 days (mean: 8.79; SD: 6.39 days) mediating 
between completion of the first and second TMS sessions. One group (‗group 1‘: n = 12) 
underwent PLCB TMS in the first session and NCBV TMS in the second, and another 
group (‗group 2‘: n = 12) received NCBV TMS in the first session and PLCB TMS in 
the second. The two groups did not differ with respect to the age of participants (group 
1: 24.33 years; SD: 3.60; group 2: 28.50 years; SD: 12.52) or the time distance 
mediating between the first and the second TMS session (group 1: 7.92 days; SD 4.76; 
group 2: 9.67 days; SD: 7.82), and therefore ‗group‘ was not a predictor of either (age: F 








For the analysis of TMS effects on priming size, the experiment employed a 2 x 
2 x 2 within-subjects design. Participants were stimulated in two different CB sites in 
two different sessions (site: NCBV, PLCB). Their priming sizes were calculated before 
and after TMS (phase). Sizes were calculated separately for formal-associative and 
semantic-categorical priming (priming type). For the analysis of TMS effects on 
sensorimotor performance, another 2 x 2 x 2 analysis was used. Mean latencies and 
accuracy rates for words and nonwords were calculated separately (‗wordness‘) before 
and after TMS (phase) on the NCBV or the PLCB (site). Additional analyses were 




6.2.6.1. Priming Effect 
 
In the first study, because of the small subject group in the TMS experiment (n = 
8; section 5.4), a pilot experiment with a larger subject group (n = 18) was run to show 
that priming occurred in a direct fashion in the form of significantly shorter latencies for 
related than for unrelated items (section 5.2). On the contrary, the number of participants 
in this TMS study (n = 24) sufficed to directly show priming. Instead of reporting a pilot 
study to demonstrate this, an analysis of raw RTs in the main TMS study is provided 
here, in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 design (site, priming type, phase, relatedness). Mean latencies per 
condition are shown below in plot 6.1 and in table 6.2. The trials excluded according to 
the criteria in section 4.4.11 amounted to 2.5% of the data. 
 
As demonstrated by a four-way ANOVA (site, priming type, phase, 
relatedness) on lexical decision latencies for unrelated and related pairs, related pairs 
showed priming across conditions, as there was a main effect of relatedness (F1 (1, 
20) = 21.33, MSe = 719.51, p < .001; F2 (1, 192) = 16.07, MSe = 4982.11, p < .001), 
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which was furthermore not selective for priming type (priming type*relatedness: 
both Fs, F < 1). The rest of the effects were captured in the standard differences-based 
analysis of priming sizes (section 4.4.11), and are reported below. 
 
Plot 6.1: Mean latencies for unrelated and related pairs per condition for TMS sessions. 








Unrelated 682.07 69.70 
Related 668.16 77.26 
After 
Unrelated 681.87 96.89 
Related 675.04 105.69 
Semantic-Categorical 
Before 
Unrelated 694.66 81.31 
Related 676.49 73.77 
After 
Unrelated 682.42 101.94 




Unrelated 691.02 102.18 
Related 670.31 85.79 
After 
Unrelated 667.95 106.50 
Related 663.10 107.32 
Semantic-Categorical 
Before 
Unrelated 698.02 103.39 
Related 678.66 91.63 
After 
Unrelated 679.75 108.19 
Related 658.74 98.74 





6.2.6.2. Effects on Priming Sizes 
6.2.6.2.1. Lexical Decision Latencies 
 
The mean priming sizes per condition, calculated as the differences between the 
mean RTs for unrelated pairs and those for related ones (section 4.4.11), are given below 
in table 6.3 and plot 6.2. The analysis showed a marginally selective disruption of 
semantic-categorical priming after NCBV TMS. The same main effects and interactions 
were observed after including the ‗group‘ variable. 
 
A 3-way ANOVA (site, priming type, phase) showed a weakly selective 
decrease of semantic-categorical priming sizes after NCBV TMS (site*priming 
type*phase: F1 (1, 20) = 2.65, MSe = 1183.53, p = .12; F2 (1, 192) = 1.14, MSe = 
6049.32, p = .29), along with a  weak decrease in priming sizes across sites and priming 
types (phase: F1 (1, 20) = 2.80, MSe = 1996.37, p = .11; F2 (1, 192) = 2.15, MSe = 
8136.37, p = .14; site: F1 (1, 20) = 1.17, MSe = 2418.61, p = .29; F2 (1, 192) = 1.84, 
MSe = 5700.22, p = .18; for the rest of Fs, F < 1, or p > .2). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: NCBV conditions (priming type, phase): An analysis of 
priming sizes in NCBV conditions, however, showed an only marginal decrease of 
priming sizes across priming types (phase: F1 (1, 20) = 2.67, MSe = 1886.08, p = .12; 
F2 (1, 192) = 2.91, MSe = 6749.13, p = .09), with no selective decrease for any of the 
two types (priming type*phase: for both Fs, F < 1, or p > .25) 
 
2-way ANOVAs: PLCB conditions (priming type, phase): No difference in 
priming sizes was observed after PLCB stimulation (for all Fs, F < 1, or p > .2).  
 
2-way ANOVAs: Formal-associative priming sizes (site, phase): No 
significant differences were introduced after TMS of either site on formal-
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associative priming sizes (phase: F1 (1, 20) = 2.35, MSe = 1344.30, p = .14; F2 < 1;  
site, site*phase: all Fs, F < 1). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: Semantic-categorical priming sizes (site, phase): An 
analysis for semantic-categorical priming sizes showed a weakly selective decrease 
after NCBV TMS (site*phase: F1 (1, 20) = 2.92, MSe = 1135.52, p = .1; F2 (1, 96) = 
2.11, MSe = 5248.52, p = .15; site: F1 (1, 20) = 2.79, MSe = 1441.51, p = .11; F2 (1, 96) 
= 1.66, MSe = 6711.75, p = .2; phase: both ps, p > .2). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: Before TMS (site, priming type): No significant differences 
were observed before stimulation of either site (all Fs, F < 1). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: After TMS (site, priming type): An analysis for priming 
sizes after TMS showed selectively lower semantic-categorical sizes after NCBV TMS, 
significantly so by subjects (site*priming type: F1 (1, 20) = 4.62, MSe = 924.53, p < 
.05; F2 (1, 192) = 1.32, MSe = 6399.71, p = .25; site: F1 (1, 20) = 1.30, MSe = 2377.10, 
p = .27; F2 (1, 192) = 2.21, MSe = 6399.71, p = .14). 
 
1-way ANOVAs (phase): An analysis of semantic-categorical priming sizes 
for NCBV TMS conditions showed a marginal decrease after TMS (phase: F1 (1, 
20) = 3.35, MSe = 1714.61, p = .08; F2 (1, 96) = 3.81, MSe = 5954.25, p = .05), while 
no such changes were observed after NCBV TMS for formal-associative priming 
(phase: both Fs, F < 1), or after PLCB TMS for either formal-associative (phase: F1 (1, 
20) = 1.87, MSe = 1611.97, p = .19; F2 < 1) or for semantic-categorical priming sizes 
(phase: both Fs, F < 1). 
 
1-way ANOVAs (site): An analysis of semantic-categorical priming sizes 
between the two sites after TMS showed marginally smaller sizes after NCBV TMS 
(site: F1 (1, 20) = 4.01, MSe = 1823.52, p = .06; F2 (1, 96) = 3.49, MSe = 6366.07, p = 
.07). No such differences were found in comparisons for semantic-categorical priming 
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sizes before TMS (site: both Fs, F < 1) or for formal-associative priming sizes before 
(site: both Fs, F < 1) or after TMS (site: both Fs, F < 1).  
 
 
Plot 6.2: Mean priming sizes per condition for TMS sessions. Error bars represent + 1 
SEM (experiment 4). 
 
 
TMS Site Priming Type TMS Phase Mean Priming Size (ms) SD (ms) 
NCBV 
Formal-Associative 
Before 13.91 39.04 
After 6.83 38.30 
Semantic-Categorical 
Before 18.18 43.14 
After -3.69 34.41 
PLCB 
Formal-Associative 
Before 20.71 45.04 
After 4.84 29.57 
Semantic-Categorical 
Before 19.36 29.71 
After 21.00 50.95 
Table 6.3: Mean priming sizes per condition for TMS sessions (experiment 4). 
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6.2.6.2.2. Lexical Decision Accuracy 
 
Priming sizes were calculated here on the basis of the difference between the 
arcsine-transformed accuracy rates for unrelated items and those for related items per 
condition (section 4.4.11). A three-way ANOVA (site, priming type, phase) showed 
no change in priming sizes after TMS selectively for site or priming type (priming 
type*phase, site*phase, priming type*site*phase: all Fs, F < 1). The same results were 
shown in a four-way ANOVA, including the ‗group‘ variable. 
 
 
6.2.6.3. Effects on Sensorimotor Performance 
6.2.6.3.1. Lexical Decision Latencies 
 
An analysis of lexical decision latencies for words and nonwords per condition 
showed that latencies did not become as short after NCBV TMS as after PLCB TMS. 
Most importantly, NCBV TMS yielded no decrease in RTs selectively when NCBV 
TMS was applied in the second session of participation, where the stimulus set was 
presented again to the participants. Mean latencies are shown below in plot 6.3 and table 
6.4. 
 
As demonstrated by a four-way ANOVA (group, site, phase, wordness) on 
latencies, the two sites did not differ significantly with respect to RTs (site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 
496) = 3.38, MSe = 3445.80, p = .07), while subject group 1 were significantly by-items 
faster than subject group 2 across conditions (group: F1 (1, 20) = 1.30, MSe = 61943.43, 
p = .27; F2 (1, 496) = 336.20, MSe = 3737.34, p < .001). Expectedly, word targets 
required significantly shorter lexical decision latencies across conditions than nonwords 
(wordness: F1 (1, 20) = 36.70, MSe = 3745.23, p < .001; F2 (1, 496) = 111.54, MSe = 
24002.60, p < .001), and participants performed faster in the second phase across 
sessions (phase: F1 (1, 20) = 5.24, MSe = 1852.81, p < .05; F2 (1, 496) = 35.47, MSe = 
4570.00, p < .001). Most importantly, latencies did not become any shorter after 
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NCBV TMS for group 1, as demonstrated by a strong site*phase*group interaction 
(F1 (1, 20) = 12.56, MSe = 566.24, p < .005; F2 (1, 496) = 38.31, MSe = 2893.85, p < 
.001). Furthermore, latencies after NCBV TMS across groups did not become as 
short as those after PLCB TMS, as demonstrated by the marginal by-subjects and 
significant by-items site*phase interaction (F1 (1, 20) = 4.19, MSe = 566.24, p = .05; 
F2 (1, 496) = 12.66, MSe = 3180.95, p < .001). A number of significant interactions are 
not discussed for the sake of brevity (site*group: F1 (1, 20) = 73.43, MSe = 1445.86, p < 
.001; F2 (1, 496) = 586.07, MSe = 3914.12, p < .001; wordness*phase: F1 (1, 20) = 6.14, 
MSe = 265.57, p < .05; F2 (1, 496) = 5.97, MSe = 4570.00, p < .05; wordness*group: F1 
(1, 20) = 5.29, MSe = 3745.23, p < .05; F2 (1, 496) = 82.53, MSe = 3737.30, p < .001; 
phase*group: F1 (1, 20) = 1.61, MSe = 1852.81, p = .22; F2 (1, 496) = 24.04, MSe = 
3539.67, p < .001; site*wordness*group: F1 (1, 20) = 5.38, MSe = 767.17, p < .05; F2 (1, 
496) = 15.33, MSe = 3914.12, p < .001; for the rest of Fs, F < 1 or p > .25). 
 
Due to space restrictions, and since no selective effects were observed for words 
or nonwords after stimulation of either site (site*phase*wordness, 
group*site*phase*wordness: all Fs, F < 1), the following analysis was performed 
collapsing on the ‗wordness‘ variable. 
 
2-way ANOVAs: NCBV TMS conditions (group, phase): An analysis for 
NCBV TMS conditions demonstrated that latencies became shorter in the second phase 
across groups, but only significantly so by items (phase: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 498) = 6.09, MSe 
= 3200.82, p < .05). However, this reduction was stronger for group 2, as 
demonstrated by the significant phase*group interaction (F1 (1, 20) = 6.05, MSe = 
798.08, p < .05; F2 (1, 498) = 60.95, MSe = 3200.82, p < .001). As above, group 1 were 
faster in their lexical decisions than group 2 (group: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 498) = 22.22, MSe = 
3486.73, p < .001). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: PLCB TMS conditions (group, phase): On the contrary, for 
PLCB TMS conditions, no such phase*group interaction was observed (both Fs, F < 1), 
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with latencies strongly becoming shorter across groups (phase: F1 (1, 20) = 13.18, MSe 
= 411.45, p < .005; F2 (1, 498) = 40.40, MSe = 4504.12, p < .001). As above, latencies 
for group 2 were shorter across phases (group: F1 (1, 20) = 5.37, MSe = 17320.88, p < 
.05; F2 (1, 498) = 710.84, MSe = 4885.73, p < .001). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: Group 1 (site, phase): An analysis of latencies for group 1 
showed that RTs decreased selectively after PLCB, not after NCBV TMS 
(site*phase: F1 (1, 10) = 21.50, MSe = 205.73, p < .005; F2 (1, 498) = 46.82, MSe = 
3041.43, p < .001), and not across sites (phase: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 498) = 1.38, MSe = 
4459.80, p = .24). Expectedly, latencies in the second session of participation (NCBV 
TMS) were much shorter than those in the first session of participation, i.e. in PLCB 
TMS conditions (site: F1 (1, 10) = 23.99, MSe = 992.91, p < .005; F2 (1, 498) = 242.41, 
MSe = 4081.58, p < .001). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: Group 2 (site, phase): On the contrary, an analysis of 
latencies for group 2 demonstrated but a marginal by-items site*phase interaction (F1 < 
1; F2 (1, 498) = 2.83, MSe = 3087.20, p = .09), with latencies becoming significantly 
shorter only across sites (phase: F1 (1, 10) = 12.19, MSe = 481.18, p < .01; F2 (1, 498) = 
64.14, MSe = 3757.85, p < .001). Expectedly, latencies in the second session, i.e. in 
PLCB TMS conditions were much shorter than those in the first session, i.e. in NCBV 
TMS conditions (site: F1 (1, 10) = 64.92, MSe = 452.95, p < .001; F2 (1, 498) = 383.46, 
MSe = 4342.30, p < .001). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: Before TMS (group, site): Unexpectedly, an analysis of 
latencies before TMS showed a reduction of RTs in the second session of participation 
selectively for group 1 (site*group: F1 (1, 20) = 127.00, MSe = 331.13, p < .001; F2 (1, 
498) = 497.48, MSe = 3430.68, p < .001), and not across sites (site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 498) = 
1.32, MSe = 3272.89, p = .25). As shown above, group 2 was faster than group 1 ( F1 < 




2-way ANOVAs: After TMS (group, site): An analysis of latencies for the 
post-TMS phase showed that RTs in the second session reduced across groups 
significantly by items (site: F1 (1, 20) = 1.61, MSe = 674.92, p = .22; F2 (1, 498) = 
13.79, MSe = 3452.98, p < .001), but even more after PLCB TMS (site*group: F1 (1, 
20) = 21.61, MSe = 674.92, p < .001; F2 (1, 498) = 200.26, MSe = 3485.97, p < .001).  
As demonstrated above, group 2 were significantly faster by-items than group 1 across 
sessions (group: F1 (1, 20) = 1.61, MSe = 674.92, p = .22; F2 (1, 498) = 251.71, MSe = 
3963.93, p < .001). 
 
1-way ANOVAs (site): Comparing RTs in the same phase and for the same 
group between the two different sessions, significantly shorter latencies were noted in 
the second session of subjects‘ participation, i.e. for group 1 before TMS (site: F1 (1, 
10) = 85.33, MSe = 285.81, p < .001; F2 (1, 498) = 260.85, MSe = 3608.38, p < .001), 
for group 2 before TMS (site: F1 (1, 10) = 47.59, MSe = 376.45, p < .001; F2 (1, 498) = 
248.69, MSe = 3095.20, p < .001), as well as for group 2 after TMS (site: F1 (1, 10) = 
27.02, MSe = 437.00, p < .001; F2 (1, 498) = 162.12, MSe = 3424.31, p < .001). For 
group 1 after TMS, latencies in the second session of participation were still shorter 
than those in the first session, but only significantly by items, and to a smaller 
extent than that of other such reductions (site: F1 (1, 10) = 4.23, MSe = 912.84, p = 
.07; F2 (1, 498) = 54.22, MSe = 3514.64, p < .001). 
 
1-way ANOVAs (group): A comparison of latencies in the same phase and 
session between the two different groups showed similar discrepancies. Expectedly, 
latencies before PLCB TMS for group 1 (first session) were significantly smaller than 
those for group 2 (second session) in the same phase (F1 (1, 20) = 6.38, MSe = 8018.54, 
p < .05; F2 (1, 498) = 455.79, MSe = 3930.06, p < .001). The same discrepancy was 
shown for the phase after PLCB TMS, yet marginally by subjects and significantly by 
items (group: F1 (1, 20) = 4.33, MSe = 9713.78, p = .05; F2 (1, 498) = 395.88, MSe = 
4250.16, p < .001). For the phase before NCBV TMS, group 1 (second session) showed 
significantly by-items shorter latencies than those for group 2 (first session: group: F1 < 
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1; F2 (1, 498) = 74.33, MSe = 3487.81, p < .001). Importantly, for the phase after 
NCBV TMS, the latencies of group 1 were significantly by-items shorter than those 
of group 2, yet to a much smaller extent than that of any of the reductions above 
(group: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 498) = 4.17, MSe = 3199.74, p < .05). 
 
1-way ANOVAs (phase): A comparison of latencies in the same group and site 
conditions between the pre- and post-TMS phases showed a similar pattern. For group 
2, there was a significant reduction of RTs after NCBV TMS (F1 (1, 10) = 9.73, MSe = 
458.24, p < .05; F2 (1, 498) = 46.63, MSe = 3663.20, p < .001), which was also observed 
after PLCB TMS, marginally by subjects and significantly by items (phase: F1 (1, 10) = 
4.51, MSe = 383.45, p = .06; F2 (1, 498) = 24.82, MSe = 3181.85, p < .001). For group 
1, the same reduction was observed after PLCB TMS (phase: F1 (1, 10) = 8.90, MSe = 
439.44, p < .05; F2 (1, 498) = 22.50, MSe = 4616.76, p < .001). However, a much 
smaller reduction was observed after NCBV TMS for group 1, which was only 
significant by items, and with a much smaller effect size (phase: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 498) 





Plot 6.3: Mean latencies per condition for TMS sessions. Error bars represent + 1 SEM 








Site Phase Group Mean latencies (ms) SD (ms) 
NCBV 
Before 
1 699.64 85.14 
2 725.73 64.57 
After 
1 712.50 113.46 
2 698.48 84.76 
PLCB 
Before 
1 763.39 89.24 
2 671.09 81.78 
After 
1 737.86 105.04 
2 654.12 84.93 






6.2.6.3.2. Lexical Decision Accuracy 
 
Accuracy rates for words and nonwords per condition were arcsine-transformed 
(section 4.4.11) and subjected to a four-way ANOVA (group, site, phase, wordness). 
The effects on latencies above were unaccompanied by similar effects on accuracy rates 
after TMS of a particular site and/ or for a particular group (phase*group, 
wordness*site*phase*group, wordness*phase*group, site*phase*group, site*phase: for 
all Fs, F < 1 or p > .1). The same pattern was observed in a three-way ANOVA 






The TMS experiment above provided evidence for disruptions in the lexical 
decision process selectively after NCBV TMS: latencies after NCBV TMS did not 
become as short as after PLCB TMS (section 6.2.7.1). Most importantly, overall lexical 
decision latencies did not become any shorter after NCBV TMS, but selectively so when 
NCBV TMS was applied in the second session of participation, where the stimuli were 
repeated. With respect to TMS effects on priming, a marginally selective disruption was 
noted for semantic-categorical priming after NCBV TMS (section 6.2.7.2). In view of 










6.2.7.1. Sensorimotor Effects 
 
Similarly to the findings of the first TMS study, the longer latencies observed 
here after NCBV TMS could be attributed to disruptions in saccadic eye movements or 
in cognitive-motor associative relations developed between nonwords- ‗NO‘ button, and 
words- ‗YES‘ button (sections 2.3.4.3 and 5.4.6.2). Reading fluency on words and 
nonwords was confounded with button presses in the context of the lexical decision task: 
all participants were right-handed, and were asked to use their right-hand index finger 
for the word response. However, the disruptions on the speed of lexical decisions were 
significant across word (right button presses) and nonword targets (left button presses). 
This corroborates the pattern found in the first TMS study, where accuracy rates dropped 
after NCBV TMS in the first session of participation across words and nonwords. Thus, 
a perceptual deficit affecting both words and nonwords would remain at the core of the 
explanation. Stimulation of a structure directly involved in saccadic movements as the 
NCBV (see section 5.4.7.1) would better explain such slowing in terms of an overall 
reading-related disruption.
87
 The results above provide the first evidence in the literature 
for reading-related disruptions induced by NCBV TMS.  
 
 
6.2.7.2. Cognitive Effects 
 
The results show a reduction in semantic-categorical priming sizes after NCBV 
TMS, yet only in a marginally selective fashion. This pattern is qualitatively different 
from that observed in the first TMS study, where NCBV TMS induced an increase in the 
size of formal-associative priming. However, these findings are far from mutually 
exclusive. One possibility may be that the disruption induced by NCBV TMS here had 
an impact on the perception of both prime and target words. Evidence for the latter was 
                                                          
87
 The results do not suffice to discard the cognitive-associative explanation discussed above, yet the 
oculomotor functions of the NCBV are much better established than the cognitive-associative ones of 
the NCB in general. 
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discussed in the previous section. For the former, though, the impact of NCBV TMS 
may have been greater, given the higher perceptual demands involved: while 1500 ms 
were given for the perception of and the decision on the target word, only 100 ms were 
given for the perception of the prime word. Conceivably, then, participants may have 
failed to perceive the prime word after NCBV TMS. Failing to perceive the prime word 
in the case of related items would make lexical decision latencies indistinguishable from 
those for unrelated items.
88
 The reason that this was not shown in the case of formal-
associative priming would be that a selective, weaker cognitive effect of associative 
boost occurred, similar to that clearly found in the first study. Such boost might have 
cancelled out the perceptual disruption induced. In other words, after NCBV TMS, 
whenever the prime was successfully perceived, the associative boost enabled an 
acceleration of responses for formal-associatively related pairs. In that case, the lack of a 
cognitive boost for semantic-categorical priming size would explain its significant 
decrease after NCBV TMS.  
 
Such explanation would at least require showing that the reading demands in this 
task were higher than those of the first TMS study, where the prime word was perceived 
well enough to invite the strong formal-associative priming observed after NCBV TMS. 
Both prime and target words in each pair here were presented in lower-case letters 
(section 6.2.2), conceivably thus diminishing the perceptual salience of the prime word. 
Moreover, the stimuli here appeared in black fonts against a white screen background, in 
a brightly lit room, whereas in the first study, the letters appeared in green fonts, against 
a black background, in a dimly lit room. The visual settings of the first study might thus 
have significantly alleviated any perceptual demands that appeared in this study to a 
larger extent.  
 
On the other hand, the pattern here may be interpreted on the grounds of a 
cognitive effect induced by NCBV TMS. Both enhanced and impoverished semantic-
                                                          
88
 In order to verify this, one would need to involve a separate control task, e.g. testing the perception of 
words appearing on the screen for only 100 ms (see section 8.2.1 for discussion). 
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categorical priming have been reported in the literature of schizophrenic populations (for 
a review, see Picard et al., 2008). Suggestively, schizophrenics have shown associative 
priming sizes that were significantly larger than those for associatively and semantic-
categorically related pairs (Nestor et al., 2006). The first study had also demonstrated a 
marginal decrease in semantic-categorical priming sizes after NCBV TMS, but sizes in 
baseline conditions were poorly matched to allow for any conclusions. In this context, 
the study here would provide suggestive evidence for the other side of the coin shown in 
the first study. Conceivably, in better experimental settings, a formal-associative priming 
boost would be accompanied by a semantic-categorical priming reduction after NCBV 
TMS. In other terms, this can be seen as a cost in processing categorical relations, 
induced by a change in the trade-off between associative and categorical computations 
that NCBV TMS might introduce, or by an increased ‗‗associational bias‘‘ disrupting 
semantic priming (Nestor et al., 2006) after NCBV TMS. Finally, the weaknesses in 
constructing the set of formal associates might also be accountable for the lack of an 
enhancement after NCBV TMS (see next section). 
 
Most importantly, the results above demonstrate a striking lack of decrease of 
RTs after NCBV TMS, but selectively for the first group, who underwent NCBV TMS 
in their second session of participation, in which they encountered the same pairs of 
letter strings presented in the first session. For the explanation of such a selective 
disruption, then, it would be worth to examine the evidence for NCB involvement in 
processing repeated linguistic stimuli. However, this CB automatization deficit in task 
performance (see section 3.5.3) would not pertain here to the task in general, i.e. the 
routine of reading the prime word, reading the target word, deciding whether the latter is 
a word, and pressing the appropriate button. Were the disruption to pertain to task 
performance in general, a similar lack of RT reduction would be expected after NCBV 
TMS for the second group as well, who received stimulation on that site in the first 
session of participation, and thus were encountering the letter-string pairs for the first 
time. As seen above, though, the disruption only appeared for the first group, who were 
encountering letter-string pairs for the second time. Conceivably, then, the 
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automatization deficit here pertained in particular to processing items that had been 
already encountered. A basic factor ensuring shorter lexical decision latencies in the 
second session of participation may thus be the consolidation of associative memory 
traces of particular prime-target letter string sequences. In other words, the prime letter 
string was acquired in the first session as a predictor of the second letter string, 
independently of any particular relation between the two (e.g. semantic relatedness, 
phrasal co-occurrence, etc). NCBV TMS may have thus impaired access to and/ or 
expression of this learned response. This would explain why the same disruption is not 
found in the second half of the first session of NCBV TMS. If NCB circuitry has stored 
such prime-target letter strings as sequences of neural events, then, quite plausibly, 
introduction of noise in such area would disrupt the retrieval of these memory traces, 
consulting which would ensure faster performance in the corresponding trials. Indeed, in 
processing repeated stimuli, similar automatization deficits have been observed in 
working memory and word-generation tasks following CB disruptions (section 2.4.2). 
Such interpretation is also compatible with recent findings relating CB deficits with 
compromised cognitive associative learning (Drepper et al., 1999; section 2.3.4.3 here). 
 
The significance of the NCB in linguistic associative learning is in fact in line 
with the argument in Argyropoulos (2008a, 2009), whereby NCB circuitry provides the 
foundation for grammaticalization operations. While the latter involve gradual changes 
manifested at a historical timescale, they are widely held to rely on the automatization of 
language processing, which results from the repeated articulation-production and 
perception-comprehension of highly frequent syntactic constructions (sections 3.4 and 
3.5 here). 
 
Moreover, the group-specific disruptions in lexical decisions reported here were 
not shown in Argyropoulos (2010b; chapter 5 here). In that study, the same pairs of 
letter strings were in fact repeated in a subsequent block for each phase (pre-TMS, post-
TMS) in each session. However, no difference was observed between judging repeated 
letter strings before TMS and judging repeated ones after TMS of any of the two sites 
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stimulated, either within or between sessions (section 5.4.6.3). A factor to consider 
would be the significantly smaller number of participants (n = 8) for that study, which 
conceivably did not suffice to show such a disruption. 
 
 
6.2.7.3. Limiting Conditions 
 
While the data above showed a rather selective disruption of semantic-
categorical priming after NCBV TMS, most of the relevant interactions reached but 
marginal levels of significance. Furthermore, the fact that the items-based analyses 
showed stronger and more significant effects both in the priming-related and in the 
reading-related analyses may suggest that any effects of NCBV TMS occurred only for a 
subset of participants (and/or that the subject pool size did not suffice). This could be 
because of the lack of neuronavigational software for the localization of the NCBV. A 
further limiting factor was, undoubtedly, the criteria used for the composition of the 
stimulus set. Material from Modern Greek lexical priming studies was not available. 
Furthermore, the commitment to N[nom]-N[nom] sequences discouraged the researcher 
from undertaking a normative study before the main experiment.  Modern Greek N-N 
sequences of the same case remain much harder to find than those in English- the case 
factor, being, apparently, a limiting one (see section 6.2.1). Indeed, plenty of words in 
the formal-associative set were highly idiomatic (e.g. ‗ζθοληύιη‘- idiomatic form of 
‗ζπόλδσιος‘ (‗spine‘)), often semantically void outwith the idiom, and appear quite 
infrequently on their own. Furthermore, several words had alternative spellings, 
according to the simplified spelling preferred in Modern Greek: e.g. ‗άζος‘- ‗άζζος‘ 
(‗ace‘); ‗ασηί/ασηηά‘-‗αθηί/αθηηά‘ (‗ear‘, ‗ears‘); ‗ηραίλο‘-‗ηρέλο‘ (‗train‘). These issues 
may have severely compromised automatic lexical access, which is needed to study non-







The second TMS study here showed some rather clear reading-related disruptions 
selectively induced after NCBV cTBS. Most importantly, latencies after NCBV cTBS 
became significantly shorter in the first session of participation, but not in the second 
one. This pattern was discussed as resulting from disruptions in NCB linguistic 
associative memory access/expression and in the practice-related facilitation in 
performance supported by NCB circuitry. With respect to the effects of CB TMS on 
priming sizes, though, results were less rigid. Semantic-categorical priming was 
disrupted after NCBV TMS in an only marginally selective fashion. Technical 
limitations in the TMS methodology and stimulus construction were the most important 
limiting conditions. While further investigation is necessary, the pattern here was 



































TMS Study 3: Effects of Theta-Burst 
Stimulation of the Right Neocerebellar 
Crus I and Vermis on Semantic-Associative 
and Semantic-Categorical Priming 
 
 
‗‗A calculating machine, an anti-aircraft ‗predictor‘, and 
Kelvin‘s tidal predictor all show the same ability. In all of these 
latter cases, the physical process which it is desired to predict is 
imitated by some mechanical device or model which is cheaper, 
or quicker, or more convenient in operation. Here we have a 
very close parallel to our […] stages of reasoning.‘‘ (Craik, 





This chapter reports the third TMS study undertaken, part of which is also found 
in Argyropoulos and Muggleton (2010).  
 
 
7.1.1. The Previous TMS Studies 
 
The two previous TMS studies (chapters 5 and 6) contrasted noun-to-noun 
formal-associative with semantic-categorical priming. The first study (chapter 5) showed 
a selective enhancement of formal-associative priming after TMS of the right 
neocerebellar vermis (NCBV). The second TMS study (chapter 6), owing, most 
probably, to technical limitations in TMS application and in stimulus set construction, 
showed a marginally selective reduction of semantic-categorical priming sizes after 
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NCBV TMS. Both studies also showed disruptions in the performance in the lexical 
decision task per se after NCBV TMS; these were explained primarily in terms of 
disruptions in reading-related processes. The second study also showed disruptions in 
the practice-related facilitation effects in lexical decision performance after NCBV 
TMS. Moreover, in those two studies, priming types differed along two axes: linguistic 
level, i.e. ‗semantic vs formal‘, and type of relation, i.e. ‗categorical vs associative‘ 
(section 2.3.4.3). This was so because it was difficult to generate a stimulus set for 
formal-categorical priming without the confounds of repetition or of semantic priming: 
lexical items that are subordinate to the same morphological category will most probably 
share a common semantic and formal core (e.g. ‗hand‘, ‗handle‘, ‗handling‘). Thus, 
semantic-categorical priming was contrasted with formal-associative priming. 
According to the theory presented in chapter 2, it was expected that the associative 
properties would be selectively affected by stimulation of a neocerebellar (NCB) locus. 
The evidence for preserved semantic-categorical representations in NCB pathology 
(section 2.4.4.5) supported the idea that semantic-categorical priming would remain 
unaffected (chapter 5), or would be more susceptible to perceptual disruptions than 
formal-associative priming (chapter 6) after NCB stimulation. Furthermore, the PLCB 
site used in the two previous studies served as an adequate control site, either because of 
its much larger depth, which made it inaccessible to TMS with a conventional flat coil 











7.1.2. The Present TMS Study 
 
In the present study, the PLCB control site was replaced with another one based 
on more precise coordinates. Furthermore, the focus was shifted from ‗formal-
associative‘ to ‗semantic-associative‘ relations and priming (section 2.3.4.3). In that 
way, semantic-categorical and semantic-associative priming could be contrasted solely 
on the basis of the different cognitive mechanisms employed for the two different types 
of relations (categorical vs associative). 
 
A most characteristic case of semantic-associative priming is that which is 
induced in cases of thematic (ζ)-role-based noun-to-verb priming. In the work of McRae 
and colleagues, for example, ζ-related pairs such as ‗sniper-shooting‘ or ‗ball-kicking‘ 
received shorter naming latencies compared with unrelated ones (e.g. McRae et al., 
2005). Characteristically, in McRae et al. (2001), the first study to systematically 
investigate noun-to-verb priming, it was proposed that event memory is organized in an 
associative manner, whereby entities and objects activate the event types in which they 
are typically involved (Lancaster & Barsalou, 1997). In this framework, ζ-roles include 
event (verb)-specific concepts, which are immediately computed online in language 
processing (McRae et al., 1997) and involve mechanisms of expectancy generation from 
nouns to verbs or vice versa (McRae et al., 2005). 
 
In chapter 2 (section 2.4.4.5 in particular), these associative, expectancy-based 
properties of such mechanisms were discussed in the light of the associative, predictive 
nature of CB computations, along with evidence on the involvement of right PLCB loci 
in verb-generation tasks (where participants generate appropriate verbs for given noun 
stimuli; e.g. Petersen et al., 1989; Fiez et al., 1992; Gebhart et al., 2002; Frings et al., 
2006). It is thus worth investigating here whether stimulation of NCB loci may 
selectively interfere with schema-transmission mechanisms from a perception-
comprehension perspective. In contrast to the previous studies, then, the one here sought 
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to examine the involvement of the NCBV and that of a verb generation-related, lateral 
NCB site in this task (see section 7.4.3 below).  
 
Finally, while the most prominent paradigm employed for capturing such 
phenomena has been the naming latencies task (e.g. McRae et al., 2005), the lexical 
decision setup was yet again preferred, given the technical issues that voice recording 
would present (e.g. prematurely triggering the voice key or not triggering it at all). For 
example, in the McRae et al. (2005) study, these issues were compensated for by the 
sizeable subject pool used (K. McRae, personal communication, 20 October 2008). In 
the context of the TMS study, given the very limited size of the subject pool available, 















7.2. Pilot Experiment 1 (Experiment 5) 
 
In view of the unavailability of a large set of related noun-verb pairs (see below) 
and a large TMS subject pool, a small number of conditions had to be preserved in order 
to maintain statistical power; the main TMS experiment was thus decided to contrast no 
more than two priming types. In order to select a reliable control priming type for the 
TMS experiment, two different priming types were assessed in a pilot study, along with 






The session consisted of 480 lexical decision trials, 240 word-nonword filler 
pairs, and 240 word-word pairs, of which 120 were related. The 1:4 relatedness ratio was 
quite low, ensuring, along with the low SOA used, minimal interference of strategic 
effects. Three different noun-verb pair sets were created, with three corresponding 
priming types. In one set, pairs were ‗semantic-categorically‘ related (‗robbery-
stealing‘). In another set, pairs were ‗formal-associatively‘ related (‗baby-sitting‘). In the 
third set, they were ‗semantic-associatively‘ related (‗sniper-shooting‘). The 80 items of 
each of the three sets were rotated across 4 lists generated, according to relatedness 
(appearing half of the time in an unrelated, and half of the time in a related version), and 
time of appearance in the session (half of the time appearing in the first half of the 
session, and half of the time in the second half). Thus both subjects-based (F1) and 
items-based (F2) analyses were made possible. Examples of the conditions generated by 





In the ‗semantic-categorical‘ set, the prime-nouns in each pair were virtually 
synonymous with the verb-targets, e.g. ‗robbery-stealing‘, ‗fear-scaring‘. Thus, 
facilitation in processing such related items would be a case of semantic-categorical 
priming, in which the two terms are synonymous, or, at least, semantic coordinates 
within the same semantic category. The semantic relatedness of those items was 
assessed by the ‗Wordnet::Similarity‘ software.
89
 In addition, it was ensured that the 
noun-verb pairs did not immediately co-occur in speech, as assessed in the BNC (written 
part; Leech, 1992). The four lists contained prime- and target-words of equal mean 
frequency and length (F < 1; table C.2, Appendix C). 
 
The second stimulus set was comprised of semantic-associatively related pairs. 
The pairs were taken from the stimulus sets used in McRae et al. (2005), and Ferretti et 
al. (2001, 2003, 2007). All four major ζ-role-based subtypes were employed here, 
involving agent- (e.g. ‗butcher-carving‘), patient- (e.g. ‗lawn-mowing‘), instrument- 
(e.g. ‗scissors-cutting‘), and location- (e.g. ‗casino-gambling‘) based priming. In 
addition, as with the first category, it was ensured that the items did not co-occur in an 
immediate fashion. Whereas McRae and colleagues (2005) attribute such priming effects 
to formal (textual) co-occurrence and/or semantic association, the emphasis here was 
given only to the latter, and, to that end, only pairs with low formal co-occurrence were 
selected. Thus, pairs like ‗wine-tasting‘, ‗ballroom-dancing‘, for example, that combine 
formal- and semantic-associative relations, or pairs such as ‗toy-playing‘, that combine 
formal-associative and semantic-categorical relations, were excluded. Of course, 
semantic-associative relatedness implies that the forms may co-occur, be it in a non-
immediate fashion. However, such loose co-occurrences could easily be found in the 
categorically related pairs as well. For example, in (1) below, the semantic-associatively 
related pair ‗stripper-entertaining‘ (1a) can loosely co-occur in speech, like the semantic-
categorically related one ‗murder-killing‘ (1b). 
 
                                                          
89
 As the software cannot assess the semantic relatedness of words of different grammatical categories 
(here, nouns and verbs), it was ensured that, in each pair, the noun was homonymous with a verb of the 
same basic semantic properties, e.g. ‗release‘, ‗fear‘. 
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(1a)  ‗[…] being a male stripper isn‘t just about taking clothes off, it‘s about entertaining 
          people […]‘ 
 
(1b)  ‗It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance […]‘ 
         
          (Google search) 
 
Several more pairs from the item sets of McRae and colleagues were excluded, 
on different grounds: due to extremely frequent/infrequent words in the BNC (e.g. 
‗‗patrolman-searching‘‘); due to coincidences of the same phoneme in the starting 
position between prime and target word (e.g. ‗‗crayon-coloring‘‘), which is avoided in 
lexical decision setups (Forster & Davis, 1991). Pairs were once again matched across 
the four lists for length and frequency of prime and target words (F < 1; table C.3, 
Appendix C). 
 
The third stimulus set was comprised of ‗formal-associatively‘ related noun-verb 
pairs: these were predominantly formed on the basis of idiomatic constructions, a great 
proportion of which included noun-verb backformations. These are much less frequent 
than those of other grammatical classes, such as the more productive adjective-verb 
backformations (Bauer, 1983, p. 208), e.g. ‗dry-cleaning‘ or ‗long-dividing‘. The noun-
verb pairs were ensured to be semantic-categorically unrelated. Thus, pairs like ‗sight-
reading‘ or ‗stock-piling‘ were excluded. Noun-verb pairs here were also semantic-
associatively (ζ-) unrelated. Thus, pairs like ‗ice-skating‘ or ‗spoon-feeding‘ were not 
included. It was also ensured that these backformations appeared at least once in the 
BNC in the N-V[ing] form, and at least once in a non-periphrastic form, e.g. ‗babysitting‘, 
but also ‗baby-sitting‘. Once again, the four lists involved prime- and target-words of 
equal frequency and length (all Fs, F < 1; table C.4, appendix C). 
 
Given the limited number of pairs that could be selected form the verb-
generation norms of McRae and colleagues, and the limited number of idiomatically co-
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occurring noun-verb sequences, no matching between the different item sets was 
attempted for prime/target word frequency/length: the three sets differed on prime word 
frequency (stimulus set: F (2, 237) = 17.47, MSe = 1929.38, p < .001), prime word 
length (F (2, 237) = 19.59, MSe = 3.52, p < .001),  target word frequency (F (2, 237) = 
5.83, MSe = 784.96, p < .005), and target word length (F (2, 237) = 8.79, MSe = 1.80, p 
< .001). However, the four lists across which the three sets were rotated were matched 
for the above measures, separately for each set. Crucially for stimulus construction here, 
the semantic-categorically related pairs involved semantically more similar nouns and 
verbs than those of the other two sets according to the ‗Wordnet::Similarity‘ ratings 
(stimulus set: F (2, 237) = 388.3, MSe = 0.02, p < .001; tables C2-4, Appendix C). On 
the other hand, the formal-associatively related items involved nouns and verbs that co-
occurred in speech more frequently than the pairs of the other two sets (stimulus set: F 




 Furthermore, the 
word-nonword filler pairs were matched for prime word frequency and length, and target 
nonword length across the two lists generated for counterbalancing their order of 
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 A disadvantage in the design was, of course, that there was no normative study or quantitative measure 
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Prime and target stimuli were presented in black letters at the center of a white 
screen of a MacBook using the ‗DirectRT‘ software (Jarvis, 2008). Each trial consisted 
of a sequence of three stimuli presented at the same screen location. First, a fixation 
point (‗+‘) was presented for 250 ms, followed by the prime for 150 ms, which was 
followed by the target letter string. The targets remained on the screen until participants 
responded. No masking mediated the presentation of the prime and the target, i.e. the 
SOA value was confounded with that of the prime duration of 150 ms (SOAs of 200ms 
or shorter guarantee automatic processes in priming; e.g. Perea & Rosa, 2002).
91
 The 
intertrial interval lasted 500 ms. 
 
                                                          
91
 The slightly longer SOA used in the present study (150 ms instead of the 100 ms of the last two studies) 
was motivated by the longer SOAs used in McRae et al. (2005).  
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Both primes and targets were always presented in lower-case letters. Participants 
were instructed to focus on the fixation point and to read the first letter string and 
respond only to the second one. The order of stimulus presentation was randomized for 
each subject. Subjects were instructed to press one of two buttons on the keyboard (‗j‘ 
for yes and ‗f‘ for no) to indicate whether the upper-case letter string was an English 
word or not, as rapidly and accurately as possible. They used their dominant right-hand 
index finger for the word responses. When the subject responded, the target disappeared 
from the screen. Each subject received a total of 20 practice trials prior to the 500 
experimental trials. Participants were tested individually in a silent, brightly lit room. 
They received written instructions explaining the task. All subjects provided informed 





12 participants were recruited according to the selection criteria in section 4.4.12; 





A 2 x 3 within-subjects and -items design was employed. Prime and target words 
in a pair could be related or unrelated (relatedness), and they could be related in three 
different ways (priming type): semantic-categorically (‗robbery-stealing‘), semantic-
associatively (‗sniper-shooting‘), formal-associatively (‗baby-sitting‘). The dependent 







Mean latencies per condition are shown in table 7.2 and plot 7.1 below. The trials 
excluded according to the criteria in section 4.4.11 accounted for 2.4% of the data. Three 
trials were also excluded from the data for different reasons,
92
 amounting to 1.3% of the 
data.  
 
A 2-way ANOVA (priming type, relatedness) demonstrated that, since the 
three priming sets were not matched for word length or frequency, latencies expectedly 
differed with respect to priming type (F1 (2, 16) = 5.97, MSe = 384.56, p < .05; F2 (2, 
228) = 6.33, MSe = 3448.50, p < .005). Crucially, however, related items received 
shorter latencies across priming types (relatedness: F1 (1, 8) = 8.88, MSe = 219.67, p 
< .05; F2 (1, 228) = 4.89, MSe = 2795.02, p < .05). The three groups, however, 
differed significantly (by items) in priming strength (priming type*relatedness: F1 
(2, 16) = 2.68, MSe = 455.84, p = .1; F2 (2, 228) = 3.44, MSe = 2730.58, p < .05), with 
the semantic-categorical set showing the strongest relatedness effect, and the formal-
associative set involving no priming (see below). 
 
1-way ANOVAs (relatedness): Separately for each group, a comparison of 
latencies for unrelated and related pairs demonstrated strong semantic-categorical 
priming both by subjects and items (relatedness: F1 (1, 8) = 10.3, MSe = 335.92, p < 
.05; F2 (1, 76) = 10.27, MSe = 2854.40, p < .005). Semantic-associative priming was 
found only by subjects (relatedness: F1 (1, 8) = 6.1, MSe = 132.90, p < .05; F2 (1, 76) 
= 1, MSe = 2696.91, p > .3). However, no formal-associative priming was shown 
(relatedness: both Fs, F < 1).  
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 Three trials were excluded from the analysis: ‗expulsion/guess-ousting‘, because the target verb was not 
recognized as a word by more than half of the participants; ‗celebrity/egg–recognising‘, 





Plot 7.1: Mean latencies for unrelated and related pairs for pilot group per condition. Error 




Priming Type Relatedness Mean RTs (ms) SD (ms) 
Semantic-Associative Unrelated 603.55 73.65 
Related 591.92 62.76 
Semantic-Categorical Unrelated 613.33 78.13 
Related 589.29 64.00 
Formal-Associative Unrelated 580.80 62.03 
Related 585.23 74.44 









The results above demonstrated that priming occurred only for the semantic-
categorical and the semantic-associative sets. The latter showed significant priming only 
by subjects. This would mean that only certain items in that set involved priming, or that 
the number of subjects did not suffice to stabilize the variance for the analysis by items. 
As no priming occurred for the formal-associative types, this set was not included in the 

















7.3. Pilot Experiment 2 (Experiment 6) 
 
In order to determine whether priming still occurred with only the two sets that 
showed priming (semantic-associative and semantic-categorical), a second pilot 




Each session consisted of a total of 500 trials, consisting of 250 filler word-
nonword pairs, and 250 word-word pairs; the latter consisted of 100 related, 100 
unrelated, and 50 unrelated filler word-word pairs. Thus the relatedness ratio was even 
lower than that of the first pilot experiment (1:4; section 7.2.1; here: 1:5), reaching that 
of the previous TMS studies (sections 5.2.1 and 6.2.1). Once again, prime and target 
word length and frequencies were kept steady across the different blocks, for both item 
sets. Filler items were matched for prime length, prime word frequency and target word 
length across the two lists generated for counterbalancing their order of appearance (F < 
1). No significant differences were found in prime/target word length or prime word 
frequency between filler (word-nonword) and test (control and target; word-word) items 
(all Fs, F < 1; table D.4, Appendix D). Categorically related noun-verb pairs were by far 
more semantically similar as assessed by ‗Wordnet::Similarity‘ (F (1, 198) = 553.5, MSe 
= 0.03, p < .001; mean = 0.73, SD: 0.25, min: 0.5, max: 1; table D.2, Appendix D) than 
associatively related ones (mean = 0.12, SD = 0.06, min: 0.05 max: 0.33; table D.3, 
Appendix D). However, co-occurrence strength was kept low and matched for the two 
sets (mean: 0.07, SD: 0.27; group: F < 1; tables D3-4), so that the two priming types 
would maximally differ along the axis of ‗categorical vs associative‘. In the same 
fashion with the experiment above, both categorical and associative sets were balanced 
across the four lists in prime/target word length/frequency (list: for categorical Fs, F < 1; 
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for associative Fs: F < 1; tables D3-4). Examples of the conditions created by the 
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The same procedure as that for the previous pilot experiment (section 7.2.2) was 
followed. In order to encourage fast lexical decisions, a message appeared on the screen 
(‗Please try to respond faster!‘) after each trial in which the subject would respond after 




40 participants were recruited according to the selection criteria in section 4.4.12; 
they were rotated across the 4 stimulus lists. 
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 Since there was no a priori hypothesis about effects on the particular strengths of different ζ-role 
relations (agent, patient, instrument, location), and given that the experiment examined ζ-role priming in 
general as opposed to semantic-categorical priming, pairs of the four basic ζ-role relations were evenly 






The present experiment employed a 2 x 2 x 2 within-subjects design. The pairs 
were either related or unrelated (relatedness), and they could be related in two different 
ways: associatively or categorically (priming type). Latencies were measured in the first 
and second phase of the session (phase). This was important, in order to capture any 
changes in priming sizes occurring in task performance, which should be taken into 




The mean latencies for related and unrelated items per priming type and per 
phase are shown in plot 7.2, and table 7.4 below. The trials deleted according to the 
criteria in section 4.4.11 amounted to 1.9% of the data. 6 trials were also excluded from 
the analysis,
 94
 amounting to 1.2% of the data.  
 
A 3-way ANOVA (phase, priming type, relatedness) showed, expectedly, that 
latencies became significantly shorter in the second phase of the session (phase: F1 (1, 
36) = 19.94, MSe = 2112.30, p < .001; F2 (1, 192) = 123.45, MSe = 1075.51, p < .001). 
No difference was observed in the latencies between priming types (priming type: both 
Fs, F < 1; rest of Fs, F < 1). Crucially, however, priming occurred selectively in the 
second phase of the session (phase*relatedness: F1 (1, 36) = 5.32, MSe = 219.92, p < 
.05; F2 (1, 192) = 5.24, MSe = 1084.16, p < .05; see below), and not across phases 
(relatedness: both Fs, F < 1).  
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The trial ‗experience/expulsion-ousting‘ was deleted, as over half of the subjects did not recognize 
‗ousting‘ as a word; Other trials were deleted because of inconsistencies in the ising/izing spelling: 
‗horizon– authorizing‘, ‗highway/celebrity-recognising‘, stress/ablation-emphasizing; The trial ‗prison-
punished‘ was also deleted, because it accidentally had the target word in the ‗–ed‘ form. Finally, the 




2-way ANOVAs (priming type, relatedness): first phase: An analysis of 
latencies in the first half showed no priming across priming types or selectively for one 
(all Fs, F < 1).  
 
2-way ANOVAs (priming type, relatedness): second phase: An analysis for 
the second phase showed significant priming (relatedness: F1 (1, 36) = 4.36, MSe = 
286.96, p < .05; F2 (1, 192) = 5.78, MSe = 1243.09, p < .05), independently of priming 
type (priming type*relatedness: both Fs, F < 1).No difference in latencies between the 
two stimulus sets was found in either analysis (priming type: all Fs, F < 1). 
An additional analysis was performed, comparing the 4 subtypes of semantic-
associative priming, based on the four different ζ-roles involved. The variables involved 
were thus ζ-role (4; agent, instrument, location, patient), phase (2; first or second half of 
the session), relatedness (2; unrelated or related items). A three-way ANOVA 
demonstrated that the acquisition of priming size in the second phase was not selective 




Priming Type Phase Relatedness Mean latencies (ms) SD (ms) 
Categorical 
First Half 
Unrelated 557.86 59.02 
Related 557.53 64.73 
Second Half 
Unrelated 539.01 60.37 




Unrelated 558.00 52.76 
Related 562.44 64.98 
Second Half 
Unrelated 538.61 65.10 
Related 532.98 57.06 







Plot 7.2: Mean latencies for unrelated and related pairs for pilot group per condition. Error 









Quite unexpectedly, the pilot experiment here did not show an overall priming 
effect, much unlike the first one. Priming occurred only in the second phase across 
priming types. This could suggest that strategic processes were accountable for. For the 
main TMS experiment, then, the main hypothesis was that any differences induced by 
TMS would be manifested with a significantly smaller or larger increase in priming size 






7.4. TMS Experiment (Experiment 7) 
 
The TMS experiment was conducted in the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience 




The same stimulus lists were used as those in the second pilot experiment 





The same procedure was followed as that in the second pilot experiment (section 
7.3.2). Upon completion of the first half of the session, the TMS session was applied. 
 
7.4.3. TMS Setup 
 
The Huang et al. (2005) continuous theta-burst stimulation protocol (cTBS) was 
employed, as in the first study (see sections 4.4; 5.4.3). Ethical approval was granted by 
the local ethics committee. All subjects provided their informed consent and received 
compensation for their participation. 
 
As in the other two studies, the right NCBV was aimed by placing the coil 1 cm 
below the inion and 1 cm to the right (e.g. Ohtsuka & Enoki, 1998; sections 5.4.3 and 
6.2.3). Instead of the PLCB site used in the two previous studies (1 cm below the inion, 
4.5 cm laterally to the right), a yet more lateral right CB hemispheric site was selected. 
Based on the arguable similarity of the psycholinguistic mechanisms involved in verb-
generation and ζ-role-based noun-to-verb priming, brain loci involved in the former 
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become of significant relevance for the latter. In the fMRI study of Frings et al. (2006; 
figure 7.1 below), a comparison of the task conditions ―verb generation in inner speech‖ 
and ―verb reading in inner speech‖ as a measure of verb generation showed CB 
activations in lobule HVI (x = 30 mm, y = −56 mm, z = −34 mm, T-value 6.05) and Crus 
I of the right PLCB (x = 48 mm, y = −60 mm, z = −30 mm, T-value 12.36). The latter 
locus was selected, given the much larger T-value yielded, as well as the larger depth of 
the former, which exceeded 3 cm (see section 4.4.9). An advantage, of course, is that, as 
shown in figure 7.1, the two areas seem to form a rather continuous activated region. 
This offers a much broader region possibly involved in the task, thus alleviating the 
costs of not using a neuronavigational system. The Talairach coordinates were registered 
and converted into scalp coordinates using the Brainsight™ TMS-MRI co-registration 
system (Rogue Research, Montreal, Canada) in one volunteer, and were found to 
correspond to 10 cm laterally to the right from the inion.
 95
 The 10 cm from the inion to 
the right were also found to correspond to the area activated in a stem completion task (x 
= 41 mm, y = −55 mm, z = −18 mm) for both overt and covert stem completion (Palmer 




Figure 7.1: Localization of the right NCB Crus I site (lateral-most, yellow-colored site). The 
two areas shown here are the products of the comparison of the conditions “verb 
generation in inner speech” and “verb reading in inner speech” as a measure of verb 
generation. The grid on the right represents T-values corresponding to the activity 
maximum of each CB area. Figure adapted from Frings et al. (2006, p. 21) with permission 
© 2006 Elsevier.  
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 Thanks to Dr. Neil Muggleton for volunteering and helping in the registration process. 
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All participants tolerated TMS well, reporting mild discomfort, especially during 
stimulation of the lateral site, which induced considerably more muscle twitches in the 
right-side face and neck muscles. The session lasted approximately 30-35 minutes: 12 
minutes for the first block, 12 minutes for the second block, and 7 minutes for TMS 





24 subjects participated in the main TMS study: 8 underwent stimulation of the 
Crus I (mean age: 24.5, SD: 6.19), 8 underwent stimulation of the NCBV (mean age: 
21.63, SD: 4.34), and 8 received a 5-7-minute break without TMS (mean age: 22.50, 




The TMS experiment here differed from the two previous ones in that a between-
subjects design was preferred. This was owed to the fact that priming occurred 
selectively in the second phase, and there thus was an unexpected increase in priming 
size (section 7.3.5.1.1 above). This was not the case in the pilot experiments of the first 
TMS study (sections 5.2.5.1 and 5.3.5.1) or in the second TMS study in control PLCB 
TMS conditions. Thus, any change in priming sizes because of TMS had to be directly 
compared with the changes that occurred in the no TMS group (section 7.3.6). 
Otherwise, an increase in priming size after TMS would have probably been interpreted 
as an expected increase, thus suggesting that TMS had no effect.
96
 Furthermore, there 
were no real ‗control site‘ conditions here. Crus I TMS was expected to selectively 
affect semantic-associative priming; however, it was an open question whether NCBV 
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 Similarly, without direct comparisons with a no TMS group, it would be hard to show whether 
enhancements selective for priming type should be attributed to poor enhancement for one type or to 
strong enhancement for the other.  
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TMS would induce an associative boost, as shown in the first study (chapter 5), or a 
semantic-categorical disruption, as suggested in the second one (chapter 6). 
 
Hence, for the examination of TMS effects on priming sizes (section 4.4.11), the 
design here included subject group (3; Crus I TMS, NCBV TMS, no TMS) as a 
between-subjects factor, as well as priming type (2; associative, categorical) and phase 
(2; before, after TMS) as within-subjects factors. 
 
For the examination of TMS effects on sensorimotor performance, a similar 3 x 2 
x 2 design was employed. Latencies and accuracy rates were analyzed for each of the 
three groups (group; 3), for the first and second halves of the session (half; 2), for words 




The analysis was performed as in the previous experiment (section 7.3.5). The 6 
trials excluded represented 1.2% of the data. The trials excluded by RT trimming 




7.4.6.1. Effects on Priming Sizes 
7.4.6.1.1. Lexical Decision Latencies 
7.4.6.1.1.1. Comparison with a no TMS Group 
 
A comparison of priming sizes for the three groups showed a rather selective 
enhancement of associative priming after stimulation of the Crus I that was much 
stronger than that for the other two groups. It also showed a rather selective absence of 
such enhancements for the NCBV group. Mean sizes per group and priming type are 
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 The application of planned comparisons or post-hoc tests did not compromise the significance or the 
size of the effects reported.  
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shown below in table 7.5 and plot 7.3. The analysis will start with comparisons among 
the three groups (three-, two-, and one-way ANOVAs), and will proceed to comparisons 
between groups, terminating with the ANOVAs for each separate group. 
 
3 groups: A three-way ANOVA (group, priming type, phase) showed a 
difference in overall priming sizes among the three groups, marginally by subjects, and 
significantly by items (group: F1 (2, 12) = 2.96, MSe = 412.29, p = .09; F2 (2, 384) = 
3.41, MSe = 7039.81, p < .05). Given the small subject pool size, priming sizes were not 
matched across groups in baseline conditions. There was also a significant by-items 
group*phase interaction, due to the selective lack of increase of priming sizes in the 
second phase for the NCBV group (F1 (2, 12) = 1.76, MSe = 652.32, p > .2; F2 (2, 
384) = 3.90, MSe = 6579.68, p < .05). The analysis also showed a priming 
type*phase*group interaction (F1 (2, 12) = 5.25, MSe = 561.70, p < .05; F2 (2, 384) = 
3.90, MSe = 6766.75, p < .05; rest of ps, p > .2), owed, to a large extent, to the strong 
associative priming observed in the second phase for the Crus I group. 
 
3 groups: two-way ANOVAs: Associative priming (group, phase): An 
analysis of associative priming sizes in particular demonstrated an increase in the 
second phase that is selective for the Crus I group (phase*group: F1 (2, 12) = 6.50, 
MSe = 449.78, p < .05; F2 (2, 192) = 4.32, MSe = 7020.47, p < .05), and not found 
across groups (phase: F1 (2, 12) = 2.79, MSe = 449.78, p = .12; F2 (1, 192) = 1.02, MSe 
= 7452.81, p > .3; group: F1 (2, 12) = 1.1, MSe = 301.06, p > .35; F2 (2, 192) = 1.68, MSe 
= 7457.63, p = .19). 
 
3 groups: two-way ANOVAs: Categorical priming (group, phase): An 
analysis for categorical priming sizes showed a significant by-items phase*group 
interaction (F1 (2, 12) = 1.53, MSe = 764.24, p > .25; F2 (2, 192) = 3.41, MSe = 6138.90, 
p < .05), due to the selective increase for the no TMS group in the second phase. This 
change was not found across groups (phase: both Fs, F < 1; group: F1 (2, 12) = 1.85, 




3 groups: two-way ANOVAs: First half (group, priming type): Comparing 
priming sizes in the first half showed no significant differences across priming types 
(group: both ps, p > .35). There was an only marginal by-subjects group*priming type 
interaction, due to the high value of categorical priming for the Crus I group in baseline 
conditions (F1 (2, 12) = 3.61, MSe = 577.33, p = .06; F2 (2, 384) = 1.7, MSe = 6714.01, p 
> .2).  
 
3 groups: two-way ANOVAs: Second half (group, priming type): Sadly, 
however, a comparison of priming sizes in the second half showed a weak non-
significant group*priming type interaction (F1 (2, 12) = 2.25, MSe = 474.46, p = .15; 
F2 (2, 384) = 2.26, MSe = 6905.48, p = .11), despite the large associative priming size 
for the Crus I group. In a stronger fashion, the NCBV group demonstrated the lowest 
priming sizes in the second phase across priming types, significantly by items, and 
marginally by subjects (group: F1 (2, 12) = 2.91, MSe = 667.76, p = .09; F2 (2, 384) = 
6.19, MSe = 6905.48,  p < .005). 
 
3 groups: one-way ANOVAs (group): A comparison of the three groups per 
condition demonstrated marginally stronger categorical priming in the first phase for 
the Crus I group (group: F1 (2, 12) = 3.11, MSe = 548.59, p = .08; F2 (2, 192) = 2.51, 
MSe = 6035.89, p = .08). As seen in plot 7.3, the no TMS group involved the largest 
categorical priming size in the second phase, but only marginally by items (F1 < 1; F2 
(2, 192) = 2.66, MSe = 6725.00, p = .07). The groups did not differ significantly for 
associative priming size in the first phase (group: F1 (2, 12) = 1.88, MSe = 425.58, p = 
.19; F2 < 1). Importantly, however, the Crus I group involved, in a clear fashion, the 
largest associative priming size in the second phase (F1 (2, 12) = 7.50, MSe = 325.26, 
p < .01; F2 (2, 192) = 5.70, MSe = 7085.97, p < .005). 
 
The analysis now turns to a comparison of priming sizes between the Crus I 
and the no TMS groups. 
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2 groups (Crus I vs no TMS): A three-way ANOVA (group, priming type, 
phase) demonstrated a significant by-items increase in priming sizes overall in the 
second phase across groups (phase: F1 (1, 8) = 3.56, MSe = 552.81, p = .1; F2 (1, 192) = 
6.80, MSe = 5989.44, p < .05). The Crus I group involved marginally larger by items 
priming sizes overall (group: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 192) = 3.65, MSe = 6895.72, p = .06). 
Crucially, however, the priming type*phase*group interaction seen above was 
retained (F1 (1, 8) = 7.02, MSe = 619.98, p < .05; F2 (1, 192) = 7.14, MSe = 7047.51, p 
< .01; also, a non-significant priming type*phase interaction: F1 (1, 8) = 3.55, MSe = 
619.98, p = .1; F2 < 1; rest of Fs, F < 1). 
 
2 groups (Crus I vs no TMS): two-way ANOVAs: Associative Priming 
(group, phase): The two groups did not differ in associative priming sizes across phases 
(group: F1 (1, 8) = 1.53, MSe = 355.74, p > .25; F2 (1, 96) = 1.95, MSe = 7574.45, p = 
.17). However, associative priming size increased in the second phase across groups 
(phase: F1 (1, 8) = 12.88, MSe = 323.35, p < .01; F2 (1, 96) = 5.75, MSe = 5438.87, p < 
.05). Crucially, the increase was stronger for the Crus I group, significantly by 
subjects, and marginally by items (phase*group: F1 (1, 8) = 6.34, MSe = 323.35, p < 
.05; F2 (1, 96) = 3.59, MSe = 7613.36, p = .06).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs no TMS): two-way ANOVAs: Categorical Priming 
(group, phase): Categorical priming sizes did not differ across groups or phases (group: 
both ps, p > .2; phase: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 96) = 1.80, MSe = 6540.00, p = .18). There was, 
however, a marginal by-items phase*group interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 2.72, MSe = 849.44, 
p = .14; F2 (1, 96) = 3.55, MSe = 6481.65, p = .06), due to the large categorical priming 
size of the Crus I group in baseline conditions. 
 
2 groups (Crus I vs no TMS): two-way ANOVAs: First phase (group, 
priming type): A comparison of priming sizes in the first phase showed a marginal 
group*priming type interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 4.47, MSe = 540.91, p = .07; F2 (1, 192) = 
3.16, MSe = 6241.01, p = .08), due to the high value of categorical priming observed in 
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the Crus I group. Priming sizes did not differ between the two groups (group: F1 (1, 8) = 
1.57, MSe = 472.88, p > .2; F2 (1, 192) = 1.78, MSe = 6241.01, p = .18).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs no TMS): two-way ANOVAs: Second phase (group, 
priming type): Crucially, a comparison of priming sizes in the second half showed a 
significant by-items group*priming type interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 3.14, MSe = 620.40, 
p = .11; F2 (1, 192) = 4.05, MSe = 7702.22, p < .05). Priming sizes did not differ 
between the two groups in the second phase (group: F1 (1, 8) = 1.3, MSe = 483.86, p > 
.25; F2 (1, 192) = 1.84, MSe = 7702.22, p = .18). 
 
2 groups (Crus I vs no TMS): one-way ANOVAs (group): Comparing priming 
sizes in each condition, the two groups did not differ in associative priming sizes in the 
first phase (group: both Fs, F < 1), but associative priming size was significantly 
larger for the Crus I group in the second phase (group: F1 (1, 8) = 15.7, MSe = 
149.78, p < .005; F2 (1, 96) = 5.29, MSe = 8259.19, p < .05). Categorical priming size 
in the first phase was, unexpectedly, significantly larger for the Crus I group (F1 (1, 8) = 
6.02, MSe = 484.48, p < .05; F2 (1, 96) = 5.44, MSe = 5553.39, p < .05), while no such 
difference was observed in the second phase (both Fs, F < 1). 
 
The analysis now turns to a comparison of priming sizes between the Crus I 
and NCBV TMS groups. 
 
2 groups (Crus I vs NCBV): A three-way ANOVA (group, priming type, 
phase) showed smaller overall priming sizes for the NCBV group across phases (group: 
F1 (1, 8) = 5.79, MSe = 383.04, p < .05; F2 (1, 192) = 5.26, MSe = 8410.09, p < .05). 
Crucially, the selective increase in associative priming size in the second phase for 
the Crus I group remained here significant by subjects (priming 
type*phase*group: F1 (1, 8) = 5.90, MSe = 761.92, p < .05; F2 (1, 192) = 2.71, MSe = 
7216.98, p = .1). There was also a significant by-items phase*group interaction (F1 
(1, 8) = 2.04, MSe = 801.96, p = .19; F2 (1, 192) = 5.59, MSe = 7216.98, p < .05), due 
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to the lack of increase in priming sizes in the NCBV group in the second phase. 
There was no priming type*phase interaction across groups (F1 (1, 8) = 2.75, MSe = 
761.92, p = .14; F2 (1, 192) = 2.11, MSe = 8369.77, p = .15; rest of Fs, F < 1, or p > .2).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs NCBV): two-way ANOVAs: Associative Priming (group, 
phase): Associative priming size increased only selectively for the Crus I group 
(phase*group: F1 (1, 8) = 11.74, MSe = 492.44, p < .01; F2 (1, 96) = 7.68, MSe = 
7552.60, p < .01; phase: F1 (1, 8) = 2.32, MSe = 492.44, p = .17; F2 (1, 96) = 1.4, MSe = 
7344.51, p > .2; group: F1 (1, 8) = 2.86, MSe = 137.73, p = .13; F2 = 2.32, p = .13).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs NCBV): two-way ANOVAs: Categorical Priming 
(group, phase): On the other hand, no increase was observed for categorical priming 
(phase, group*phase: all Fs, F < 1). The Crus I group only showed marginally stronger 
categorical priming across phases (group: F1 (1, 8) = 4.38, MSe = 498.82, p = .07; F2 (1, 
96) = 2.97, MSe = 8020.15, p = .09).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs NCBV): two-way ANOVAs: first half (group, priming 
type): A comparison for the phase before TMS showed a significant by-subjects 
group*priming type interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 6.41, MSe = 577.86, p < .05; F2 (1, 192) = 
1.3, MSe = 7785.52, p > .2; group: both Fs, F < 1). This was due to the poorly matched 
baseline conditions across groups, and, in particular, to the larger associative priming 
sizes for the NCBV group in the first phase (see below). 
 
2 groups (Crus I vs NCBV): two-way ANOVAs: second half (group, priming 
type): For the phase after TMS, the NCBV group showed smaller sizes, significantly 
by items, and marginally by subjects (group: F1 (1, 8) = 4.33, MSe = 885.34, p = .07; 
F2 (1, 192) = 10.78, MSe = 7841.55, p < .005) independently of priming type 
(group*priming type: F1 (1, 8) = 2.64, MSe = 437.56, p = .14; F2 (1, 192) = 1.2, MSe = 
7841.55, p > .25). 
2 groups (Crus I vs NCBV): one-way ANOVAs (group): Comparing priming 
sizes of the two groups for each condition, the NCBV group showed larger associative 
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priming size before TMS than the Crus I group, but only significantly so by subjects 
(F1 (1, 8) = 6.38, MSe = 247.21, p < .05; F2 < 1). Crucially, though, the Crus I group 
involved larger associative priming size in the after TMS in a much stronger 
fashion (F1 (1, 8) = 12.00, MSe = 382.97, p < .01; F2 (1, 96) = 9.34, MSe = 7888.40, p 
< .005). For categorical priming, there was only a weak tendency by items for larger 
sizes for the Crus I group (first phase: F1 (1, 12) = 3.41, MSe = 630.31, p = .1; F2 < 1; 
second phase: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 96) = 2.50, MSe = 7794.71, p = .12). 
 
The analysis now turns to a comparison of priming sizes between the no TMS 
and the NCBV TMS groups. 
 
2 groups (NCBV vs no TMS): three-way ANOVA (priming type, phase, 
group): A comparison of the priming sizes between the two groups showed a significant 
by-items phase*group interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 2.93, MSe = 602.19, p = .11; F2 (1, 192) 
= 6.68, MSe = 5474.56, p < .05), independently of priming type (rest of ps, p > .25). 
 
2 groups (NCBV vs no TMS): two-way ANOVAs: first phase (priming type, 
group): The two groups did not differ in priming sizes for the first half of the session 
(all ps, p > .2).  
 
2 groups (NCBV vs no TMS): two-way ANOVAs: second phase (priming 
type, group): In the second half, however, the NCBV group involved significantly (by 
items) smaller sizes (group: F1 (1, 8) = 2.2, MSe = 634.08, p = .18; F2 (1, 192) = 5.70, 
MSe = 5172.67, p < .05) independently of priming type (group*priming type: both Fs, F 
< 1, or p > .2).  
 
The analysis now turns to the ANOVAs performed for each of the three groups 
separately. 
Crus I group: A two-way ANOVA (priming type, phase) for the Crus I group 





 and significantly by items (priming type*phase: F1 (1, 4) = 5.90, MSe = 
1078.69, p = .07; F2 (1, 192) = 4.64, MSe = 8011.52, p < .05; phase: F1 (1, 4) = 1.20, 
MSe = 752.58, p > .3; F2 (1, 192) = 2.79, MSe = 8011.52, p = .1; rest of ps, p > .25).  
 
Crus I group: one-way ANOVAs (phase): The interaction above was due to 
the strong boost of associative priming in the second phase (phase: F1 (1, 4) = 21.36, 
MSe = 282.24, p < .05; F2 (1, 96) = 7.79, MSe = 7517.37, p < .01), not shown for 
categorical priming (phase: both Fs, F < 1). 
 
No TMS group: A two-way ANOVA (priming type, phase) for the no TMS 
group alone showed a marginal by-items increase in priming sizes in the second phase 
(phase: F1 (1, 4) = 3.04, MSe = 353.04, p = .16; F2 (1, 192) = 3.67, MSe = 5025.42, p = 
.06), which was marginally stronger by items for categorical priming (priming 
type*phase: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 192) = 3.08, MSe = 5025.42, p = .08).  
 
No TMS group: one-way ANOVAs (phase): An analysis for categorical 
priming demonstrated a marginal by-subjects and significant by-items increase of size 
in the second phase (phase: F1 (1, 4) = 7.14, MSe = 149.85, p = .06; F2 (1, 96) = 7.50, 
MSe = 4515.98, p < .01), which was not found for associative priming sizes (phase: 
both Fs, F < 1). 
 
NCBV group: two-way ANOVA (priming type, phase): Unlike the other two 
groups, the NCBV group alone involved no increase in priming size in the second 
phase; on the contrary, it showed a nonsignificant decrease by items (phase: F1 < 1; 
F2 (1, 192) = 2.39, MSe = 7575.23, p = .12), independently of priming type (priming 
type*phase: both Fs, F < 1, or p > .3). 
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Plot 7.3: Mean priming sizes for the three groups per condition. Errors bars represent + 1 




Priming TMS Phase Group Mean Priming Sizes (ms) SD (ms) 
Associative 
 
Before TMS (first half) 
No TMS -3.03 24.64 
NCBV TMS 9.08 17.02 
Crus I TMS -10.78 18.71 
After TMS (second half) 
No TMS 3.79 20.61 
NCBV TMS -5.85 26.60 
Crus I TMS 28.04 15.73 
Categorical 
Before TMS (first half) 
No TMS -3.47 21.97 
NCBV TMS 0.34 34.46 
Crus I TMS 23.53 23.52 
After TMS (second half) 
No TMS 12.88 19.48 
NCBV TMS -3.95 20.89 
Crus I TMS 5.93 36.19 




7.4.6.1.1.2. Comparison with the Pilot Group 
 
Since the pilot group (n = 40) used in the previous experiment (section 7.3) 
completed the experimental session virtually in the same way that the ‗no TMS‘ group 
(n = 8) did, it was possible to compare this group with the two TMS groups. Mean 
priming sizes for the new comparison are shown below in table 7.6 and plot 7.4. As 
above, the analysis will start with the comparisons among the three groups (from three- 
down to one-way ANOVAs), and terminate with the comparisons between groups. The 
comparison between the NCBV and the Crus I group, along with analyses for each 
separate group may be found above.  
 
The comparison of priming sizes among the NCBV (n = 8), Crus I (n = 8) and 
pilot groups (n = 40) demonstrated effect sizes and significance levels close to those 




3 groups: A three-way ANOVA (priming type, phase, group) showed a 
significant by-items main effect of group, with the NCBV group having the lowest 
overall sizes, and the Crus I group the largest ones (group: F1 (2, 44) = 2.01, MSe = 
737.48, p = .15; F2 (2, 384) = 4.64, MSe = 5925.88, p < .05).  The analysis also 
demonstrated a marginal by-subjects priming type*phase interaction (F1 (2, 44) = 3.39, 
MSe = 687.43, p = .07; F2 (1, 192) = 2.23, MSe = 6606.27, p = .14). Most importantly, 
however, it showed a significant by-items phase*group interaction (F1 (2, 44) = 2.20, 
MSe = 505.68, p = .12; F2 (2, 384) = 4.20, MSe = 5574.40, p < .05), with sizes not 
increasing for the NCBV group in the second phase, unlike the other two groups. The 
analysis also showed a significant by-subjects priming type*phase*group interaction 
(F1 (2, 44) = 3.95, MSe = 687.43, p < .05; F2 (2, 384) = 2.06, MSe = 5574.40, p = .13; 
rest of Fs, F < 1), which was at least partly due to the selective increase of semantic-
associative priming after Crus I TMS. 
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 An apparent disadvantage of this comparison is that the variances for the pilot group (n = 40), would be 
much better-stabilized than those for each TMS group (n = 8). This is the reason why the comparison 
among the three smaller (n = 8) groups was reported separately. 
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3 groups: Two-way ANOVAs: Categorical Priming (phase, group): An 
analysis of categorical priming sizes in particular demonstrated an only marginal by-
items difference among the three groups independently of phase, with the Crus I group 
involving the highest values and the NCBV group the lowest ones (group: F1 (2, 44) = 
1.75, MSe = 705.97, p = .19; F2 (2, 384) = 2.66, MSe = 5502.29, p = .07). No changes in 
categorical priming size were found in the second phase (phase, phase*group: all Fs, F < 
1, or p > .2).  
 
3 groups: Two-way ANOVAs: Associative Priming (phase, group): On the 
contrary, the three groups differed significantly in the changes observed in associative 
priming sizes (phase*group: F1 (2, 44) = 5.28, MSe = 548.98, p < .01; F2 (2, 192) = 
5.07, MSe = 5744.39, p < .01), with the NCBV group involving no increase, and the 
Crus I group demonstrating the strongest one in the second phase. The tendency for 
increase in associative priming across groups in the second phase was only marginal (F1 
(2, 44) = 3.82, MSe = 548.98, p = .06; F2 (1, 96) = 3.39, MSe = 5400.54, p = .07).The 
three groups did not differ significantly in associative priming size across phases (group: 
F1 < 1; F2 (2, 192) = 2.03, MSe = 6349.48, p = .13).  
 
3 groups: Two-way ANOVAs: first phase (priming type, group): Comparing 
priming sizes in the first half showed no significant difference among groups (group: 
both ps, p > .2); there was only a marginal-by subjects group*priming type interaction 
(F1 (2, 44) = 2.64, MSe = 773.14, p = .08; F2 (2, 384) = 1.2, MSe = 5620.05, p > .3), due 
to the large categorical priming sizes of the Crus I group in the first phase. 
 
3 groups: Two-way ANOVAs: second phase (priming type, group): A 
comparison of priming sizes in the second half demonstrated that the NCBV involved 
the lowest sizes of the three groups, marginally by subjects and significantly by items 
(group: F1 (2, 44) = 3.04, MSe = 630.54, p = .06; F2 (2, 384) = 7.21, MSe = 5880.24, p 
< .005). However, as in the analysis of the previous section, the group*priming type 
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interaction in the comparison for the second phase remained elusive (F1 (2, 44) = 
1.8, MSe = 481.67, p = .18; F2 < 1).  
 
3 groups: One-way ANOVAs: Categorical Priming (group): Comparing 
categorical priming size per phase, the groups differed only marginally in the first half 
(group: F1 (2, 44) = 2.71, MSe = 681.04, p = .08; F2 (2, 192) = 2.53, MSe = 669.06, p = 
.09), with the Crus I group showing the highest values; no differences were found in the 
second half (both Fs, F < 1, or p > .2).  
 
3 groups: One-way ANOVAs: Associative Priming (group): On the contrary, 
examining associative priming sizes per phase, the Crus I group showed the largest 
size only in the second half (F1 (2, 44) = 5.57, MSe = 443.16, p < .01; F2 (2, 192) = 
6.21, MSe = 6066.96, p < .005); no differences were found in the first half (both ps, p > 
.3).  
 
The analysis now turns to a comparison of priming sizes between the Crus I 
and pilot groups. 
 
2 groups (Crus I vs pilot): A three-way ANOVA (priming type, phase, 
group) showed an increase in priming size in the second half across priming types 
(phase: F1 (1, 40) = 4.72, MSe = 471.12, p < .05; F2 (1, 192) = 6.39, MSe = 5129.11, p < 
.05), independently of group (phase*group: both Fs, F < 1). It also demonstrated larger 
overall priming sizes for the Crus I group, marginally by subjects and significantly by 
items (group: F1 (1, 40) = 3.41, MSe = 768.32, p = .07; F2 (1, 192) = 6.81, MSe = 
5590.35, p < .05). This difference was not selective for a priming type (priming 
type*group: both Fs, F < 1).  Importantly, though, a strong increase in priming size was 
noted, selectively for associative priming across groups (priming type*phase: F1 (1, 40) 
= 8.79, MSe = 711.66, p < .01; F2 (1, 192) = 4.50, MSe = 5129.11, p < .05; see below), 
which was stronger for the Crus I TMS group, significantly by subjects, and 
marginally by items (priming type*phase*group: F1 (1, 40) = 6.23, MSe = 711.66, p 
< .05; F2 (1, 192) = 2.88, MSe = 5050.74, p = .09).  
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2 groups (Crus I vs pilot): Two-way ANOVAs: Associative Priming (phase, 
group): The two groups did not differ significantly in associative priming size across 
phases (group: F1 (1, 40) = 1.2, MSe = 639.61, p > .25; F2 (1, 96) = 2.83, MSe = 
6439.85, p = .1). There was, however, a strong increase in the second phase across 
groups (phase: F1 (1, 40) = 14.93, MSe = 533.62, p < .001; F2 (1, 96) = 11.84, MSe = 
4681.17, p < .005), which was significantly stronger by subjects for the Crus I group 
(phase*group: F1 (1, 40) = 5.17, MSe = 533.62, p < .05; F2 (1, 96) = 2.36, MSe = 
4828.39, p = .13).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs pilot): Two-way ANOVAs: Categorical Priming (phase, 
group): The Crus I group unexpectedly showed significantly (by items) larger 
categorical priming sizes overall (group: F1 (1, 40) = 2.59, MSe = 714.08, p = .12; F2 (1, 
96) = 4.19, MSe = 4740.85, p < .05), but not selectively for a phase (phase*group: F1 (1, 
40) = 2.68, MSe = 649.16, p = .11; F2 < 1). No change in categorical priming size was 
observed independently of group (phase: both Fs, F < 1).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs pilot): Two-way ANOVAs: First half (priming type, 
group): The priming sizes of the two groups in the first phase did not differ across 
priming types (group: F1 (1, 40) = 1.46, MSe = 649.41, p > .2; F2 (1, 192) = 2.73, MSe = 
4982.45, p = .1), but only in a marginally by subjects selective fashion for categorical 
priming (group*priming type: F1 (1, 40) = 3.70, MSe = 785.43, p = .06; F2 (1, 192) = 1.9, 
MSe = 4982.45, p > .2), with the Crus I group showing the largest sizes (see below).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs pilot): Two-way ANOVAs: Second half (priming type, 
group): Comparing the priming sizes in the second phase between the two groups 
showed that the Crus I group involved significantly larger priming sizes by items across 
priming types (group: F1 (1, 40) = 2.93, MSe = 590.04, p = .1; F2 (1, 192) = 4.49, MSe = 
5658.64, p < .05). This difference was larger for the associative priming type, but 
only marginally by subjects (priming type*group: F1 (1, 40) = 3.17, MSe = 511.58, p 




2 groups (Crus I vs pilot): One-way ANOVAs: Associative Priming (group): 
A comparison of the two groups in associative priming sizes per phase showed larger 
priming size for the Crus I group in the second half (group: F1 (1, 40) = 7.98, MSe = 
419.85, p < .01; F2 (1, 96) = 5.00, MSe = 5841.67, p < .05), and not for the first half 
(group: both Fs, F < 1).  
 
2 groups (Crus I vs pilot): One-way ANOVAs: Categorical Priming (group): 
The marginally significant differences between the two groups in categorical priming 
sizes were due to the unexpectedly larger sizes for the Crus I group in the first, baseline 
phase (group: F1 (1, 40) = 5.27, MSe = 681.47, p < .05; F2 (1, 96) = 4.62, MSe = 
4538.34, p < .05), but not for the second one (group: both Fs, F < 1). 
 
The analysis now turns to a comparison of priming sizes between the NCBV 
and pilot groups. 
 
2 groups (NCBV vs pilot): A three-way ANOVA (priming type, phase, 
group) showed no increase in priming sizes after NCBV TMS (phase*group: F1 (1, 
40) = 4.13, MSe = 481.00, p < .05; F2 (1, 192) = 6.52, MSe = 4455.49, p < .05), no 
matter the priming type (rest of Fs, F < 1). 
 
2 groups (NCBV vs pilot): Two-way ANOVAs: second half (priming type, 
group): The interaction above was due to the significantly (by items) smaller priming 
sizes in the second half for the NCBV TMS group (group: F1 (1, 40) = 2.37, MSe = 
620.08, p = .13; F2 (1, 192) = 4.16, MSe = 4140.53, p < .05), once again across priming 
types (group*priming type: Fs, F < 1).  
 
2 groups (NCBV vs pilot): Two-way ANOVAs: first half (priming type, 
group): These differences were only marginal by items in the first half of the session 
(group: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 192) = 2.95, MSe = 4092.17, p = .09), and were not selective for a 





Plot 7.4: Mean priming sizes for the TMS groups and the pilot group per condition. Error 








Pilot 0.33 26.37 
NCBV TMS 0.34 34.46 
Crus I TMS 23.53 23.52 
Second Half 
Pilot 5.56 24.21 
NCBV TMS -3.95 20.89 




Pilot -4.44 29.40 
NCBV TMS 9.08 17.02 
Crus I TMS -10.78 18.71 
Second Half 
Pilot 5.62 23.43 
NCBV TMS -5.85 26.60 
Crus I TMS 28.04 15.73 




7.4.6.1.1.3. Comparison of Thematic Roles 
 
Given that the associative priming set involved four different ζ-role subsets 
(agent, instrument, location, patient; see sections 7.2.1 and 7.3.1), a number of additional 
analyses were performed to determine whether the TMS effects observed were selective 
for a subset. Comparing the changes in the priming sizes of the four different subsets 
among the NCBV (n = 8), Crus I (n = 8), and No TMS (n = 8) groups, the increase was 
shown to be selectively stronger for the Crus I group, but independent of subset 
(phase*group: F1 (2, 12) = 8.35, MSe = 1550.47, p < .01; F2 (2, 168) = 5.22, MSe = 
6918.89, p < .01; ζ-role*phase*group: both Fs, F < 1). A comparison of different ζ-role 
priming sizes for that group showed an in the second phase independently of subset 
(phase: F1 (1, 4) = 32.54, MSe = 768.92, p < .01; F2 (1, 84) = 10.47, MSe = 7413.31, p < 
.005; phase*ζ-role: F1 < 1; F2 (3, 84) = 1.80, MSe = 7413.31, p = .15). No such increase 
in associative priming size was observed in the NCBV or the pilot group (all Fs, F < 1, 
or p > .25).  
 
Similarly, comparing the priming sizes of the different subtypes among the 
NCBV (n =8), Crus I (n = 8), and pilot groups (n = 40) demonstrated that the increase is 
stronger for the Crus I group, independently of subset (phase*group: F1 (2, 44) = 4.84, 
MSe = 2669.55, p < .05; F2 (2, 168) = 5.99, MSe = 5804.53, p < .005; phase*group*ζ-
role: both Fs, F < 1). 
 
7.4.6.1.2. Lexical Decision Accuracy 
 
As in the previous studies, priming-related effects on accuracy were calculated as 
differences between the arcsine-transformed accuracy rates for unrelated items and those 
for related items per group (section 4.4.11). A three-way ANOVA over these differences 
(group, priming type, phase) showed an only marginal by-subjects increase in the 
difference between unrelated and related items in the second phase (phase: F1 (2, 12) = 
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3.81, MSe = 0.06, p = .08; F2 (1, 192) = 2.62, MSe = 0.22, p = .11), independently of 
priming type and/ or group (rest of Fs, F < 1, or p > .2). 
 
7.4.6.2. Effects on Sensorimotor Performance 
7.4.6.2.1. Lexical Decision Latencies 
 
An analysis of lexical decision latencies for words and nonwords for the three 
groups (n = 8 each) in the first and second half of the session (plot 7.5 and table 7.7 
below) showed a much stronger decrease in RTs for the ‗no TMS‘ group in the second 
phase than for the TMS ones. As above, the analysis will begin with the ANOVAs 
involving all three groups (three-, and, wherever necessary, two- and one-way), and will 
proceed to comparisons between two groups, terminating with the appropriate ANOVAs 
for separate groups. 
 
3 groups: A three-way ANOVA (group, wordness, phase) demonstrated a 
clear difference between words and nonwords across groups, with words being judged as 
such much more quickly than nonwords (wordness: F1 (1, 12) = 24.85, MSe = 967.90, p 
< .001; F2 (1, 492) = 130.56, MSe = 5961.83, p < .001). Unexpectedly, latencies differed 
significantly (by items) among groups (group: F1 < 1; F2 (2, 984) = 32.02, MSe = 
1984.27, p < .001), with the Crus I group involving the longest ones. Latencies also 
became shorter in the second phase across groups (phase: F1 (1, 12) = 27.74, MSe = 
494.49, p < .001; F2 (1, 492) = 169.34, MSe = 2262.25, p < .001). The difference 
between words and nonwords is stronger in the no TMS group, significantly so by items 
(wordness*group: F1 (2, 12) = 1.4, MSe = 967.90, p > .3; F2 (2, 984) = 30.44, MSe = 
1984.83, p < .001). The difference in latencies between words and nonwords changes 
significantly (by items) in the second phase, with words receiving even shorter latencies 
in the second phase than nonwords (wordness*phase: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 492) = 7.28, MSe = 
2262.25, p < .01). However, crucially for the analysis here, latencies for the two TMS 
groups became shorter in the second phase to a much smaller extent than those in 
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the no TMS group, across target types. This is demonstrated by a significant by-
items phase*group interaction (F1 (2, 12) = 1.7, MSe = 494.49, p > .2; F2 (2, 984) = 




3 groups: Two-way ANOVAs: First phase (group, wordness): Given that the 
analysis was between subjects with a small size for each subject group (n = 8), latencies 
were not well-matched in the baseline conditions across groups: the three groups 
differed significantly (by items) in the first phase (group: F1 < 1; F2 (2, 984) = 17.02, 
MSe = 2162.94, p < .001), with the Crus I group showing the longest, and the NCBV 
group the shortest ones. The analysis also showed a main effect of wordness, as above 
(F1 (1, 12) = 20.92, MSe = 555.44, p < .005; F2 (1, 492) = 116.25, MSe = 4392.28, p < 
.001), and a wordness*group interaction (F1 < 1; F2 (2, 984) = 12.29, MSe =  2162.94, p 
< .001), observed also in the second phase, with the no TMS group showing the greatest 
differences in latencies between words and nonwords.  
 
3 groups: Two-way ANOVAs: Second phase (group, wordness): The groups 
differed significantly (by items) in the second phase with larger effect sizes (group: 
F1 < 1; F2 (2, 984) = 28.45, MSe = 1844.79, p < .001), with the no TMS group showing 
the shortest latencies. The analysis also showed the same main effect of wordness (F1 (1, 
12) = 18.01, MSe = 687.22, p < .005; F2 (1, 492) = 74.17, MSe = 3831.81, p < .001), and 
the same wordness*group interaction (F1 (2, 12) = 2.06, MSe = 687.22, p = .17; F2 (2, 
984) = 18.50, MSe = 1844.79,  p < .001), with words receiving shorter latencies than 
nonwords, and even more so for the no TMS group.  
 
                                                          
100
 In view of space restrictions, a number of ANOVAs are not reported. As there was no 
wordness*phase*group interaction, the separate analyses across groups for words and nonwords are not 
reported here. Both these analyses showed the same group*phase interaction as the one above. Similarly, 
because of the fact that groups differed significantly overall in latencies, further comparisons between 
groups separately in each phase are not reported. In all of these comparisons, groups differed both in the 
first and in the second phase. However, the effect size of the difference between any of the two TMS 
groups and the no TMS one is larger in the phase after than in the phase before. For all of these cases, 
the group*phase interaction is reported instead.  
318 
 
The analysis now moves to a comparison of latencies between the NCBV and 
no TMS groups. 
 
2 groups (NCBV vs no TMS): A three-way ANOVA (group, phase, 
wordness) showed once again a significant by-items main effect of group, with the 
NCBV group involving the shortest latencies of the two (group: F1 < 1; F2 (1,492) = 
10.15, MSe = 2017.53, p < .005). As above, words were judged more rapidly than 
nonwords (wordness: F1 (1, 8) = 15.96, MSe = 1252.15, p < .005; F2 (1, 492) = 140.00, 
MSe = 4758.07, p < .001), and even more strongly for the no TMS group. This is shown 
by a significant by-items group*wordness interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 1.4, MSe = 1252.15, p 
> .25; F2 (1, 492) = 46.22, MSe = 2017.53, p < .001). As above, latencies became much 
shorter across groups in the second phase (phase: F1 (1, 8) = 18.06, MSe = 672.53, p < 
.005; F2 (1, 492) = 140.22, MSe = 2400.94, p < .001), and even more so for word 
targets- this is demonstrated by a significant by-items phase*wordness interaction (F1 < 
1; F2 (1, 492) = 4.55, MSe = 2400.94, p < .05). Crucially, though, there was a 
significant by-items group*phase interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 1.3, MSe = 672.53, p > .25; 
F2 (1, 492) = 16.54, MSe = 2099.07, p < .001), with the NCBV group showing a 
much smaller decrease of RTs in the second phase, independently of target type 
(wordness, and rest of ps, p > .2). 
 
The analysis now moves to the comparison of latencies between the no TMS 
and the Crus I group. 
 
2 groups (Crus I vs no TMS): A three-way ANOVA (group, phase, 
wordness) showed that words were also judged more rapidly than nonwords (wordness: 
F1 (1, 8) = 21.63, MSe = 904.72, p < .005; F2 (1, 492) = 139.29, MSe = 4888.01, p < 
.001), and even more strongly for the no TMS group- this was demonstrated by a 
significant by-items group*wordness interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 2.02, MSe = 904.72, p = 
.19; F2 (1, 492) = 44.72, MSe = 1964.62, p < .001). As demonstrated by a significant by-
items phase*wordness interaction (F1 < 1; F2 (1,492) = 3.95, MSe = 2169.37, p < .05), 
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this wordness difference became larger in the second phase, independently of group (no 
group*phase*wordness interaction: F1 (1, 8) = 3.04, MSe = 153.07, p = .12; F2 < 1).As 
above, the no TMS group showed shorter latencies overall (group: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 492) = 
22.70, MSe = 1964.62, p < .001). Crucially, however, there was a clear reduction in 
latencies in the second phase across groups (phase: F1 (1, 8) = 21.56, MSe = 498.84, p < 
.005; F2 (1, 492) = 145.12, MSe = 2169.37, p < .001), which was significantly smaller 
for the Crus I group in the second phase- this is demonstrated by a significant by-
items group*phase interaction (F1 (1, 8) = 2.78, MSe = 498.84, p = .13; F2 (1, 492) = 
22.72, MSe = 1857.33, p < .001).  
 
The analysis now moves to the comparison of latencies between the NCBV and 
the Crus I group. 
 
2 groups (Crus I vs NCBV): Three-way ANOVA (group, phase, wordness): 
However, a comparison between the latencies of the Crus I and those of the NCBV 
group showed that the two groups did not differ on the extent of such decrease of 
RTs in the second phase (group*phase: both Fs, F < 1). The analysis only showed a 
decrease in RTs across the two groups (phase: F1 (1, 8) = 17.06, MSe = 312.09, p < .005; 
F2 (1, 492) = 71.03, MSe = 1977.65, p < .001). The two groups once again differed by 
items in overall latencies, with the NCBV group showing the shortest latencies (group: 
F1 < 1; F2 (1, 492) = 63.70, MSe = 1970.65, p < .001). There was also a clear difference 
in latencies between words and nonwords, with words being judged faster than 
nonwords (wordness: F1 (1, 8) = 13.03, MSe =746.83, p < .01; F2 (1, 492) = 63.39, MSe 
= 4261.86, p < .001). There was also a phase*wordness interaction by items, with the 
decrease in RTs for words being larger than that for nonwords (F1 < 1; F2 (1, 492) = 
6.94, MSe = 1977.65, p < .01; rest of Fs, F < 1). 
 





1 group: no TMS: Two-way ANOVAs (phase, wordness): An analysis of 
latencies for the no TMS group demonstrated a decrease in RTs that is much stronger 
than that shown for the two TMS groups below (phase: F1 (1, 4) = 11.56, MSe = 859.28, 
p < .05; F2 (1, 492) = 132.50, MSe = 2217.53, p < .001). This difference in effect sizes 
grounds the interactions of interest observed above. There was also a main effect of 
wordness (F1 (1, 4) = 11.82, MSe = 1410.04, p < .05; F2 (1, 492) = 170.08, MSe = 
3697.86, p < .001), and a non-significant phase*wordness interaction (F1 (1, 4) = 2.88, 
MSe = 190.95, p = .17; F2 (1, 492) = 1.44, MSe = 2217.53, p > .2), also observed in 
marginal levels for the two TMS groups below. 
 
1 group: Crus I: Two-way ANOVA (phase, wordness): An analysis of 
latencies for the Crus I group showed a decrease in RTs with effect sizes smaller than 
those for the no TMS group above (phase: F1 (1, 4) = 15.96, MSe = 138.41, p < .05; 
F2 (1, 492) = 34.96, MSe = 1809.17, p < .001). As above, there was a preserved main 
effect of wordness (F1 (1, 4) = 11.82, MSe = 399.41, p < .05; F2 (1, 492) = 44.30, MSe = 
3154.77, p < .001), and a marginal by-items phase*wordness interaction (F1 < 1; F2 (1, 
492) = 3.06, MSe = 1809.17, p = .08). 
 
1 group: NCBV: Two-way ANOVA (phase, wordness): The decrease in RTs 
for the NCBV group was marginal by subjects and significant by items, with effect sizes 
smaller than those for the no TMS group (phase: F1 (1, 4) = 6.50, MSe = 485.78, p = 
.06; F2 (1, 492) = 33.99, MSe = 2282.48, p < .001). As above, there was a marginal by-
items wordness effect (F1 (1, 4) = 4.58, MSe = 1094.26, p = .1; F2 (1, 492) = 42.39, MSe 
= 3077.74, p < .001), and a marginal by-items phase*wordness interaction (F1 < 1; F2 (1, 








Target Letter String Phase (Half) Group Mean RTs (ms) SD (ms) 
Word 
First 
NCBV TMS 550.58 76.61 
No TMS 557.01 68.62 
Crus I TMS 565.88 46.25 
Second 
NCBV TMS 534.89 88.75 
No TMS 513.49 49.64 
Crus I TMS 551.76 40.75 
Nonword 
First 
NCBV TMS 579.79 94.12 
No TMS 594.37 47.49 
Crus I TMS 592.68 52.22 
Second 
NCBV TMS 555.74 101.79 
No TMS 567.42 29.13 
Crus I TMS 573.56 46.05 








7.4.6.2.2. Lexical Decision Accuracy 
 
 Accuracy rates were arcsine-transformed and subjected to a three-way ANOVA 
(group, phase, wordness), which only showed a non-significant trend by items for higher 
accuracy rates in the second phase across groups (phase: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 492) = 1.81, MSe 
= 0.06, p = .18). However, no change occurred selectively for a group (phase*group: 




The results above provide evidence for a rather selective enhancement of 
semantic-associative priming after stimulation of the right NCB Crus I. While such 
increase in priming size occurred in the pilot group as well, it was significantly smaller, 
and was not selective for a priming type. On the contrary, priming did not occur after 
NCBV TMS, which can be interpreted as a TMS effect on perceptual or cognitive 
processes. Latencies after TMS of either site were not as short as those in the second 
phase for the no TMS group. 
 
7.4.7.1. Sensorimotor Effects 
 
The decrease in RTs for lexical decisions in the second phase of the session was 
much smaller in the two TMS groups than that in the ‗no TMS‘ group. This finding 
differs from those of the two previous TMS studies (chapters 5 and 6), where it was 
selectively NCBV TMS that showed this effect. Of course, the power of the analysis was 
constrained by the between-subjects design here. One possibility is that of a placebo 
effect after TMS, with slower lexical decisions being made independently of stimulation 
site. Another possibility is that the effect induced by TMS of the Crus I could be 
cognitive in nature, and could involve the disruption of practice-induced facilitation, 
much like in the case of PLCB patients (section 2.4.2). Thus the much smaller decrease 
in RTs observed after TMS would be owed to a perceptual, NCBV TMS-induced effect, 
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and a cognitive, Crus I-induced one. Stronger designs with larger subject pools would be 
required to explore this possibility.  
 
7.4.7.2. Cognitive Effects 
 
The findings here were in line with the predictions made in the second chapter, 
where it was hypothesized that disruption of CB cortical activity would amount to 
disinhibited predictions in semantic processing (section 2.6.2.2), much like in the first 
study, where NCBV TMS enhanced formal-associative priming.  
 
As in the second study (chapter 6), not all interactions reached significance, and 
many of them showed sizeable effects either by subjects or by items. This may suggest 
that not all subjects showed the effect of TMS, plausibly because of the lack of precise 
neuronavigated coordinates and due to the significant depth of the site. It would also 
suggest that priming was affected for only a subset of items, and/or that the number of 
subjects and/or items did not suffice to yield significant effects in all cases. 
 
The fact that priming was only observed in the second phase of the session in the 
preceding pilot experiment might suggest that the large increase in associative priming 
size for the Crus I group is also strategic in nature. Instead of a direct enhancement of 
non-attentional semantic-associative priming then, Crus I TMS might have arguably 
disrupted access to associative memory. In so doing, it might have prompted heavier 
involvement of the strategic component, which is arguably at work here. In order to 
validate this interpretation, tasks showing priming independently of phase should be 
used instead. 
 
 In spite of the marginal differences among groups in semantic-categorical 
priming sizes in baseline conditions, the effect of Crus I TMS was rather selective for 
semantic-associative, and not for semantic-categorical priming. This is in line with the 
findings in Fiez et al. (1992) and Gebhart et al. (2002), where CB patients showed 
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retained semantic representations and were able to select the appropriate verb for a given 
noun from a list, despite their deficits in verb generation (section 2.4.4.5). This suggests 
that the information stored in those PLCB loci is not one of lexical (verb) entries, but 
pertains to the rapid application of event knowledge in the linguistic stream (Ferretti et 
al., 2007). 
 
A question in this study would be whether the mechanism affected is one of 
covert production. In other words, it might be the case that an ‗‗internal generation‘‘ 
component is affected here (Gebhart et al., 2002). From this perspective, such ζ-role-
based priming would be observed because the NCB internally generates a verb-response 
to the noun-stimulus. As in the first study (section 5.4.7.2.2), the results here cannot 
discard this interpretation, and only contrastive stimulation of cortical language 
production-related loci would provide some insight. However, as discussed above, such 
explanations restrict the role of the CB to the production modality, and ignore its 
significance in grounding feedforward control and state estimation par excellence 
(section 2.5). 
 
Another question would be whether a doubly dissociative mapping is tenable 
between formal- and semantic-associative processes on the one hand, and medial and 
lateral NCB circuits on the other. The evidence here does not suffice for such an 
argument. At first blush, the fact that right NCBV TMS did not induce an enhancement 
of associative priming might be taken to suggest that such a dissociation is tenable. 
However, the anatomical co-occurrence of the ‗oculomotor vermis‘ with the 
‗neocerebellar vermis‘ complicates the picture- if anything, this was the take-home 
lesson of the second TMS study, where it might as well have been the case that right 
NCBV TMS impaired perception of the prime words altogether. In fact, the third TMS 
experiment used visual settings similar to the second one (chapter 6): both prime and 
target words appeared in lower-case black letters at the center of a white screen, and 
participants were sat in a brightly lit room. Thus, the absence of a priming enhancement 
after right NCBV TMS in comparison with the performance of the pilot group might 
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have been caused by perceptual disruptions after right NCBV TMS. On the contrary, the 
visual settings of the first experiment did not impose such heavy perceptual demands: 
prime words appeared in lower-case-, while target words appeared in upper-case letters; 
stimuli appeared in green fonts against a black background, and were perceived in a 
dimly lit room; thus perceptual disruptions accompanying NCBV TMS might have been 
alleviated to a considerable extent. Hence, it remains an open question whether NCBV 
TMS in contexts of lower perceptual demands would induce cognitive effects in the 
same direction as those of Crus I TMS. 
 
A further issue would be whether the enhancement observed here in ζ-role-based 
priming should rely on the same neurocognitive mechanisms as other semantic-
associative types. In other words, would the right posterolateral Crus I be specialized 
particularly in action-oriented associations, prototypically involving an agent (e.g. 
‗hunter‘), a patient (e.g. ‗pray‘), an instrument (e.g. ‗gun‘) or a location (e.g. ‗forest‘) on 
the one hand, and an action verb (e.g. ‗hunting‘) on the other? Or would it be as strongly 
involved in any association of semantic representations (e.g. ‗gun‘-‗hunter‘, or ‗forest‘-
‗pray‘)? If there is such a specialization, is it due to semantic properties (representation 
of action), or to grammatical class (verb)? Further experimentation is required to 
contrast these different kinds of priming. 
 
Much like in the first TMS study (chapter 5), the findings here may be seen in 
the light of particular psycholinguistic phenomena, as studied in experimental settings 
(chapter 2), or as shown in historical linguistic data (chapter 3). Such phenomena would 
rely on semantic-associative computations that can be applied in sentence processing. In 
the form of schema-transmission, these computations would be involved in garden paths, 
semantic and verbal illusions, and ζ-role misassignments in processing sentences with 
non-canonical word order (sections 2.4 and 2.6.1). Beyond schema-transmission, 
semantic-associative computations of the NCBKFLP would include processes like the 
pragmatic routines and the metonymic inferential shortcuts discussed in the context of 





The present study assessed semantic-categorical and semantic-associative noun-
to-verb priming before and after TMS of different NCB compartments, and before and 
after no TMS at all. It was shown that stimulation of the right NCB Crus I enhanced 
associative priming rather selectively, and to a significantly larger extent than any 
strategic effect did in the pilot group. The present study thus provided some first TMS 
evidence for the selective involvement of NCB loci in semantic-associative 
computations. These findings were discussed in the light of the NCBKFLP hypothesis 















Conclusion of Volume II: General 
Discussion 
 
The empirical part of the thesis described the first steps taken in the experimental 
exploration of the hypotheses generated in the theoretical part. After presenting the 
reasons why TMS experimentation was preferred over clinical or imaging studies, the 
discussion moved to the particular settings of stimulation used (chapter 4). Three TMS 
studies on the neocerebellum (NCB) were reported, which are, to the best of my 
knowledge, the first CB TMS studies on language processing.   
 
Despite a considerable number of limiting conditions (summarized in section 8.2 
below), the following patterns were observed. The first study (chapter 5) demonstrated a 
selective enhancement of formal-associative priming after NCBV TMS. The second 
study demonstrated a marginally selective decrease in semantic-categorical priming 
sizes after NCBV TMS, along with a clear disruption of the practice-induced reduction 
of reaction times after NCBV TMS in processing repeated pairs of letter strings. Finally, 
the third one showed a quite selective increase in semantic-associative priming sizes 
after TMS of the Crus I, which was larger than that observed in the no TMS group. No 
categorical or associative priming was shown after NCBV TMS. 
 
TMS on the NCB cortex may have introduced neural noise into the Purkinje cell 
layer, the output of which inhibits the deep CB nuclei. This would result in disinhibited 
CB output to the language-related cortical loci. This output may reflect predictions 
generated on the basis of co-occurrence relations between different linguistic events – in 
this case, relations between lexical forms, i.e. ‗formal associates‘, or of lexical semantic 
representations, i.e. ‗semantic associates‘. NCBV TMS may have also compromised 
access to the co-occurrence information on the previously encountered pairs of prime-
target letter strings, which may reside in the Purkinje cell layer of the CB cortex. 
However, the first results of theta-burst stimulation (TBS) of the CB have shown effects 
in the opposite direction from those of 1 Hz CB rTMS (section 4.4.9). Furthermore, it 
328 
 
remains unclear why NCB cTBS enhanced performance in processing associatively 
related word pairs, while it disrupted performance in processing newly acquired letter 
strings that co-occurred ad hoc only in experimental settings. Thus, while further 
research is required to provide a concrete explanation for the direction of the effects, 
their selective nature remains quite suggestive. 
 
The results also demonstrated some tendencies for reduced semantic-categorical 
priming after NCBV TMS. The marginal trend in the first study for semantic-categorical 
priming to drop selectively after NCBV TMS was partly owed to differences in pre-
TMS baseline conditions between the two sites (section 5.4.6.1.1). More clearly, in the 
second study, NCBV TMS impaired semantic-categorical priming in a marginally 
selective fashion (section 6.2.7.2). In the third study, neither semantic-associative nor 
semantic-categorical priming gained significant size in the second half after NCBV 
TMS, unlike sizes for the other groups (section 7.4.7.2). However, the second and third 
tasks involved higher perceptual demands; thus, a perceptual disruption induced by the 
NCBV TMS could have impaired the perception of the prime word altogether. On the 
contrary, the relatively spared formal-associative priming sizes after NCBV TMS in the 
second study could be explained on the grounds of a selective cognitive enhancement 
cancelling out the perceptual disruptions induced (section 6.2.7.2). 
 
Furthermore, the studies here provided some first evidence in the literature for 
disruptions in reading-related processes after NCBV TMS. These were manifested in 
lower accuracy rates after NCBV TMS in the first session of participation in the first 
study (section 5.4.7.1), and in longer latencies after NCBV TMS in the second study 
(section 6.2.7.1). The design of the third study did not allow to dissociate placebo effects 
from actual TMS effects on performance after stimulation (section 7.4.6.2.1). Finally, 
there was a tendency for longer latencies after NCBV TMS selectively for ‗word‘ 
responses in the first experiment. This trend could be accounted for by an additional 
disruption in the control of right-hand index-finger responses after NCBV TMS. As 
discussed in the next chapter, a number of conditions would need to be met to ensure 




Conclusions and Future Directions  
 
‗‗The unconscious comes before the conscious. 
The logic of the historic process comes before 
the subjective logic of the human beings who 
participate in the historic process‘‘ 





The present work developed a synthesis of neocerebellar (NCB) computations 
and psycholinguistic models employing state estimation and feedforward control. In this 
manner, it provided a first, testable answer to the long-standing, yet poorly addressed 
question of the way in which cerebellar (CB) computations participate in language 
processing. In particular, it was argued that the NCB provides a strong candidate for the 
instantiation of associative computations of psycholinguistic mechanisms. These 
associative operations of the cortico-cerebellar circuits may bias, override, or bypass the 
categorical operations of cortico-cortical mechanisms. The NCB can also adaptively 
control the trade-off between cortico-cortical and cortico-cerebellar involvement in the 
processed linguistic signals. A number of findings were discussed in the light of this 
hypothesis, and several mechanisms in sentence processing were shown to rely on 
computations that are fundamentally instantiated by NCB circuitry. The phenomena in 
which such mechanisms are often captured also provide the testing grounds for the 
empirical assessment of the hypothesis here (chapters 1 and 2). 
 
The argument was then taken further, to suggest that NCB computations are 
fundamental for the dialogical routinization phenomena underlying grammaticalization 
operations. In this vein, an attempt was made to bring neurolinguistics, 
psycholinguistics, and historical linguistics in contexts of richer interdisciplinary 
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discourse. Automatization, the domain-general core of grammaticalization processes, 
was shown to heavily rely on CB circuitry. The uniform and multimodal computations 
of the latter enable the exploration of NCB contributions to grammaticalization changes.  
In particular, it was argued that the intra-generational psycholinguistic changes 
underlying grammaticalization operations rely on an adaptive shift from categorical 
towards associative computations in the online processing of constructions in routinized 
dialogical contexts.  To this end, a range of phenomena accompanying 
grammaticalization were shown to involve such associative mechanisms. According to 
the argument, the NCB would be fundamental for both the associative component, and 
for the adaptive trade-off between the cortico-cortical categorical and cortico-cerebellar 
associative component (chapter 3).  
 
Finally, the first steps have been taken here to explore these hypotheses with 
TMS, constructing and running the first psycholinguistic experiments for CB stimulation 
(chapter 4). The first study compared formal-associative with semantic-categorical 
noun-to-noun priming. A selective increase in associative priming was found after TMS 
of the right Neocerebellar Vermis (NCBV), along with evidence for a reading-related 
disruption (chapter 5). The second study, also comparing the two priming sizes in 
Modern Greek, showed evidence for a rather selective impairment in semantic-
categorical priming, along with disruptions in reading-related processes after NCBV 
TMS. This pattern was discussed as a product of the interaction of associative priming 
enhancement and disrupted perception of the prime word, or as a cognitive effect on the 
categorical-associative trade-off. Above all, the study demonstrated a lack of shorter 
latencies after NCBV TMS, selectively in the second session of participation. This was 
discussed as a result of disrupted linguistic associative memory access/ expression 
following NCB TMS (chapter 6). The third study compared semantic-categorical with 
semantic-associative noun-to-verb priming. Whereas priming reached significance only 
in the second phase for a pilot group, semantic-associative priming increased much more 
strongly and rather selectively after stimulation of the right NCB Crus I. This was in line 
with imaging results demonstrating the involvement of this compartment in cognitive 
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aspects of verb generation. On the contrary, (semantic) priming overall for the NCBV 
TMS group showed no increase in priming size in the second half (chapter 7), which 
could be explained as either a perceptual or as a cognitive effect. Despite the weaknesses 
in the results, owed, to a large extent, to the limiting conditions in experimentation here 
(see next section), such selective involvement of NCB circuitry in formal and semantic 
associations provides evidence for the hypothesis that NCB circuits support state 


















8.2. Limiting Conditions and Future Directions 
 
While the absence of further experimental work in the thesis may be frustrating, 
it is apparent that the hypothesis at hand required significant interdisciplinary theoretical 
analysis. NCB language functions had not been approached from an emulative 
perspective in more than a speculative fashion, lacking psycholinguistic insight (section 
2.3.1). Similarly, historical linguists remain, with a few exceptions, far from 
psycholinguistic modelling, and, with even less exceptions, from neurolinguistic 
research (sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3).  
 
 
8.2.1. On TMS Experimentation 
 
Most importantly though, there was no pre-established CB TMS paradigm to 
follow for psycholinguistic experimentation, since the studies reported here were the 
first of their kind (section 4.4). Above all, significant time and resources had to be spent 
in acquiring the necessary expertise for TMS experimentation. The TMS work, 
including the number of experiments, was further constrained by a number of technical 
issues: 
 
The unavailability of a complete and in use TMS apparatus in the University of 
Edinburgh (R. Shillcock, J. Brooks, personal communication, 2008-2010), could only 
minimally be compensated for by relying on personal contacts with TMS laboratories in 
other Institutions, especially the Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience (University College 
London). Other laboratories were often unavailable (e.g. University of Birmingham: 
Prof. Chris Miall, personal communication, 16 April 2009; Neuroscience and Aphasia 
Research Unit, University of Manchester: Dr. Gorana Pobric, personal communication, 
29 April 2009). On its own, a visiting status in TMS laboratories imposed heavy 
constraints on the amount of time that a laboratory room could be booked for, both due 
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to laboratory availability, and due to available resources for longer stays. Limited time 
thus made subject pools of satisfactory sizes unattainable. Furthermore, the heavily 
constraining native-speaker requirement (section 4.4.12), especially for the largely 
international London student population, meant loosening on other restrictions in 
participant recruitment. No registered MRIs were set as a prerequisite for participation, 
the obvious cost being that no neuronavigational software (unavailable in the 
‗Papanikolaou‘ hospital lab) could be used to accurately map brain- to scalp-coordinates 
for the localization of the stimulation area. Moreover, the prominence of the inion, used 
as a landmark here (section 4.4.8), varied greatly across participants, thus compromising 
the reliable calculation of the scalp-based coordinates. This was especially reflected in 
the second and third TMS studies, where interactions often reached significance only by 
items, partly suggesting that only a subset of participants may have been successfully 
stimulated (see also section 8.2.3). Thus, stronger resources, or long-term placement in 
research contexts of organized TMS experimentation, would ensure larger subject pools, 
allowing for accurate, individuated mapping of brain-to-scalp coordinates. 
 
Another limitation which is quite intrinsic to TMS is the complexity in 
interpreting results given the causal nature of the methodology involved (section 4.2). 
This translated into a question as to whether the changes induced should be interpreted 
as due to a secondary, indirect effect on the language-related cortical loci to which the 
stimulated CB areas ultimately project, or due to a direct effect on CB-based language 
processes. For example, the sensorimotor effects induced in Miall and Christensen 
(2004) after CB TMS were seen as products of either a direct CB influence, or an 
indirect influence via the CB effect on motor cortical function. In the present context, 
the nature of the CB computations (section 2.2), the suggestive evidence for CB 
involvement in such tasks (section 2.4), and the absence of any known associations with 
cortical pathology (e.g. section 2.4.4.4) suggest that the TMS neural noise affected direct 
NCB contributions. Stronger evidence could be acquired with the addition of 
experimental conditions including contrastive stimulation of language-related cortical 
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loci and CB ones. In turn, more experimental conditions would require a significant 
number of participants and/or stimuli. 
 
The sensory disruptions following NCBV TMS were also difficult to dissociate 
from any cognitive aspects in the second and third studies (chapters 6 and 7). It could 
not be determined whether the impairments in semantic priming after NCBV TMS were 
partly or even completely owed to disruptions in the perception of the prime word. In 
future work, the use of a perceptually less demanding task or the addition of a control 
task could provide insight into the extent to which lack of priming may be attributed to 
sensory or cognitive effects.  
 
Furthermore, the studies here in fact departed considerably from the majority of 
offline CB TMS experiments with respect to the protocol used, by employing theta-burst 
stimulation (TBS) instead of the more widely tested  for the CB ‗1 Hz rTMS‘ protocol 
(e.g. section 4.4.9). This was because of the strong encouragement in using TBS 
protocols as providing more reliable and sizeable results than 1 Hz TMS protocols (Dr. 
Neil Muggleton; Prof. Vince Walsh, personal communication, 28 January 2009; section 
4.4.5). However, the CB TMS literature has only recently exhibited the first TBS 
findings, and, as already mentioned, they show effects in the opposite direction from 
those after 1 Hz CB TMS (section 4.4.9). It would thus be interesting to examine 
whether effects in opposite directions would be established with 1 Hz TMS in the same 
or similar tasks.  
 
As discussed in chapter 4, TMS experimentation is often based on imaging 
evidence for the association of a particular brain area with task performance, and goes 
on to explore the causal nature of such an association (Paus, 1999; see section  4.2 here). 
Another limiting condition was thus the absence of any MRI coordinates of activated CB 
loci in tasks similar to those used here. Future research could furthermore combine fMRI 
to first localize the particular CB area activated in the particular linguistic task for each 
participant, and then accurately target this area with TMS (e.g. Desmond et al., 2005). 
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Moreover, the NCBV proved to be the most accessible area of stimulation, both 
because of its significantly smaller depth, as compared with other NCB sites, and 
because of its longitudinal compactness. The PLCB site employed in the first and second 
studies (chapters 5 and 6) proved to be a reliable control site. The lack of coils for 
deeper stimulation and the fact that neuronavigational software was not employed also 
meant that the NCBV would be the most accessible site. Furthermore, significantly 
larger amplitudes (45% of maximum machine output instead of the regular 40%) were 
used in compensation for the depth of the target areas, which involved tolerable yet often 
unpleasant sensation during stimulation. For the stimulation of deeper CB areas, the 
double cone coil or the more modern H-coil (e.g. Zangen et al., 2005) would be 
required. Finally, the use of neuronavigational software in combination with smaller 
coils for more precise stimulation would help localize the more elusive hemispheric 
NCB loci (‗PLCB‘, ‗Crus I‘). Overall, such enhanced TMS agenda would necessitate 
resources to support longer stays in TMS labs, or, alternatively, the organization of a 
TMS lab in the University of Edinburgh. 
 
 
8.2.2. On Patient Studies 
 
A clinical paradigm was avoided here, on the grounds of the significant 
methodological problems involved in CB cognitive research (section 4.3). 
Characteristically, while sentence processing tasks had been initially constructed and 
assessed in normative and pilot studies for both native speakers of English and Modern 
Greek, the situation in both Edinburgh and Thessaloniki proved discouraging for such 
patient studies. No sizeable subject pool was available in Hospitals cooperating with the 
University of Edinburgh (Dr. Thomas Bak, personal communication, 2007-2010). As for 
the Hospitals in Thessaloniki, despite the availability of patients with CB pathology, 
several issues made their participation impossible. Patients were constrained to 
constantly visited hospital beds, and could not be taken to a quiet room for testing. The 
336 
 
great heterogeneity in the etiology of their CB impairment (in most cases accompanied 
by supratentorial lesions) would have required significant time-depth with each subject, 
in order for different batteries to be run before the main task. Brain images were also 
largely unavailable. 
 
In the near future, such patient studies could be arranged in close cooperation 
with individual neurologists (Dr. K. Gymnopoulos, St. Luke‘s Hospital, Panorama, 
Thessaloniki, Greece; personal communication, November, 2009)), ensuring accessible 
subjects with available brain images in satisfactory testing conditions. Tasks of sentence 
processing as those initially prepared, with accuracy rates providing the primary 
dependent measure, would be best suited for such populations (section 4.4.10): e.g. 
plausibility or ζ-role judgments (Ferreira & Stacey, 2000; Ferreira, 2003), or simple 




8.2.3. On the Psycholinguistic Tasks Involved 
 
Regarding the experimental findings at hand, an outstanding issue would be the 
direct comparison between formal- and semantic-associative priming, since the studies 
reported here selectively contrasted types of semantic-categorical (superordinate-
subordinate, or coordinate/synonymous-coordinate/synonymous terms) priming with 
either formal-associative priming (chapters 5 and 6), or with semantic-associative 
priming (chapter 7).  While such a comparison was attempted in the first pilot 
experiment of the last study (section 7.2), the semantically unrelated, formally co-
occurring noun-verb pairs (e.g. ‗baby-sitting‘), did not show any priming, and their 





Furthermore, a number of design issues could be raised for the tasks involved. 
The first experiment (chapter 5) used a small number of items (15 unrelated control 
items compared with 15 related target items per phase per priming type). Items were not 
counterbalanced with respect to their relatedness, thus making an items-based analysis 
of priming sizes impossible. The second study was constrained by the unavailability of 
any word generation or similarity judgment norms in Modern Greek (section 6.2.1 for 
discussion). The task of the third TMS study showed priming only in the second phase 
of the session, suggesting that strategic effects might have been at work. The between-
subjects design that was necessarily adopted led to poorly-matched priming sizes in 
baseline conditions. Moreover, while significantly stronger enhancement of priming was 
observed in the group that received stimulation of the lateral site, it would have been 
preferable to show such changes in the absence of a strategic component (section 7.4.7). 
This could conceivably be achieved with shorter SOAs, or might require another 
priming paradigm altogether (e.g. naming latencies). Furthermore, the fact that may 
TMS effects were demonstrated exclusively in either a subjects- or an items-based 
analysis would suggest that the changes pertained to a subset of the stimuli used, that 
only a subset of participants were successfully stimulated in the correct NCB sites, 
and/or that more items and participants were necessary. Future work should employ 
more homogeneous and well-normed stimulus sets, along with more accurate 
stimulation methods (section 8.2.1). 
 
Other paradigms for studying simple word-to-word priming phenomena, such as 
naming latencies tasks, might conceivably induce more robust priming effects, and thus 
support easier-to-capture TMS-induced changes. However, given the technical issues 
involved in recording voice responses, the lexical decision task was preferred as a 
technically less-demanding task (see section 7.1.2). Larger subject pools would once 





Furthermore, employing TMS methodology in this new field of NCB emulation-
based psycholinguistic mechanisms was a significant factor in using a priming 
paradigm. Far-reaching conclusions for sentence processing could still be drawn, with 
the advantage of avoiding any confounds from other constraints and phenomena 
involved in the sentential level of processing (section 4.4.11). Given that the first 
encouraging steps were taken here, future research could expand to other experimental 
hypotheses directly derived from the NCBKFLP model (section 2.6). Above all, it would 
be interesting to involve sentential stimuli in future CB TMS setups (section 2.6.1). 
However, the most appropriate sentence comprehension tasks for TMS investigation 
would be those involving reaction times as a dependent measure, and not accuracy rates 
(section 4.4.10). Encouragingly, Ward‘s (2007) studies on phenomena of shallow 
processing in ζ-role- and plausibility- judgment tasks successfully used reaction times as 
the primary dependent measure, in contrast to those of Ferreira and Stacey (2000) and 
Ferreira (2003). Similarly, studies involving more subtle judgments, such as noise 
discrimination in phoneme restoration experiments (section 2.6.3.1), would conceivably 




8.2.4. Theoretical Directions 
 
In the same vein, a number of theoretical issues deserve further investigation. For 
instance, while emulation is involved in covert imitative linguistic perception and 
comprehension of conspecifics (Pickering & Garrod, 2007), NCB internal models were 
investigated here only in the context of copying the dynamics of the perception-
comprehension process, with no particular reference to the production system. As 
already discussed, though, there is some first evidence supporting the idea of NCB 
involvement in covert imitative perception of conspecifics (section 2.5), with which the 




Furthermore, CB computations are involved in both sensory processing and 
motor output generation (section 2.2). It is by analogy conceivable, then, that the 
NCBKFLP is not exhausted to language comprehension. Cases of speech reduction 
based on predictability, as observed in both psycholinguistic (section 2.6.3.2) and 
historical linguistic contexts (3.6.3.1), provide a suggestive example. Similarly, NCB 
computations in language processing were only explored on the basis of feedforward 
internal models; inverse models were not discussed (section 2.2.1.1), but could offer 
significant insight into further neurocomputational aspects of psycholinguistic 
mechanisms.  
 
Another interesting research venue would be the investigation of the distinct 
computations of other neuroanatomical loci, such as the basal ganglia. The fluent gating 
of competing alternatives for online unification in sentence processing was already seen 
as a promising linguistic function of that structure. This could be important for the 
constant negotiation of categorical status of linguistic items, as reflected in 












8.3. Closing Statement 
 
The work presented here will hopefully bring together a number of very modern 
trends of research in cognitive science, such as those of neocerebellar language 
functions, neocerebellar feedforward control and state estimation in higher cognition, 
and emulation in language processing. The work has also enriched cerebellar TMS 
research, by introducing the first linguistic experiments in the field. Finally, the dynamic 
neurolinguistic components discussed here pave the way for a concrete grounding of the 
cognitive aspects of major phenomena of historical linguistic change. The thesis then, if 
anything, has contributed to laying the foundations for studying neocerebellar ‗dynamics 
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Material for Experiments 1, 2, and 3  
(TMS study 1)  
 
Table A.1 : Unrelated and related pairs for formal-associative and semantic-categorical 
















Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
1 33.59 45.48 5.73 1.64 37.87 32.12 5.58 1.68 
2 32.04 37.96 5.73 1.52 38.55 51.24 5.58 1.73 
































M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1 35.7 38.6 5.6 1.6 37.8 30.4 5.2 1.6 34.1 50.4 5.5 1.5 37.8 30.4 5.2 1.6 
2 33.8 52.1 5.8 1.7 37.1 38 5.2 1.2 31.5 37.2 5.6 1.5 37.1 38.0 5.2 1.2 
Table A.3: Word length and frequency for related and unrelated pairs of the formal-







































M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
1 30.9 34.3 5.83 1.9 37.9 34.5 6.0 1.7 33.7 57.2 5.9 1.5 37.9 34.5 6.0 1.7 
2 31.3 27.6 5.9 1.5 40.0 62.8 5.9 2.0 31.6 32.3 5.7 1.5 40.0 62.8 6.0 2.1 
Table A.4: Word length and frequency for related and unrelated pairs of the semantic-







Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Formal-
Associative 
1 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.55 0.71 
2 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.57 0.89 
Semantic-
Categorical 
1 0.01 0.02 0.42 0.09 0.01 0.03 
2 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.08 0.00 0.01 
Table A.5: Semantic similarity, lexical co-occurrence and word association strength for 
formal-associatively and semantic-categorically related pairs (experiments 1, 2, and 3; 










Analysis of latencies for the first TMS study 
 
Mean latencies per TMS Site (NCBV, PLCB), Priming Type (formal-associative, 
semantic-categorical), TMS Phase (before, after TMS), and Relatedness (unrelated, 
related) are demonstrated in table A.6 and plot A.1 below.  
 
A 4-way ANOVA (site, priming type, phase, relatedness) demonstrated an 
expected acceleration of reaction times in the second phase, marginally by subjects and 
significantly by items (phase: F1 (1, 6) = 5.68, MSe = 3433.56, p = .06; F2 (1, 112) = 
36.98, MSe = 2040.85, p < .001). Latencies for the associative group were much shorter 
than those for the semantic group, significantly so by subjects (priming type: F1 (1, 6) = 
9.68, MSe = 540.69, p < .05; F2 (1, 112) = 2.51, MSe = 13170.10, p = .12). Sadly, also, 
the number of participants here, unlike the larger pilot group in the first study, did not 
suffice to show a relatedness effect across priming types (F1 (1, 6) = 2.81, MSe = 439.89, 
p = .15; F2 (1, 112) = 1.4, MSe = 7478.32, p > .2). The analysis also showed a significant 
by-items site*phase interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 1.4, MSe = 2067.60, p > .3; F2 (1, 112) = 
7.53, MSe = 1593.74, p < .01). This is because the acceleration of responses after PLCB 
TMS is much stronger than that after NCBV TMS (see below). Crucially, though, there 
was also a strong site*priming type*phase*relatedness interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 20.25, 
MSe = 165.55, p < .005; F2 (1, 112) = 9.27, MSe = 1593.74, p < .005; no 
site*phase*relatedness interaction: F1 (1, 6) = 2.25, MSe = 95.55, p = .18; F2 < 1; rest of 
ps, p > .2). This was at least partly owed to the selective decrease of RTs for 
associatively related items after NCBV TMS. 
 
3-way ANOVAs: A comparison of NCBV TMS conditions (priming type, 
phase, relatedness) showed a strong priming type*phase*relatedness interaction (F1 
(1, 6) = 14.31, MSe = 190.95, p < .01; F2 (1, 112) = 7.45, MSe = 1759.54, p < .01; also, 
phase: F1 (1, 6) = 2.2, MSe = 2094.74, p > .2. F2 (1, 112) = 7.75, MSe = 1759.54, p < 
.01; priming type: F1 (1, 6) = 7.88, MSe = 435.94, p < .05, F2 (1, 112) = 1.8, MSe = 
387 
 
5568.44, p > .2; relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 5.17, MSe = 267.31, p = .06; F2 (1, 112) = 1.73, p 
= .19; priming type*relatedness: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 112) = 1.80, MSe = 6262.42, p = .18; rest 
of Fs, F < 1).  
 
3-way ANOVAs: On the contrary, a comparison of RTs for PLCB TMS 
conditions (priming type, phase, relatedness) demonstrated an only marginal by 
subjects phase*priming type*relatedness interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 4.62, MSe = 189.88, p = 
.08; F2 (1, 112) = 1.76, MSe = 1875.05, p = .19; also, phase: F1 (1, 6) = 5.17, MSe = 
3406.42, p = .06; F2 (1, 112) = 39.38, MSe = 1875.05, p < .001). 
 
3-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for the phase after TMS (site, priming 
type, relatedness) showed a clear site*priming type*relatedness interaction (F1 (1, 
6) = 8.13, MSe = 227.18, p < .05; F2 (1, 112) = 8.91, MSe = 1626.22, p < .005; also, 
site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 112) = 2.68, MSe = 1626.22, p = .1; site*relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 8.66, 
MSe = 59.37, p < .05; F2 < 1; priming type*relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 2.78, MSe = 193.50, 
p = .15; F2 (1, 112) = 1.4, MSe = 5363.30, p > .25; rest of ps, p > .2). 
 
3-way ANOVAs: On the contrary, a comparison of RTs for the phase before 
TMS (site, priming type, relatedness) demonstrated an only marginal by subjects 
site*priming type*relatedness interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 4.34, MSe = 348.91, p = .08; F2 (1, 
112) = 1.91, MSe = 1392.44, p = .17; also, site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 112) = 5.68, MSe = 
1392.44, p < .05; relatedness: both Fs, p > .3; rest of Fs, F < 1). 
 
3-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for formal-associative priming 
conditions (site, phase, relatedness) showed a significant site*phase*relatedness 
interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 19.10, MSe = 137.86, p < .01; F2 (1, 56) = 4.51, MSe = 
1825.24, p < .05; also, site: F1 < 1; F2 (1, 56) = 25.64, MSe = 1853.37, p < .001; phase: 
F1 (1, 6) = 6.45, MSe = 1701.35, p < .05; F2 < 1; relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 7.41, MSe = 




3-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for semantic-categorical priming 
conditions (site, phase, relatedness) showed an also significant site*phase*relatedness 
interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 7.58, MSe = 123.24, p < .05; F2 (1, 56) = 4.83, MSe = 1362.24, p 
< .05; also, phase: F1 (1, 6) = 3.90, MSe = 2206.09, p = .1; F2 (1, 56) = 13.05, MSe = 
2228.33, p < .005; site*phase: F1 (1, 6) = 1.4, MSe = 1253.71, p > .25; F2 (1, 56) = 4.61, 
MSe = 1362.24, p < .05; rest of Fs, F < 1). 
 
3-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for related items (site, priming type, 
phase) demonstrated a site*priming type*phase interaction, which was significant 
by items, but marginal by subjects (F1 (1, 6) = 4.31, MSe = 558.44, p = .08; F2 (1, 56) 
= 5.86, MSe = 1311.68, p < .05), and a marginal by items site*phase interaction (F1 < 1; 
F2 (1, 56) = 4.02, MSe = 1311.68, p = .05; also, phase: F1 (1, 6) = 3.62, MSe = 2788.85, 
p = .11; F2 (1, 56) = 24.03, MSe = 1550.05, p < .001; no phase*priming type interaction: 
F1 < 1; F2 (1, 56)  = 1.76, MSe = 1550.05, p = .19; rest of Fs, F < 1). 
  
3-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for unrelated items (site, priming 
type, phase) also demonstrated a site*priming type*phase interaction, significantly by 
subjects, and marginally by items (F1 (1, 6) = 6.75, MSe = 159.83, p < .05; F2 (1, 56) = 
3.78, MSe = 1875.80, p = .06). It also shows a marginal by items site*phase interaction 
(F1 (1, 6) = 2.44, MSe = 805.37, p = .17; F2 (1, 56) = 3.61, MSe = 1875.80, p = .06; also, 
phase: F1 (1, 6) = 8.52, MSe = 1103.12, p < .05; F2 (1, 56) = 15.10, MSe = 2531.64, p < 
.001; rest of ps, p > .25). 
 
Given the above interactions, further analysis concentrated on the conditions 
after NCBV TMS.  
 
2-way ANOVAs: A two-way ANOVA for the conditions after NCBV TMS 
(priming type, relatedness) showed a clear priming type*relatedness interaction (F1 
(1, 6) = 6.03, MSe = 363.22, p < .05; F2 (1, 112) = 5.90, MSe = 3174.45, p < .05; also, 
relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 4.57, MSe = 363.22, p = .08; F2 (1, 112) = 1.4, p > .3).  
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2-way ANOVAs: On the contrary, two-way ANOVAs for conditions before 
NCBV TMS (priming type*relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 3.08, MSe = 239.17, p = .13; F2 < 1), 
before PLCB TMS (priming type*relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 2.49, MSe = 312.72, p = .17; 
F2 < 1), and after PLCB TMS (priming type*relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 3.40, MSe = 57.46, 
p = .12; F2 < 1) showed at most marginal effects.  
 
2-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for the associative priming set in 
NCBV conditions (phase, relatedness) demonstrated a phase*relatedness interaction, 
which was significant by subjects, and marginal by items (F1 (1, 6) = 7.64, MSe = 
271.86, p < .05; F2 (1, 56) = 3.40, p = .07; also, phase: F1 (1, 6) = 2.74, MSe = 1133.92, 
p = .15; F2 (1, 56) = 4.95, MSe = 2046.34, p < .05; relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 6.39, MSe = 
204.19, p < .05; F2 (1, 56) = 3.41, MSe = 3600.41, p = .07).  
 
2-way ANOVAs: A comparison of related items for NCBV conditions 
(priming type, phase) showed a significant by-items and marginal by subjects 
phase*priming type interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 4.35, MSe = 507.14, p = .08; F2 (1, 56) = 
8.01, MSe = 1221.84, p < .01; phase: F1 (1, 6) = 1.80, MSe = 1516.93, p > .2; F2 (1, 56) 
= 5.93, MSe = 1221.84, p < .05). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: A comparison of unrelated items after TMS (site, priming 
type) showed an unexpected site*priming type interaction, significant by items, and 
marginal by subjects (F1 (1, 6) = 5.48, MSe = 68.64, p = .06; F2 (1, 56) = 4.36, MSe = 
1795.01, p < .05; site: F1 (1, 6) = 1.4, MSe = 683.33, p > .3; F2 (1, 56) = 2.12, MSe = 
1795.01, p = .15). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for related items after TMS (site, 
priming type) demonstrated a significant by-items site*priming type interaction (F1 
(1, 6) = 3.31, MSe = 518.29, p = .12; F2 (1, 56) = 4.58, MSe = 1457.43, p < .05; no 




2-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for associative priming after TMS 
(site, relatedness) showed a site*relatedness interaction (F1 (1, 6) = 21.19, MSe = 
101.690, p < .005; F2 (1, 56) = 5.37, MSe = 1865.18, p < .05; relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 
3.90, MSe = 318.46, p = .1; F2 (1, 56) = 3.08, MSe = 2879.84, p = .09; site: F < 1, or p > 
.2). 
 
2-way ANOVAs: A comparison of RTs for the semantic-categorical set after 
TMS (site, relatedness) shows no effect of site (site: both Fs, F < 1, or p > .2) or of 
relatedness (both Fs, F < 1), but only a site*relatedness interaction, which was only 
marginal by items (F1 (1, 6) = 1.2, MSe = 184.86, p > .3; F2 (1, 56) = 3.54, MSe = 
1387.26, p = .07). 
 
1-way ANOVAs: formal-associative priming (relatedness): The above 
interactions were owed to strong associative priming occurring after NCBV TMS 
(relatedness: F1 (1, 6) = 10.34, MSe = 322.61, p < .05; F2 (1, 56) = 5.43, MSe = 
3476.05, p < .05). On the contrary, for the other conditions, the number of participants 
did not suffice to show priming (Associative priming before NCBV TMS: both Fs, F 
< 1; Associative priming before PLCB TMS: both ps, p > .2; Associative priming 
after PLCB TMS: both Fs, F < 1). 
 
1-way ANOVAs: semantic-categorical priming (relatedness): Similarly, the 
number of participants did not suffice to show semantic-categorical priming for any 
condition (after NCBV TMS: both Fs, F < 1, or p > .25; before NCBV TMS: a 
nonsignificant trend by subjects for priming: F1 (1, 6) = 3.06, MSe = 327.86, p = .13; F2 
(1, 56) = 1.53, MSe = 1947.81, p > .2; before PLCB TMS: both Fs < 1; after PLCB 







            
Plot A.1: Mean latencies for unrelated and related pairs for TMS sessions per condition. 
Error bars represent + 1 SEM (experiment 3). 
TMS Site Priming Type TMS Phase Relatedness Mean RTs (ms) SD (ms) 
NCBV Formal-Associative Before TMS Unrelated 524.23 47.11 
Related 527.57 45.78 
After TMS Unrelated 520.62 52.80 
Related 491.74 50.64 
Semantic-Categorical Before TMS Unrelated 544.94 39.98 
Related 529.10 43.80 
After TMS Unrelated 522.26 45.72 
Related 526.47 68.60 
PLCB Formal-Associative Before TMS Unrelated 545.92 66.23 
Related 530.77 69.60 
After TMS Unrelated 503.72 61.56 
Related 507.66 62.52 
Semantic-Categorical Before TMS Unrelated 547.50 67.19 
Related 552.08 90.50 
After TMS Unrelated 519.06 53.24 
Related 513.12 55.40 




Analysis of accuracy rates for the first TMS study 
 
a) Dependent measure: Priming size (difference between arcsine-transformed 
mean accuracy rates for unrelated pairs and related ones per condition; see 
section 5.4.6.1.2). 
 
Mean accuracy rates are shown below in plot A.2 and table A.7 for convenience.  
 
In a three-way ANOVA (site, priming type, phase), no effects reached 
significance without including a between-subjects variable of session number (all ps, p > 
.2). This is conceivably because of basic learning effects on the presented words 
occurring in the second session.  
 
4-way ANOVA (site, priming type, phase, session number): An analysis 
including ‗session number‘ as a between-subjects variable showed that accuracy 
differences for the formal-associative set were larger than those for the semantic-
categorical set (priming type: F (1, 4) = 5.35, MSe = 0.00, p = .08). Interestingly, there 
was a significant priming type*phase*session number interaction (F (1, 4) = 8.31, MSe 
= 0.00, p < .05). A number of other interactions did not approach significance (priming 
type*site*phase*session number: F (1, 4) = 2.76, MSe = 0.00, p = .17; priming 
type*site*session number: F (1, 4) = 3.20, MSe = 0.00, p = .15; site*session number: F 
(1, 4) = 3.80, MSe = 0.00, p = .12; rest of ps, p > .2). Subsequent analysis demonstrated 
that the priming type*phase*session number interaction was due to a rather selective 
decrease of accuracy differences for formal-associative priming in the first session after 
TMS, independently of site, with only marginally stronger effects demonstrated after 
NCBV TMS.  
 
Thus, in order to assess whether that change represents a TMS effect or not, a 
comparison was performed between the TMS group (n = 8) and the pilot group that 
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completed two sessions with no TMS (n = 8; section 5.3), collapsing on different site 
conditions (four-way ANOVA: group, priming type, phase, session number). The 
comparison demonstrated no priming type*group*phase interaction (F < 1). It only 
showed a significant difference in priming types across conditions, with larger accuracy 
differences for formal-associative priming than semantic-categorical priming (priming 
type: F (1, 12) = 5.00, MSe = 0.05, p < .05). The analysis also showed a marginal 
phase*group interaction across priming types (F (1, 12) = 4.06, MSe = 0.00, p = .07), 
and a marginal session number*priming type*group interaction across phases (F (1, 12) 
= 3.78, MSe = 0.00, p = .08). The rest of the interactions did not approach significance 
(session number*group: F (1, 12) = 2.21, MSe = 0.00, p = .16; session number*priming 
type*phase: F (1, 12) = 2.91, MSe = 0.00, p = .11; rest of Fs, F < 1). Another such 
comparison was attempted, this time between the subjects that underwent NCBV TMS 
in their first session (n = 4) and the no TMS pilot group (n = 8); however, no differences 
were shown whatsoever (all ps, p > .2). 
 
b) Dependent measure: arcsine-transformed accuracy rates 
A four-way ANOVA (priming type, TMS site, TMS phase, relatedness) was also 
performed on raw, arc-sine transformed accuracy rates. The analysis only showed a 
significant by-subjects and marginal by items decrease in accuracy rates in the second 
phase (phase: F1 (1, 6) = 10.64, MSe = 0.00, p < .05; F2 (1, 112) = 3.05, MSe = 0.05, p = 
.08); it also showed an unexpectedly significant by items difference in accuracy rates 
between the two sites overall, with higher accuracy rates for PLCB conditions (site: F1 
(1, 6) = 1.80, MSe = 0.00, p > .25; F2 (1, 112) = 4.09, MSe = 0.05, p < .05; no 
phase*relatedness interaction: F1 (1, 6) = 2.20, MSe = 0.00, p > .2; F2 (1, 112) = 2.37, 
MSe = 0.05, p = .13; no site*phase*priming type interaction: F1 (1, 6) = 3.84, MSe = 













Unrelated 97 4 
Related 98 3 
After TMS 
Unrelated 95 5 
Related 94 7 
PLCB 
Before TMS 
Unrelated 97 5 
Related 100 0 
After TMS 
Unrelated 96 5 





Unrelated 97 4 
Related 96 5 
After TMS 
Unrelated 97 5 
Related 95 7 
PLCB 
Before TMS 
Unrelated 98 3 
Related 99 2 
After TMS 
Unrelated 97 4 
Related 97 4 
Table A.7 : Mean accuracy rates for unrelated and related pairs for TMS sessions per 
condition (experiment 3). 
 
            
Plot A.2 : Mean accuracy rates for unrelated and related pairs for TMS sessions per 
condition. Error bars represent + 1 SEM (experiment 3). 
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Appendix B  
Material for Experiment 4  






















Table B.2 : Semantic-categorically related pairs (experiment 4). 
 
Measures Priming Set Mean SD 
Prime word HNC frequency (words/million) Associative 7.08 9.89 
Coordinate 7.43 10.30 
Total 7.25 10.08 
Prime word length (number of letters) Associative 6.02 1.52 
Coordinate 6.00 1.43 
Total 6.01 1.47 
Target word HNC frequency (words/million) Associative 7.48 10.27 
Coordinate 7.11 9.41 
Total 7.30 9.82 
Target word length (number of letters) Associative 6.03 1.32 
Coordinate 6.01 1.28 
Total 6.02 1.30 










Measures List Mean SD 
Prime word HNC frequency (words/million) 1 7.16 9.74 
2 7.34 10.44 
Total 7.25 10.08 
Prime word length (number of letters) 1 5.97 1.47 
2 6.05 1.48 
Total 6.01 1.47 
Target word length (number of letters) 1 5.95 1.42 
2 6.09 1.16 
Total 6.02 1.30 
Target word HNC frequency (words/million) 1 7.26 9.77 
2 7.34 9.93 
Total 7.30 9.82 
Table B.4: Word measures (experiment 4). 
 
Measures List Mean SD 
Prime word HNC frequency (words/million) 1 7.51 7.91 
2 7.52 6.62 
Total 7.52 7.22 
Prime word length (number of letters) 1 5.56 1.69 
2 5.88 1.33 
Total 5.72 1.51 
Target word length (number of letters) 1 5.84 1.03 
2 6.04 1.46 
Total 5.94 1.25 




























Test Items for experiment 5  




Table C.1 : Semantic-categorically, formal-associatively, and semantic-associatively 




Measures Mean SD 
Prime word BNC frequency (words/million) 36.05 35.18 
Prime word length (letters) 6.78 2.30 
Target word BNC frequency (words/million) 19.64 25.30 
Target word length (letters) 8.18 1.30 
Semantic Similarity (Wordnet::Similarity Ratings) 0.74 0.25 
BNC phrase frequency (phrases/million)  0.00 0.00 
Table C.2: Measures for semantic-categorically related items (experiment 5). 
Measures Mean SD 
Prime word BNC Frequency (words/million) 25.52 34.39 
Prime word length (letters) 6.48 1.87 
Target word BNC frequency (words/million) 15.65 17.16 
Target word length (letters) 8.30 1.62 
Semantic Similarity (Wordnet::Similarity ratings) 0.12 0.06 
BNC phrase frequency (phrases/million) 0.05 0.20 
Table C.3: Measures for semantic-associatively related items (experiment 5). 
Measure Mean SD 
Prime word BNC frequency (words/million) 65.18 58.03 
Prime word length (letters) 5.04 1.34 
Target word BNC frequency (words/million) 30.28 37.70 
Target word length (letters) 7.48 1.04 
Semantic Similarity (Wordnet::Similarity ratings) 0.18 0.07 
BNC phrase frequency (phrases/million) 0.35 0.46 
Table C.4: Measures for formal-associatively related items (experiment 5). 
 
Measures List Mean SD 
Prime Word BNC Frequency (words/million) A 30.67 48.26 
B 30.21 22.34 
Total 30.44 37.52 
Prime Word Length (number of letters) A 5.84 1.78 
B 5.86 2.19 
Total 5.85 1.99 
Target Word Length (number of letters) A 8.26 1.49 
B 8.22 1.49 
Total 8.24 1.49 























Material for Experiments 6 and 7  







Table D.1 : Semantic-categorically and semantic-associatively related pairs (experiments 






















Measures Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Prime word BNC frequency (words/million) 0.61 234.12 39.89 41.69 
Prime word length (letters) 3.00 12.00 6.97 2.25 
Target word BNC frequency (words/million) 0.60 240.57 26.05 37.16 
Target word length (letters) 6.00 12.00 8.12 1.36 
Semantic Similarity (Wordnet::Similarity Ratings) 0.50 1.00 0.73 0.25 
BNC phrase frequency (phrases/million) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Table D.2: Semantic-categorically related items (experiments 6 and 7). 
 
Measures Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Prime word BNC frequency (words/million) 0.67 209.64 27.58 39.70 
Prime word length (letters) 3.00 11.00 6.61 1.92 
Target word BNC frequency (words/million) 0.66 119.57 19.41 22.81 
Target word length (letters) 6.00 12.00 8.15 1.51 
Semantic Similarity (Wordnet::Similarity Ratings) 0.05 0.33 0.12 0.06 
BNC phrase frequency (phrases/million) 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Table D.3: Semantic-associatively related items (experiments 6 and 7). 
 
Measures Pair Mean SD 
Prime word length (number of letters) Word-Nonword 6.66 1.43 
Word-Word 6.78 1.92 
Total 6.72 1.69 
Target word length (number of letters) Word-Nonword 8.19 1.34 
Word-Word 8.14 1.53 
Total 8.17 1.44 
Prime word BNC frequency (words/million) Word-Nonword 32.70 39.93 
Word-Word 33.62 40.83 
Total 33.16 40.34 





Appendix E  
TMS Safety Declaration Form  
























TMS Safety Declaration Form  
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